Judgment : BHATTACHARYA, ACJ. (1.) This appeal is at the instance of Life Insurance Corporation of India and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29th October, 1992 passed by the Assistant District Judge, Eighth Court, Alipur, in Title Suit No.88 of 1982, by which the learned Trial Judge decreed the suit in part in preliminary form against the defendant Nos.2 to 6 with costs by awarding a sum of Rs. 74,851.25 paisa. The defendant Nos.2 to 6 were found jointly and severally liable to pay the said amount and at the same time, it was further declared that the suit property mentioned in Schedule A to the plaint should be kept as security against decretal amount. The defendants were asked to make payment within three months from the date of the decree with the stipulation that in default, the plaintiff would be at liberty to sell out the mortgaged property and if the sale proceeds did not satisfy the decretal amount, the plaintiff would be at liberty to proceed against the defendant Nos. 2 to 6 personally. The plaintiffs prayer for pendente lite and future interest was, however, rejected. (2.) Being dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the present appeal. (3.) The only grievance of the appellant in this appeal is that the learned Trial Judge erred in law in refusing the plaintiffs prayer for pendente lite and future interest. (4.) None appears on behalf of the respondent in spite of service. (5.) There is no dispute that one Smt. Renuka Sarkar, wife of the defendant No. 1 and the mother of the defendant Nos.2 to 6 took loan of Rs.35,000/-from the Life Insurance Corporation of India with an agreement to pay back the loan with interest as stipulated in the agreement by mortgaging the house property, for the construction of which, the loan was taken. (6.) The said Renuka Sarkar after taking such loan, but before the repayment of the amount, died. The suit was, accordingly, filed against her heirs and legal representatives. The defendant No. 1, the husband having died during the pendency of the suit, the same proceeded against the defendant Nos. 2 to 6. (6.) The said Renuka Sarkar after taking such loan, but before the repayment of the amount, died. The suit was, accordingly, filed against her heirs and legal representatives. The defendant No. 1, the husband having died during the pendency of the suit, the same proceeded against the defendant Nos. 2 to 6. (7.) The reason for not granting any interest assigned by the learned Trial Judge is that it was the duty of the plaintiff to communicate to the defendants immediately after the death of their predecessor that the loan amount remained unpaid. According to the learned Trial Judge without intimating the heirs of the mortgagor about the non-payment of the loan-amount, the plaintiff should not be allowed to enjoy pendente lite interest and the future Interest, and thus, according to the learned Trial Judge it would cause injustice to the defendants if interest pendente lite and future interest were imposed upon. (8.) After hearing Mr. Bhattacherji, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant and after going through the admitted fact that the loan Was taken by executing a deed of mortgage which stipulated specific clause of payment of interest at the rate fixed therein till realisation, and that the loan remained unpaid, we are unable to approve the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Judge for absolving the defendants of the liability to pay pendente lite and future interest. (9.) Since this appeal arises out of a suit for sale of mortgage property, the Court while considering the question of imposition of interest should be guided not by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure but by the provisions contained in Order 34 Rule 11 thereof. (9.) Since this appeal arises out of a suit for sale of mortgage property, the Court while considering the question of imposition of interest should be guided not by the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure but by the provisions contained in Order 34 Rule 11 thereof. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in Order 34 Rule 11 of the Code providing mode of passing direction for payment of interest pendente lite and future interest In this type of a suit which is quoted below: "Payment of Interest.- In any decree passed in a suit for foreclosure, sale or redemption, where interest is legally recoverable, the Court may order payment of interest to the mortgagee as follows, namely :-(a) interest up to the date on or before which payment of the amount found or declared due is under the preliminary decree to be made by the mortgagor or other person redeeming the mortgage- (i) on the principal amount found or declared due on the mortgage-at the rate payable on the principal, or, where no such rate is fixed, at such rate as the Court deems reasonable, (ii) 1 [***], and (iii) on the amount adjudged due to the mortgagee for costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by the mortgagee in respect of the mortgage-security up to the date of the preliminary decree and added to the mortgage- money,-at the rate agreed between the parties, or, failing such rate, at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum as the Court deems reasonable; and (b) subsequent interest up to the date of realisation or actual payment on the aggregate of the principal sums specified in Clause (a) as calculated in accordance with that clause at such rate as the Court deems reasonable." (10.) The scope of the aforesaid provisions have been interpreted by the Apex Court in a recent case of N.M. Veerappa v. Canara Bank reported in AIR 1998 SC 1101 : 1998 WBLR (SC) 109 in the following way : "From the aforesaid rulings the following principles can be summarised, (a) Before 1929, it was obligatory for the Court to direct the contract rate of interest to be paid by the mortgagor on the sum adjudged in the preliminary decree, from the date of suit till the date fixed for payment as per Order 34, Rule 2(c)(1) or Order 34, Rule 4(1) or Order 34, Rule 7(c)(1), respectively in suits for foreclosure, sale or redemption, (b) But after the 1929 Amendment, because of the words used in the main part of Order 34, Rule 11, namely that "the Court may order payment of interest" it is no longer obligatory on the part of the Court while passing preliminary decree to require payment at the contract rate of interest from date of suit till the date fixed in the preliminary decree for payment of the amount. It has been so held in Jaigobinds case by the Privy Council, AIR 1940 FC 20 and by this Court in S.P. Majoos case (1969) 3 SCR 33 : ( AIR 1969 SC 600 ) that the new provision gives a certain amount of discretion to the Court so far as pendente lite interest is concerned and subsequent interest is concerned. (c) It is no longer obligatory to award the contractual rate after date of suit and up-to-date fixed for redemption as above-stated even though there was no question of the contractual rate being penal, excessive or substantially unfair within the meaning of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918. (d) Even if the Court otherwise wants to award interest, the position after the 1929 and 1956 Amendments is that the Court has discretion to fix interest from date of suit under Order 34, Rule 11(a)(i) up-to-date fixed for payment in the preliminary decree, the same rate agreed in the contract, or, if no rate is so fixed, such rate as the Court deems reasonable-on the principal amount found or declared due on the mortgager is concerned. (e) The Court has also power to award from date of suit under Order 34. Rule 11 (a)(iii) a rate of interest on costs, charges and expenses as per the contract rate or failing such rate, at a rate not exceeding 6%. This is the position of the discretionary power of the Court, from date of suit up-to-date fixed in the preliminary decree as the date for payment. (f) Again under Order 34, Rule 11(b) so far as the period after the date fixed for payment is concerned, the Court, even if it wants to exercise its discretion to award interest up-to-date of realisation or actual payment, on the aggregate sums specified in Clause (a) of Order 34, Rule 11, could award interest at such rate as it deemed reasonable." (11.) Regarding the exercise of discretion in the matter of award of interest, we should bear in mind that the award of interest cannot be viewed as an imposition of penal measure but in fact is a normal accretion on capital. In this connection, we cannot help mentioning the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Alok Shanker Pandey v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1198 : (2007)3 WBLR (SC) 9 : ""It may be mentioned that there is misconception about interest. Interest is not a penalty or punishment at all, but it is the normal accretion on capital. For example if A had to pay B a certain amount, say 10 years ago, but he offers that amount to him today, then he has pocketed the interest on the principal amount. Had A paid that amount to B10 years ago, B would have invested that amount somewhere and earned interest thereon, but instead of that A has kept that amount with himself and earned interest on it for this period. Hence equity demands that A should not only pay back the principal amount but also the interest thereon to B." (Emphasis supplied by us) (12.) Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, we find that the specific rats of interest was stipulated in the deed of mortgage between the parties in case Of default and according to such agreement, interest at the rate of interest 12.5% compounding half yearly should be payable as pendente lite interest from the date of institution of the suit viz. 16th August, 1982 till the date of decree viz. 29th October, 1992 amounting to Rs. 1,81,925/- and an additional Interest @ 2.5% on suit value for the aforesaid period as provided in the mortgage comes to Rs. 19,024/- and thus, a total amount of pendente lite interest should come to Rs. 2,00,949/-. The learned Trial Judge should have awarded that amount in addition to the decretal amount of Rs. 74,851.25 paisa. In addition to the aforesaid amount, the plaintiff should also be entitled to get future interest at the rate of existing Bank rate for the time being in force, namely, 12% per annum from October, 1992 till December, 1999 and @ 8% per annum from January, 2000 till actual payment. The suit was filed in the year 1982 and the defendants admitted the claim of the plaintiff. It appears that the defendant No. 2 stood as a guarantor to the loan in addition to the mortgage executed by his mother. The suit was filed in the year 1982 and the defendants admitted the claim of the plaintiff. It appears that the defendant No. 2 stood as a guarantor to the loan in addition to the mortgage executed by his mother. Therefore, the knowledge of the loan by the defendants and the fact that the same was not paid was known to the defendant No.2 is beyond any doubt. The suit took 10 years to reach the stage of preliminary decree. Thus, it was a case where the Trial Judge erred in law in exercising discretion in favour of the defendants by allowing the defendants to take advantage of their own default for the no fault on the part of the plaintiff. The discretion exercised by the learned Trial Judge is opposed to the principles laid down by the Apex Court as indicated above. (13.) We, accordingly modify the judgment and decree by awarding a further amount of Rs. 2,00,949/- as pendent lite interest with further interest @ 12% per annum on the unpaid amount from the date of the preliminary decree dated 29th October, 1992 till 31 st December, 1999 and @ 8% per annum from 1st January, 2000 till actual payment of the full amount. (14.) The Appeal is, thus, allowed to the extent indicate above. (15.) In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.