Judgment :- (1.) This frivolous contempt petitioner has embarrassed Court more than the alleged contemnors. It has now become a practice in this Court for the contempt jurisdiction to be unnecessarily invoked or toyed with and used as an instrument of oppression. There could be no better example of such misadventure than the present proceedings. (2.) In W.P. No. 1799 of 2008 an order was made on January 20, 2009 permitting the writ petitioners to carry out certain amendments. The order recorded that it would be open to the writ petitioners to apply to the appropriate police authority for posting a picket at the expense of the writ petitioners in accordance with the Police Regulations of Calcutta, 1968. The order further provided that it would be open to the police authorities to consider such application and take appropriate steps. There was, as is clear from the order dated January 20, 2009, no positive direction for the police authorities to do anything. (3.) A subsequent order was made on February 2, 2009 by which the petition was disposed of. The operative part of the order of February 2, 2009 recorded that it would be open to the writ petitioners to seek police assistance for the purpose of repairing the boundary wall between the passage at premises No.4, N.S. Road and the lane to the north of premises No.8 Lyons Range. The order directed the Officer-in-Charge of Hare Street Police Station to render all assistance to ensure that there was no breach of peace or nothing untoward at the time of repairing the wall. (4.) The contempt petition has been instituted against the Commissioner of Police, the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station and the State through the Secretary in the Department of Home. As is the requirement under the rules in this Court, the acts of contempt have been set out in the cause title. (4.) The contempt petition has been instituted against the Commissioner of Police, the Deputy Commissioner, the Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station and the State through the Secretary in the Department of Home. As is the requirement under the rules in this Court, the acts of contempt have been set out in the cause title. The petitioners claim that the respondents have acted in derogation of the orders passed by Court by doing the following: - "(i) By refusing to take steps to render all assistance to ensure there is no breach of peace or anything untoward at the time of repairing the wall at the premises No.4, Netaji Subhas Road, Kolkata subject to defraying the usual expenses for expenses for rendering such assistance as the Contemnors; (ii) By willfully and dishonestly setting up false and flimsy excuses with the view to frustrate and violate the solemn directions given in the aforesaid order; (iii) By deliberately acting and/or taking steps contrary to the directions given in the aforesaid order; (iv) By other wrongful and illegal acts and conducts in violation of the said solemn order." (5.) Apropos the first charge levelled against the respondents, there is no allegation in the petition - at least the petitioners have not been able to show any-that there was any breach of peace at the time that the petitioners attempted to repair the relevant boundary wall. In the absence of even an allegation that there was breach of peace, the first ground that has been carried to this Court could not have been made a basis for invoking this extraordinary contempt jurisdiction. (6.) In the second ground the petitioners say that the alleged contemnors had willfully and dishonestly set up false and flimsy excuses with the view to frustrate and violate the solemn directions. The ground is symptomatic of the vague allegations that have come to pass in this Court on which petitions are founded and reams of paper are wasted. Such ground was undeserving of clambering on to these green papers and should have been left out altogether. The third and fourth grounds fare no better. However, the second/third and fourth grounds bring to the fore a malaise that has come to stay. Such ground was undeserving of clambering on to these green papers and should have been left out altogether. The third and fourth grounds fare no better. However, the second/third and fourth grounds bring to the fore a malaise that has come to stay. An order of limited effect or import is obtained; the order is sought to be given a twist and interpreted in a particular manner that suits the petitioner; notices are issued for compliance with the petitioners demands-which may or may not have been intended by the order cited; and, a contempt notice is slapped on the alleged contemnors to induce them to succumb to pressure. Such undesirable practice has to be uprooted without any ado or delay. (7.) As has been noticed above, there is no positive direction on the police authorities or the respondents to the writ petition by the first order of January 20, 2009. The second order merely required assistance to be rendered by the Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station to ensure that there was no breach of peace at the time that the boundary wall was being repaired. At the very highest, it was only the Officer-in-Charge of the Hare Street Police Station who could have been guilty of acting in derogation of the order if a breach of peace had occurred and no assistance had been rendered by such Police Officer. (8.) It was unfortunate and unfair on the part of the petitioners to rope in the Commissioner of Police when the Commissioner had no obligation to discharge under the order. (9.) It is also a matter of concern that this petition progressed to the stage where copies of the petition were required to be served on the alleged contemnors. Strictly speaking, upon a breach of an order being alleged and the Court being petitioned, a Rule may issue on the Courts prima facie satisfaction of the charge. In response to a Rule, the alleged contemnors are required to present themselves before Court and, usually, their written response is sought on the substance of the charge. A Rule may amount to a slur and cause inconvenience to an alleged contemnor to be present in Court on the day when the rule is made returnable. A practice has now developed where a hearing is often given to the alleged contemnors before issuing the Rule. A Rule may amount to a slur and cause inconvenience to an alleged contemnor to be present in Court on the day when the rule is made returnable. A practice has now developed where a hearing is often given to the alleged contemnors before issuing the Rule. As a prelude to the pre-Rule hearing, copies of the contempt petition are directed to be served on the alleged contemnors. This has the twin purpose of the alleged contemnors being afforded an opportunity to correct themselves if an order has not been complied with; and, providing the alleged contemnors a platform to justify the acts and conduct complained of without directing them to be in attendance before Court. (10.) Yet, there is a duty on the Court to ensure that an unworthy petition does not slip through even to the stage where copies of the petition reach the alleged contemnors. Yes, Courts are today docket-fatigued and burdened with more work than may be possible to deliver. But that is merely an excuse. A frivolous contempt petition as the present one should have been scotched at the outset and should never have survived the initial scrutiny. It would again be an excuse to suggest that Courts sometimes rely on the submission made at the Bar and receive a petition. (11.) Contempt of Court is understood in common law as an act or omission calculated to interfere with the due administration of justice. A Civil Contempt, of the kind that is alleged here, would arise upon the disobedience of an order made in a civil cause. Contempt of Court is disobedience of the Court, by acting in opposition to the authority and dignity thereof. It signifies a wilful disregard of the Courts order such that it tends to bring the authority of the Court and the administration of law into disrepute. The constitutional scheme of things recognised in this country provides for a certain order and it is in furtherance of the preservation of such order that the power of dealing with contempt is vested in the judiciary. (12.) The jurisdiction in contempt is not to massage any judicial ego; it is far less a tool for a litigant to settle scores. The principal objective is to uphold the primacy of a constitutional order and the rule of law. (12.) The jurisdiction in contempt is not to massage any judicial ego; it is far less a tool for a litigant to settle scores. The principal objective is to uphold the primacy of a constitutional order and the rule of law. High authorities speak of diffidence and temperance in the invocation of this jurisdiction and the sparing use of the punitive measures available. The non-compliance of an order has to be wilful and deliberate and not mere accidental or unintentional. A contumacious act involves an element of defiance. But to begin with there must first be a violation before an assessment is called for as to whether it was wilful or deliberate defiance. (13.) As much as the authority of the judiciary is rooted to the Constitution, it derives its real power not from the sentences it imposes or the orders of injunction that it issues, but from acceptability-the trust, faith and confidence of citizens. The very essence of the contempt jurisdiction is to ensure that public confidence in the administration of justice and its efficacy is not eroded. If Courts have to exercise utmost restraint in exercising the power to punish for contempt, the Bar should exercise circumspection in invoking the jurisdiction. The rat race has become so frenzied and all-consuming that we hardly take time off to ponder where the system is headed; whether we give enough respect to command respect. The structure of values that is supported by the Constitution mandates that the contempt jurisdiction is neither invoked in frivolity nor exercised in a feudal manner. (14.) There is no charge in this petition that amounts to the breach by the alleged contemnors of any order of Court. The petition is in gross abuse of the process and the alleged contemnors need not be called upon at all. (15.) C.C. No.113 of 2009 is dismissed. The petitioners will pay costs assessed at 1000 GM to any fund that provides for relief to police officers who have been injured in the line of duty, to be nominated by the Commissioner of Police. The costs should be paid within a fortnight from the date of receipt of an authenticated copy of this order. (16.) The Court regrets that this unmeritorious petition slipped through and was permitted to be served on the alleged contemnors. The costs should be paid within a fortnight from the date of receipt of an authenticated copy of this order. (16.) The Court regrets that this unmeritorious petition slipped through and was permitted to be served on the alleged contemnors. Urgent certified photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.