Judgment : BHATTACHARYA, ACJ. (1.) This appeal is at the instance of a claimant in a proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act and is directed against an award dated 18th August, 2004 passed by the learned Judge, Sixth Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in M.A.J. Case No. 127 of 2003, thereby dismissing the claim-application. (2.) The appellant before us filed a proceeding under Section 166 of the Act on the allegation that on 8th March, 2003 at about 11:50 hours the appellant along with some Jawans of the Border Security Force were making route march exercise, when a truck, insured by the Insurance Company, came at a tremendous speed and caused death of a particular Jawan and serious injuries to six others including the applicant. The injured persons were admitted to the North Bengal Medical College and Hospital and were treated as indoor patients. According to the applicant, the driver of the offending vehicle was solely responsible for the accident. The applicant was aged 36 years and his monthly income was Rs. 7,009/- at the relevant time and due to the injury caused to his chest, he was partially disabled to the extent of 50%. He, thus, claimed Rs. 6,70,000/- as compensation. (3.) At the time of hearing of the application, it was established that due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the concerned truck the accident occurred, as a result, the applicant was injured. The learned Tribunal below, however, refused to believe the evidence of P.W.3 who found that the applicant had become disabled to the extent of 50% on the ground that it would appear from the documents filed by the appellant himself that he was found to be fit to join his duty as a Jawan of the Border Security Force. From the aforesaid documents, the learned Tribunal opined that there was no justification of granting any amount of compensation as there has been no pecuniary loss of the appellant for the injury suffered by him because the entire financial burden of his treatment was taken by his employer, the B.S.F. Authority. The learned Tribunal below, thus, dismissed the application. (4.) Therefore, the question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in dismissing the application altogether by awarding no compensation. The learned Tribunal below, thus, dismissed the application. (4.) Therefore, the question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether the learned Trial Judge was justified in dismissing the application altogether by awarding no compensation. (5.) As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of R.D. Hattangadi V. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others reported in AIR 1995 SC 755 : 1995 WBLR (SC) 127, for assessing compensation due to injury arising out of the accident consequent to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, the Court should proceed in the following way : "Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non- pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical Calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include : (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit ; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened ; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life." (6.) In the said decision, the Supreme Court felt that it was really difficult to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and agony suffered by the victim and for having become a lifelong handicapped. No amount of compensation, the Supreme Court proceeded, could restore the physical frame of the appellant and for that reason, it has been said by the Court that whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury "so far as money can compensate" because it is impossible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations and money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame. (7.) In that connection, the Supreme Court relied upon the following observations in the case of Ward v. James, (1965)1 All ER 563, where it was said : "Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured much for his "lost years", you can, however, compensate him for his loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected "years of survival". You can compensate him for his loss of earnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursing and attendance. But how can you compensate him for being rendered a helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury, be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing to back injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has lost everything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges and Juries have to do the best they can and give him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it well-nigh insoluble: They are being asked to calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part a conventional sum. The Judges have worked out a pattern, and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money." (Emphasis supplied by us) (8.) The Supreme Court also pointed out that in its very nature, whenever a Tribunal or a Court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused, but all the aforesaid elements have to be viewed with objective standards. At that stage, the Court, by relying upon its own decision in the case of C.K. Subramonia Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair reported in AIR 1970 SC 376 , decided in connection with the Fatal Accidents Act, cautioned that in assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rested in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent was inevitable. The Supreme Court also relied upon the following observations of the Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 12 regarding non-pecuniary loss stated at page 446 of the volume : "Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern. Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair, fairness being interpreted by the Courts in the light of previous decisions. Thus there has been evolved a set of conventional principles providing a provisional guide to the comparative severity of different injuries, and indicating a bracket of damages into which a particular injury will currently fall. The particular circumstance of the plaintiff, including his age and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the award. The fall in the value of money leads to a continuing reassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessments of damages at certain key points in the pattern where the disability is readily identifiable and not subject to large variations in individual cases." (9.) Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, we now propose to consider what should be the amount of "just compensation" in the facts of the present case. (10.) After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and after going through the materials on record we find that undisputedly the appellant was, due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the offending truck, seriously injured for which he was hospitalized and could not join service for more than one year. Ultimately, no doubt, he had been found fit and joined the duty. In our opinion, in such circumstances, though there has been no pecuniary loss, yet, for the injury, he undoubtedly suffered mental pain and physical discomfort for more than one year till he was found to be fit to join the duty and in such circumstances, he should be entitled to get at least a sum of Rs. In our opinion, in such circumstances, though there has been no pecuniary loss, yet, for the injury, he undoubtedly suffered mental pain and physical discomfort for more than one year till he was found to be fit to join the duty and in such circumstances, he should be entitled to get at least a sum of Rs. 25,000/-although there is no permanent disability of the appellant as would appear from the certificates being Exbt.6 and Exbt.8 relied upon by the learned Tribunal below. We, however, hold that the learned Tribunal rightly refused to accept the certificate issued by the P.W.3 which was issued earlier to the issue of Exbt. 6 and Exbt. 8, the certificates issued by the employer of the appellant. (11.) For a Jawan attached to B.S.F, it is extremely painful to remain unfit for more than one year and at the same time, the appellant suffered enormous physical discomfort arising out of the injury which kept him out of service for the said period. (12.) The learned Tribunal below, as it appears from the award impugned, did not consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter. (13.) The appeal is, thus, allowed. The award impugned is set aside. The respondent/Insurance Company is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to the appellant within a month from today with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing of the application till actual payment. (14.) In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.