These two revisions have been preferred at the instance of Commis sioner of Trade Tax, U. P. , Lucknow against common order passed by the Trade Tax Tri bunal, Kanpur in two connected second ap peals No. 665 of 2000 and 666 of 2005 relat ing to the assessment years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998 whereby and whereunder it has allowed the appeals preferred by the dealer and set aside the assessment order creating demand for trade tax as also the first appel late order remanding the matter to the Assess ing Authority with certain directions to record findings on the issues mentioned in the ap pellate order. 2. Both these revisions relate to the same assesses and the arguments by learned coun sel were advanced in respect to the revision No. 2077 of 2005 relating to the assessment year 1997-1998 with the understanding that identical controversy is involved in the com panion revision. By way of clarification, it may be added that the revision No. 2077 of 2005 arises out of assessment proceedings while the connected revision No. 2074 of 2005 arises out of reassessment proceedings initi ated under section 21 of the U. P. Trade Tax Act with respect to the assessment year 1996-1997, which was the first year of the busi ness of dealer opposite party. 3. The facts of the case may be noticed in brief. The dealer opposite party claims that it is an institution certified by the U. P. Khadi and Village Industries Board. It carries on the business of manufacture and sale of mentha crystals. The mentha crystals were manufac tured out of mentha oil purchased by it. The dealer claimed exemption on the sale of mentha crystals so sold and manufactured out of mentha oil purchased by it under notifica tion No. 2454 dated 5. 10. 1995 issued under section 4 (c) of the U. P. Trade Tax Act (here inafter referred to as the Act ). The case of the dealer is that its product i. e. mentha crystals is exempt from payment of trade tax under Entry No. 35, in particular of the said notifi cation. The said plea did not find favour with the Assessing Authority. The assessment or der was carried in appeal before the first ap pellate authority who was of the opinion that certain probing is required in the matter. The said plea did not find favour with the Assessing Authority. The assessment or der was carried in appeal before the first ap pellate authority who was of the opinion that certain probing is required in the matter. Con sequently, it set aside the assessment order and restored the matter to the file of the As sessing Officer to reframe the assessment or der after ascertaining the facts on certain is sues mentioned in the appellate order. Still aggrieved, the dealer further challenged the said order by way of second appeals before the tribunal who by the order under revision set aside the appellate order and the assess ment order was well and held that in view of the notification No. 2454 dated 5th of Octo ber, 1995, the product of the dealer is not exi gible to any tax under the Act. 4. In the memo of revision the following questions of law have been framed: (i) "whether the manufacturing of mentha crystals out of mentha oil purchased by the dealer is covered under entry No. 34 of the notification No. 2454 dated 5-10-1995? (ii) Whether the dealer is liable to exemp tion under the above notification even if he himself has not collected and processed the forest plants?" 5. The contention of the learned standing counsel is that the dealer is not entitled to get the benefit of the aforesaid notification for the reasons more than one. On its own show ing, the dealer has purchased the mentha oil and after processing the same manufactured mentha crystals. The mentha crystals do not fall under the Entry No. 34 of the said notifi cation which reads "collection and process ing of forest plants for medicinal purposes". Admittedly, the dealer has not collected the mentha herbs rather it purchased it from the seller. The benefit of the said entry can be availed of only by such dealers who collects mentha herb and process thereafter for me dicinal processes. The view taken by the tri bunal that use of word and in between the words "collection" and "processing" should be read as disjunctively, is not legally ten able and it should be read conjointly, submits the learned standing counsel. The view taken by the tri bunal that use of word and in between the words "collection" and "processing" should be read as disjunctively, is not legally ten able and it should be read conjointly, submits the learned standing counsel. Elaborating the argument, it was submitted that there being no ambiguity in the notification, the notifica tion being in the nature of an exemption noti fication it should be read and understood on its plain reading without resorting any exter nal aid. Shri S. D. Singh, learned counsel for the dealer, on the other hand, submits that the very purpose and object of issuing notifica tion is to grant exemption to such village industries which are registered with Khadi and Village Industries Board Adhiniyam, 1956. Unit of the dealer has been registered as vil lage industry with the U. P. Khadi and Gramodyog Board for manufacture of mentha crystals and de-mentha oil out of Jari Booti (herbs ). Taking an analogy of a circular is sued by the Commissioner of Trade Tax in respect of footwear dated 29th September, 2000, which has been relied upon by the tri bunal in the impugned order holding that the "footwear" and "chappals" are the part of leather industries and therefore, mentha crys tals are exempt under the said notification. The similar interpretation and treatment is required to be given to mentha crystals also, submits the learned counsel for the -dealer. 6. Considered the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The relevant notification for our purposes is the notification No. 2454 dated 5th October, 1995 which has been issued in ex ercise of powers given under clause (c) of sec tion 4 of the Act. By this notification the ear lier notification No. 7037 dated 31st of Janu ary, 1995 has been amended. The present no tification provides for exemption of sale by institutions in Uttar Pradesh by All India Khadi and Village Industries Commission or the Uttar Pradesh Khadi and Village Indus tries Board, of products of village industries specified therein. 7. The Entry No. 34 with which we are con cerned reads as follows: (34) "collection and processing of forest plants for medicinal purposes". 8. The controversy centers round the in terpretation and scope of the aforesaid Entry. 7. The Entry No. 34 with which we are con cerned reads as follows: (34) "collection and processing of forest plants for medicinal purposes". 8. The controversy centers round the in terpretation and scope of the aforesaid Entry. The dealers plea is that it being registered with U. P. Khadi and Gramodyog Board, its product mentha crystals is exempt under the aforesaid entry No. 34. The case of the depart ment is otherwise. 9. The tribunal accepted the dealers con tention primarily on the ground that the word "and" in the aforesaid Entry has been used disjunctively i. e. it should be as or. To sup port its view, it has placed reliance upon the Apex Court judgment in Ishwar Singh Bindra and others v. State of U. P. , AIR 1968 SC 1450 wherein the Apex Court has considered the "maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes", 11th Edition. On a fair reading of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Apex Court, it appears that the conclusion drawn by the tribunal is not correct, what has been said therein is that "and" has generally cumulative sense, requir ing the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and herein it is the antithesis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such connection, it is by force of context, read as or. The relevant extract of report is repro duced below:- "and" has generally a cumulative sense, requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and herein it is the antith esis of or. Sometimes, however, even in such a connection, it is, by force of a context, read as "or". Sometimes to carry out the intention of the legislature it is found necessary to read me conjunctions "or" and "and" one for the other. Strouds Judicial Dictionary Edn. And Max well on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. Ref. (para 11)" 10. Noticeably, on the interpretation of the relevant provision involved therein, the Apex Court was of the view that in the context of that Statute the word and was used for or. It was of the view that the word and should be read disjunctively. And Max well on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn. Ref. (para 11)" 10. Noticeably, on the interpretation of the relevant provision involved therein, the Apex Court was of the view that in the context of that Statute the word and was used for or. It was of the view that the word and should be read disjunctively. The tribunal misunder stood the ratio of the said decision and with out examining the relevant entry No. 34 and the other part of the notification which con tains the said Entry as also the statutory pro vision, proceeded to decide, the appeals on the footing that the word and be read dis junctively notwithstanding the context thereof. It may also be noticed that the said decision was not rendered under the Trade Tax Act, but with respect to a penal proyision. The interpretation of exemption notification granting exemption from tax, excise or duty was not involved therein. 11. The Apex Court in State of Punjab and others v. M/s. Punjab Fibres Limited, 2004 AIR SCW 6988 and others, a case under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act while dealing the exemption from tax granted by a notifi cation issued therein to textile mills in respect of sales within State has made the following observations which is apt for present pur poses: "7. it is settled law that to avail of the ben efits of a notification the party must strictly comply with the conditions of the notifica tion. It is also settled law that the notification has to be interpreted in terms of its wording. Where the language is very clear and unam biguous, benefit cannot be granted merely on the ground of sympathy. " 12. In State of Kerala v. M/s. Battu Kalam Chemical Industries, JT 2001 (7) SC 144 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3330 ), a case under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, dealing with the scope of exemption notification it has been held that the language of notification being crystal clear, no external aid to its construction is required. 13. In State of Kerala v. M/s. Battu Kalam Chemical Industries, JT 2001 (7) SC 144 : ( AIR 2001 SC 3330 ), a case under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, dealing with the scope of exemption notification it has been held that the language of notification being crystal clear, no external aid to its construction is required. 13. In M/s. ITC Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise JT, 2004 (7) SC 409 : ( AIR 2005 SC 1370 ), a case under the Central Ex cise and Salt Act, 1944, the Apex Court after noticing its various earlier pronouncements including that given under the Sales Tax Act has laid down that while considering an ex emption notification, the supposed intention of the exempting authority cannot be looked into. In other words, it has been laid down that the notification should be read as a whole and if there is not ambiguity in the statutory language, the notification should be inter preted on its plain language. The legislature is- deemed to intend and mean what it says. The need for interpretation arises only when the words used in the Statute are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the legislature. Only two excep tions are there to the rule of plain language. Firstly, the rule of strict construction does not apply to a provision which merely lays down machinery for calculation or procedure for collection of tax. The second exception is : If two constructions are possible and strict construction would lead to an absurd result than the construction which is in keeping with the object of the statutory provision or in keep ing with the equity could be accepted. 14. Applying the principal of law, as de lineated above, it may be noticed that it is not the case of the dealer nor was found by the tribunal that Entry No. 34 on its plain language suffers with an ambiguity or it may lead to an absurd result. The ambiguity, if any, in the aforesaid Entry, was not pointed out by the tribunal in its order nor the same was pointed out during the course of argument before this Court. Resort of external aid of interpretation to read and as disjunctively is, therefore, uncalled for. 15. Even otherwise also, the normal rule is that the word or is disjunctive and is nor mally conjunctive. Resort of external aid of interpretation to read and as disjunctively is, therefore, uncalled for. 15. Even otherwise also, the normal rule is that the word or is disjunctive and is nor mally conjunctive. The reading of word or as and is not be resorted to, unless some other part of the same Statute or the clear in tention of it requires that to be done, as said by Lord Halsbury, reproduced in the Book of Justice G. P. Singh, namely "the principles of statutory interpretation" in Chapter - 5, page 436, 10th Edition. 16. In Asbestos Hyderabad Cement Prod ucts and another v. Union of India (2000) 1 SCC 426 : ( AIR 2000 SC 314 ), a case under the Central Excise Act, it was held that the word and be read conjointly on its plain lan guage. 17. The other limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the dealer that the afore said notification should be interpreted in the manner in which it was understood by the department as is evident from circular of the Commissioner dated 29-1-2000 with respect to the grant of exemption to footwear is con cerned, it is liable to be rejected. The said cir cular cannot be imported for the purposes of Entry No. 34 of the notification in question, as it relates altogether to a different Entry. The Entry No. 34 being unambiguous, it should be read as it is without making addition or sub traction therein. Additionally, the circular was issued in the light of the decision given by the Commissioner of Trade Tax, which is not so in the present case. The Tribunal has com mitted manifest error of law in proceeding with the matter on the premises of the said circular and importing its purport to explain the Entry in question. 18. A reading of the order of the Tribunal would show that the Tribunal has misdirected itself and assumed certain facts. In the earlier part of the order it has correctly observed that the dealer opposite party has manufactured mentha crystals out of the purchased mentha oil. However, in the discussion part, it pro ceeded on the footing that the mentha oil was extracted by the dealer from the herbs. In the earlier part of the order it has correctly observed that the dealer opposite party has manufactured mentha crystals out of the purchased mentha oil. However, in the discussion part, it pro ceeded on the footing that the mentha oil was extracted by the dealer from the herbs. The relevant portion is reproduced below:- "mentha Ayal Jo Van Paudh Se Vyapari Dwara Nikala Gaya, Vah Ark Hai Jismen Appealkarta Dwara Mentha Kristals Ka Utpadan/nirman/prasanskaran Kiya Gaya Hai Jo Pravishti-34 Ke Antargat Aati Hai Aur Jiski Choot Vyapari Ko Dey Hai. . . . . . . . . " 19. The tribunal on the aforesaid footing has wrongly set aside the order passed by the First Appellate Authority. It may be noted that the First Appellate Authority required the As sessing Officer to scrutinize the certificate is sued in favour of the dealer by the U. P. Khadi and Gramodyog Board, whether the product of the dealer was in the category of product of medicinal value, to whom the goods were sold, number of workers employed by the dealer etc. Without making any comment on the above points as to whether the directions given by the First Appellate Authority is ger mane or not, the tribunal conveniently set aside the order of the First Appellate Author ity. It was incumbent upon the tribunal be fore setting aside the First Appellate order to record a finding with regard to the relevancy of the above issues. The case of the dealer was that the remand order was not justified as the relevant material are already on the record. 20. The tribunal decided the issue in favour of the dealer without adverting to the ques tion as to whether the product of the dealer has been sold for medicinal purposes. The ex emption is granted on collection and processing of forest plants for medicinal purposes. It was not even the case of the dealer that the mentha crystals were sold for medicinal pur poses. The burden lay upon a dealer to fulfill all the criteria as laid down in an exemption notification. Having failed to do so, the dealer was not entitled to take the benefit of the ex emption notification. 21. It was not even the case of the dealer that the mentha crystals were sold for medicinal pur poses. The burden lay upon a dealer to fulfill all the criteria as laid down in an exemption notification. Having failed to do so, the dealer was not entitled to take the benefit of the ex emption notification. 21. In State of Goa and another v. Colfax Laboratories Ltd. and another (2004) 9 SCC 83 : ( AIR 2004 SC 45 ) it has been held by Supreme Court that in order to come within the ambit of "medicinal preparation" the ar ticle must be used for the purpose of either curing or mitigating the disease after its symp toms have appeared or in prevention of any disease. "disease" means an impairment of the normal state of the living animal that in terrupts or modifies the performance of the vital functions in a response to environmen tal factors (as malnutrition, industrial hazards or climate) or to specific infective agents (as worms, bacteria or viruses) or to inherent defects of the organism (as various genetic anomalies) or to combinations of these fac tors. 22. The other facet of the order of the tri bunal is that it was of the view that once Khadi and Gramodyog Board has expressed its view in the matter, the Trade Tax Department is bound by it and cannot take a different view. It invoked the principle as enshrined under section 4-A of the Act in the case of "new unit" in whose favour eligibility certificate has been granted. In support thereof the tri bunal has placed reliance upon a letter of U. P. Khadi and Gramodyog Board dated 8-12-1999. In absence of any statutory provision prohibiting the Trade Tax Authorities to make an inquiry in this regard, it is difficult to agree with the tribunal. How, the letter dated 8th December, 1999 or any other letter or corre spondence in between the dealer and the Khadi Gramodyog Board would bind the au thorities under the U. P. Trade Tax Act, is dif ficult to understand. It is the duty and the ob ligation of the assessing authority to assess the turnover of a dealer in exercise of statu tory power conferred on it. The assessing au thority has to interpret and apply the provisions of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. It is the duty and the ob ligation of the assessing authority to assess the turnover of a dealer in exercise of statu tory power conferred on it. The assessing au thority has to interpret and apply the provisions of the U. P. Trade Tax Act. There being no provision making the certificate given by the U. P. Khadi and Gramodyog Board as con clusive, the said certificate is not sacrosanct and will not fetter the power of the assessing authority to interpret the provisions of the U. P. Trade Tax Act in accordance with law. The exemption notification has been issued in the light of the statutory provision namely section 4 (c) of the Act. The said provision itself provides that the exemption shall be granted on such conditions as may be speci fied in the notification. Further, the notifica tion also provides that the exemption shall be withdrawn if such an institution misuses any of the conditions subject to which notifica tion is admissible. Obviously, whether such institution fulfills the conditions or misuses any of the conditions subject to which exemp tion is admissible can be gone into by the as sessing authority in the course of assessment proceedings. The broad proposition as laid down by the tribunal that since certificate has been granted to such institution by the U. P. Khadi and U. P. Industries Board, the product of such institution will not be exigible to tax and the Trade Tax Department would have no say in the matter if adopted, would run counter to the scheme of the U. P. Trade Tax Act including the exemption notification as well. 23. The Commissioner of Trade Tax v. S/s. Bhartiya Charmodhyog Sangh, Agra, 2007 UPTC 1208 relied upon by the learned counsel has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a case under the Cen tral Sales Tax Act and the issue was whether the exemption granted by the notification to the institution certified by All India Khadi and Village Industries Commission, Mumbai or by U. P. Khadi and Village Industries Board, Kanpur with reference to the goods or a class or category of the goods under the exemp tion notification are generally exempted from the tax under the U. P. Trade Tax Act or not. The said controversy arose in the light of the section 8 (2-A) of Central Sales Tax Act. The said controversy arose in the light of the section 8 (2-A) of Central Sales Tax Act. In that relation, it was found that the exemption granted under the said notification in respect of U. P. sales is not generally exempt, but the exemption is conditional one. Therefore, the said decision is not of any help for the deci sion of the controversy on hand. 24. in G. P. Ceramics-Private Limited v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 2 SCC 90 : (2009 (2) ALJ 327, a case under the U. P. Trade Tax Act with reference to section 4a thereof, it was held that it is now well established principle of law that whereas eligibility criteria laid down in the exemption notification are required to be con strued restrictly, once it is found that the ap plicant satisfies same, the exemption notifi cation should be construed liberally. In this very case, the Apex Court has referred its ear lier decision in State Level Committee v. Morgardshammar India Ltd. (1996) 1 SC 108 : (1996 All LJ 137) wherein it has been point edly held that section 4a provides for exemp tion from tax. This being a provision provid ing for exemption or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed strictly, was held therein. 25. The upshot of the above discussions is that the Entry in question in the said Justifi cation is not attracted to the facts of the present case. The dealer having not collected the forest plants itself for medicinal purposes is not entitled for exemption of tax as it sim ply carried on the processing of the mentha oil to manufacture menthe crystals. The tri bunal was not justified in reading word and in Entry No. 34 of the said notification as dis junctively. It has also misdirected itself as it assumed certain non- existent facts. 26. In view of the above, it is held that the tribunal was not correct in extending the ben efit of aforesaid exemption notification to the dealer opposite party on the sale of mentha crystals. 27. Since the matter having been disposed off finally by the tribunal and by this Court as well, the order of remand passed by the First Appellate Authority has become incon sequential; nor its restoration was prayed by the learned counsel for the dealer. 27. Since the matter having been disposed off finally by the tribunal and by this Court as well, the order of remand passed by the First Appellate Authority has become incon sequential; nor its restoration was prayed by the learned counsel for the dealer. The reas sessment and the assessment order for the rel evant assessment years are, therefore, re stored. No order as to costs. 28. In the result both the revisions succeed and are allowed. No order as to costs. Revisions allowed. .