JUDGEMENT 1. Heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Sinha, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma, Senior Advocate for the opposite party nos. 2, 3 and 4 and Mr. Dharmesh Kumar Shrivastava, learned counsel appears for the opposite party nos. 26 and 27. 2. Nobody appears on behalf of the other opposite parties. 3. The defendant-petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 21.6.2005 passed in Title Suit No. 267 of 1986 whereby his petition filed with a prayer that the suit concerned has abated under Section 4(c) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been rejected by the trial court. 4. The plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 267 of 1986 for partition of the properties detailed in Schedules A, B and C of the plaint. During the pendency of the suit, there was notification under Section 3(1) of the Act published in the year 1995 with regard to the concerned villages wherein the suit lands are situated, Subsequently, there was a notification under Section 4A of the Consolidation Act whereby the State Government cancelled the notification earlier made under Section 3(1) of the Act. However, that appears to have again been recalled and the consolidation operations had been revived in the village concerned. Thereafter, a petition was filed by this defendant-petitioner before the court below that since the lands mentioned in the Schedules of the plaint are covered under the consolidation operation, as per the notification under Section 3(1) of the Act, the trial court cannot proceed with the suit, and thus, should declare it to have abated under Section 4(c) of the Act. The trial court, by the impugned order, has held that the properties involved in the suit involves household and movable properties also and not only agricultural land, hence, the provisions under Section 4(c) of the Act will not apply or be attracted and, thus, has rejected the application. 5. The trial court, by the impugned order, has held that the properties involved in the suit involves household and movable properties also and not only agricultural land, hence, the provisions under Section 4(c) of the Act will not apply or be attracted and, thus, has rejected the application. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the trial court has committed error in passing the impugned order inasmuch as there is concept of partial abatement of suit and it is well settled that even if the, properties are of composite nature still if they are clearly divisible, the suit will abate with regard to the property which falls within the meaning of land described in Section 2(9) of the Act but would certainly continue with regard to the properties which are not covered under the definition of land under the Act. Thus, according to him, the court below ought to have passed an order declaring partial abatement of the suit. 6. The point raised by Mr. Yogesh Chandra Verma, appearing for the opposite parties is that since the suit properties are composite in nature which includes residential house as well as movable properties apart from the agricultural lands etc., and since movable properties and residential houses are not included within the definition of land as per Section 2(9) of the Act the suit cannot be held to have abated. Hence the prayer of the defendant petitioner before the court below was liable to be rejected. 7. It is further submitted by him that the consolidation authorities are not competent and entitled to partition the joint family properties. In support of his submission learned counsel placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this court rendered in the case of Balihari Thakur and Another vs. Smt. Tara Devi and Others reported in 1967 BLJR page 9. wherein it has been held that Section 4 of the Act does not include the word partition thus such suits are not covered under the provisions. Thus, it is submitted that in view of the aforesaid decision the partition suit would not abate. 8. I do not find force in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the opposite parties as subsequently, there was amendment in the Act by the Amendment Act 27 of 1975 whereby Section 8A was introduced which is as follows: 8A. Partition of joint holdings. 8. I do not find force in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the opposite parties as subsequently, there was amendment in the Act by the Amendment Act 27 of 1975 whereby Section 8A was introduced which is as follows: 8A. Partition of joint holdings. (1) The Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer may, either on an application or of their own motion, partition joint holdings. (2) The partition of joint holdings shall be effected on the basis of shares: Provided that where the raiyats concerned agree, it may be effected on the basis of specific plots. 9. Plain reading of the aforesaid amended provision reveals that the earlier decision in Balihari Thakur (supra) is not applicable after amendment and now the consolidation authorities are empowered to partition the joint holdings. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in the case of Manji Ram @ Manji Halwai vs. The State of Bihar reported in 1979 (2) BLJ 493 wherein it has been held that the suit will abate in respect of the properties which are agricultural lands while the same shall proceed in respect of the properties other than that. 11. The concept of partial abatement is not new. Apart from the aforesaid decision of this Court, question of partial abatement was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh vs. Saryu Prasad Singh & Ors. reported in 1985 PLJR (NOC) 48. This aspect was again considered by a Division Bench of this court in Bettiah Estate vs. Pushpa Devi & Ors. reported in 1986 PLJR page 222, wherein the earlier decision in Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh as (supra) has been noticed and quoted in paragraph 12 which is again reproduced: 12. In construing the aforesaid arguments canvassed for total abatement, it may first be noticed that the law does visualize partial abatement of a suit in this context. This becomes necessary because it was vaguely hinted that no partial abatement is at all visualized. It is unnecessary to examine this limited issue on principle because it stands covered by recent precedent. In Civil Revision No. 1563 of 1978 (Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh vs. Saryu Prasad Singh and Others) decided on 14th February, 1985 (to which I was a party). This becomes necessary because it was vaguely hinted that no partial abatement is at all visualized. It is unnecessary to examine this limited issue on principle because it stands covered by recent precedent. In Civil Revision No. 1563 of 1978 (Chaturbhuj Prasad Singh vs. Saryu Prasad Singh and Others) decided on 14th February, 1985 (to which I was a party). [1985 PLJR (NOC) 48] the very question was specifically posed and then answered in the following terms: "In my opinion, therefore, a suit or a proceeding can partially abate. It will abate in respect of the lands lying in the area in respect of which the Government has declared its intention to make a scheme for consolidation of holdings by a notification in official Gazette under Section 3(1) of the Act. It will not abate in respect of any land for which there is no such notification." 13. Thereafter the aforesaid Division Bench has laid down the guidelines for the relevant purpose. The relevant paragraph 17 of the aforesaid decision Is reproduced as follows: 1. Now, reverting back to the question posed earlier, it is apt to say that though it may well involve some intricacy, yet justice of the case demands a somewhat precise formulation of the answer. Therefore, if the other requisites of Section 4 are salisfied then it must be held that (i) where the suit properties is wholly within the definition of land, the whole of the suit would abate; (ii) where the suit property does not come within the said definition at all, no question of abatement would arise even though such property may be situated within the area notified for consolidation under Section 3(1); and (iii) where the suit property is composite in nature but is clearly divisible then the suit would abate with regard to the property which is within the meaning of Section 2(9) but would continue with regard to property which is not so. *******" 14. In yet another decision of this Court in Mostt. Siya Kuer & Ors. vs. Mostt. Keshar Kuer & Ors. reported in 1990(1) PLJR page 90, in Civil Revision challenging the order of the court below holding the suit in question is hit by provision of 4(c) of the Act, it has been noticed that Section 8A of the Act sufficiently empowers the authorities to partition the joint holdings. 15. Siya Kuer & Ors. vs. Mostt. Keshar Kuer & Ors. reported in 1990(1) PLJR page 90, in Civil Revision challenging the order of the court below holding the suit in question is hit by provision of 4(c) of the Act, it has been noticed that Section 8A of the Act sufficiently empowers the authorities to partition the joint holdings. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner produces certified copy of plaint of the partition suit concerned (Title Suit No. 267 of 1986). Let the same be kept on record. A bare perusal of the plaint goes to disclose that several properties involved in the suit, as described in the Schedules of the plaint, are within the ambit of the definition of land as per Section 2(9) of the Act which is clearly divisible. 16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the order impugned is liable to be set aside on the ground that it is not in conformity with the settled principle of law laid down by this Court. It has to be held that the suit concerned has partially abated against the properties which fall within the definition of the land as described in Section 2(9) of the Act. However, for the properties which are outside the scope of the definition aforesaid, the suit must proceed. 17. As a result this Civil Revision is allowed. The order dated 21.6.2005 passed by the Sub-Judge-IV, Rohtas at Sasaram in Title Suit No. 267 of 1986 is set aside and it is held that the suit stands partially abated so far properties coming within the ambit of the definition of land under the Act whereas with regard to the properties out of the scope of definition of land under Section 2(9) of the Act, the suit shall proceed. 18. There will be no order as to cost.