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2009 DIGILAW 857 (AP)

Katwal Abdul Hakeem Sab (died) by LRs. v. Nasyam Sufiya

2009-12-01

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2009
JUDGMENT :- The legal representatives of the 1 st defendant in OS No.1 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Rayachoty, filed this second appeal. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein are referred to, as arrayed in the suit. The facts pleaded by the parties, in brief, are as under : 2. Abdul Gafoor and his wife, Khaja Bee, have four sons and two daughters. The sons are (1) Ismail, father of 2nd plaintiff, by name Reddy Basha; (2) Gulam Mohaboob Sab, husband of 2nd defendant, by name Rahamath Bee, and father of defendant No.3, Mahaboob Basha and defendant No.4; (3) Abdul Hakim Sab, the 1st defendant, and (4) Syfuddin, the 3rd plaintiff Daughters are Nasyam Sufiya, the 1st plaintiff and Pattan Hajaram Bee, the 5th defendant. Abdul Gafoor had 3 acres of land, which is part of Sy.No.485 of Rayachoty Village. He executed a gift deed dated 10.3.1964, EX.B 1, gifting one acre each in favour of his wife, Khaja Bee; son, the 1st defendant, and another son, Syfuddin, the 3rd plaintiff. Through a sale deed dated 21.1.1970, the 3rd plaintiff is said to have sold his one acre to the 1st defendant. Khaja Bee died somewhere around 1970. 3. The plaintiffs filed the suit for partition of one acre of land, left by Khaja Bee, and allotment of respective shares in their favour, and defendants 1 to 5. The 6th defendant is said to be probable purchaser of the plaint schedule land. 4. The suit was opposed by the 1st defendant alone. He pleaded that the suit schedule property of one acre was bequeathed by his mother, Khaja Bee, under a Will dated 16.3.1968, Ex.B2, in favour of his father, and two brothers, and the legatees in turn, have sold the property in his favour, through sale deed, Ex.B3, dated 21.1.1970. He has also taken the plea that Khaja Bee made an oral gift in his favour. The third alternative pleaded by him was, that the 3rd plaintiff, i.e., his another brother by name, Syuddin has executed a deed of relinquishment in his favour. 5. Through its judgment dated 16.3.2007, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree, directing that the suit schedule property be divided and the respective shares be allotted in favour of the concerned parties. The third alternative pleaded by him was, that the 3rd plaintiff, i.e., his another brother by name, Syuddin has executed a deed of relinquishment in his favour. 5. Through its judgment dated 16.3.2007, the trial Court passed a preliminary decree, directing that the suit schedule property be divided and the respective shares be allotted in favour of the concerned parties. The 1st defendant filed AS No.26 of 2008 in the Court of V Additional District Judge, Rayachoty. The appeal was dismissed on 2.4.2009. Hence this second appeal. 6. Sri B. Venkat Rama Rao, learned Counsel for the 1st defendant submits that the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court ignored the voluminous oral and documentary evidence, in relation to the I transfer or accrual of the suit schedule property in favour of the 1st defendant. He contends that the suit land was under the possession and enjoyment of the 5th defendant for the past several decades, and the suit is barred by limitation. He further contends that the plaintiffs have relinquished their rights, not only through specific acts, but also by their conduct and acquiescence. Learned Counsel submits that, little doubt, that existed, as to the manner in which the property accrued to the 1st defendant, stands cleared through Ex.B3, and there was no basis for the decree passed by the trial Court and approval by the lower Appellate Court. 7. Sri S. V. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, on the other hand, submits that, admittedly, Khaja Bee was the owner of one acre of the suit land, on the strength of EX.A I, and after her death, it has accrued to her legal heirs, in accordance with Law of Succession. He contends that the 1st defendant was not certain about his plea, and his only effort was to knock away the entire property, held by the common ancestor, Abdul Gafoor, in one way or the other to the exclusion of other legal heirs. 8. The suit, filed for the relief of partition of the property, left by Khaja Bee; was resisted by the 1st defendant alone. The relationship of the parties, is not disputed. As mentioned earlier, his defence was, in the form of three alternatives. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration : (i) Whether the 1st defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property ? The relationship of the parties, is not disputed. As mentioned earlier, his defence was, in the form of three alternatives. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration : (i) Whether the 1st defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property ? (ii) Whether the suit property is joint property of plaintiffs and D2 to D5 ? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition and separate possession as prayed for? 9. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A 13 were filed. The 1st defendant deposed as DW1, and DWs.2 to 4 were also examined. He filed Exs.B1 to B9. The trial Court repelled the defence put forward by the 1st defendant and passed a preliminary decree. The lower Appellate Court framed four points for its consideration, viz. (1) Whether the first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property ? (2) Whether the suit property is joint property of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 5? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to partition and separate possession as prayed for ? (4) Whether there are any sufficient grounds to set aside the preliminary decree and judgment dated 16.3.2007 passed in as No.1 of 2006 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge's Court, Rayachoty ? After discussing the matter at length, it dismissed the appeal. 10. The only controversy among the parties is, as to whether the suit schedule property, which admittedly was owned and held by Khaja Bee, remained with her, at the time of her death, or whether she has parted with that property, in any manner ? 11. Since there is no dispute about the common ancestry and the relationship of the parties, the burden squarely rested upon the 1st defendant, to prove, as to how the other legal heirs of late Khaja Bee are not entitled to succeed to that property. 12. The first plea raised by him was that, his mother executed a Will, dated 16.3.1968, Ex.B2, in his favour. Not a single witness was examined to prove that Will. Therefore, it cannot be said that EX.B2 was proved. Learned Counsel for the 1 st defendant did not press this ground, in the second appeal. 13. 12. The first plea raised by him was that, his mother executed a Will, dated 16.3.1968, Ex.B2, in his favour. Not a single witness was examined to prove that Will. Therefore, it cannot be said that EX.B2 was proved. Learned Counsel for the 1 st defendant did not press this ground, in the second appeal. 13. The second plea raised by the 1st defendant was that, his mother made an oral gift in favour of his father, Abdul Gafoor, and his brothers, Ismail and Ghulam Mohammed. The three donees in turn, are said to have executed a sale deed, Ex.B3, dated 21.1.1970, in his favour. None of the three donees were living by the time the suit came to be filled. The plaintiffs flatly denied the oral gift. In the written statement, it was pleaded that one Mr. Nagasubbanna, examined as DW2, was present when the oral• gift was made. However, in his deposition as DW1, the 1st defendant did not speak about the presence of DW2. In his cross-examination, DW2 stated that the oral gift was made on 18.3.1969, whereas according to the contents of written-statement, it was made on 1.3.1969. There is serious discrepancy as to the persons in whose favour the oral gift is said to have been made. According to DW2, one of the dones is Syfuddin, the 3rd plaintiff. This is at total variance with the plea in the written statement. 14. Oral gift is a typical facility which is available exclusively to Muslims. In the ordinary course, a gift is required to be made through a registered document as provided for under Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. When such a vital requirement as to registration is relaxed, the proof in the form of oral evidence must be unequivocal and clinching. The benefit of any doubt or contradiction has to be given in favour of the person, who is adversely affected in the event of the plea of oral gift being accepted. Any relapse in this regard is likely to provide handle to an individual to trample the rights of other persons to succeed in accordance with law. Therefore, the plea raised by the 1st defendant, as regards oral gift was rightly repelled by the trial Court and lower appellate Court. 15. Any relapse in this regard is likely to provide handle to an individual to trample the rights of other persons to succeed in accordance with law. Therefore, the plea raised by the 1st defendant, as regards oral gift was rightly repelled by the trial Court and lower appellate Court. 15. Obviously, being aware of the weakness of the two pleas referred to above, the 1st defendant has pressed into service the alleged relinquishment, vis-a-vis the property by one of his brothers, i.e., the 3rd plaintiff. This is said to have been done through an unregistered document dated 13.3.1970. The document was not placed before the Court, much less it was proved. Assuming that the 3rd plaintiff relinquished his share, it does not disentitle the other parties, to inherit the property in accordance with their shares. 16. All the aspects referred to above, are pure questions of fact and no principle of law is involved, much less a substantial question of law. The trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court have examined the matter and appreciated the evidence from the correct perspective. This Court is not inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact. 17. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.