JUDGMENT L. K. MISHRA, J. ( 1 ) THE wife-appellant has challenged the judgment of the judge, Family Court dated 21-9-2001 in Civil proceeding No. 85 of 1998 by which he annulled the marriage of the parties under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. ( 2 ) SIDHARTHA Pandit, the husband the respondent herein) filed the petition for annulment of the marriage on the ground that at the time of marriage the wife was suffering from recurrent attacks of epilepsy. The marriage of the parties took place on 5-2-1998 according to the Hindu rites and customs. On 13-1-1998 at about 3. 00 A. M. the husband woke up and found the wife having an epileptic attack. She had lost her sense and was salivating. One Dr. Bankim Patnaik, who was neighbour of the husband was called and on examination found the wife to be suffering from severe attack of epilepsy. He prescribed medicines and also advised to consult a Neurologist. On the next day morning on enquiry she disclosed that she was subjected to intermittent attack of epilepsy since her childhood and was under treatment, On her request, her family members were called and they came with her earlier prescriptions which revealed that she was under treatment since 10-7-1985 in various hospitals. The husband took Rajeswari to Dr. Maya gantayat and other doctors for treatment but the situation did not improve. Therefore, the petition for annulment of the marriage was tiled. The wife-appellant filed her written statement claiming chat the husband demanded a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- and a Hero honda Motor Cycle as dowry. He was paid rs. 60,000/- only. Demanding the rest dowry of Rs. 40,000/- and the Motor Cycle, she alleged, the petitioner denied to keep sexual relationship with her saying that till the demand was fulfilled the marriage would not be consumated. She also alleged cruelty on the part of the husband. ( 3 ) THE Trial Court framed the following issues :- " (i) Whether the respondent is subjected to recurrent attacks of Epilepsy, (ii) Whether the consent for marriage was obtained by fraud by concealing the fact that the respondent suffered from Epilepsy; and (iii) Whether the petitioner ill-treated and assaulted the respondent for non-fulfillment of dowry demand"? ( 3 ) THE Trial Court framed the following issues :- " (i) Whether the respondent is subjected to recurrent attacks of Epilepsy, (ii) Whether the consent for marriage was obtained by fraud by concealing the fact that the respondent suffered from Epilepsy; and (iii) Whether the petitioner ill-treated and assaulted the respondent for non-fulfillment of dowry demand"? After both parties led evidence, the trial Court decided the case in favour of the husband holding that the wife was suffering from recurrent attacks of epilepsy and her allegation of demand of dowry was not proved by her. He annulled the marriage and in addition to that directed the husband-petitioner to pay permanent alimony to the tune of Rs. 90,000/. ( 4 ) THE respondent-husband was set ex. parte since he did not appear to contest the matter after appearing for some time. The appellant appeared in person and filed her written note of argument on the basis of which this case is disposed of after perusal of records. ( 5 ) AS per lexical definition 'epilepsy' is a chronic functional disease of the nervous system, manifested by recurring attacks of sudden insensibility or impairment of consciousness, commonly accompanied by peculiar convulsive seizures. Though initially, 'recurrent attack of epilepsy' was a disqualification of marriage and was also made a ground for annulment of marriage; this ground was sought to be deleted by the legislature. The statement of objects and reasons of the Amendment Act 39 of 1999 reads as follows :- "statement OF OBJECTS AND reasons based on the recommendations of the Law commission of India as contained in their fifty-ninth Report on "hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 4 of the Special Marriage act, 1954 were amended vide the Marriage laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 so as to remove the doubts about the degree of lunacy. Ever since the aforesaid amendment came into force, the Central Government have been receiving representations from eminent medical experts, jurists and Members of Parliament for omission of references to "epilepsy" contained in the aforesaid Acts of 1955 and 1954 on the ground that medical experts have found that epilepsy is fairly well controllable in a majority of cases and the patients can lead a normal life and, therefore, equating "epilepsy" "to insanity" would do great injustice to patients suffering from epilepsy in matrimonial matters. The grounds for annulling a marriage by a decree of nullity as contained in Sectton 12 of the Hindu Marriage act, 1955 refers to Section 5 (ii) thereof. Similarly, the grounds for declaring a marriage as null and void by a decree of nullity as contained in Section 24 of the Special marriage Act, 1954 refers to Section 4 (b)thereof. Hence, the removal of references to "epilepsy" in Section 5 (H) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Section 4 (b) (iii) of the special Marriage Act, 1954 has the effect of non-availability of the ground of epilepsy for getting a decree of nullity of the marriage as well. In order to mitigate the hardships of the persons suffering from epilepsy on account of the aforesaid provisions, necessary amendments to remove reference to "epilepsy" in the 1955 and 1954 Acts are proposed. 2. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects. RAM JETHAMALANI" ( 6 ) THE amendment came into effect by the Marriage Law Amendment Act, 1999 (Act 39 of 1999) with effect from 29-12-1999 on which date it received the assent of the president. The words, "or epilepsy" in Section 5 (ii) (c) of the Act were omitted by the said amendment. Relevant portion of Sec. 5 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Act') prior to its amendment read as follow : "5. Conditions for a Hindu Marriage :-A marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus if the following conditions are fulfilled namely (i) xxxxxxxxxxxxx (ii) At the time of marriage, neither party - (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) has been subject to recurring attack of insanity or epilepsy. Relevant point of Section 12 of the Act (prior to its amendment) read as follows : 12. Voidable marriage- (1) Any marriage solemnized whether before or after commencement of this Act shall be voidable and may be annulled by a decree of nullity on any of the following grounds : (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) that the marriage is in contravention of the condition specified in Clause (ii) of section 5: or xx xxx xxx" ( 7 ) THUS, if the respondent was subjected to recurrent attacks of epilepsy, it was a ground for annulment of the marriage. It was the allegation of the husband that the wife was subjected to recurrent attacks of epilepsy and the learned trial Court also decreed the suit on this ground. The other ground on which the suit was decreed was that the fact that the respondent was suffering from epilepsy was fraudulently suppressed by her relatives from the husband. Therefore, epilepsy is the pivot on which the facts of the case revolve. The main questions which falls for consideration in this case are whether in fact the petitioner-wife was subjected to recurrent attacks of epilepsy and the finding of the learned Court in this regard is sustainable and whether a decree of annulment of marriage could have been granted on the said ground. ( 8 ) THE scanning of the pleadings and the evidence of the parties is necessary to find out as to whether the wife was suffering from recurrent attacks of epilepsy. In this regard, the petitioner has examined himself and has reiterated the facts narrated in his pleadings. He was a witness to epileptic fits of the wife, the first of which occurred before consummation of marriage. One neighbouring doctor, namely Dr. Bankim Patnaik was called and opined the wife to be suffering from fits of epilepsy. Not only that the husband was told by wife that she was suffering from epilepsy from her childhood. She asked to inform her parents, pursuant to which her mother came with medicines and her father came with all the prescriptions. The bunch of prescriptions stalling from Ext. 1 and 2 to 2/17 reveal that the petitioner was suffering from epilepsy and was subjected to recurrent attacks of epilepsy since her childhood and was under continuous treatment. Surprisingly this witness was not at all cross-examined by the respondent and there is note by the trial Court that "cross examination due to absence of the respondent declined". A careful perusal of the record reveals that no step was taken at any subsequent point of time to recall this witness for cross-examination though other witnesses appearing on behalf of the appellant were cross-examined. There is thus nothing to discredit the evidence of the husband. Since the documents have been marked without any objection, the contents thereof will also be read into evidence and it was not necessary to call for a doctor to prove the prescription. Nevertheless, the petitioner has examined one Dr. There is thus nothing to discredit the evidence of the husband. Since the documents have been marked without any objection, the contents thereof will also be read into evidence and it was not necessary to call for a doctor to prove the prescription. Nevertheless, the petitioner has examined one Dr. Brahamananda Acharya, who has stated that he was working as Asst. Professor of Neurosurgery in S. C. B. Medical College and Hospital and on 10-7-1985 he had treated the respondent for epilepsy. He has proved Ext. 2/13 to 2/16 and 2/27. He stated that in the year 1998 again she was taken to him by the petitioner for treatment. In cross-examination nothing has come out from his mouth to discredit his version. Another witness Dr. Maya Gantayat (P. W. 3) has proved Ext. 2/15 to be the prescription which she had granted in favour of Rajashree Mishra for epilepsy. On the other hand, the respondent herself who was examined as P. W. 2 has categorically admitted in her examination-in-chief itself that Dr. Bankim Pattnaik had treated her and opined that she should be treated under Dr. Brahmananda Acharya. In cross-examination, she has also admitted that she was suffering from epilepsy from her childhood and was under the treatment of Dr. Acharya since 1985, Her father Rama chandra Mishra who was examined as O. P. W. 1 has categorically stated in his examination-in-chief that the respondent was suffering from epilepsy but has claimed that after treatment she was cured. In cross-examination, he has stated that she was suffering from the age of 11 years to 15 years. Thus a joint reading of the evidence of both the sides and the admitted documents clearly prove that the petitioner was subjected to recurrent attacks of epilepsy. Thus the finding of the learned court below cannot be thrown out on this ground. ( 9 ) IT is claimed by the husband that the disease of the wife was not disclosed to him prior to the marriage and, therefore, the consent of marriage was obtained by perpetrating fraud upon him. His claim in this regard has not been challenged in cross-examination and no positive evidence has been adduced from the side of the wife that her disease was disclosed to the husband side. His claim in this regard has not been challenged in cross-examination and no positive evidence has been adduced from the side of the wife that her disease was disclosed to the husband side. On the other hand her claim in the written statement is that she was not at all suffering from epilepsy which claim she had to give up while deposing in Court. The conduct of the wife and her father show that they have not disclosed that she was suffering from epilepsy. A fraud was thus perpetrated on the husband since had he been aware of this fact he might not have consented to marry the respondent. It may be remembered here that when the suit was filed epilepsy was very much a ground of annulment of marriage. In this regard also the finding of the learned court below is sustainable. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, that is not the end of the matter. When the suit was filed in the year 1998, the ground of epilepsy was very much available for annulment of marriage. The marriage Law Amendment Act, 1999 (Act 39 of 1999) which received assent of the president on 29-12-1999 omitted the words "or epilepsy" from Section 5 (ii) (c) of the act. Therefore, when the suit came for judgment the ground of epilepsy was no longer available as a ground of annulment. The question now arises what effect the deletion of such ground will have on the pending suit. Whether the judgment will not be valid since the statute has been amended deleting the ground of epilepsy or whether the petitioner would be entitled to a decree for annulment of marriage notwithstanding the fact that such ground was no more available since he had filed the suit prior to such amendment. This question needs careful analysis. ( 11 ) THE appellant in her written notes of argument has cited certain decisions to show that the amendment should be held to be retrospective in operation and, therefore, the effect of the same would be that such ground was not available at any point of time to obtain a decree for annulment of marriage. The decisions are not of much help in the present scenario. It cannot be said categorically whether the amendment is prospective or retrospective in operation. The decisions are not of much help in the present scenario. It cannot be said categorically whether the amendment is prospective or retrospective in operation. It is definitely prospective inasmuch as after the amendment no suit for annulment of marriage pan be filed on the ground that the other spouse suffers from recurrent attack of epilepsy. However, if it is held that the amendment is unconditionally retrospective then the effect would be to nullify all judgments and decrees which have been obtained on this ground at any point of time since the advent of the Act. Such an interpretation is definitely not contemplated. ( 12 ) IN our view the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which provides for the effect of repeal can only be resorted to. At this stage, reference can be made to the law propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M/s. Ambalal Sarabhai enterprises Ltd. v. Armit Lal and Co. and another, reported in AIR 2001 SC 3580 which fits on all fours to this case. Paras-23, 24 and 25 of the said decision are quoted in extenso for the sake of clarity. "23. This leads us to the question, whether in a case where S. 6 of the General Clauses act is applicable, what effect it would have on a pending proceeding, when repealing provisions come into operation. It is not in dispute in the present case that the Delhi Rent act is the Central Act hence S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable. We may also record here, in none of the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsels application of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act was considered. It is not in dispute in the present case that the Delhi Rent act is the Central Act hence S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is applicable. We may also record here, in none of the aforesaid decisions cited by the learned counsels application of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act was considered. We may quote here S. 6 of the General clauses Act, 1897: "section 6 : Effect of repeal where this Act, or any (Central Act) or regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. " 24. The opening words of S. 6 specify the field over which it is operative. It is operative over all the enactment under the General Clauses Act, Central Act or Regulations made after the commencement of General clauses Act. It also clarifies in case of repeal of any provision under the aforesaid Act or regulation, unless a different intention appears from such repeal, it would have no effect over the matters covered in its subclauses, viz. , (a) to (e ). It also clarifies in case of repeal of any provision under the aforesaid Act or regulation, unless a different intention appears from such repeal, it would have no effect over the matters covered in its subclauses, viz. , (a) to (e ). It clearly specifies that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or in existence or effect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed statute, affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the repealed statute and also does not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. Thus, the Central theme which spells out is that any investigation or legal proceeding pending may be continued and enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not come into force. 25. As a general rule, in view of S. 6, the repeal of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment were still in force. In other words, such repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if the enactment has not been repealed. In fact, when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties gets crystallised on that date. The mandate of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. We find Clause (c) of S. 6, refers the words "any right, privilege, obligation acquired or accrued" under the repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. We may hasten to clarify here mere existence of right not being 'acquired' or 'accrued', on the date of the repeal would not get protection of S. 6 of the General clauses Act. " ( 13 ) THE above decision clinches the issue. In the present case, the wife was found to be suffering from recurrent attack of epilepsy and, therefore, the husband had a right to bring a suit for annulment of marriage on that basis. " ( 13 ) THE above decision clinches the issue. In the present case, the wife was found to be suffering from recurrent attack of epilepsy and, therefore, the husband had a right to bring a suit for annulment of marriage on that basis. He having done so before the amendment which omitted such ground came into force, his right got crystallized and cannot be subsequently defeated at any stage of the proceeding including appeal. In other words, it would be as if such a ground was not omitted for the husband. For the aforesaid reason the judgment of the Court below needs no interference. The appeal is bound to fail and is dismissed as such. Appeal dismissed. --- *** --- .