JUDGMENT P.K. Musahary, J. 1. Heard Mr. P.K. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. R.H. Nabam, learned senior Government advocate for State respondents. 2. 'Review' as a 'noun' in English, as per New Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary means an examination of something with the intention of changing it if necessary and as a 'verb' to carefully examine or consider something again especially so that you can decide if it is necessary to make change; synonymous to "Reassess", i.e., to review the evidence. To err is human. Human beings are fallible. Human fallibility is a universally accepted concept. With "Judges-are-also-fallible-as-human-beings", attitude which is of course, not deniable, the petitioner calls upon us to do an act of looking and offering something again for correction or improvement in the judgment and order of two hon'ble Judges, one of whom who presided over and spoke for the Division Bench, has retired already; and none of us is associated with the said Bench, so as to "grant all reliefs" as "may deem fit and proper" as a simple prayer "in the facts and circumstances of the case". 3. "A plea for review is like asking for the moon unless first judicial view is manifestly distorted" - once observed hon'ble Justice Krishna Iyer, Supreme Court, as his lordship then was. We, in India, are, so far obliged to follow the principle laid down in the forties by Federal Court in Raju Prithichand v. Sukhrai AIR 1941 FC 1, that Federal Court should not sit as a court of appeal from its own decision nor will it entertain applications of review for re-hearing and also that an order once passed is final and cannot be entertained except in certain exceptional circumstances to prevent irremediable injustice being done by the court of last resort as whereby some accident without any blame, the party has not been heard and an order has been made inadvertently as if the party had not been heard. 4. We shall discuss the legal questions involved in the case at hand, later. First, we shall narrate the facts, in short: The petitioner while working as a Junior Teacher in Ramakrishna Mission School, Along, the Secretary-cum-Principal of the School circulated notice dated 15.5.2003 directing all the teachers to attend a meeting on 17.5.2003. The petitioner put his signature and also wrote thereon "no agenda". First, we shall narrate the facts, in short: The petitioner while working as a Junior Teacher in Ramakrishna Mission School, Along, the Secretary-cum-Principal of the School circulated notice dated 15.5.2003 directing all the teachers to attend a meeting on 17.5.2003. The petitioner put his signature and also wrote thereon "no agenda". The infuriated Secretary-cum-Principal asked the petitioner to explain his conduct by 20.5.2003. The petitioner replied the same but his reply being found unsatisfactory, the Secretary-cum-Principal issued show-cause notice dated 21.5.2003 directing him to explain before the Inquiry Officer on 23.5.2003. The petitioner replied to the said notice on 22.5.2003 denying the allegation of misconduct. He also appeared before the Inquiry Officer as directed. On receipt of the reply, on the same day, i.e., 22.5.2003, the Secretary-cum-Principal informed the petitioner that the charge of misconduct against him stood "confirmed inasmuch as he has admitted and affirmed the responsibility for defacing the 'Signature Sheet' in his statement of 20th May, 2003" and directed him to explain his conduct before the Inquiry Officer on 23.5.2003. Accordingly, the petitioner appeared before the Inquiry Officer who was none other than the same Secretary-cum-Principal of Ramakrishna Mission School, Along. The said Secretary-cum-Principal acted as disciplinary authority, Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. The Secretary-cum-Principal forwarded the proceeding of the inquiry to the Secretary of the School Managing Committee, i.e., to himself. The said inquiry proceeding/report was placed before the meeting of the School Managing Committee on 24.5.2003, which was presided over by the Deputy Commissioner, Along, as its Chairman. In the said meeting, a resolution was passed reflecting various other alleged misconducts against the petitioner and authorizing the Secretary of the said Managing Committee to award a suitable punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offence in view of series of misconducts of the petitioner. The Secretary-cum-Principal of Ramakrishna Mission School, Along, attended the said meeting and signed the resolution also. Pursuant to the said resolution, the School Managing Committee demoting the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher w.e.f. 1.6.2003. The petitioner challenged the said punishment order in WP(C) 181(AP)/2003 before this Court. The learned Single Judge by judgment and order, 2.9.2005, while holding that the writ petition is maintainable, dismissed it on merit. Pursuant to the said resolution, the School Managing Committee demoting the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher w.e.f. 1.6.2003. The petitioner challenged the said punishment order in WP(C) 181(AP)/2003 before this Court. The learned Single Judge by judgment and order, 2.9.2005, while holding that the writ petition is maintainable, dismissed it on merit. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, the petitioner preferred a writ appeal being WA No. 610/2005 in the Principal seat of this Court, which was admitted on 18.11.2005 and on being transferred to Itanagar Bench, was renumbered as W.A. No. 23(AP)/2005. The learned Division Bench allowed the said writ appeal directing the petitioner appellant to submit ah appeal/representation under Rule 34 of Ramakrishna Mission School, Along, Service Rules, 1991. 5. The petitioner is dissatisfied with the observation made in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgment and order, dated 2.9.2005. Mr. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has pointed out that the observations made in paragraph 18 of the judgment aforementioned with the words "...the impugned order dated 31.5.2003 was rendered by the disciplinary authority on consideration of the report of show-cause inquiry held on 23.5.2003 as well as series of misconducts committed earlier by the writ petitioner" tend to give an impression that the disciplinary authority and Inquiry Officer were two different persons which is not correct and in fact, the disciplinary authority and the Inquiry Officer were same person. Further, the observations made in the same paragraph of the judgment and order with the words "...noticed that no specific representation against such show-cause notice has been made by the appellant/writ petitioner before the authority as contemplated under Clause 34 of the Service Rules...." reflects that the learned Division Bench failed to consider the report and the proceedings of the inquiry and passing of a resolution authorizing the Secretary-cum-Principal to impose penalty on the petitioner. According to Mr. Tiwari, submission of representation by the appellant to the appellate authority would be an empty formality and his grievance would never be addressed. According to Mr. Tiwari, submission of representation by the appellant to the appellate authority would be an empty formality and his grievance would never be addressed. The last observation in paragraph 18 of the said judgment and order to the effect that "...inquiry report preferable to the said incident may still provide a legal basis for the appropriate authorities to consider for further appropriate disciplinary action" is against the accepted principle of law that disciplinary authority cannot impose penalty by taking into consideration those extraneous matters which are not part of the charge and subject-matter of the inquiry. 6. Further, Mr. Tiwari, pointed out to paragraph 19 of the said judgment and order, wherein the learned Division Bench observed that "it would be in consonance with the rules of natural justice that the issue of penalty may be appropriately considered by the Managing Committee of Ramakrishna Mission School instead of Secretary and the said Managing Committee could also be in the position to appreciate the entire facts and circumstances and also to take a specific view as to whether the alleged misconduct under Clause 31 of the relevant Service Rules is attracted on appreciation of the materials on record". In regard to the above observations, it submitted that the learned Division Bench failed to notice that the Managing Committee after considering the proceedings of inquiry and the report of the inquiry officer recommended imposition of penalty on the petitioner and, hence, the consideration of penalty by the same Managing Committee would amount to post-decisional hearing. Such post-decisional hearing is no substitute for pre-decisional hearing. In regard to comments in paragraph 19 of the said judgment with the words "...considering the fact that the inquiry report with respect to the alleged misconduct referred to show-cause notice dated 25.5.2003 is in existence, the validity of which had not been specifically challenged in the writ proceeding", it is submitted that the petitioner was not required to challenge the validity of the inquiry report separately and the learned Division Bench failed to notice that the petitioner, while challenging the very legality of the departmental proceeding, contended that the same is incurably vitiated. 7. Referring to the case of State of Mysore v. Macchegowda AIR 1964 SC 506 , Mr. 7. Referring to the case of State of Mysore v. Macchegowda AIR 1964 SC 506 , Mr. Tiwari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the past alleged misconduct cannot be considered for imposing penalty if they are not included in the charge sheet. The ground was taken in the writ appeal but the learned Division Bench failed to consider the same. Direction to submit representation before the same School Managing Committee would not yield, quite naturally, any positive result except driving the petitioner from Caeser to Caeser. The inherent injustice can be rectified by suitably reviewing the judgment and order, to do full and effective justice to the petitioner in the light of decision rendered by the Supreme Court in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595. 8. The provision of review is provided under Article 137 of the Constitution of India to be exercised by the Supreme Court coupled with power to frame Rules under Clause (c) of Article 145 of the Constitution of India. In civil proceedings, power of review is provided under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, on the grounds of: (1) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or (2) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or (3) For any other sufficient reasons. High Court in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise power of revision under the provision of Order 47, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, inasmuch as it has been held by a 5-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 1909 , to the effect that there is nothing under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. Existence of power of review is not in dispute but the exercise of the said power is circumscribed by laws so far made by the Supreme Court; the important amongst those, for the purpose of deciding the present case, could be traced in the following cases. 9. The normal principle, as held in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1982) 2 SCC 167 , is that a judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so. For instance, if the attention of the court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, otherwise, the party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by the court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and taking a fresh decision. The court, as held in O.N. Mahindroo v. Distt. Judge, Delhi (1971) 3 SCC 5 , may reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass any order to do full and effective justice. Reference may be made to Col. Avtar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India 1980 (Supp) SCC 562, wherein it is held that review is not a routine procedure and the court cannot review its earlier order unless the court is satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. While holding so, it referred to earlier decision rendered in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib (1975) 1 SCC 674 , wherein it was held that a review of judgment in a case is a serious step and a reluctant resort to it is appropriate only where a glaring omission or a blatant misconduct like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality. Above all, the Apex Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224 , held that power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. It is further held that power of review can be exercised within the limit of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. 10. Law is, thus, well settled by now. Re-examination and re consideration is permissible in review on the basis of universally accepted basic philosophy that fallibility is inherent in all human beings. But then, in legal proceedings, the petitioner is to make out a clear case that either: (1) There is an inadvertent error apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished-out and searched, or (2) There is an error of law, or (3) The error pointed out in review petition was indeed a mistake and the earlier judgment would not have been passed but for erroneous assumption which infact did not exist, its perpetration shall result in a miscarriage of justice, or (4) the petitioner has not been heard for no fault of his and irremediable injustice has been done, or (5) There exist exceptional circumstances of a substantial and compelling character to make such an order as may be necessary in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court or it is necessary to do so for the sake of justice that is to say to do full and effective justice. 11. It can be seen from the facts narrated and contentions made in the petition that the review has neither been sought for on ground of and inadvertent error apparent on the face of the record nor on the ground of an error of law. There is not even a complaint of causing irremediable injustice to the petitioner for not being heard. The petitioner has attempted to show that the learned Division Bench, by directing the petitioner to file a representation/appeal before the Managing Committee, has committed an error of law inasmuch as the learned Division Bench failed to consider the accepted legal position that the disciplinary authority cannot award any punishment taking into account the past alleged misconduct of the delinquent which are not part of the Charge Sheet. We are not prepared to accept the same as an error of law, for, the learned Division Bench has directed the petitioner to file the representation/appeal before the Managing Committee so that it can reconsider the petitioner's case. The writ court, and for the matter, the writ appellate court cannot assume the power and function of the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority to correct the irregularities/illegalities committed by the disciplinary authority. 12. We are only to consider as to whether the error pointed out by the petitioner are the result of erroneous assumption of facts which did not exist and cause injustice to the petitioner or resulted in miscarriage of justice. We have carefully gone through the judgment in question. The learned Division Bench while delivering the judgment, in question, correctly appreciated the facts of the case as pleaded in the writ petition as well as the grounds taken in the writ appeal. The learned members of the Division Bench have noted their findings with comments based on their reasoning. The comments of the learned Judges, as pointed out by the petitioner, in our considered view, cannot be replaced by our comments. We see, no reason, whatsoever, to express different view or to differ from the judgment and order rendered by the learned Division Bench inasmuch as the writ appeal was allowed with a direction to the petitioner to file a representation/appeal before the Managing Committee leaving a scope for reconsideration of his case. The apprehension expressed by the petitioner that filing of a representation/appeal would tantamount to asking the delinquent to approach himself from Ceaser to Ceaser, in our consideration, is pre-mature inasmuch as the Managing Committee of the school has been directed to consider and dispose of the petitioner's representation/appeal in the light of the observations/directions made in the judgment and order passed by the learned Division Bench. 13. Last of all, we would like to discuss as to whether there is any exceptional circumstance of substantial and compelling character to review judgment and order in question arid as to whether it is necessary to review the same in the interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process of court. There is no denying the fact that the Principal is the secretary of the school Managing Committee. There is no denying the fact that the Principal is the secretary of the school Managing Committee. He issued the notice to the petitioner asking for explanation on his alleged misconduct, conducted inquiry, submitted inquiry report to himself as secretary of the Managing Committee, convened a meeting of the Managing Committee, placed the inquiry proceeding/report before the Managing Committee and got a resolution passed in a meeting of the Managing Committee authorizing himself to award appropriate punishment. He was admittedly present in the said meeting of the Managing Committee, and also signed the proceeding/resolution. There is also no denying the fact that he passed the award of punishment demoting the petitioner to Assistant Teacher in the capacity of Secretary-cum-Principal of the School Managing Committee. There is a clear finding to the effect that the Managing Committee did not appoint any inquiry officer or presenting officer to conduct the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner. The Secretary-cum-Principal of the Managing Committee though authorized under the Rules to act as inquiry officer, conducted the inquiry without examining any witnesses. Thus, there was no proper inquiry or disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner as per the accepted procedure. This omission/mistake is committed by the school Managing Committee for which the learned Division Bench directed the petitioner of file a representation/appeal before the Managing Committee this misconduct has been brought to our notice and now, we have to see as to whether any direction can be given to the Managing Committee to rectify the mistake in the interest of justice and to do full and effective justice to the petitioner. In Lily Thomas (supra), it is held that law is to bend before justice and justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers of the rules or procedures or technicalities of law which cannot stand in the way of administration of justice. We can read this into the provision under Order 47 , Rule 1(1)(c) of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides that review can be made 'for any other sufficient reasons'. The expression 'for any other sufficient reasons' has been given an expanded meaning. A decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances, has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise of power of review. The expression 'for any other sufficient reasons' has been given an expanded meaning. A decree or order passed under misapprehension of true state of circumstances, has been held to be sufficient ground to exercise of power of review. The petitioner, no doubt, could not make out a case of the 'rarest of rare cases' in the present case, but, in our considered view, he has been able to make out a case, under the aforesaid expression 'for any other sufficient reasons' which would not preclude the court from exercising power of review to rectify, even if the judgment and order, in question, is taken as the final order, to give full and effective justice, else, it would be oppressive to judicial conscience and would cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice. 14. We have noted that the petitioner has called upon this Court "to grant all the reliefs as sought for in the writ appeal, namely, setting aside the impugned order dated 31.5.2003 imposing the penalty of reduction in rank and reinstate him to the post of Junior Teacher with all consequential benefits". We are not oblivious of the limited scope in exercising the power of review and such reliefs as sought for by the petitioner could be considered in a proceeding in an appeal only. The review court is not to consider the matter as a court of appeal and as such, it is not permissible under the law to grant the petitioner all the reliefs claimed in the writ appeal. 15. Considering all aspects of the matter in the light of the attending facts and circumstances and the law established, we are not inclined to review judgment and order in question as demanded by the petitioner, except providing that the representation/appeal, if filed by the petitioner before the school Managing Committee as directed by the learned Division Bench shall be reconsidered by the said Managing Committee without allowing Swami Sumedhananda, if he is still functioning as Secretary-cum-Principal of the respondent-school, to participate in the proceeding of the meeting of reconsideration of the petitioner's case so that he cannot influence the Managing Committee in taking its decision as an appellate authority. It may also be provided that if Swami Sumedhananda is no longer serving as Secretary-cum-Principal of the respondent-school, the Managing Committee would be at liberty to allow the new Secretary-cum-Principal to participate in the proceeding of the meeting. 16. It may also be provided that if Swami Sumedhananda is no longer serving as Secretary-cum-Principal of the respondent-school, the Managing Committee would be at liberty to allow the new Secretary-cum-Principal to participate in the proceeding of the meeting. 16. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this review petition stands disposed of.