Judgment : This appeal is filed by the United India Insurance Company Limited challenging the award dated 29.03.2001 in O.P.No.170 of 1997 on the file of the Court of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal cum - District Judge, Srikakulam. By impugned award the learned Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- as prayed to respondent Nos.1 and 2 (claimants) for death of Manduru Vasudevayya. The accident occurred on 25.04.1983 at 6.00 pm when Vasudevayya and others were proceeding in a tractor-trailor as coolies. A lorry bearing No.OSG 245 dashed against the tractor trailor, as a result of impact, tractor-trailor fell down. Vasudevayya died on the spot. Alleging that he was earning Rs.900/- per month and aged 45 years, the amount as stated was claimed. The insurer opposed the O.P, inter alia, on the ground that there was no negligence on the part of the lorry that the claim is exorbitant, and that O.P is barred by limitation. First claimant (wife of deceased) gave evidence as P.W.1. Exs.A1 to A9 were marked. There was no evidence let in on behalf of the insurer. Considering the evidence, learned Tribunal answered the two issues as well as additional issue in favour of the claimants and awarded the amount as prayed for. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that when the accident occurred on 25.04.1983, the petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, filed on 13.05.1997 is barred by limitation. Per contra, learned Counsel for the claimants submits that the right that is accrued to the claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (old Act, for brevity), did not extinguish even after repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (new Act, for brevity), and therefore, by reason of the amendment deleting Section 166(3) of the new Act providing for limitation, question of limitation does not apply. He placed reliance on Vinod Gurudas Raikar v National Insurance Company Limited (1991) 4 SCC 333 = AIR 1991 SC 2156 = 1991 ACJ 1060 , National Insurance Company Limited v Swaranlata Das AIR 1993 SC 1259 = 1993 Supp (2) SCC 743 = 1993 ACJ 748 , and Dhannalal v D.P.Vijayvargiya (1996) 4 SCC 652 = AIR 1996 SC 2155 = 1996 ACJ 1013. The short question that requires consideration is whether a petition under Section 166(1) of the new Act would be maintainable claming damages for the death of person in a motor accident involving a motor vehicle insured by authorized insurer when the old Act is in force and right to claim compensation accrued to the persons while the old Act was in force. New Act came into force on 01.07.1989 repealing old Act. Section 166(3) of the new Act provided for limitation of six months for filing an application before the Tribunal under Section 166(1) of the new Act, duly conferring power on the Tribunal to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Section 166(3) of the new Act was deleted by Central Act No.54 of 1994 (amendment Act) with effect from 14.11.1994. The amendment Act is, however, silent as to whether deletion of Section 166(3) of the new Act providing for limitation is restrospective. Be that as it is, a perusal of Section 166(1) of the new Act would show that an application for compensation arising out of an accident by the use of motor vehicles of the nature specified in Section 165(1) of the new Act may be made to the Tribunal by the person who sustained injury or where death has resulted, by the legal heir of the deceased. Section 165(1) of the new Act empowers the State Government to constitute Motor Accident Claims Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating upon the claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. "Accidents involving death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" can only mean that accidents arising out of use of motor vehicles after the enactment of new Act. However, by reason of Section 214(1) of the new Act proceedings initiated under the old Act are deemed to have been continued. "Accidents involving death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" can only mean that accidents arising out of use of motor vehicles after the enactment of new Act. However, by reason of Section 214(1) of the new Act proceedings initiated under the old Act are deemed to have been continued. After coming into force of the new Act from 01.07.1989 though the Tribunals were continued as reconstituted Tribunals to adjudicate the claims filed under Section 110-A of the old Act, initially the claims arising out of accident which accrued prior to 01.07.1989 were also filed under Section 166(1) of the new Act with applications for condonation of delay wherever there was delay. In Vinod Gurudas Raikar (supra) the Supreme Court considered the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, on the delayed claims filed after coming into force of the new Act. In the said case the claim petition was filed on 15.03.1990 by the person who was injured in motor accident occurred on 22.01.1989. Contention was raised that the right that accrued under the old Act cannot get extinguished even after a period of six months and even if the new Act comes into force. The Supreme Court did not accept the principle. Their Lordships laid down as under. It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is whether the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy... Yet again it was held. The second exception is whether the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy... Yet again it was held. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause'also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause ot action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. In Swaranlata Das (supra) the ratio in Vinod Gurudas Raikar (supra) was culled out as follows. Shri Sharma stated that the provisions in the 1988 Act in this behalf detract from their counterpart in the 1939 Act. He submitted that the position that even in respect of claims arising out of accidents occurring before the commencement of the 1988 Act but instituted after its commencement are governed by Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act is settled by a pronouncement of this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raiker v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 1991 (4) SCC 333 : ( AIR 1991 SC 2156 ). Shri Sharma is right in this submission. The pronouncement of this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raiker's case (supra) supports it... In Dhannalal (supra) interpreting Section 166(3) of the new Act (since omitted by amendment Act), the Supreme Court laid down as follows. ...It has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. ...It has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166, is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised.....When sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act 54 of 1994, by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158, which provides : "As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner of such report, forward the some to such Claims Tribunal and Insurer". In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information / report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days or receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days or receipt of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said section by the Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14-11-1994, in respect of the accident which took place on 4-12-1990, in view of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation. Yet again the Supreme Court observed as follows. The matter will be different if any claimant having filed a petition for claim beyond time which has been rejected by the Tribunal or the High Court, the claimant does not challenge the same and allows the said judicial order to become final. The aforesaid Amending Act shall be of no help to such claimant. The reason being that a judicial order saying that such petition of claim was barred by limitation has attained finality. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. But that principle will not govern cases where the dispute as to whether petition for claim having been filed beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident is pending consideration either before the Tribunal, High Court or this Court. In such cases, the benefit of amendment of sub-section (3) of Section 166 should be extended. From the three decisions referred to hereinabove, it may be taken as well settled that claims arising out of accident occurring before commencement of the new Act but instituted after its commencement are governed by Section 166(3) of the new Act. After deletion of Section 166(3) of the new Act, the plea of limitation cannot be raised, and the benefit of deletion of Section 166(3) of the new Act shall have to be extended even to the pending applications for condonation of delay. Thus, it is clear that all the claim petitions filed after the new Act in relation to the accident that occurred before commencement of new Act have to be dealt with as per Section 166(3) of the new Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 54 of 1994. In this case, claimants did not file any application seeking condonation of delay, and therefore, learned Tribunal was in error in proceeding with the matter without going into this aspect of the matter. Learned Counsel for claimants submits that as the offending vehicle was registered in the State of Orissa, the delay might have occurred. But, the claimants did not take any steps to put forth such a case before the learned Tribunal. It is, therefore, a fit case to remand the matter to Tribunal. Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed and the impugned award is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal - cum -District Judge, Srikakulam, to decide the matter afresh. Liberty is given to respondent Nos.1 and 2 (claimants) to file appropriate application under Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it stood prior to amendment, and seek condonation of delay. There shall be no order as to costs.