AMAR SARAN AND R. N. MISRA, JJ. By means of these five writ petitions which are being disposed of by this com mon order, the petitioner has prayed for quashing: the F. I. Rs. dated 4. 2. 2009 in Case Crime No. 76 of 2009, 52 of 2009, F. I. Rs. dated 5. 2. 2009 in Case Crime No. 35 of 2009, 17 of 2009, F. I. R. dated 6. 2. 2009 in Case Crime No. 27 of 2009, under sections 419, 420 and 380 IPC, 420 IPC, 420 IPC, 356 IPC and 419 and 420 IPC, lodged in Police Stations Dhoomanganj, George Town, Khuldabad, Attarsuiya and Shahganj, dis trict Allahabad, respectively. 2. The allegations in the F. I. Rs. in the writ petitions are similar that two persons had duped certain ladies in some colonies in Allahabad town, after entering their homes usually in the absence of their spouses, and then by overpowering the women by hypnotism or other means or by practising some deception and fraud and thereafter relieving them of their gold and jewellery. The F. I. Rs were lodged against two unknown persons on 4. 2. 2009, 5. 2. 2009 and 6. 2. 2009 with respect to the incidents which took place in the houses of the vic tim women, who were divested of their jewellery. 3. On 13. 2. 2009 the co-accused Ashwani Kumar Duggai alias Kale was ar rested by the police of Police Station Khuldabad, when the informant Govind Swaroop Khanna of Case Crime No. 35 of 2009 accompanied by his wife Geeta Khanna informed the Police Station that the two persons, who were involved in the in cident at their house on 5. 2. 2009 had been seen in the Allahabad Railway station compound near the motorcycle stand. At about 3 p. m. , the co-accused Ashwani Ku mar was picked up along with his motor cycle near the railway station motorcycle stand. The petitioner is said to have made good his escape. From Ashwanis posses sion, several items of gold and other jewel lery were recovered. Some of the other per sons, who had also been similarly duped by the accused persons and had lodged the aforementioned reports arrived there, and identified the co-accused as the person who had entered their house, and also the jewel lery which they had been relieved of. Some of the other per sons, who had also been similarly duped by the accused persons and had lodged the aforementioned reports arrived there, and identified the co-accused as the person who had entered their house, and also the jewel lery which they had been relieved of. The co-accused Ashwani Kumar Duggai con fessed that he relieved some women of their jewellery on 4th, 5th and 6th Febru ary, 2009 by means of the dupe practised by the co-accused, along with his brother, the petitioner. 4. It is argued by the learned Coun sel for the petitioner that the statement made by the co-accused to the police is in admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act and thus there is no evidence against the petitioner. In this connection he has drawn our attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in Jay Prakash v. State of U. P. , 2005 (53) ACC 17 that the recoveries, if at all, could only be used against the co-accused Ashwani Kumar Duggai from whom they had been made under section 27 or 8 of the Evidence Act, and could not be used against the petitioner at all. Simi larly reliance was placed in the case of Sa hib Singh v. State of Haryana, 1997 (35) ACC 355 (SC ). for the proposition that the confessional statement must be substantially proved and could only be admitted in evidence, if it was not hit by sections 24, 25 and 26 of the Evi dence Act i. e. if it had not been obtained by inducement or coercion, and a confes sion to the police could not be admitted in evidence. Another case cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners was Bheru Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 (31) ACC 240 (SC) that the statement of an accused, which amounted to his conduct could also be used under section 8 of the Evidence Act, but the said confessional statement could only be used against the particular accused and against no other accused. He has also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (58) ACC 1061 (SC) for the proposition that extra judicial- confessions are of limited value, and it is for the Court to act cautiously upon them. He has also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra, 2007 (58) ACC 1061 (SC) for the proposition that extra judicial- confessions are of limited value, and it is for the Court to act cautiously upon them. Another case cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was Abdul Rashid v. State of Bihar, 2001 (42) ACC 693 (SC ). which again reiterated the position that confessions made before a police officer are inadmissible in evidence in Court. 5. Whilst broadly we do not dispute the legal propositions laid down in the aforesaid law reports, we think they have no application at all at this stage in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In our view the basic fallacy in the petitioners line of argument is that for disposing of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, at this primary stage when the police has only commenced investiga tion, and arrested a co-accused from whom some recoveries have been made, and who has disclosed the petitioners complicity in the crime, the eventual legal admissibility of the material in possession of the police can be looked into. The issue of the legally admissible evidentiary value of the infor mation with the police does not come up for consideration at this stage at all. Basi cally the value of the "evidence" is a matter to be considered after the commencement of the trial when evidence is led by the prosecution under section 231 and the de fence under section 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an offence exclu sively triable by the Court of Sessions, or under sections 242 and 243 Cr. P. C. by the prosecution and defence in the trial of a warrant case by a Magistrate instituted upon a police report, or under sections 244 and 247 Cr. P. C. in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report. In sum mons cases triable by Magistrates the prosecution and defence evidence is led under section 254 Cr. P. C. or under section 264 Cr. P. C in cases tried summarily by a Magistrate in Chapter XXI for trial of summons cases. 6. P. C. in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report. In sum mons cases triable by Magistrates the prosecution and defence evidence is led under section 254 Cr. P. C. or under section 264 Cr. P. C in cases tried summarily by a Magistrate in Chapter XXI for trial of summons cases. 6. It is significant to note that at the stage of investigation, under section 41 (1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, all that is required for a police officer ar resting a person without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant is only that person may be said to be concerned with a cognizable offence, or against him a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been so concerned. The basic flaw in the petitioners contention is that there is no requirement under this provision that admissible evidence must be available at the stage. Hence all the cases cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, which relate to the appellate post trial stage are clearly inapplicable to the circumstances of the present case. At the initial stage, if a co-accused, who is arrested with stolen prop erty or property illegally acquired in circumstances which raise suspicion of the commission of any offence, and if this accused discloses a few names about the complicity of any other accused in the offence, could it not be said that there was prima facie material which would amount to "credible information" or give rise to a "reasonable suspicion" about the complic ity of the accused whose name was dis closed by the arrested accused, for the po lice officer to act on the information even by arresting the accused, if the police offi cer considers it necessary. Moreover, such an arrest may also be necessary as the co-accused may be needed for interrogation or for effecting some further recoveries and it would be the grossest abuse of the process of the Court, if on the strength of such "learned" arguments about the ultimate admissibility or inadmissibility of the "evidence" in Court, this Court was to inter fere with the investigation and to stay the hands of the police from arresting the ac cused or recording his statement or getting some recoveries effected at this initial stage in the investigation. In Adri Dharan Das v. State of W. B. , 2005 (51) ACC 706 (SC) = 2005 (27) AIC 8 (SC) the necessity of arrest for vari ous aspects of investigation has been clari fied. The said passage reads as follows: "ordinarily, arrest is a part of the proc ess of investigation intended to se cure several purposes. The accused may have to be questioned in detail regarding various facets of motive, preparation, commission and af termath of the crime and the connection of other persons, if any, in the crime. There may be circum stances in which the accused may provide information leading to dis covery of material facts. It may be necessary to curtail his freedom in order to enable the investigation to proceed without hindrance and to protect witnesses and persons con nected with the victim of the crime, to prevent his disappearance to maintain law and order in the lo cality. For these or other reasons, arrest may become an inevitable part of the process of investigation. The legality of the proposed arrest cannot be gone into in application under section 438 of the Code. The role of the investigator is well de fined and the jurisdictional scope of interference by the Court in the process of investigation is limited. The Court ordinarily will not inter fere with the investigation of a crime or with the arrest of the ac cused in a cognizable offence. An interim order restraining arrest, if passed while dealing with an ap plication under section 438 of the Code will amount to interference in the investigation, which cannot, at any rate, be done under section 438 of the Code. " As an illustration, if a terrorist like Kasab whilst in custody names other persons also as being conspirators in a crime with him, would it not be a travesty of law if the police is precluded from taking action against those accused persons, because an argument is advanced in the High Court that any confession made in the presence of the Police Officer is inadmissible in evi dence in view of section 25 of the Evidence Act. 7. Another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that different ages of the two persons, who were said to have been involved in the crimes, were mentioned in the different F. I. Rs. 7. Another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was that different ages of the two persons, who were said to have been involved in the crimes, were mentioned in the different F. I. Rs. by the different ladies in the differ ent localities of Allahabad, hence, the identity of the petitioner becomes ques tionable. In one F. I. R. their ages were de scribed as 25-35 years, in another F. I. R. their ages were described as 30-40, in a third F. I. R. their ages were described as 40 or 45 years, in another F. I. R. they were only described as two persons were described as two youths in yet another F. I. R. We think that nothing material turns on these minor discrepancies made in describing the ac cused persons by the duped ladies to their husbands and the value of such discrepan cies if any can be considered by the investi gating agency or the Trial Court. Certainly such minor variations can provide no ground for quashing the F. I. R. S at this stage. 8. It was next submitted that the petitioner was physically handicapped and was suffering from ankylosis of the right foot, but this fact has not been noted in the FIRs. In the first place this defence material cannot be looked at the stage vide Savita v. State of Rajasthan (2005) 12 SCC 338 at page 340. We do not know whether the petitioners leg was cov ered or uncovered as has been shown in the photograph annexed with the petition and from the mere fact that there was no mention that one of the accused, the peti tioner had some defect in his leg, provides no ground for raising such a dispute re garding his identity so as to justify quash ing the investigation against him. 9. It was also argued that the peti tioner was living separately from his brother Ashwani Kumar Duggal with whom he was inimical and the petitioner has a separate ration card. He had even moved an application on 24. 12. 2008 before the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar that he had separated himself from his brother. This again is a defence document which cannot be considered at this stage. Moreo ver we do not know whether the said document has been given by way of peshbandi or is a genuine document. He had even moved an application on 24. 12. 2008 before the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar that he had separated himself from his brother. This again is a defence document which cannot be considered at this stage. Moreo ver we do not know whether the said document has been given by way of peshbandi or is a genuine document. At any rate, these are all matters for examination by the investigating agency or the Trial Court and cannot be examined in this writ petition. There is thus no substantiation of the petitioners plea that the co-accused has falsely implicated him in this case because of some enmity. 10. The veracity of the incident is cor roborated by the recovery of the various items of gold and jewellery from the pos session of the co-accused, which different duped women were deprived of who have identified the co-accused as well as their jewellery which was recovered from him. This co-accused has nominated his brother, the petitioner as also being involved in this offence. There was also no good reason for the police to falsely nominate the petitioner if he had no hand in the offence. 11. We therefore find no good ground for interfering with the investigation in this case, or for quashing the FIR or for restrain ing the police from arresting the petitioner. There is thus no force in these writ peti tions, which are accordingly dismissed. .