ORDER 1. They are heard. 2. The present petition is filed by the petitioner challenging the part of order dated 4.1.2007, Annexure P/l. By this order, the respondents have given promotion to the petitioner as Ticket Examiner with effect from 26.2.1983. It is also directed by the respondents that the petitioner will be given notional promotion on the aforesaid post from 26.2.1993. It is also stated in the order that after promotion of the petitioner with effect from 26.2.1993 as Ticket Examiner, the petitioner shall not claim any future promotion on that basis. This part of the order is being challenged by the petitioner. 3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the aforesaid order of promotion was passed on the basis of a judgment passed by this Court in W.P. No. 858/93 decided by this Court on 31'st October, 1994. It is to be seen that once a proforma promotion has been given to the petitioner as Ticket Examiner from 26.2.1993 then the petitioner shall certainly be entitled to claim the seniority and other consequential benefits excluding the monetary benefits from the date the notional benefit is given on promotion as Ticket Examiner with effect from 26.2.1993. The petitioner's promotion shall be treated to be a notional promotion but according to this Court the respondents were justified in directing the said impugned order that the petitioner shall not be entitled for any promotion on the basis of his proforma promotion as Ticket Examinere with effect from 26.2.1993. 4. On behalf of the respondent, it is contended that the said condition was imposed on the basis of a letter issued by the petitioner himself which has been agreed by the petitioner and the management. It is to be seen on record, no agreement as such has been passed by the respondents along with the return. Apart from the aforesaid, the condition as such which has been imposed of not claiming the promotion on the basis of the petitioner's proforma promotion with effect from 26.2.1993 as Ticket Examiner cannot be decided in the eye of law because once the petitioner has been given promotion on the said post from a particular date and has also been debarred for not claiming any monetary benefits from the date the promotion is given then the question of seniority on the basis of proforma promotion from a particular date does not arise. 5. 5. In this regard, I may refer here a judgment in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 wherein the apex Court has considered the aforesaid question with regard to contract accepted by an employee and apex Court has held that merely because an employee has accepted the conditions of the contract that by itself would not be enough only and if condition as such are not arbitrary and violation of Article i 4. ·The apex Court has further considered that in a contract, the parties are not equal and therefore there is no question of there being any bargaining by an employee against an employer. The relevant paragraph are reproduced as under:- Should then our courts not advance with the times? Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the day? Should all jurisprudential development pass us by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of nineteenth-centuary theories? Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the Courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample under foot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges are bound by their oath to "uphold the Constitution and the laws". The Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Art. 14. This principle is that, the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No Court can visualize the different situation which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No Court can visualize the different situation which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livehood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be., This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contractil1g parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The Court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. 94. The normal rule of Common Law has been that a party who seeks to enforce an agreement which is opposed to public policy will be non-petition vide order dated 16.5.2005 passed in writ petition No.1 04/203. The respondent further contended that because the order of termination was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing when conducing enquiry, hence, the order of termination was illegal. The respondent further contended that because the order of termination was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing when conducing enquiry, hence, the order of termination was illegal. In the aforesaid writ petition the appellant resisted the claim of the respondent No. 4/original petitioner on the ground that the respondent No.4 filed the writ petition after a period of seven years, hence, there was delay and laches on the part of the respondent. It was further contended that meanwhile the respondents also elected Panch of the Gram Panchayat. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent vide impugned order on the ground that the service of the respondent was terminated without conducting any enquiry or giving any opportunity of hearing, hence, the order of termination was bad in law. The learned Single Judge further observed that a similar petition W.P. No. 104/2003 has been allowed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, hence, the petition of the respondent also deserve to be allowed. On the basis of aforesaid findings, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition of the answering respondent. 4. From the facts of the case, it is clear that the service of the respondent No.4 from the post of Anganwadi Worker was terminated vide order dated 1.6.2000 and she filed the petition before the High Court in the year 2007 challenging the order ofterrninatioI1, nearly after a period of seven years. Although she explained the reason of delay in filing the petition that another petition of similarly situated employee against the order of termination was allowed by the High Court, hence, the petition of the original petitioner-respondent No.4 be also allowed. 5. It is an undisputed fact that the respondent No.4 filed the petition before the Court after a period of seven years. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nadia Distt. Primary School Council and another v. Sristidhar Biswas and others, reported in (2007) 12 SCC 779 , has held as under with regard to delay and laches:- "9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the person who had not approached the Court in time and waited for the result of the decision of other cases cannot stand to benefit. The Court only gives to benefit to the persons who are vigilant about their rights and not who sit on the fence. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the person who had not approached the Court in time and waited for the result of the decision of other cases cannot stand to benefit. The Court only gives to benefit to the persons who are vigilant about their rights and not who sit on the fence. Mallick case was decided in 1987; in 1989 Dibakar Pal filed the petition and thereafter, petition filed by Dibakar Pal challenging the Panel of 1980 was hopelessly belated. Likewise, the present writ petition filed by the respondents herein. The explanation that the respondent waited for the judgment in Sirazul Haque Mallick case or Dibakar Pal is hardly relevant. 10. In this connection, learned counsel invited our attention to a recent decision of this Court in Chairman, U.P Jal Nigam v. Jaswnt Singh. In that case, referring to various decisions of this Court, it was observed that those who sit on the fence and wait for a favourable order and therafter wake up to take up the matter, are not entitled to any relief. In Para 13 of the judgment, this Court concluded as follows: (SCC p. 471) "13. In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondent are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petition as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the reliefis granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provision of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely required the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the Court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?" 11. In the present case, the panel was prepared in 1980 and the petitioners approached the Court in 1989 after the decision in Dibakar Pal. Such persons should not be given any benefit by the Court when they allowed more than nine years to elapse. Delay is very significant in matter of granting relief and Courts cannot come to the rescue of the persons who are not vigilant about their rights. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court condoning the delay of nine years cannot be countenanced." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation and another v. labar Singh and others, reported in (2007) 2 SCC 112, has held as under with regard to delay and laches :"43. We are unable to countenance the above submission of Mr. Mehta and Mr. Sangal insofar is it relates to the non-maintainability of the writ petition and the delay and laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraph supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 1 0 years and that the laches. We have already referred to the decision of this Court in U.P State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey. This Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical terms that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out." 6. As per the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court even some order has been passed in favour of a person, another person could not be permitted to get the relief after a long delay from the Court. As per the principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court even some order has been passed in favour of a person, another person could not be permitted to get the relief after a long delay from the Court. The Court has specifically observed that the Court grants benefits to the persons, who are vigilant about their rights and not who sits on the fence". Looking to the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in our opinion, no relief could be granted in favour of the answering respondent No.4 on the ground of delay and laches. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of J.N. Ganatra v. Morvi Municipality, Morvi reported in AIR 1996 SC 2520 , which has been cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No.4 is distinguishable on facts and it is not applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed: The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside. No order as to costs.