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2009 DIGILAW 88 (KAR)

State by Rural Police v. Vithal Muttappa Kanamadi

2009-01-31

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR, K.N.KESHAVANARAYANA

body2009
JUDGMENT K.N. Keshavanarayana, J,-- This appeal filed under Section 378(1) and (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the State is directed against the judgment and order dated 26-8-2003 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur in SC No. 128 of 2002, acquitting the Respondents-accused of the charges levelled against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302, 341 and 304A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is as under: 3. One Shobha, the deceased in the case was the second daughter of P.W. 1-Smt. Kasturi wife of late Bhimappa Karennavar. They were residents of Yellammawadi Kokatnur Village of Sindagi Taluk in Bijapur District. The said Shobha was married to first accused Vithal Muttappa Kanamadi. Second accused Kamalawwa is the mother and the third accused Kasturi is the sister of first accused. All the accused are residents of Tikota Village in Bijapur Taluk. The marriage of said Shobha with the first accused was solemnised about 7 or 8 months prior to 7-7-2002. After the marriage said Shobha started living with the accused 1 and 2 in Tikota Village to lead her married life. Third accused was residing in the adjacent house with her family. For some time after the marriage, said Shobha was looked after well and affectionately by the accused. After about three months of the marriage, the accused started coercing the deceased to bring Rs. 10,000/- from her mother purportedly for renovation of their garage. When Shobha visited her parental house she informed P.W. 1 about the demand for Rs. 10,000/-made by the accused. However, P.W. 1 pleaded her inability to comply with the said demand. The said demand by the accused continued even thereafter and P.W. 1 could not comply with the said demand. On 6-7-2002, P.W. 1 came to the house of the accused in Tikota Village to bring her daughter Shobha back to her house on the eve of first Aashada after the marriage. On arrival of P.W. 1, the accused questioned P.W. 1 as to whether she had brought money as demanded by them. However, since P.W. 1 stated that she had not brought any money, the accused proclaimed that they would deal the said Shobha suitably. On arrival of P.W. 1, the accused questioned P.W. 1 as to whether she had brought money as demanded by them. However, since P.W. 1 stated that she had not brought any money, the accused proclaimed that they would deal the said Shobha suitably. In the early morning of 7-7-2002, P.W. 1 went out of the house of the accused for answering second call of nature, and at about 6.00 a.m., when she returned near the house of the accused, she heard the screams of her daughter Shobha from inside the house of third accused and she saw the first and the third accused holding her daughter Shobha and the second accused pouring kerosene on her and setting fire. On seeing this, P.W. 1 shouted for help. However, at that time, the accused shut the door of the house and at that time some neighbours also came there. After some time, when the door of the house was opened, P.W. 1 found her daughter Shobha lying dead with burn injuries. Immediately she informed her relatives over telephone and after her brother-P.W. 2-Prahlad - reached the scene of occurrence at about 11.00 a.m., P.W. 1 narrated the incident to him. As narrated by P.W. 1, P.W. 2 scribed the complaint-Ex. P. 1 and lodged the same before P.W. 12-S.R. Biradar, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, Tikota Police Station, who, based on the said complaint, registered the case in Crime No. 80 of 2002 against the accused persons and dispatched the first information report (Ex. P. 9) to the Jurisdictional Magistrate. The FIR reached the Magistrate at about 4.45 p.m. on the same day. P.W. 12 after registering the case, requested the Tahsildar over telephone to conduct the inquest mahazar on the body of the deceased, as her death had occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Accordingly, P.W. 7-Bahusaheb Ganapatrao Shinde, the then Tahsildar of Bijapur Taluk, conducted the inquest on the dead body of the deceased between 2 to 3 p.m. inside the house of the accused 3 and thereafter sent the body for post-mortem examination. P.W. 9-Dr. Ravindra Vithal Kadarkoppa conducted post-mortem at the primary health centre, Tikota, between 3.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. on the same day. During the inquest, the Tahsildar noticed 100% burn injuries over the body. The doctor, who conducted the post-mortem opined that the death was due to burnt shock. P.W. 9-Dr. Ravindra Vithal Kadarkoppa conducted post-mortem at the primary health centre, Tikota, between 3.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. on the same day. During the inquest, the Tahsildar noticed 100% burn injuries over the body. The doctor, who conducted the post-mortem opined that the death was due to burnt shock. P.W. 12 during the investigation conducted spot mahazar, recovered the kerosene can, matchbox, etc., from the scene of offence, recorded the statements of material witnesses, and arrested the accused persons. P.W. 13-Bhimappa Yamanappa Bellubbi, Circle Inspector of Police, who took up further investigation of the case, collected post-mortem report, sketch of the scene of occurrence prepared by the PWD Engineer and also other necessary documents and after completing the investigation laid the charge-sheet against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 341 and 504 read with Section 34 of IPC. 4. Upon production of the accused persons before the learned Magistrate, they were subjected to judicial custody and the remained in judicial custody till completion of the trial. During the trial, second accused-mother of the first accused died on 28-1-2003 and therefore, the case against the second accused was closed as abated and the trial was proceeded against the accused 1 and 3. 5. The learned Sessions Judge, on committal of the case and after hearing both the sides, framed charges for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 302 and 341 read with Section 34 of IPC and in the alternative for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC against the accused 1 and 3. The accused pleaded not guilty for the charges levelled against them and claimed to be tried. 5. During the trial before the learned Sessions Judge, the prosecution, to bring home the guilt of the accused persons of the charges levelled against them, examined in all 13 witnesses as P. Ws. 1 to 13, got marked documents as per Exs. P. 1 to P. 11 and produced material objects M. Os. 1 and 2. After the prosecution closed its side of evidence, the learned Sessions Judge examined the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, wherein the accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The accused did not choose to lead any defence evidence. 1 and 2. After the prosecution closed its side of evidence, the learned Sessions Judge examined the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, wherein the accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. The accused did not choose to lead any defence evidence. The defence of the accused was one of total denial, asserting that they have been falsely implicated in the case. During the cross-examination of P.W. 1, the defence had made a feeble attempt to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, as such the death of the deceased Shobha was not a homicidal one. 7. The learned Sessions Judge, after the trial and on assessment of oral and documentary evidence, by the judgment and order under appeal, held that the deceased Shobha met with a homicidal death on account of burns. However, the learned Sessions Judge held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused 1 and 3 caused the homicidal death of Shobha by setting her on fire by pouring kerosene. The learned Sessions Judge also held that the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused 1 and 3 along with deceased second accused harassed and humiliated the deceased by coercing her to bring Rs. 10,000/- from her mother. Accordingly, the learned Session Judge held that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused for any of the charges levelled against them and consequently recorded a judgment of acquittal. 8. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of acquittal the State has presented this appeal with special leave, inter alia, on the grounds that the learned Sessions Judge has committed serious error in holding the accused persons not guilty of the charges levelled against them, though the evidence on record placed by the prosecution has convincingly proved that the accused, after pouring kerosene on the deceased set her ablaze, which resulted in her death and therefore the learned Sessions Judge ought to have held the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. 9. Upon service of notice of this appeal, the accused have entered appearance through their Counsel Ms. Anitha Kulkarni, Advocate. 10. We have heard Ms. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the Appellant and Ms. 9. Upon service of notice of this appeal, the accused have entered appearance through their Counsel Ms. Anitha Kulkarni, Advocate. 10. We have heard Ms. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for the Appellant and Ms. Anitha Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused and perused the records. 11. Perusal of the judgment under appeal indicates that the learned Sessions Judge in order to record judgment of acquittal has rejected the evidence of P.W. 1-mother of the deceased - who was projected as an eye-witness by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused. The learned Sessions Judge for the following reasons has rejected the evidence of P.W. 1: (a) There is delay in lodging the complaint, which has not been properly explained; (b) The complaint-Ex. P. 1 was prepared after consultation, discussion and deliberations; (c) The evidence of P.W. 1 is not corroborated by any other witness; (d) The evidence of P.W. 1 is inconsistent with her version in Ex. P. 1 with regard to the overt acts on the part of the accused persons; (e) The conduct of P.W. 1 being the mother of deceased in not rushing to the rescue of her daughter is highly unnatural and therefore her presence at the alleged scene of occurrence is highly doubtful, as such she cannot be accepted as an eye-witness; (f) Though the police station was within a distance of one furlong from the scene of occurrence, the conduct of P.W. 1 in not approaching the police immediately after the alleged incident is unnatural; (g) The time of the death as opined by P.W. 9-doctor, who conducted the post-mortem, is contrary to the case of the prosecution; (h) There was no specific incidence of harassment to the deceased by any of the accused; and (i) The purported demand of money after the marriage was not in relation to dowry, but was for renovation of the garage as such there is no ground to hold that the death of the deceased was 'dowry death' within the meaning of Section 304B of IPC. 12. Ms. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor during her argument contended that the learned Sessions Judge has not properly referred to and discussed the evidence of P.W. 1 about the incident and has erroneously rejected the evidence of P.W. 1 on improper considerations. 12. Ms. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor during her argument contended that the learned Sessions Judge has not properly referred to and discussed the evidence of P.W. 1 about the incident and has erroneously rejected the evidence of P.W. 1 on improper considerations. She further submitted that if the entire evidence on record is read as a whole, presence of P.W. 1 at the scene of occurrence cannot be doubted nor the learned Sessions Judge has doubted the presence of P.W. 1 at the scene of occurrence and therefore the learned Sessions Judge was not right in disbelieving the evidence of P.W. 1. She further contended that it is well-settled law that a conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole eye-witness and corroboration is not the rule of evidence and it is only a rule of prudence and even in the absence of corroboration, conviction can be recorded on the basis of the evidence of sole eye-witness, if the testimony of such witness is reliable and truthful. According to the learned ASPP, the evidence of P.W. 1 is truthful and there was no reason for P.W. 1 to depose falsehood before the Court and lodging a false complaint by implicating the accused. It is her further submission that there was no delay in lodging the complaint and even if there was little delay, the same has been explained by several circumstances which have been completely overlooked by the learned Sessions Judge. She further contended that merely because there is some delay in lodging the complaint, that by itself cannot be a ground to view the case of the prosecution with suspicion, unless it is shown that the delay has been utilised by the complainant to falsely implicate the accused persons by giving a coloured version. She further contended that the conduct of P.W. 1, as has been described by the learned Sessions Judge, is not unnatural, but if the evidence of P.W. 1 is read as a whole, it would indicate that she, after seeing the accused pouring kerosene and setting her daughter on fire, shouted for help and at that time, the accused persons shut the door of their house and therefore there was no opportunity for the P.W. 1 to rush to the rescue of her daughter. Even otherwise, it is contended, the reaction on the part of the person on seeing a ghostly incident cannot be uniform, as different persons react differently to like situations and therefore that by itself cannot be a ground to reject the testimony of P.W. 1-an eye-witness - which is otherwise reliable. It is further submitted that merely because P.W. 1 waited for the arrival of her relatives to the scene of occurrence to lodge the complaint, it cannot be inferred that the allegations made in the complaint are created or concocted and the accused were falsely implicated, after discussions and deliberations. In this regard, she contended that having regard to the fact that P.W. 1 being a lone lady present at the scene of occurrence, which is the place of accused, where she had no other acquaintees except the accused persons themselves, and after having seen a ghostly incident of setting her own daughter on fire, must have been in a State of shock and therefore there was nothing unnatural in her waiting for her relatives to come to the place, so that she could proceed to lodge a complaint about the incident. Learned ASPP contends that while considering the question as to whether there is any delay in lodging the complaint, the Court is required to see the circumstances under which the complaint was lodged and the mental condition of the complainant after seeing such ghastly incident and if these circumstances are taken into consideration, there was absolutely no delay in lodging the complaint nor was there any unnatural conduct on the part of P.W. 1 in waiting for her relatives to come to the scene of occurrence. 13. Learned Additional State Public Prosecutor further submits that the motive for committing murder on the part of the accused is clearly established by the evidence of P.W. 1, who has clearly stated that even 15 days prior to the incident, the accused had sent the deceased to her parental house for bringing Rs. 10,000/- and that as their demand had not been complied with by the deceased and her mother, the accused had a strong motive for committing murder of deceased, who was not able to fulfill their demand for bringing money from her mother. 10,000/- and that as their demand had not been complied with by the deceased and her mother, the accused had a strong motive for committing murder of deceased, who was not able to fulfill their demand for bringing money from her mother. Submission of learned ASPP is that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. 14. However, Ms. Anuradha Desai, fairly submits that the evidence of P.W. 1 does not satisfactorily indicate that the demand of Rs. 10,000/-was in connection with dowry to attract the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC. 15. Alternatively, learned ASPP, submits that assuming for the sake of arguments and as suggested by the defence during the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that the deceased committed suicide, since the death occurred within seven years from the date of marriage, presumption ought to have been drawn against the accused that they have abetted the suicide by deceased and since the accused having not rebutted this presumption, the learned Sessions Judge at least ought to have convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC, as all the ingredients required for the offence under Section 306 of IPC have been stated in the charges levelled against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC. It is her further contention that even in the absence of specific charge for the offence punishable under Section 306 of IPC, the accused can be convicted for the said offence, as they have been charged for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of IPC. 16. Further submission of learned ASPP is that there is absolutely no explanation forthcoming from the accused during the course of their examination under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. as to how the deceased sustained burn injuries when she was inside the house of accused 3 and when it is clearly established that the three accused were the only persons present inside the house at that time. P.C. as to how the deceased sustained burn injuries when she was inside the house of accused 3 and when it is clearly established that the three accused were the only persons present inside the house at that time. In this regard, she contended that it was within the specific knowledge of the accused as to how the deceased sustained burn injuries and therefore it was for them to prove the said fact as per Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and since the accused have not come out with any kind of explanation in this regard, their conduct itself is sufficient to indicate their guilt for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and this circumstance would be a corroborating circumstance to the evidence of P.W. 1. With these submissions, Ms. Anuradha Desai, learned ASPP, sought for allowing this appeal and to convict the accused persons accordingly for the aforesaid offences. 17. On the other hand, Ms. Anitha Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused, submits that though the alleged incident occurred at about 6.00 a.m. on 7-7-2002, even according to the endorsement made in the complaint-Ex. P. 1, the complaint was lodged at about 12.30 p.m. on the same day and the FIR had reached the jurisdictional Magistrate only at 4.45 p.m., and thus there has been delay both in lodging the complaint and FIR reaching the Jurisdictional Magistrate and this delay has not been satisfactorily explained by the prosecution and therefore the case of the prosecution has been rightly viewed with suspicion by the learned Sessions Judge and the said finding does not call for interference by this Court. 18. It is further contended by the learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused that as it is not the case of the prosecution that P.W. 1 promised to bring money when she visited the house of the accused for taking her daughter on the eve of first Aashada, there was no reason for the accused questioning P.W. 1 as to whether she had brought the money as such there was no immediate cause for the accused persons to commit murder of the deceased. 19. Ms. 19. Ms. Anitha Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the Respondent-accused further contends that as held by the learned Sessions Judge, the evidence of P.W. 1 is highly inconstant and untrustworthy, therefore the learned Sessions Judge has rightly not placed reliance on the testimony of P.W. 1 and there is no error committed by the learned Sessions Judge in this regard. She further contended that though according to P.W. 1, her friend Haleema also came to the scene of occurrence, the said Haleema has not been cited either as a witness in the charge-sheet or examined before the Court during the trial and thus the prosecution has suppressed material witness. 20. Learned Counsel for the Respondent-accused further submitted that the evidence of P.W. 1 is not corroborated and she being the mother of the deceased is a highly interested witness and therefore without there being any proper corroboration, her testimony cannot be relied upon and as such the learned Sessions Judge has rightly rejected the testimony of P.W. 1 as uncorroborated. She further contended that from the answers elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1, it is clear that there was cordiality between P.W. 1 and the accused as well as the deceased and the accused, therefore there was no reason for the accused to do away with the life of the deceased. 21. Ms. Anitha Kulkarni submits that the contents of sketch of the scene of occurrence (Ex. P. 8) as well as spot Mahazar (Ex. P. 3) indicate that P.W. 1 could not have seen the alleged incident stated to have occurred inside the house of accused 3 by standing on the road in front of the house, therefore she was rightly branded as not an eye-witness by the learned Sessions Judge. It is her further contention that the defence of accused that the deceased committed suicide is highly probable and acceptable in the light of the answers elicited from P.W. 1 and the reason for the suicide by the deceased has also been indicated, as such, the death of the deceased was not homicidal and it was a suicidal death for the reason suggested to P.W. 1 and therefore the accused are not guilty of any of the charges levelled against them. 22. 22. Learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused further contended that having regard to the fact that P.W. 1 has admitted that the accused were cordial with her and her daughter-the deceased-and that the deceased had not made any complaint to P.W. 1 against any of the accused, there is absolutely no circumstance to indicate that the accused in any way subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment, so as to drive her to commit suicide and therefore the charge either under Section 498A or 304B of IPC is not proved beyond all reasonable doubt, as such, the learned Sessions Judge has rightly acquitted the accused persons of the charges levelled against them and the said judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge does not call for any interference by this Court. 23. In the light of the submissions made by both sides, the following points arise for our consideration in this appeal.- (1). Whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that A1 and A3 were not responsible for the homicidal death of deceased Shobha? (2). Whether the prosecution has proved the guilty of the accused for any one of the charges levelled against them? (3). Whether the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge calls for interference by this Court? 24. No doubt, this appeal is filed by the State against the judgment of acquittal. Now the general principle of law regarding the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeal against an order of acquittal is well-settled. The Apex Court in the case of Chandrappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) CriLJ 2136 : Chandrappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) CriLJ 2136, after considering the earlier judgments on the point, including a judgment of the Privy Council, has summarised the general principle in this regard as under: (1) An Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appropriate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an Appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an Appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as "substantial and compelling reasons", "goods and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes" etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an Appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusions. (4) An Appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a Competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of the innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. (5) If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the Trial Court, it ought not to be disturbed by the Appellate Court. 25. Keeping the above principle of law in mind, we proceed to consider the case on hand to find out as to whether the judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned Sessions Judge can be sustained or is liable to be interfered with? 26. The following facts are undisputed: The deceased Shobha was married to accused 1 about seven or eight months prior to her death on 7-7-2002. After the marriage the deceased was residing with her husband and mother-in-law in his house situated at Tikota. Accused 3-the sister of accused 1 was residing in the house adjacent to the house of accused 1. On 7-7-2002 at about 6.00 a.m. deceased Shobha sustained burn injuries inside the house of accused 3 and died there itself. After the marriage the deceased was residing with her husband and mother-in-law in his house situated at Tikota. Accused 3-the sister of accused 1 was residing in the house adjacent to the house of accused 1. On 7-7-2002 at about 6.00 a.m. deceased Shobha sustained burn injuries inside the house of accused 3 and died there itself. The learned Sessions Judge in the light of the evidence of Doctor-P.W. 9 who conducted post-mortem examination and based on his opinion that the death was due to shock due to burns has held that the death of deceased Shobha was homicidal. While reaching this conclusion, the learned Sessions Judge has not considered the defence of the accused as suggested to P.W. 1 during cross-examination that deceased Shobha committed suicide. When death takes place on account of burn injuries without any other injuries, one cannot with certainty say as to whether it was homicidal as the death due to burns could occur even on account of suicidal act or even it could be accidental. However, in this case it is neither the case of the prosecution nor the case of the accused that the deceased sustained burn injuries accidentally. As noticed above, the definite case of the prosecution is that the deceased met with homicidal death. An attempt has been made by the defence to contend that the deceased committed suicide. 27. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge ought to have considered as to whether the death was homicidal or suicidal? The learned Sessions Judge, in our opinion, has jumped to the conclusion that the death was homicidal only on the basis of the opinion of Doctor-P.W. 9 without referring to any other circumstances which would support his finding that the death was homicidal. 28. According to the evidence of P.W. 9-Doctor, the deceased had suffered 100% burns all over the body and therefore, the death was due to the burnt shock. According to the evidence of P.W. 1, when she returned to the house of the accused after answering the call of nature at about 6.00 a.m., she heard the screams of her daughter and immediately when she turned, she saw two of the accused holding the deceased and the other accused pouring kerosene and setting the deceased Shobha ablaze as a result she sustained burn injuries. Though P.W. 1 has been cross-examined at length, there is no suggestion put to her that she was not present at the scene of occurrence. It is her definite say that she had come to the house of the accused on the previous evening to take her daughter to the parental house on the eve of first Aashada and since the accused told her to take deceased Shobha on the next day morning, she stayed in the house of the accused during that night. The fact that P.W. 1 came to the house of the accused in the evening of 6-7-2002 and she stayed there during that night has not been disputed and challenged by the accused during the cross-examination. Thus, the presence of P.W. 1 in the house of the accused on 6-7-2002 and on 7-7-2002 is not disputed. Therefore, her presence in the house of the accused in the morning of 7-7-2002 is fully established. The evidence of P.W. 1 further establishes that she saw her daughter inside the house and two of the accused holding her and another accused pouring kerosene and setting fire. In the cross-examination of P.W. 1, it is elicited that after seeing this she shouted and at that time the accused shut the door of the house and after some time she saw her daughter lying dead with burn injuries. From this, it is clear that before the door was shut she had seen her daughter alive and after some time when the door was opened, she saw her daughter lying dead with burn injuries all over the body. From the evidence of P.W. 1, it is further established that during this period it was the three accused who were present inside the house. 29. The evidence of P.W. 7, the Tahsildar, Bijapur Taluk establishes that on 7-7-2002 after receiving the requisition from the police he visited the house of accused 3, and conducted inquest over the dead body of Shobha between 2.00 and 3.00 p.m. on the same day in the presence of punchas and drew up inquest mahazar as per Ex. P. 2. In the cross-examination, it is elicited from him that he reached the place where the dead body was lying at about 1.00 p.m. 30. P.W. 3-Basappa is one of the punch witnesses to the inquest. P. 2. In the cross-examination, it is elicited from him that he reached the place where the dead body was lying at about 1.00 p.m. 30. P.W. 3-Basappa is one of the punch witnesses to the inquest. He has deposed before the Court that on being called by the Tahsildar he went to the house of accused 3 at Tikota. He has further stated that inside the house he saw dead body of Shobha and thereafter the inquest was conducted and he has attested the inquest mahazar-Ex. P. 2. In the cross-examination, it is elicited from him that he was called by the Tahsildar at about 1.30 p.m. and he was taken to the house of accused 3 which was by the side of house of accused 1 and 2. It is further elicited from him that the dead body was partly burnt. He has denied further suggestion that it was not possible to identify the dead body. In the entire cross-examination of P.W. 3, there was no suggestion that dead body of Shobha was not lying inside the house of accused 3 and inquest was not conducted therein. 31. Thus the evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 7 and the contents of inquest mahazar-Ex. P. 2 clearly establishes that dead body of Shobha was lying inside the house of accused 3 with burn injuries and the inquest was conducted there. This corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 to the effect that when she last saw her daughter alive, her daughter was inside the house of accused 3 and little later she was found dead inside the house of accused 3. Now the question is as to how did the deceased caught fire and sustained burn injuries, was it due to the overt acts of the accused 1 to 3 or was it due to her own suicidal act? 32. Except suggesting to P.W. 1 during the cross-examination that deceased Shobha committed suicide, the accused have not been able to bring out on record any possible circumstances for the deceased to take a drastic step of ending her life within 7-8 months from the date of her marriage. 32. Except suggesting to P.W. 1 during the cross-examination that deceased Shobha committed suicide, the accused have not been able to bring out on record any possible circumstances for the deceased to take a drastic step of ending her life within 7-8 months from the date of her marriage. One of the reasons for the alleged suicide on the part of the deceased as suggested to P.W. 1 was that this P.W. 1 being the mother was not treating the deceased equally with her elder sister and therefore, the deceased was frustrated. Witness has denied this suggestion. It is well-settled law that mere suggestions would not be substantial evidence. It was incumbent on the part of the accused to bring out the circumstances that the deceased was not being treated equally with her elder sister therefore because of that the deceased was frustrated and went to depression which ultimately led her to take the drastic decision of ending her own life. The next suggestion to P.W. 1 in the cross-examination is that accused 1-husband of the deceased was suffering from some disease. Of course, P.W. 1 initially denied the said suggestion but later admitted that accused 1 was suffering from some disease. But it is not brought out on record during the cross-examination of P.W. 1 or during the examination of the accused under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. as to from what kind of disease accused 1 was suffering which made the deceased to end her life by committing suicide. Assuming that accused 1 was suffering from some disease, that by itself cannot be a ground to hold that the deceased had a reason for committing suicide. It is not brought out on record that the deceased was a sensitive lady and that at any point of time she had exhibited suicidal tendencies. Therefore, the theory of defence that the deceased committed suicide is neither probable nor acceptable. No doubt, the accused is not required to prove the defence theory to the hilt as required to be done by the prosecution. Nevertheless the defence theory must be probable and acceptable. 33. One other circumstances which negatives the defence theory that the death of Shobha was suicidal is that when deceased is alleged to have committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting herself ablaze in the presence of three accused what should have been the conduct of the accused. Nevertheless the defence theory must be probable and acceptable. 33. One other circumstances which negatives the defence theory that the death of Shobha was suicidal is that when deceased is alleged to have committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting herself ablaze in the presence of three accused what should have been the conduct of the accused. As a normal prudent person, accused 1 being the husband, accused 2 being the mother-in-law of the deceased ought to have made attempts to prevent the deceased from committing suicide or ought to have tried to put off the fire and thereby save the life of the deceased. No such acts have been done by the accused. 34. It is elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that accused 1 and the deceased were on cordial terms and there was no quarrel between them. If that was so, the husband on seeing his wife setting herself ablaze should have attempted to prevent the deceased from committing such suicidal acts and ought to have doused the fire and rushed her to the hospital. Admittedly, no such actions have been taken by any of the accused. This conduct on the part of the accused completely negates the theory of suicide. On the other hand, this conduct coupled with other circumstances clearly supports the evidence of P.W. 1 that the deceased sustained burn injuries on account of the positive act on the part of the accused as otherwise there was no reason for the deceased sustaining burn injuries leading to her death. 35. Under these circumstances, though we do not concur with the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge to reach the conclusion that the deceased met homicidal death, the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge that the death of the deceased was homicidal nevertheless is correct. 36. Now the next question required to be considered is as to whether the prosecution has satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused were responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased. As noticed earlier, the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused persons for the charges levelled against them has placed reliance on the direct evidence of P.W. 1. Of course according to the prosecution, P.W. 6 was another eye-witness. However, P.W. 6 during the evidence before the Court did not support the case of the prosecution. As noticed earlier, the prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the accused persons for the charges levelled against them has placed reliance on the direct evidence of P.W. 1. Of course according to the prosecution, P.W. 6 was another eye-witness. However, P.W. 6 during the evidence before the Court did not support the case of the prosecution. Obviously, he being the neighbour of the deceased has not chosen to support the case of the prosecution during his evidence before the Court. Nevertheless, the mere fact that P.W. 6 cited as an eye-witness by the prosecution, has not supported the case of the prosecution during the trial, it cannot be a ground either to reject the case of the prosecution or to doubt the evidence of P.W. 1. The evidentiary value of P.W. 1 will have to be tested on the basis of her own evidence and other circumstances and not in the background of the fact that the other witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the evidence of P.W. 6 is of no consequence. 37. As noticed above, the learned Sessions Judge has not placed reliance on the evidence of P.W. 1 and for that he has assigned certain reasons as indicated earlier. Therefore, it is necessary for us to find out as to whether the learned Sessions Judge was right in rejecting the evidence of P.W. 1 and the reasons assigned by him for doing so are proper or not. 38. As discussed above, the presence of P.W. 1 in Tikota Village on 6-7-2002 having come there to take her daughter on the eve of first ashada has not been disputed and the same is satisfactorily established. It is not the say of the accused that P.W. 1 was not in the village in the morning on 7-7-2002. P.W. 1 has categorically stated on oath that in the morning of 7-7-2002 when she returned to the house of the accused after answering the call of nature she heard her daughter screaming inside the house of the accused and then she saw two accused holding her and the other pouring kerosene and setting fire. The defence has cross-examined P.W. 1 at length and has tried to bring out certain circumstances to discard this evidence of P.W. 1. 39. The first circumstance, as stated by the learned Sessions Judge, is delay in lodging the complaint. The defence has cross-examined P.W. 1 at length and has tried to bring out certain circumstances to discard this evidence of P.W. 1. 39. The first circumstance, as stated by the learned Sessions Judge, is delay in lodging the complaint. No doubt according to the P.W. 1 the incident took place at about 6.00 a.m. and complaint was lodged at about 12.30 p.m. on the same day. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that the police station is at a distance of 1 furlong from the house of the accused. Therefore, according to the accused, P.W. 1 had all the opportunity to go to the police station immediately after the incident and lodge the complaint and having not done so, the delayed presentation of the complaint would create great amount of suspicion about the case of the prosecution. However, it is now well-settled law that every delay in lodging the complaint cannot be viewed with suspicion. It is also laid down in catena of decisions that while considering the delay in lodging the complaint, the Courts are required to bear in mind the circumstances under which the complainant was placed before lodging the complaint and the state of mind of the complainant after witnessing ghastly incident. P.W. 1 is none other the mother of the deceased. After seeing her loved daughter being set on fire by her own husband and relatives of her husband, it is quite natural that she would have become stunned and shocked and therefore she must have been in a great state of mental shock and it would have certainly taken longer time for her to come to her senses and then to think of proceeding to lodge the complaint. The incident has occurred in the village where the accused are residing. P.W. 1 is not resident of the said village. Therefore, it was a new place for her where except accused she might not have had any other acquaintees who could have consoled her. Of course it is brought out in the cross-examination that one Haleema, one of her friends, also had come to Tikota and after hearing her cries the said Haleema came there and through said Haleema she informed her relatives and villagers abut the incident. It is not brought on record by the defence that P.W. 1 is an educated lady. Complaint-Ex. P. 1 bears LTM of P.W. 1. It is not brought on record by the defence that P.W. 1 is an educated lady. Complaint-Ex. P. 1 bears LTM of P.W. 1. Therefore, it is reasonable to hold that she was a rustic villager. Under these circumstances, if P.W. 1 who was placed in such a situation had waited for her relatives to come to lodge a complaint, it cannot be said that she had deliberately delayed lodging of the complaint. 40. According to P.W. 2, he scribed the complaint-Ex. P. 1. He has stated in his evidence that after receiving the telephonic message about the incident he came to Tikota at about 11.00 a.m. and met P.W. 1 at about 11.15 a.m. near the house of accused 3 and at that time P.W. 1 narrated the entire incident to him and accordingly he wrote the same and P.W. 1 affixed her LTM and thereafter both of them went to police station and lodged the complaint. 41. P.W. 12-ASI stated on oath that at about 12.30 p.m. on 7-7-2002, the complainant came to the police station and lodged complaint-Ex. P. 1 and on receipt of the same he registered the case. Only suggestion put to P.W. 12 in cross-examination is that he concocted the statements of witnesses. Thus, there is no challenge to the evidence of P.W. 12 that he received the complaint at 12.30 p.m. and based on this complaint he registered the case and FIR was dispatched. Therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that the complaint was lodged at 12.30 p.m. in the police station. From this, it may be noticed that the complaint has been lodged nearly about 61/2 hours after the incident. However, having regard to the fact and circumstances under which P.W. 1 was placed and having regard to her mental state after seeing such ghastly incident and she being a rustic villager having waited for her relatives and villagers to come to the scene of occurrence from her village which was at a distance, even if there was some delay in lodging the report, it has been satisfactorily explained and it was understandable. Therefore, merely because the complaint was lodged about 61/2 hours after the accident, it cannot be said that P.W. 1 is not a trust worthy witness. Nor this little delay can be the basis to view the case of the prosecution with suspicion. Therefore, merely because the complaint was lodged about 61/2 hours after the accident, it cannot be said that P.W. 1 is not a trust worthy witness. Nor this little delay can be the basis to view the case of the prosecution with suspicion. There is no circumstance brought out by the defence to indicate that this delay in lodging the complaint has been utilised by the complainant to falsely implicate the accused by suppressing the real facts. 42. There was no reason for P.W. 1 to falsely implicate these accused persons as responsible for the death of her daughter as even according to the suggestion put to P.W. 1, she was in cordial terms with the accused and even on 6-7-2002, when she came to the house of the accused, she was treated with hospitality. If that was so, there was absolutely no reason for P.W. 1 to falsely implicate the accused in the case. P.W. 1 had no axe to grind against the accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that by utilising little delay in lodging the complaint, the accused have been falsely implicated in the case. The evidence on record clearly establishes that FIR reached jurisdictional Magistrate at 4.45 p.m. on the same day. 43. P.W. 8-Sangappa, Police Constable has stated on oath that at 1.30 p.m. on 7-7-2002 the First Information Report was entrusted to him for the purpose of delivering the same to the jurisdictional Magistrate and accordingly he went to Bijapur and delivered the First Information Report to the learned Magistrate at 4.45 p.m. There is absolutely no cross-examination to this witness in this behalf. Admittedly, the Court of the learned Magistrate was not in Tikota, and it was in Bijapur. Therefore, P.W. 8 was required to travel from Tikota to Bijapur for delivering the same to the learned Magistrate. It is not forthcoming on record as to what was the distance between Tikota and Bijapur. Nevertheless, after the first information report was entrusted to P.W. 8 he must have taken some time to reach Bijapur and by the time he could reach Bijapur, the learned Magistrate must have been sitting in the open Court and therefore P.W. 8 has delivered the first information report at 4.45 p.m. Under these circumstances, we see no delay in first information report reaching the jurisdictional Magistrate. 44. 44. The other reason assigned to doubt the evidence of P.W. 1 is that her evidence before the Court as to the specific overt act on the part of accused 1 to 3 is inconsistent with the statement made in complaint-Exhibit P. 1. 45. According to her evidence before the Court, the accused 1 and 2 held the deceased and the accused 3 poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze. However, as per the contents of Exhibit P. 1, the accused 1 and 3 held the deceased and accused 2 poured kerosene and lighted the matchstick. 46. This inconsistency, according to the learned Sessions Judge, is a strong ground to doubt the evidence of P.W. 1 and since there is no corroboration to the evidence of P.W. 1, her evidence before the Court is not reliable. 47. It is well-settled law that corroboration is not a rule of evidence, but it is only a rule of prudence. The Courts look for corroboration when the evidence of a witness is not wholly reliable and if there is some doubt on certain material particulars. It is also well-settled law by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary eye-witness, if the evidence of such solitary eye-witness inspires the confidence of the Court and such evidence is wholly reliable. (See Anil Phukan Vs. State of Assam, AIR 1993 SC 1462 ; Yakub Ismailbhai Patel Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 4209 ; Jivan Lal and Others Vs. State of M.P., 1996 (9) SCALE 262 ; Pandappa Hanumappa Hanamar and another Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1997 SC 3663 : Pandappa Hanumappa Hanamar and another Vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1997 SC 3663 : Sunil Kumar Vs. The State Govt of NCT of Delhi, (2004) CriLJ 819. 48. It is also well-settled law that the evidence of a witness cannot be discarded on the ground that the witness is closely related to the deceased or the victim. However, a note of caution has been sounded that whenever witness is closely related to the victim or the deceased, the Courts will have to closely scrutinise the evidence of such witnesses with caution before accepting the same. (See State of U.P. Vs. Paras Nath Singh and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1073 ; Wariyam Singh and others Vs. However, a note of caution has been sounded that whenever witness is closely related to the victim or the deceased, the Courts will have to closely scrutinise the evidence of such witnesses with caution before accepting the same. (See State of U.P. Vs. Paras Nath Singh and Others, AIR 1973 SC 1073 ; Wariyam Singh and others Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 305 and Mahadeo Laxman Sarane and Another Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) CriLJ 3209 ). In the case on hand, no doubt P.W. 1 is mother of the deceased and therefore she is closely related to the deceased. The fact that she was in the village of the accused on the date of the incident is convincingly established and is not disputed. Therefore, her presence at the scene of occurrence on that day cannot be doubted. There was no reason for P.W. 1 to depose falsehood before the Court. As observed by the Apex Court in Anil Phukan's case, in the normal course of events, a close relative would be the last person to spare the real assailant and implicate a false person. The inconsistency between her evidence and the statement made in Exhibit P. 1 with regard to the specific role assigned to the accused cannot by itself in the circumstances of the case loom large so as to completely reject the testimony of P.W. 1. As noticed earlier, P.W. 1 must have been in a state of shock after seeing the ghastly incident. Therefore, in that situation, while narrating the incident to P.W. 2 for scribing the complaint, she might have stated about the role of the accused in confusion and the role of each of the accused has been stated in general. Even if it is accepted that there is some inconsistency in this regard, in our opinion, this does not make much difference for the simple reason that the evidence of P.W. 1 clearly establishes that all the three accused were inside the house when P.W. 1 saw her in the house of the accused 3 and after seeing this incident when she shouted the door was closed. Therefore, she might not have been able to see the whole of the act committed by each of the accused person and remember the same vividly. This may be termed as exaggeration. Therefore, she might not have been able to see the whole of the act committed by each of the accused person and remember the same vividly. This may be termed as exaggeration. Nevertheless, the end result was the deceased was burnt and she died due to burns inside the house of accused 3. The evidence on record clearly establishes that apart from accused 1 to 3, no other person was inside the house at that time. Therefore, it is on account of collective act of accused 1 to 3 the deceased sustained burn injuries. The death of the deceased due to burn injuries is attributable to the collective act by accused 1 to 3. This is a strong circumstance which is consistent with the evidence of P.W. 1. The accused during their examination under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., have not come out with any kind of explanation as to how the deceased caught fire. As they were the only persons inside the house, it was within the special knowledge of accused as to how the deceased sustained burn injuries. However, the accused have not given any explanation in this regard. The facts that the incident occurred inside the house of accused 3 in the early hours of the morning, though it was not the place of residence of deceased and accused 1 and 2, and the presence of accused 1 and 2 at that hour and place and the failure on the part of the accused to give any acceptable explanation as to how the deceased sustained burn injuries are circumstances which corroborates the testimony of P.W. 1 as to the complicity of accused for the homicidal death of deceased. 49. We see no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused that as accused 2 died during the trial, P.W. 1 during her evidence before the Court has deliberately changed the role of accused 2 to accused 3. There is no circumstance to substantiate this submission. Therefore, we reject the said contention. 50. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in holding that there was inconsistency in the evidence of P.W. 1 and that inconsistency has gone to the root of the case of the prosecution and has discredited the testimony of P.W. 1 leading the Court to look for some corroboration. 50. Under these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was not right in holding that there was inconsistency in the evidence of P.W. 1 and that inconsistency has gone to the root of the case of the prosecution and has discredited the testimony of P.W. 1 leading the Court to look for some corroboration. In our considered opinion, the evidence of P.W. 1 in this case is cogent, consistent, is wholly reliable and it inspires the confidence of the Court. Assuming for the purpose of arguments that the evidence of P.W. 1 requires corroboration, in our opinion, the above facts and circumstances would corroborate the evidence of P.W. 1. 51. Yet another circumstance pitted against the testimony of P.W. 1 is her conduct. According to the learned Sessions Judge, conducted of P.W. 1 in not rushing to the rescue of her daughter was unnatural and therefore her presence at the scene of occurrence is doubtful. 52. We do not see any substance in this reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge. It is now well-settled law by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court that different persons react differently to a like situation. Some persons on seeing ghostly incident may become stunned and stand like a statue even without moving, some may cry and shout to attract others, some may run away out of fear, some may go to the rescue of the victim even at the risk of their life, and ultimately endanger their own life. Therefore, there is no straight jacket formula as to how a person should react to a situation. In this case, it is elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that after seeing the accused pouring kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, she shouted and at that juncture the accused shut the door and therefore P.W. 1 had no opportunity to rush to the rescue of her daughter as the door was closed. Under these circumstances, there was no unnaturalness in the conduct of P.W. 1 warranting to doubt her testimony. 53. Under these circumstances, there was no unnaturalness in the conduct of P.W. 1 warranting to doubt her testimony. 53. Yet another reason assigned by the learned Sessions Judge was that the evidence of P.W. 9-Doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination indicated that the time of death was within 48 hours and having regard to the fact that post-mortem examination was conducted within 12 hours from the time of the death, he ought to have given the time of death as within 12 hours or 24 hours and since the time of death is stated as within 48 hours the death must have taken place after 24 hours and before 48 hours of the conduction of the post-mortem examination. 54. There is absolutely no basis for this observation of the learned Sessions Judge. The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination has given an outer time-limit for the death prior to the conduction of the post-mortem examination. If P.W. 9 says that the death was within 48 hours, it does not mean that the death must have occurred between 24 to 48 hours prior to the post-mortem examination. The death might have occurred even within one hour or two hours also. Under these circumstances, on the basis of evidence of P.W. 9 with regard to the time of death, learned Sessions Judge could not have doubted the evidence of P.W. 9 as to the time of the incident. 55. The learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that there was no motive on the part of the accused to commit murder of the deceased and therefore the accused cannot be held responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased. According to the prosecution, the accused went on demanding the deceased to get Rs. 10,000/- from her mother purportedly for renovating the garage and since the deceased could not comply with the said demand, the accused have killed the deceased by pouring kerosene and setting her ablaze. The evidence of P.W. 1 clearly establishes that the accused were demanding Rs. 10,000/-. According to P.W. 1, about three or four months after the marriage, the deceased informed her (P.W. 1) about the demand made by the accused. According to P.W. 1 even about fifteen days prior to the incident, the deceased had come to her (P.W. 1) house and informed her that the accused are still demanding Rs. 10,000/-. 10,000/-. According to P.W. 1, about three or four months after the marriage, the deceased informed her (P.W. 1) about the demand made by the accused. According to P.W. 1 even about fifteen days prior to the incident, the deceased had come to her (P.W. 1) house and informed her that the accused are still demanding Rs. 10,000/-. It is in the evidence of P.W. 1 that even when she came to the house of accused, the accused asked her as to whether she has brought money. This evidence of P.W. 1 is consistent with the contents of Exhibit P. 1 as this fact has also been clearly stated in Exhibit P. 1. There is absolutely no suggestion to P.W. 1 during the cross-examination that at no point of time the accused made any demand for money. Therefore, the evidence on record clearly establishes that the accused were unhappy as the deceased had not complied with their demand for Rs. 10,000/-. Therefore, this is certainly a motive for the accused to commit murder of the deceased. 56. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the prosecution has not been able to prove the motive attributed against the accused that by itself cannot be a ground to reject the case of the prosecution. In Thaman Kumar Vs. State of Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 2003 SC 3975 , the Apex Court has held that: "there is no such principle or rule of law that where the prosecution fails to prove the motive for commission of the crime, it must necessarily result in acquittal of the accused". It is further observed by the Apex Court that "where the evidence is found to be trustworthy and reliable and finds corroboration from the medical evidence, a finding of guilt can safely be recorded even if the motive for the commission of the crime has not been proved". Therefore, we see no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the prosecution has not proved the motive. 57. There is also no substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondents that there are deficiencies in the investigation. According to learned Counsel, though according to P.W. 1 her friend Haleema also came to the scene of occurrence immediately after hearing her cries, Haleema has not been cited as a witness in the Charge-sheet and not examined before the Court. According to learned Counsel, though according to P.W. 1 her friend Haleema also came to the scene of occurrence immediately after hearing her cries, Haleema has not been cited as a witness in the Charge-sheet and not examined before the Court. No doubt P.W. 1 admits that along with her one Haleema also came to Tikota on 6-6-2002 and in the morning of 7-7-2002 when she cried, said Haleema also came there. No doubt the said Haleema was not cited as a witness in the charge-sheet nor examined as a witness during the trial. However, the deficiency in the investigation cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mansingh and Others, JT (2003) 1 SC 252, the Apex Court has clearly ruled that deficiency in the investigation cannot be a ground to disbelieve the prosecution version which is authentic, credible and cogent. Merely because the Investigating Officer has failed to record statement of said Haleema and cite her as a witness in the charge-sheet, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecution nor it can be a ground to doubt the evidence of P.W. 1. Having regard to the answer elicited from P.W. 1 in the cross-examination that soon after she cried the accused shut the door, even if Haleema had been cited as a witness, her evidence would not have in any way supported the version of P.W. 1 as even according to P.W. 1, Haleema reached the scene of occurrence only after hearing her cries. Therefore, Haleema could not have seen any overt acts committed by the accused. Under these circumstances, non-inclusion of Haleema as a witness in the charge-sheet or the non-examination of said Haleema during the trial has not rendered the case of the prosecution doubtful. 58. In the light of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge was not justified in rejecting the evidence of P.W. 1. The evidence of P.W. 1 is cogent, consistent and natural. There are no circumstances to doubt her evidence warranting the Court to look for corroboration. Even if corroboration was necessary, there are several circumstances, as indicated earlier, which would corroborate the version of P.W. 1 that accused were responsible for the homicidal death of deceased. The evidence of P.W. 1 is cogent, consistent and natural. There are no circumstances to doubt her evidence warranting the Court to look for corroboration. Even if corroboration was necessary, there are several circumstances, as indicated earlier, which would corroborate the version of P.W. 1 that accused were responsible for the homicidal death of deceased. In the light of the evidence of P.W. 1, in our opinion, there is no need for looking for corroboration and this is not a case to look for corroboration to accept the evidence of P.W. 1. The solitary evidence of P.W. 1, in our opinion, is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the accused for the charge levelled against them for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC. No doubt, the accused are charged with offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. However, P.W. 1 has not stated anything about the accused subjecting the deceased to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry. The demand of Rs. 10,000/- according to P.W. 1 was not towards dowry but it was for renovation of garage. The three ingredients to constitute an offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC are that the death of a married woman must have taken place within seven years from the date of the marriage and the death must have occurred due to burns or otherwise than under natural circumstances and more importantly such married woman must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death. Though in this case the first two ingredients are established, there is no evidence on record to indicate that the accused in any way subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment prior to her death in connection with dowry. In the light of the materials on record and having regard to the requirement of law, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor fairly submitted that the appeal in respect of the finding of the learned Sessions Judge as to the charge under Section 304B of the IPC and Section 498A of the Code of Civil Procedure is not seriously pressed. In the light of the materials on record and having regard to the requirement of law, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor fairly submitted that the appeal in respect of the finding of the learned Sessions Judge as to the charge under Section 304B of the IPC and Section 498A of the Code of Civil Procedure is not seriously pressed. Nevertheless, we hold that the evidence on record do not satisfactorily prove the alternative charge framed against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 304B of the IPC nor evidence on record establishes that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment within the meaning of explanation (a) or (b) to Section 498A of the IPC. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in acquitting the accused persons in respect of charges under Sections 498A and 304B of the IPC. 59. The other charge levelled against the accused is for the offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC. According to the prosecution, the accused wrongfully restrained the deceased from moving out at the time of the incident. The discussion made above clearly establishes that two of the accused firmly held the deceased and the other accused poured kerosene and set her ablaze. Therefore, the charge levelled against the accused for the offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC stands proved. 60. In view of the discussion, we hold that the prosecution has satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 1 and 3 are guilty of the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The judgment of the sessions Court acquitting the accused persons for these offences is liable to be set aside. 61. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The judgment and order dated 26-8-2003 passed by the Principal Sessions Judge, Bijapur at Bijapur in S.C. No. 128 of 2002 acquitting the accused 1 and 3 for the offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC is hereby set aside. 62. The accused 1 and 3 are convicted for the offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. 62. The accused 1 and 3 are convicted for the offences punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. The bail and surety bonds of the accused are hereby cancelled. ORDER ON SENTENCE 63. We have heard Smt. Anitha Kulkarni, learned Counsel for the Respondents and Smt. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor regarding the sentence. 64. Learned Counsel for the Respondents-accused submitted that accused 1 is a young person and after the judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge acquitting him, he has married for the second time and he has children through her and he has a large family to maintain. She also submitted that the accused 3 is a lady having husband and children, therefore lenient view be taken with regard to imposition of sentence. 65. On the other hand, Smt. Anuradha Desai, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor submitted that having regard to the manner in which the accused have committed the heinous crime of murdering the deceased by pouring kerosene and setting fire and her ablaze inside the house is sufficient to impose the maximum punishment provided under the law. 66. We have given our anxious considerations to the submissions and to the facts of this case. The accused 1 and 3 have been found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. The punishment prescribed for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC is either the death sentence or imprisonment for life. The minimum sentence a Court could award after finding the accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is imprisonment for life. It is now well-settled law by catena of decisions that death penalty can be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that this case is not the one falling under the category of rarest of rare cases warranting imposition of death sentence. Therefore, the only other sentence the Court can award is imprisonment for life having regard to the offence for which the accused have been found guilty. 67. Accordingly, we sentence the accused 1 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and the accused 3 to undergo simple imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs. Therefore, the only other sentence the Court can award is imprisonment for life having regard to the offence for which the accused have been found guilty. 67. Accordingly, we sentence the accused 1 to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and the accused 3 to undergo simple imprisonment for life and also to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Having regard to the maximum sentence imposed for the major offence, we are not proposing to impose any separate sentence for the offences punishable under Section 341 of the IPC. 68. The accused 1 and 3 are directed to surrender themselves before the learned Sessions Judge on or before 30-3-2009. On such surrender, the learned Sessions Judge shall commit the accused 1 and 3 to prison to serve the sentence. The accused 1 and 3 are entitled for the benefit under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A free copy of this judgment shall be delivered to the accused.