ORAL JUDGMENT B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.-Both these writ petitions are being heard together because the orders of removal from service against the respective petitioners therein have been passed by respondent No. 1 in the respective petitions after dispensing with holding of disciplinary inquiry as contemplated by Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, in Writ Petition No. 531/2007, was appointed to the post of police Sub-Inspector on 29.7.2002 and after completion of training in August, 2004 in Drug Law Enforcement conducted by Narcotic Control Bureau, she was posted as police Sub-Inspector, Anti Narcotic Cell, Police Station, Panaji on 2.4.2005. Between 6.2.2006 to 19.2.2007 she earned about 16 commendation certificate and some prizes, details whereof are not very relevant at this stage. On 22.9.2007, midnight, she conducted a raid on a rave party and caught d red handed one Preetam Lotlikar. Sanjay Sood and Sunil Datwani with narcotic drugs and booked them under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act and took them in custody. We are concerned with Preetam Lotlikar and Sunil Datwani and both of them were released on bail by the judicial Magistrate F.C. with condition to report to the petitioner daily. On 8.10.2007, Lajwanti Datani, mother of Shri Sunil Datani lodged a complaint against her in Anti Corruption Branch. Panaji that for showing leniency to Sunil and for weakening the criminal case against him, she demanded bribe of Rs. 40,000/on 28.9.2007. Trap was then laid and in the said trap Constable Rajesh Warrang working under her, was caught red-handed while accepting the amount of Rs. 10,000/- as first installment. This trap was led on 9.10.2007. Thereafter, the quarter where the petitioner was residing with her parents was searched and on 10.10.2007, she was dismissed from service with immediate effect by respondent No. 1 after stating that it was no reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against her. The petitioner then approached this Court on 26.10.2007 in this a writ petition. 2. Petitioner Hemant in Writ Petition 201/2009 was offered a temporary post as police constable in the office of Director General of Police on 8.5.2001. On 11.6.2001, he joined and was sent for training. After completion of training in December, 2002 he was posted as Police Constable at Vasco Police Station. On 11.9.2004, after satisfactory completion of probation he was confirmed as Police Constable. On 11.6.2001, he joined and was sent for training. After completion of training in December, 2002 he was posted as Police Constable at Vasco Police Station. On 11.9.2004, after satisfactory completion of probation he was confirmed as Police Constable. On 25.5.2008, he was on night duty at Dabolim Airport Outpost and his duty was to end on 26.5.2008. The Airport Security is essentially b handled by CISF Agency. The petitioner was assigned with the duty of receiving or sending off VIPs and VVIPs and escorting them into the Airport or outside the Airport. One Mr. Kaushal Kumar, Sub-Inspector, CISF. Unit ASG, Goa Airport lodged a complaint at Vasco Police Station on 26.5.2008 that between 2100 hours on 26.5.2008 to 6.30 hours on 26.5.2008 unknown culprit entered into Flamingo Duty Free Shop, Goa International Airport. Dabolim Goa, by creating hole into the wall and attempted to commit theft of foreign liquor of various brands, totally valued at 7,039 US Dollars. Offence under Sections 457, 380, read with Section 511 was then registered. The stolen material was then found within the campus of airport only. On 27.5.2008, the petitioner was arrested by Vasco Police in connection with the said crime and he was placed under suspension, pending disciplinary proceedings in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 12 of Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975 (hereinafter, referred to as “1975 Rules"). However, on 28.5.2008. Superintendent of Police (South), in exercise of powers under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India after recording that holding of an inquiry was not reasonably practicable dismissed the petitioner from services. On 29.5.2008 the petitioner was released on bail. One d CISF Constable Ditiraj Dhobi and his friend Ramsurat who were also arrested in connection with FIR No. 119/08 were also released on bail. Ditiraj Dhobi was also suspended but later on his suspension was revoked and he joined his duties. Against his dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal on 18.7.2008 to respondent No.2 Inspector General of Police and on 12.11.2008 that appeal came to be rejected. The present petition then came to be filed on 12.3.2009. 3. We have heard learned Senior Advocate Shri S.G. Dessai along with Ms. S. Rodrigues for both the petitioners and learned Advocate General with Mr. M. Salkar, for the respondents in Writ Petition 531/07 and Advocate Sameer Bandodkar for the respondents in Writ Petition No. 201/09. 4. The present petition then came to be filed on 12.3.2009. 3. We have heard learned Senior Advocate Shri S.G. Dessai along with Ms. S. Rodrigues for both the petitioners and learned Advocate General with Mr. M. Salkar, for the respondents in Writ Petition 531/07 and Advocate Sameer Bandodkar for the respondents in Writ Petition No. 201/09. 4. After narrating facts as disclosed above and after inviting our attention to the orders of dismissal. Advocate Dessai has argued that exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b) is totally unwarranted and in the present facts there is no material on record to take recourse a to that power. He states that even after challenge in the writ petition the respondents have failed to substantiate their contention that holding of departmental enquiry was not reasonably practicable. He states that both the orders are not only punitive but also cast stigma and that has been done behind the back of the petitioners and without hearing them. He states that a show cause notice at least would have been given to the petitions before taking such a drastic decision condemning them unheard. He has relied upon several judgments to substantiate his stand and we find it proper to refer to them while considering arguments in detail. He has also invited our attention to provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and 1975 Rules in support of his arguments. He states that the petitioners, therefore, need to be reinstated in service forthwith, by quashing and setting aside, the said dismissal orders. 5. Learned Advocate General has on the other hand, invited our attention to the provisions of 1975 Rules to point out that remedy of filing appeal is available in view of Rules 13 and 14 to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 531/2007 and as that remedy has not been utilized, the present petition needs to be dismissed. He has also relied upon the judgment of constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court c in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel, reported at (1985) 3 SCC 398 on which Advocate Dessai has also placed reliance. He states that from the affidavits filed on record, material with respondents No. 1 and 2 against the petitioners has amply come on record and continuation of officers like the petitioners in service was found detrimental to public interest and public good. He states that from the affidavits filed on record, material with respondents No. 1 and 2 against the petitioners has amply come on record and continuation of officers like the petitioners in service was found detrimental to public interest and public good. He argues that State of Goa is wrongfully projected as heaven for drug traffickers and to clean that impression, the Government acts sternly in such matters. Past service record of lady petitioner is not sufficient because according to him one wrong is enough to tarnish her image. He states d that question, therefore, needs to be left for consideration of the appellate Authority and this Court should not interfere in writ jurisdiction. In the alternative and without prejudice, he states that after the dismissal of the petitioner in 2007 period of about 2 years has elapsed and hence in changed circumstances, if the petitioner makes an appropriate representation/appeal the competent authority may consider whether to hold departmental enquiry against the petitioner or not. He states that writ petition as filed, therefore, needs o be dismissed. In view of this statement made by the learned advocate General in order to enable him to take proper instructions and authorization in this respect, we had adjourned the hearing to next date However, on the next date learned Advocate General stated that as the competent officers were not available in the State, he could not take complete instructions. 6. Learned Addl. Government Advocate Shri Bandodkar appearing for the respondents in Writ Petition 201/09 has adopted a the arguments of learned Advocate General and in addition, invited our attention to Memo of Appeal filed by the petition Constable Hemant to urge that action of dispensing with departmental enquiry was not challenged by him at all. 7. He has also invited our attention to reply affidavit to urge that stolen property was recovered at the instance of petitioner Hemant only. In these circumstances, he states that the impugned order of dismissal dated 28.5.2008 is just and proper and does not suffer from any vice. 8. In his brief reply, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has stated that the competent authorities in both the matters have resorted to Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution and, therefore, provisions of Article 311 (3) making that decision final are squarely applicable and even bind the appellate authority. 8. In his brief reply, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners has stated that the competent authorities in both the matters have resorted to Article 311(2)(b) of Constitution and, therefore, provisions of Article 311 (3) making that decision final are squarely applicable and even bind the appellate authority. He also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and others v. R. Reddappa and another, reported at (1993) 4 SCC 269 to State that such an objection cannot be raised at the belated stage. 9. With the assistance of the respective Counsel we have perused the impugned orders and various judgments. In so far as petitioner Hemant in Writ Petition 201/09 is concerned, against the order of dismissal dated 28.5.2008 he approached the appellate authority and the appellate authority has dismissed his appeal on 12.11.2008. His writ petition, therefore, can be considered on merits. However, petitioner in writ Petition No. 531/2007 did not file any appeal challenging order of dismissal dated 10.10.2007 passed by the Director General of police. Goa. The writ petition was heard on 7.11.2007, 23.11.2007, 12.12.2007 and on that day, after healing learned Advocate General, it came to be admitted. On 28.7.2008, an application for early hearing was dismissed and on 30.1.2009, the writ petition was directed to be fixed for final hearing on 16.6.2009. The objection about availability of alternate remedy or its efficacy ought to have been raised at threshold to oppose the admission of writ petition. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner has mentioned that such objection was raised by learned Advocate General and inspite of that on 12.12.2007 writ petition was admitted for early final hearing. This statement of learned Senior Advocate has not been refuted. 10. Perusal of para 5 of Union of India and others v. R. Reddappa and another (supra) shows that the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that once High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is satisfied of injustice or arbitrariness, then the restriction self imposed or statutory, stands removed and no rule or technicality on exercise of power can stand in the way of rendering justice. As objection was raised and inspite of that writ petition came to be admitted for early final hearing and in view of the above observations and for reasons which become apparent below, we find that in the present circumstances, the availability of alternate remedy or its efficacy need not be gone into as it cannot come in the way of this Court considering the challenge on merits. As it is, we are required to consider identical challenge in relation to same service in Writ Petition No.201/09. 11. Constitutional Bench Judgment in Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel (supra) has been heavily relied upon by the petitioner as also by the respondents. This judgment is also quoted in several other reported judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, to which we are making reference little later. 12. In Workmen of Hindus tan Steel Ltd. and another v. Hindustan Steel Ltd. and others reported at 1984 (Supp) SCC 554, the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that where an order caste stigma or affects livelihood, before making that order principles of natural justice, namely a reasonable opportunity to present one's case and controvert the adverse evidence must be effectually and fully given. Thus, even though proviso (b) to Article 311 (2) permits dispensing with the inquiry, a safeguard has been introduced in Constitution and authority has to specify reasons why it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. The power of dispensing with inquiry is conferred for the purpose and to effectuate that purpose, power can be exercised setting down the reasons. The reasons must be germane to the issue viz. of dispensing with the inquiry. Although in view of Article 311(3) of decision of appellate authority is final, it only means that the Court cannot inquire into adequacy or sufficiency of reasons, but then the reasons are subject to limited judicial review. The employer has to satisfy the Court about the good and objective reasons showing both proof of misconduct and valid and objective reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. Mere ipse dixit of the employer in such a situation is of no significance. The employer has to satisfy the Court had holding of an inquiry will be either counter-productive or may cause such irreparable and irreversible damage which in the facts and circumstances of the case need not be suffered. Mere ipse dixit of the employer in such a situation is of no significance. The employer has to satisfy the Court had holding of an inquiry will be either counter-productive or may cause such irreparable and irreversible damage which in the facts and circumstances of the case need not be suffered. In Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, reported at (1991) I SCC 362, after considering the scope of Article 311 in light of above mentioned Constitution Bench Judgment, the stand taken by the employer has been reproduced in para 5 and then Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that counter filed was nothing but reproduction of para 3 of the impugned order reproduced by it in para (1) of the judgment. The said para stated that it was reported that employee had thrown threats that he with the help of other police employees would not allow holding of any departmental inquiry against him and he and his associates would not hesitate to cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Hon'ble Apex Court mentions that its attention was not drawn to any material existing on the date of the impugned order in support of the allegations contained in para 3 thereof that the appellant had thrown any such threat and it was a incumbent upon the employer to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order. Article 311 (2)(b) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from "the material placed before it" that it is not reasonably practicably to hold a departmental inquiry. This satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. Necessary particulars were not given and the Hon'ble Apex Court also noticed that the employee was in hospital and could not have given such threats. The appeal filed by the employee was thus allowed and order of dismissal was set aside. In Chandigarh Administration, Union Territory, Chandigarh and others v. Ajay Manchanda and others reported at (1996) 3 SCC 753 , in para 4 finality given by Article 311 (3) has been considered and it has been observed that judicial review is not altogether excluded. The appeal filed by the employee was thus allowed and order of dismissal was set aside. In Chandigarh Administration, Union Territory, Chandigarh and others v. Ajay Manchanda and others reported at (1996) 3 SCC 753 , in para 4 finality given by Article 311 (3) has been considered and it has been observed that judicial review is not altogether excluded. Said para shows that if requisite satisfaction was formed mala fide or it was founded or extraneous grounds, the judicial review is permissible. In para 16 of this judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that no one had ever stated either before the SP (Headquarters) preliminary enquiry officer) or before the SSP that he was terrorised, intimidated or threatened by Kuldip Singh. Only because one Advocate Raheja mentioned in latter that he did not wish to proceed with his complaint because of compromise, SSP had inferred that he was terrorised and intimidated. The Hon'ble Apex Court was not satisfied with this material or inference drawn from it. It also noticed that in order of dismissal or anywhere in record, SSP had not said that he had information about intimidation or terrorising or issuing threats from some other source. The inference drawn by SSP, therefore, was held to be not reasonable or relevant one. In Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar reported at (2003) 4 SCC 579 , the scope of judicial review has been considered and it has been observed that if two views are possible about possibility of holding departmental inquiry, it is not within the domain of Court to substitute its view for that Disciplinary Authority as if the Court is sitting as appellate authority over the Disciplinary Authority. The contemporaneous circumstances can be duly taken note of in arriving at a decision whether to dispense with an inquiry or not. What the High Court is expected to do is to see whether there was any scope for judicial review and focus should be on the impracticability or otherwise of holding the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority has to judicially address itself to the matter before it and act in good faith with due regard to all relevant considerations without getting influenced by irrelevant considerations. The Court has to be slow to interfere in any such matter unless the decision is tainted by any impropriety. The Disciplinary Authority has to judicially address itself to the matter before it and act in good faith with due regard to all relevant considerations without getting influenced by irrelevant considerations. The Court has to be slow to interfere in any such matter unless the decision is tainted by any impropriety. In Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, reported at (2005) 11 SC 525 termination order dated 27.12.1999 as reproduced in para 4 shows that the Enquiry officer submitted his report dated 17.12.1999. The Disciplinary Authority (S.P. Gurgao) observed that conducting a regular departmental inquiry was not reasonably practicably because main prosecution witness Mr. Kenichi Tanaka was a foreigner and could have left the counter in midst of the departmental proceedings. He was not likely to name the delinquent official even during the regular departmental proceedings which was evident from his letter dated 6.12.1999 and the report of the inquiry officer. Hence, conducting such an inquiry was not going to be reasonably practicable and he opined that it was a fit case to proceed against the corrupt official under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In para 5, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that holding of a departmental inquiry is rule and dispensing with it is an exception. The order of termination did not show any reason assigned for recording that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. The reasons were held to be no ground for dispensing with the inquiry. It was also noticed that visa of the complainant Tanaka was extended upto 22.12.2000. A reasonable opportunity as contemplated in Article 311(2) of the Constitution envisages an opportunity to defend and establish innocence by cross examining the prosecution witnesses and by examining defence witnesses. In these circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court set aside the order of termination, but granted the employer liberty to hold an inquiry after affording him reasonably opportunity. Learned Senior Advocate has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in MANU/SC/0401/2009 in case of Uma Nath Pandey and others v. State of U.P. and another to point out the true meaning of adhering to principles of natural justice. Learned Senior Advocate has relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in MANU/SC/0401/2009 in case of Uma Nath Pandey and others v. State of U.P. and another to point out the true meaning of adhering to principles of natural justice. In S.J. Meshram v. Union of India, reported at 1987 (Supp) SCC 164, the likelihood of destruction of evidence and of non-appearance d of members of Mahila Samiti to adduce evidence for fear of threat and harassment and loss of vital document showing actual amount of misappropriation were held irrelevant and inadequate reasons under Article 311(2)(b) for dispensing with the departmental inquiry. 13. The petitioners have drawn our attention to Division Bench Judgment dated 1.4.2009 delivered at Panaji, Goa in Writ Petition No. 435/2008 to state that there Police Department had withdrawn similar order and agreed to hold regular departmental inquiry. Learned Advocate General has brought to our notice that as preliminary inquiry was conducted against the petitioner therein by recording statement of witnesses, there was no reason to dispense with holding regular departmental inquiry. The Government found that the matter was squarely covered by Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab and others reported at 2006 (13) SCC 581 and hence Government decided to withdraw that termination order. It is apparent that that Writ Petition 434/2008 has not been decided on merits and does not lay down any law. 14. All the judgments mentioned above invariably referred to the case of Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel (supra). Several paragraphs of the said judgment have been pointed out to us by both sides. But, in view of the various judgments mentioned by us above, we do not find it necessary to refer to all of them. The said judgment in para 44 states that where Clause (2) of Article 311 is properly applied and inquiry is dispensed with, concerned Government servant cannot be heard to complaint that he is deprived of his livelihood. In para 62, conditions for application of different clauses of Article 311(2) are mentioned. The said judgment in para 44 states that where Clause (2) of Article 311 is properly applied and inquiry is dispensed with, concerned Government servant cannot be heard to complaint that he is deprived of his livelihood. In para 62, conditions for application of different clauses of Article 311(2) are mentioned. In para 70, the Hon'ble Apex Court states that when public servant by himself or in concern with others has brought a situation in which it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry and his conduct is as such as to justify his dismissal, both public interest and public good demand that such penalty should forthwith and summarily be imposed upon him In para 123, the Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that CISF Act and CISF Rules show that a Government servant who has been dismissed after dispensing with departmental inquiry has got remedy to file an appeal or a revision. Where it is a case falling under Clause (b) of the second proviso of Article 311 (2) and dispensing with inquiry by disciplinary authority was the result of situation prevailing at that time, after change of situation the Government servant can claim to have an inquiry held in which he can establish that he was not guilty of the charges on which he has been dismissed. However, by Article 311(3) he cannot contend that inquiry was wrongly dispensed with. In para 137, the Hon'ble Apex Court states that if situation continued to be same or again similar situation arose it would not then be reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry at the time of hearing of appeal or revision. In para 138, it has been held that in order to decide whether reasons are germane to clause (b), the Court must put itself in place of disciplinary authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have done. Perusal of paras 130, 131, 132, 133, 134 and 135 shows that reasons for dispensing with departmental inquiry have to precede the decision. The Disciplinmy Authority is not expected to dispense with departmental inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid holding of an inquiry or because department case against the Government servant is weak and would fall. The Authority has to record the reasons in writing for its satisfaction. The Disciplinmy Authority is not expected to dispense with departmental inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid holding of an inquiry or because department case against the Government servant is weak and would fall. The Authority has to record the reasons in writing for its satisfaction. Learned Advocate General has relied upon this judgment to show and urge that compliance there with has been fully done. 15. The order of dismissal dated 10.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 531/07, after briefly mentioning the facts in first two paragraphs in third paragraph mentions that the act of misconduct on the part of the petitioner revealed her corrupt activities prejudicial to the interest a of Department and she had shaken the faith of the public in the Police Department. She acted in most reprehensible manner unacceptable in disciplined force specially at the rank of PSI and it would be detrimental to the public interest to allow her to continue in service. Thereafter the order reads : "And whereas, the undersigned has understood the facts of the case. it is after due deliberation, I am satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against the said accused L/PSI, Sandhya Gupta under Goa Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. 1975. as amended from time to time for the reason that she being a member of Police Force and of the rank of a Police Sub-Inspector which is a supervisory post, she will over awe the witnesses and will exert her influence to the extent that there is no reasonable practicable possibility to hold an enquiry against her. Now, therefore, in view of the above facts and circumstances the undersigned being the competent authority in exercise of powers vested in me under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India hereby dismiss the said accused L/PSI, Sandhya Gupta of cm, ANC. Panaji, from service with immediate effect: In Writ Petition 201/2009, the order of dismissal dated 28.5.2008 mentions the facts in first two paras and then in third para mentions that during the interrogation petitioner Hemant admitted his involvement in the crime. In fourth para it is mentioned that undersigned (Superintendent of Police (South), Margao. Panaji, from service with immediate effect: In Writ Petition 201/2009, the order of dismissal dated 28.5.2008 mentions the facts in first two paras and then in third para mentions that during the interrogation petitioner Hemant admitted his involvement in the crime. In fourth para it is mentioned that undersigned (Superintendent of Police (South), Margao. Goal went through detailed report of Police Inspector, Vasco Police Station about the mischievous activities of alleged accused petitioner of committing theft at a place where he was deployed for duties which has shaken the faith of the public and tarnished the image of the Police Department in the eyes of the public. He acted in a most reprehensible d manner which is unacceptable being member of a disciplined force in the rank of constabulary and it would be detrimental to public interest to allow him to continue in service of Police Department. The said order thereafter, reads : "And whereas the undersigned has understood the facts of the case. It is after due deliberation, I am satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry against PC-6229, Hemant L. Kankonkar of Vasco Police Station, to prove his guilt under Goa Police Subordinate Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975, as amended from time to time for the reasons : (1) Delinquent being member of displined force i.e. Goa Police, nobody will dare to depose against him in a regular Departmental Enquiry. (2) The delinquent PC-6229, Hemant L. Kankonkar have indulged in a Criminal act of severe nature which shows that protector of law has turned to be a criminal. (3) The delinquent has tarnished the image of the Police Force by his misconduct and continuing him in service will be bad for the Department. Now, therefore, in view of the above facts and circumstances, the undersigned, being the competent authority in exercise of powers vested in me under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. and also Rule 10(ii) Goa Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1975, hereby dismiss the said alleged accused PC-6229, Hemant L. Kankonkar of Vasco Police Station from service, with immediate effect." As mentioned above, the appellate authority has confirmed this order on 12.11.2008. 16. The respondents have relied upon their affidavits-in-reply filed in both the writ petitions to support their action. and also Rule 10(ii) Goa Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1975, hereby dismiss the said alleged accused PC-6229, Hemant L. Kankonkar of Vasco Police Station from service, with immediate effect." As mentioned above, the appellate authority has confirmed this order on 12.11.2008. 16. The respondents have relied upon their affidavits-in-reply filed in both the writ petitions to support their action. Affidavit is filed by one Shri Brijendra Singh Brar (IPS) in Writ Petition No. 531/2007 and in that affidavit, after mentioning relevant provisions of Constitution of India and 1975 Rules, he has raised a preliminary objection and also pointed out limited scope of a judicial review available to this Court. He has pointed out how continuation of the petitioner was found against public interest and how charges are of serious nature. It has been said that considering the nature of inquiry c required to be conducted against her, it was not reasonably practicable to hold it then. Thereafter, the material collected against the petitioner has been pointed out in short including the tape recorded conversation between the petitioner and the complainant; between Rajesh and the complainant. It appears that there are two cassettes of such conversation. During the raid on quarter of the petitioner some bills of purchase of refrigerator, AC, microwave oven, mixer grinder have also been attached. Thus, effort is to show that there is enough material with the department to show that the petitioner is involved in misconduct as alleged and her continuation, therefore, is detrimental to the public interest. 17. In Writ Petition No. 201/2009, reply affidavit is filed by Shri Allan De Sa. Superintendent of Police, South District. Margao i.e. respondent No.1. The contents of the said affidavit are more or less identical and again effort is made to show that the department has got sufficient material with it to show involvement of the petitioner Hemant in the incident of theft. 18. We have also reproduced above relevant text of both the dismissal orders. The case law cited has also been discussed by us. The requirement of Article 311 (2), in so far as present matters are concerned is a satisfaction that the Government servant needs to be dismissed or removed from the service because of misconduct alleged against him and a finding that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry. The case law cited has also been discussed by us. The requirement of Article 311 (2), in so far as present matters are concerned is a satisfaction that the Government servant needs to be dismissed or removed from the service because of misconduct alleged against him and a finding that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry. The orders of punishment in both the matters apart from merely expressing the possibility of not holding such inquiry reasonably does not mention any reason in support thereof. It has a been mentioned that the petitioner in writ Petition No. 531/2007 will over awe the witnesses and will exert her influence to the extent that there is no reasonable practicable possibility to hold an enquiry against her. In the other writ petition reasons given are that nobody will dare to depose against the petitioner Hemant in regular departmental inquiry. The other two reasons given there are that protector of law has turned to be a criminal and has tarnished the image of the police force. These last two grounds cannot be the reasons relevant for reaching at finding that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry against the petitioner Hemant. Thus, the only reason given in his case is nobody will dare to depose against him in regular departmental inquiry. It is not however stated in the said order or in any orders separately passed that such satisfaction is recorded elsewhere or then no objective material has been disclosed in the affidavit-in-reply to support such conclusion. There is no any complaint pointed out or produced before us to show that petitioner Hemant at any time tried to win over or pressurise or terrortse any witness or any employee of the Department. On the contrary it appears that the police complaint against him is lodged by Sub-Inspector CISF Unit ASG. Goa Airport. No names of witnesses who can be brought under pressure by him are disclosed to us and it appears that if any of the witnesses are employees of CISF or attached to police station at Vasco where the petitioner was working it cannot be presumed that they will shirk from their duty to depose truly and correctly against the petitioner. No names of witnesses who can be brought under pressure by him are disclosed to us and it appears that if any of the witnesses are employees of CISF or attached to police station at Vasco where the petitioner was working it cannot be presumed that they will shirk from their duty to depose truly and correctly against the petitioner. As no incident of any actual threat or warning by the petitioner to any such witness is even considered by respondent No.1, we find that there is no material to support the said finding. 19. The same logic holds good even in case of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 531/2007. No incident that she tried to contact any witness or tried to influence him/her or terrorize such witness is mentioned anywhere on record before us. No complaint oral or in writing from any such witness is pleaded by the department. 20. It appears that because both the petitioners are employees of Police Department the competent authorities have inferred that they will over awe the witnesses or terrorise them or bring influence on them. Such an inference cannot be drawn in air. The authorities ought to have pointed out to us that they had received complaints either in writing or orally against the petitioners from either the witnesses or the prosecuting agency and unfortunately no such material has been placed on record in the reply affidavit or even during hearing. It is not even stated that opinion about holding of departmental inquiry not being reasonably practicable has been recorded elsewhere separately. If the reasons given by the respective officers are to be accepted it is apparent that the Government cannot conduct departmental inquiry against any police officer and in that event, protection afforded to them by Article 311, as also by 1975 Rules is rendered meaningless. Both the orders proceed on the presumption that being employees of Police Department, the petitioners are bound to bring pressure on witnesses and terrorise them. This general impression of top officers is not sufficient to sustain the act of respondents which results in depriving the protection extended to both the petitioners by Constitution of India and also by 1975 Rules mentioned above. The orders of dismissal dated 10.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 531/2007 and dated 28.5.2008 in Writ Petition No. 201/2009 are. Therefore, found to be unsustainable. The orders of dismissal dated 10.10.2007 in Writ Petition No. 531/2007 and dated 28.5.2008 in Writ Petition No. 201/2009 are. Therefore, found to be unsustainable. It is made clear that mere making out a strong case showing that if the departmental inquiry is required to be conducted it would certainly result in dismissal is not sufficient to dispense with the departmental inquiry. Rightly, no arguments about b nature of inquiry or then its peculiarity are advanced to demonstrate reasonable impracticability of holding it. We have therefore, not expressed anything on merits of material which the respondents have collected against respective petitioners. 21. With the result, order of dismissal dated 10.10.2007 passed by the Director General of Police. Goa. Panaji in Writ Petition No. 531/2007 is quashed and set aside. 22. The order of dismissal dated 28.5.2008, passed by Superintendent of Police (South). Margao. Goa in Writ Petition No. 201/2009 is also quashed and set aside. Consequently the order dated 12.11.2008 passed by the appellate authority. viz. Inspector General of Police (Goa). Panaji is also quashed and set aside. 23. Both the petitioners are accordingly reinstated back in service with liberty to the respondents to proceed further in the departmental inquiry against them in accordance with law. The period of absence of respective petitioners till today is directed to be regularised as period of suspension pending inquiry by passing suitable orders within a period of 4 months from today and the necessary subsistence allowance with arrears be released to them within said period. If the departmental enquiry is conducted the period of suspension as directed by this Court can then be regularised as per out come of such departmental inquiry as per law. 24. Both the writ petitions are thus allowed. Rule made absolute in the above terms in both the matters. However in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.