Judgment Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 seek Wit of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the orders of the 3rd Respondent in Proceedings Rc.No.248471/PR.II(3)/2004 dated 212. 2004 and to direct the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioners in service with all consequential monetary and service benefits. 2. Petitioner in W.P.No35995/2005 seeks Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, to quash the orders of the 1st Respondent in Rc.No.5529/AP II/3/2005 dated 21. 2005 and to direct the Respondents to reinstate the Petitioner in service along with back wages from the date of removal order. 3. Since all three Petitions relate to same occurrence, all the three Petitions were taken up together and shall stand disposed of by this common order. 4. Facts in nutshell are as follows:- (i) Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 joined the Police Services as Grade-II Police Constables on 011. 1997. After completion of training, they joined in Tamil Nadu Special Police and then transferred to Armed Reserve. (ii) Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005 has joined the Police Services as Grade-II Police Constable on 30.6.1977. After completion of training, Petitioner was posted at Madurai and served till 1983 as Grade – I Constable. Thereafter, Petitioner was promoted as Women S.I. and was serving at All Women Police Station, Tallakulam, Madurai City. (iii) Petitioners in all three Petitions, one Periyasamy [HC 2296], and Balasubramanian [Gr.I PC 856] were deployed in Patrol No.1 Vehicle [TN 59 G 0277 – Tempo Traveller] from 20.00 hours on 23. 2004 to 07.00 hours on 23. 2004. While they were on patrol duty on 23. 2004 night at 12.05, Petitioners noticed opening of Wine Shop No.5135 beyond midnight belonged to TASMAC situated at P.T.Rajan Road, Narimedu, Madurai and picked up Deivam [Supervisor], Chellapandi and Sathish [Salesmen] and kept them illegally in the Patrol Vehicle till 3.30 hours and threatened and got Rs.500/- towards illegal gratification from the Supervisor and shared themselves. Thereafter, Petitioners released them and thereby brought disrepute to the Police Department. (iii) On complaint from the Collector, Madurai dated 23. 2004, 4th Respondent – Asst. Commissioner of Police, [PEW], Madurai City conducted preliminary enquiry and since during the course of preliminary enquiry prima facie case was made out, all three Petitioners were placed under suspension. Asst. Commissioner of Police, Thallakulam L & O Range, Madurai city was nominated as Enquiry Officer. Petitioners have participated in the Enquiry. Enquiry Officer gave his Enquiry Report on 17. Commissioner of Police, [PEW], Madurai City conducted preliminary enquiry and since during the course of preliminary enquiry prima facie case was made out, all three Petitioners were placed under suspension. Asst. Commissioner of Police, Thallakulam L & O Range, Madurai city was nominated as Enquiry Officer. Petitioners have participated in the Enquiry. Enquiry Officer gave his Enquiry Report on 17. 2004 holding the charge as proved. Copy of enquiry report was served upon the Petitioners. (iv) Based on the enquiry report, 3rd Respondent – Commissioner of Police, Madurai City being the Disciplinary Authority awarded punishment of removal from service w.e.f. 18. 2004 AN. Aggrieved by the same, Petitioners have preferred an appeal before 2nd Respondent – Addl. Director General of Police, L & O, Chennai on 28. 2004 which came to be rejected on 010. 2004 and 110. 2004 respectively. The review application filed by the Petitioners also came to be rejected by the 1st Respondent – Director General of Police, Chennai on 212. 2004 and 21. 2005 respectively which are challenged in these Writ Petitions. 5. Respondents have filed counter stating that after analysing the pros and cons of the evidence adduced by the witnesses in the Enquiry and gravity of proven charge, Disciplinary Authority has passed order of punishment of removal from service. According to the Respondents, the deliberate and daring act of the Petitioners not only brings stigma on the reputation of the Petitioners, but also tarnishes the image of the entire Police force among the public. 6. Mr. S. Ravi, learned counsel for the Petitioners in W.P.No.3141 & 3402/2005 has submitted that P.Ws.2 to 4 have not stated anything about the Petitioners for the alleged receipt of bribe. Learned counsel further submitted that the above said witnesses have stated that only the Women S.I. had received the bribe. It was submitted that Petitioners are innocent Police Constables of young age who were working in the Armed Reserve. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that their case stands on different footing than that of the Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005. 7. Mrs. S. Padma, learned counsel for the Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005 submitted that Petitioner has joined in the Police department as Women PC in the year 1977 and thereafter she got promotion as Women S.I. and discharged the duty to the satisfaction of her higher officials. 7. Mrs. S. Padma, learned counsel for the Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005 submitted that Petitioner has joined in the Police department as Women PC in the year 1977 and thereafter she got promotion as Women S.I. and discharged the duty to the satisfaction of her higher officials. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that Petitioner has received many rewards and since, Petitioner being the strict officer, she has been implicated in this case falsely. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that Petitioner has not participated in the enquiry and the authorities are pre-determined to take action against the Petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that Appellate Authority has not considered all the evidence and not considered the Petitioners blemishless service in the Police department. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would further submit that there was no written complaint from any one and all proceedings were done in a hurried manner without giving opportunity to the Petitioner. 9. Mr. N.Senthilkumar, learned AGP submitted that time of occurrence and place of occurrence and the manner in which PWs.2 to 4 were taken in the Patrol vehicle and later let off after receiving money would clearly indicate that Petitioners were guilty of the misconduct and such delinquency has to be firmly dealt with. Placing reliance upon 1982 I LLJ 46 State of Haryana vs. Rattan singh, learned AGP would further submit that simple point is whether there was some evidence or was there no evidence. 10. PW.2 Deivam [Supervisor of TASMAC], PW.3 Chellapandi and PW.4 Sathish [Salesmen of TASMAC] who were the crucial witnesses to speak about the charge of demanding and acceptance of bribe. PWs.2 to 4 have categorically deposed in one voice that they had been taken in the Patrol vehicle and PW.2 Deivam took Rs.500/-from the sale proceeds of TASMAC and gave it to the Women S.I. of Police [Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005]. 11. During his oral enquiry, PW.2 had deposed on 23. 2004 mid-night 12.30 A.M., Head Constable Periyasamy had called them to the Patrolling vehicle and questioned them as to why the shop was opened at late hours and made them to get into the vehicle. 11. During his oral enquiry, PW.2 had deposed on 23. 2004 mid-night 12.30 A.M., Head Constable Periyasamy had called them to the Patrolling vehicle and questioned them as to why the shop was opened at late hours and made them to get into the vehicle. On being demanded money, he informed Head Constable Periyasamy that he would go and get money from the shop and PW.2 brought five 100 rupees notes and handed over it to the Women S.I. [Petitioner in W.P.No.35995/2005] who was present in the Patrolling vehicle and who received the same. 12. Salesmen of TASMAC shop who were examined as PWs.3 and 4 had also specifically deposed that Head Constable Periyasamy made them to get into the vehicle and Rs.500/- was given to Women S.I. 13. None of the PWs have implicated the Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3242/2005. Statement of PW.2 is to the effect that he gave Rs.500/-to Women S.I. who in turn had given Rs.100/- to the remaining Police personnel in the vehicle. In his cross examination, PW.2 had admitted that Petitioners [W.P.No.s3141 & 3402/2005] who were Gr.II Police Constables have not demanded any money separately nor received any money. Thus, PW.2 had resiled from his earlier version before the Asst. Commissioner of Police [PEW]. Therefore, it cannot be said it is the case of no evidence. As rightly submitted by the learned AGP, there is some evidence to show that there was demand of bribe and Rs.500/-was paid to the Women S.I. who in turn had given Rs.100/- to the Police personnel remaining in the Patrolling vehicle. In exercising Judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution of India, sufficiency or otherwise of evidence is beyond scrutiny. 14. Observing that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply and observing that sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny in an un-reported judgment of the Supreme Court in 1982 I LLJ 46 State of Haryana Vs. Rattan Singh, the Supreme Court held as under:- "4. .... The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Rattan Singh, the Supreme Court held as under:- "4. .... The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and wordly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic Tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." 15. Applying the ratio of the above decision, this Court finds that statement of PW.2 before the Asst. Commissioner of Police [PEW], there is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the Petitioners. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of no evidence which would invalidate the impugned order. 16. W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005: Coming to the quantum of punishment imposed upon the Writ Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3242/2005, it is to be noted that Petitioner in W.P.No.3141/2005 [S.Selvakumar] was only Gr.II Police Constable driver. Petitioner in W.P.No.3402/2005 [K.Jeyamayan] was only Gr.II Police Constable who was a party in the Patrolling vehicle. Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 who were only Gr.II Police Constables were acting on the direction/orders of the Women S.I. [Petitioner in W.P.No.35955/2005]. Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 have completed nearly 7 years of service. There seems to be no previous reported misconduct. 17. Penalty imposed upon the Petitioners [W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005] commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. Penalty of removal for the alleged misconduct appears to be disproportionate to the gravity of charge. 18. If the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority is one, which, having regard to the rules, could be imposed for the proved misconduct, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution will not go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the penalty awarded by the authority. 18. If the penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority is one, which, having regard to the rules, could be imposed for the proved misconduct, the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Art.226 of Constitution will not go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the penalty awarded by the authority. However, there are exceptions of the rule: (i) where the penalty imposed is mala fide or so disproportionate as to shock of conscience of the Court; (ii) where the penalty imposed falls under Cl. (1) of the second proviso to Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. 19. In service matters, the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. Unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court, there is no scope for interference. In B.C.Chaturvedi V.Union of India [1996 I LLJ 1231], the Supreme Court, after considering the various issues and case laws and the scope of interference in the punishment imposed by the authorities, has held as follows :- "A review of the above legal position would establish that the Disciplinary Authority, and on appeal the Appellate Authority, being fact-finding authorities, have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment, keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof". 20. The imposition of appropriate punishment is within the discretion of Disciplinary Authority. Power under Article 226 is one of the judicial review. It is not an appeal from a decision. If misconduct is established normally the court would not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the court. 21. The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. It is not an appeal from a decision. If misconduct is established normally the court would not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless it shocks the conscience of the court. 21. The scope of interference with quantum of punishment has been the subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. Referring to various decisions in 2007(2) MLJ 278(SC) [Union of India and Ors. v. Dwarka Prasad Tiwari], the Supreme Court has held as follows :- "15. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the Court should not interfere with the administrators decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in the Wednesburys the Court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the Court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in decision making process and not the decision. 16. To put differently, unless the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the Court/Tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further to shorten litigations, it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed. 17. The above position was recently reiterated in Union of India and another v. K.G.Soni [ 2006(6) Supreme 389 : 2006 III LLJ 802b (SC)] following Domoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and ors. v. Munna Lal Jain AIR 2005 SC 584 : 2005(10) SCC 84 : 2005 I LLJ 730 (SC)." 22. It is pertinent to note that in W.P.No.4024/2005 preferred by Head Constable Periyasamy, referring to Dwarka Prasad Tiwaris case, Justice K.CHANDRU has modified the punishment of removal from service into one of compulsory retirement. 23. Though appropriate punishment for the alleged misconduct of bribe is dismissal, Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 were only acting on the directions of the Women S.I. [Petitioner in W.P.No.35955/2005]. 23. Though appropriate punishment for the alleged misconduct of bribe is dismissal, Petitioners in W.P.Nos.3141 & 3402/2005 were only acting on the directions of the Women S.I. [Petitioner in W.P.No.35955/2005]. In such circumstances punishment of removal from service appears to be harsh and the same is modified as reduction to a lower stage in the time scale and salary is reduced to starting point of time scale. 24. W.P.No.35995/2005: Pws2 and 3 have stated that PW2, Deivam, handed over Rs.500/- to women S.I (Writ Petitioner) and only after receiving money she has let them off. PW4, Satish, had also spoken about giving money Rs.500/-to the Police, though not specifically to women S.I. It is a clear case of evidence against women S.I-writ petitioner. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner Dr.S.Padma submitted that PWs 2 and 3 have not deposed correct facts and the writ petitioner had not taken TASMAC employees to the Patrolling vehicle and the Enquiry Officer failed to appreciate defence stand of writ petitioner. 25. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that PW2, Deivam, accepted that he was warned and let off without taking action against him on request made by him that he will lose his job if action is taken against him. It was therefore contended that it clearly shows that he was only warned and all the allegations of taking Rs.500/-as bribe was only a concocted one. 26. Learned counsel would further submit that Pws 2 to 4 threaded with false implications and made false complaint to the District Manager TASMAC who in turn had written to the District Collector. 27. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further submitted that statement of PW2 is riven with contradictions which would discredit evidence of PW2. Pointing out contradiction in the statement of PW2, learned counsel submitted that before Assistant Commissioner of Police, PW2 stated that Rs.500/-paid to woman SI was shared by the Police party where as before Enquiry Officer PW2 has stated that writ petitioner had taken entire Rs.500/-. It was further argued that in view of contradiction statement of PW2 cannot be relied upon to prove misconduct. 28. Learned counsel for Petitioner further submitted that during oral enquiry Ex.No.D.I-G.D of Controlroom and Ex.No.D2 GD of Patrol Vehicle I itself would show that the Enquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority wanted to take some action for the Collectors letter. 28. Learned counsel for Petitioner further submitted that during oral enquiry Ex.No.D.I-G.D of Controlroom and Ex.No.D2 GD of Patrol Vehicle I itself would show that the Enquiry Officer as well as Disciplinary Authority wanted to take some action for the Collectors letter. It was further argued that G.D entries of Control Room and Police Patrol Vehicle I regarding the time 1.20 hrs would only indicate picking up of 4 persons and handed over to Tallakulam Police station and taken one Karthik from Madhisiam Police station to General Hospital and obtained certificate of drunkenness and handed over to the Madhisiam Police station. It was mainly argued that when entries in in Police Department are true in respect of other instances, but absence of entry regarding taking up of three employees to TASMAC would clearly show that it is a concocted charge against the Petitioner. 29. It was also argued that Petitioner has been made a scape-goat for taking revenge by PWs 2 to 4. Drawing Courts attention to materials on record the learned counsel would further submit that District Collectors letter does not indicate any specific allegation against Petitioner and while so proved minute against the Petitioner cannot be sustained. 30. It passes ones comprehension as to why TASMAC employees PWs 2 to 4 should venture to take revenge upon the writ petitioner. By exercising judicial review under Art.226 this Court does not sit in as Court of appeal for assessing the evidence. 31. Based on evidence, the Enquiry Officer held that the charges levelled against Petitioner were proved. Being S.I of Police who headed the Police party in Patrolling vehicle the writ petitioner was expected to maintain strict discipline. 32. In 1992 (4) SCC 54 (State of Punjab & Others V. Ram Singh) , the Supreme Court held that the Petitioner being part of disciplinary force was expected to maintain strict discipline. 33. Exercising judicial review under Art. 226 of Constitution, Writ Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. 34. 33. Exercising judicial review under Art. 226 of Constitution, Writ Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. 34. Observing that once findings of fact are based on appreciation of evidence, in Writ jurisdiction High Court would not normally interfere with those factual findings, in Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A.K.Chopra, (1999) 1 SCC 759 , the Supreme Court has held as under: "In departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact finding authorities. Once findings of fact, based on appreciation of evidence are recorded, the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction may not normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that the recorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findings were wholly perverse and /or legally untenable. The adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence is not permitted to be canvassed before the High Court. Since, the High Court does not sit as an Appellate Authority, over the factual findings recorded during departmental proceedings, while exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot normally speaking substitute its own conclusion, with regard to the guilt of the delinquent, for that of the departmental authorities. Even insofar as imposition of penalty or punishment is concerned, unless the punishment or penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the departmental Appellate Authority, is either impermissible or such that if shocks the conscience of the High Court, it should not normally substitute its own opinion and impose some other punishment or penalty." 35. High Court would interfere with the conclusion of Enquiry Officer only if it stands vitiated by certain fundamental flaws. High Court would interfere only if the orders suffer from perversity or it is a case of no evidence. 36. Coming to the question of punishment, as discussed earlier, where the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority to modify the penalty imposed. 37. High Court would interfere only if the orders suffer from perversity or it is a case of no evidence. 36. Coming to the question of punishment, as discussed earlier, where the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority to modify the penalty imposed. 37. It was stated that Petitioner was the first batch of women police in 1977 and for about 27 years there was no complaints or charge against the Petitioner. On behalf of Petitioner it was also submitted that she had received many awards and rewards towards excellent service rendered for the work done during the visit of V.I.Ps. It was also submitted that Petitioner had received good work certificate for the work done during the Chithirai festival at Madurai. Having regard to long service for 27 years without any adverse remark, in my considered view punishment of dismissal from service appears to be disproportionate and the same is modified as compulsory retirement. 38. W.P.No.3141&3402/2005:Punishment of dismissal from service is modified as reduction to lower stage in the time scale and accordingly salary is reduced to starting point of time scale. "Petitioners are ordered to be reinstated in service within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. "The period from 17.08.2004 till the date of reinstatement shall be considered as leave on loss of pay. However the aforesaid period shall be taken into account for continuation of service, pension and other attendant benefits. 39. W.P.No.35995/2005: Punishment of dismissal from service on the Petitioner is modified as compulsory retirement. "The Respondents are directed to settle the retiral benefits to the writ petitioner within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. "The Respondents are further directed to process the pension papers of the Petitioner within a period of twelve weeks. There is no order as to costs.