JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J.-The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Sub Inspector on 29.10.1993 against 1% quota reserved for sportsman. A notice was issued to him on 3.2.1997. He filed reply to the same. A Regular inquiry was instituted against the petitioner vide order dated 25.3.1997. He was supplied with the substance of imputation of misconduct on 8.4.1997. He filed reply to the same on 15.4.1997. The regular charge-sheet was issued on 16.8.1997. The Inquiry Officer was appointed. He submitted inquiry report. Consequently, show cause notice dated 25.5.1998 was issued to the petitioner. He assailed the show cause notice dated 25.5.1998 before the learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal. The learned Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal granted the interim relief to the petitioner. 2. Mr. Dilip Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that the initiation of departmental proceedings against the petitioner was not warranted. According to him, the petitioner was fully eligible and qualified to be considered for the post of Assistant Sub Inspector in the year 1993. 3. Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Additional Advocate General has vehemently argued that the present petition is not maintainable against the issuance of show cause notice dated 25.5.1998. According to him, the petitioner ought to have filed reply to the show cause notice and, if any, adverse orders were passed against him, he was at liberty to assail the same before the competent forum. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the pleadings carefully. 5. The petitioner, as noticed above, was appointed as Assistant Sub Inspector against 1% quota reserved for sportsman on 29.10.1993. A regular inquiry was instituted against him. He was supplied with the substance of imputation of misconduct on 8.4.1997. The reply was filed to the substance of imputations on 15.4.1997. The regular charge-sheet was issued on 16.8.1997. The enquiry was held by Assistant Commandant Sh. R.K. Chauhan. The copy of inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner alongwith show cause notice dated 25.5.1998. 6. Mr. Dilip Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that the petitioner was qualified as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. However, Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Additional Advocate General has drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure R-2 dated 20.2.1991 whereby the essential qualification of the post of Assistant Sub Inspector was graduation.
6. Mr. Dilip Sharma, Advocate has vehemently argued that the petitioner was qualified as per the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. However, Mr. R.K. Sharma, learned Senior Additional Advocate General has drawn the attention of the Court to Annexure R-2 dated 20.2.1991 whereby the essential qualification of the post of Assistant Sub Inspector was graduation. The employer had sought the necessary information from the Himachal Pradesh University whether the University from which the petitioner had obtained the Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) degree was recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC) or nor. The Himachal Pradesh University informed the employer that the Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishvidhalya was declared fake University by the University Grants Commission on 14.9.1993. 7. The Court is of the considered view that the present petition was premature. The petitioner has been issued a show cause notice on 25.5.1998. He never filed reply to the same before rushing to the Court. He has been given opportunity by way of show-cause notice to explain the position. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the explanation/reply to the show cause notice was supposed to pass orders in accordance with law. The petitioner has prejudged the entire issue by presuming that the Disciplinary Authority was bound to impose penalty upon him even without considering his reply. 8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chanan Singh versus Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab and others, (1976) 3 SCC 361 have held the petition to be premature filed against the issuance of show cause notice. Their Lordships have held as under: “4. The first point raised in objection by the second respondent is that the writ petition is premature since no action has been taken finally against the appellant, the disciplinary proceedings are still pending and the explanation of the appellant is under consideration. It is only in the event of the appellant being punished that any grievance can arise for him to be agitated in the proper forum. Other obstacles in the way of granting the appellant relief were also urged before the High Court and before us, but we are not inclined to investigate them for the short reason that the writ petition was in any case premature. No punitive action has yet been taken. It is difficult to state, apart from speculation, what the outcome of the proceedings will be.
No punitive action has yet been taken. It is difficult to state, apart from speculation, what the outcome of the proceedings will be. In case the appellant is punished, it is certainly open to him either to file an appeal as provided in the relevant rules or to take other action that he may be advised to resort to. It is not for us. at the moment, to consider whether a writ petition will lie or whether an industrial dispute should be raised or whether an appeal to the competent authority under the rules is the proper remedy, although these are issues which merit serious consideration. We are satisfied that, enough unto the day being the evil thereof, we need not dwell on problems which do not arise in the light of the view we take that there is no present grievance of punitive action which can be ventilated in court. After all, even the question of jurisdiction to re-open what is claimed to be a closed enquiry will, and must, be considered by the Managing Director. On this score, we dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, without costs.” 9. The Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh versus Brahm Datt Sharma and another, (1987) 2 SCC 179 has held that writ petition against a show cause notice is not maintainable. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a Govt. servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the Govt. servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the Govt. servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Govt. to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the Govt. servant and only thereafter a final decision -in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.” 10.
to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the Govt. servant and only thereafter a final decision -in the matter could be taken. Interference by the Court before that would be premature. The High Court in our opinion ought not to have interfered with the show cause notice.” 10. In a similar case i.e. Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board versus Ramesh Kumar Singh and others, (1996) 1 SCC 327, where the petitioner instead of showing cause had straightway filed the writ petition in the High Court, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held as under: “9. We heard counsel. It is common ground that Quarter No. M/11 (Old) Adityapur, near Jamshedpur, belongs to Board. According to the Board and the 4th respondent the hire-purchase transaction is still in force, and the ownership of the building has not been finally transferred to the 4th respondent. The 1st respondent would say that the 4th respondent is the owner having purchased the building from the Board. The basic or fundamental fact is thus in dispute. the 3rd respondent is the competent authority notified by the State Government under the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982 to initiate summary proceedings for eviction against the sub-letting, unauthorised occupation by any person, of the premises, etc., belonging to the Board. Annexure Ext. P-4 notice, is the one so issued by the 3rd respondent. The appellant and the 4th respondent complained about the forcible or unauthorised occupation by the first respondent of the premises belonging to the Board. The 3rd respondent was competent to initiate the proceedings under the Act if the building still belongs to the Board and the ownership has not vested in the 4th respondent. It may be, that this basic fact is denied by the 1st respondent when he states that the 4th respondent is the owner having purchased the building from the Board and that he is a tenant under the 4th respondent. The basic facts, on the basis of which the jurisdiction of 3rd respondent to initiate/continue the proceedings, require investigation and adjudication. If, as pleaded by appellant and the 4th respondent, the Board is the owner and the 4th respondent is the hirer, it cannot admit of any doubt that the 3rd respondent has jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings as per Annexure Ext. P-4.
If, as pleaded by appellant and the 4th respondent, the Board is the owner and the 4th respondent is the hirer, it cannot admit of any doubt that the 3rd respondent has jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings as per Annexure Ext. P-4. If that basic fact is denied by the 1st respondent, that may require investigation of disputed facts and adjudication by the competent authority - the 3rd respondent. Without showing cause against Annexure Ext. P-4, notice, the 1st respondent straightway filed the Writ petition in the High Court and assailed Annexure Ext. P-4 and the eviction proceedings. The averments in this regard, contained in paragraph 13 (H) of the Special Leave Petition, are not denied in the detailed counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent in this Court. 10. We are concerned in this case, with the entertainment of the writ petition against a show cause notice issued by a competent statutory authority. It should be borne in mind that there is no attack against the vires of the statutory provisions governing the matter. No question of infringement of any fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is alleged or proved. It cannot be said that Ext. P-4 notice is ex facie a "nullity" or totally "without jurisdiction" in the traditional sense of that expression- that is to say, that even the commencement or initiation of the proceedings, on the face of it and without anything more, is totally unauthorised. In such a case , for entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against a show-cause notice, at that stage, it should be shown that the authority has no power or jurisdiction, to enter upon the enquiry in question. In all other cases, it is only appropriate that the party should avail of the alternate remedy and show cause against the same before the authority concerned and take up the objection regarding jurisdiction also, then. In the event of an adverse decision, it will certainly be open to him, to assail the same either in appeal or revision, as the case may be, or in appropriate cases, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 11.
In the event of an adverse decision, it will certainly be open to him, to assail the same either in appeal or revision, as the case may be, or in appropriate cases, by invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 11. Similarly, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhaiji versus Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others, (2003) 1 SCC 692 have held the petition to be premature filed merely against the issuance of show cause notice. Their Lordships have held as under: “15. The petition filed by the writ petitioner before the High Court was entirely misconceived and, in a way, premature, The show cause notice issued by the sub-divisional officer cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. The appellant should have participated in the enquiry after showing cause. Instead he chose to rush post haste to the High Court. The High Court rightly turned down the writ petition.” 12. Accordingly, in view of the observations made hereinabove and the definitive law laid down by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is held that a show cause notice cannot said to be without jurisdiction/authority. The disciplinary authority has instituted the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. He has been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself. He has been supplied with the copy of inquiry report along with show cause notice dated 25.5.1998. 13. Consequently, the present petition filed by the petitioner is premature and the same is dismissed. The interim order dated 16.7.1998 passed by the erstwhile Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal stands vacated with immediate effect. It is open to the respondent-State to proceed with the matter further in accordance with law. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.