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2009 DIGILAW 884 (GAU)

Dhirendra Sutradhar v. State of Tripura

2009-12-09

UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2009
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. By filing the instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for quashing/setting aside and/or cancelling the order dated 2.5.2006 issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of Tripura (Annexure H to the writ petition) whereby and whereunder the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Forest Ranger vide order dated 5.10.2002 has been cancelled and also for cancelling the Disciplinary Proceeding initiated against him by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of Tripura vide Memorandum dated 30.8.2007 (Annexure I to the writ petition). 2. Heard Mr. B. Das, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. T.D. Majumdar, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State respondents. 3. The factual matrix of the case in a nutshell is that the petitioner was appointed as Forest Guard under the Forest Department, Government of Tripura, on 2.12.1970 as a General Candidate (Annexure B to the writ petition) and he was appointed as Forester (Grade-II) w.e.f. 1.8.1971 (Annexure C to the writ petition). Subsequently, on 29.6.1981 the petitioner submitted his Scheduled Castes category Certificate to the office for the first time. Thereafter, vide office order dated 5.10.2002 he was appointed to the post of Forest Ranger showing him under the SC category (Annexure D to the writ petition). Thereafter, by an order dated 14.7.2004 (Annexure E to the writ petition) issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Government of Tripura, respondent No. 2 herein, the petitioner was placed under suspension and a disciplinary proceeding was contemplated against him. But ultimately, no proceeding was drawn up against him and the said order of suspension was revoked. So the petitioner was paid his full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. Thereafter, vide memorandum dated 20.8.2004 (Annexure F to the writ petition) again a disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner. An officer was appointed to enquire into the allegation who after hearing the parties and recording the evidence adduced by the parties submitted his report on 26.2.2007 (Annexure J to the writ petition) holding that the allegations against the petitioner did not sustain. Meanwhile, by an order doted 2.5.2006 (Annexure H to the writ petition) the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Forest Ranger was cancelled. Meanwhile, by an order doted 2.5.2006 (Annexure H to the writ petition) the promotion of the petitioner to the post of Forest Ranger was cancelled. Thereafter, by another order dated 28.7.2007 (Annexure G to the writ petition) the disciplinary proceeding drawn up against the petitioner was withdrawn stating, inter alia, that it has been made without prejudice to further action which was considered in the circumstances of the case including issue of fresh charge sheet in accordance with CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. It is also contended in the writ petition that a further disciplinary proceeding was drawn up on 30.8.2007 against the petitioner on the same allegation without making any reference to the earlier proceeding. On receipt of the memo of the aforesaid proceeding, the petitioner submitted a representation to the respondent No. 2 on 15.10.2007 (Annexure K to the writ petition) but without any result. To hold the enquiry in the said proceeding, another enquiry officer was appointed who accordingly issued notice to the petitioner. The petitioner made a representation to the enquiring authority stating, inter alia, that the said enquiring authority should not hold any enquiry as the said proceeding was not sustainable. Thereafter, the enquiring authority issued two notices on to the petitioner 16.1.2008 end 26.2.2008 asking him to appear before it for the purpose of enquiry. According to the petitioner, the respondent authorities have been committing gross illegality and irregularity by initiating proceeding one after another against him on the charge that he submitted a false SC certificate as according to him, the District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala after elaborate enquiry and being satisfied that he belonged to the SC community, issued the SC certificate. Against the said proceeding and the order of cancellation of his promotion to the post of Forest Ranger, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition for quashing end setting aside the same as stated supra. 4. The respondents by filing their counter-affidavit denied the allegation of the petitioner made in the writ petition. It is contended in the counter affidavit that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner for his furnishing false SC certificate and accordingly his promotion to the post of Forest Ranger has been cancelled as that was done treating him as a scheduled caste. It is contended in the counter affidavit that the disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner for his furnishing false SC certificate and accordingly his promotion to the post of Forest Ranger has been cancelled as that was done treating him as a scheduled caste. It has been further contended in the counter affidavit that there is absolutely no requirement of law to make reference of earlier proceedings while initiating fresh proceeding on the same subject matter when the earlier disciplinary proceeding was withdrawn with condition that modification of charge sheet was required and the withdrawal was without prejudice to further action including issue of fresh charge sheet as the disciplinary authority has inherent power to review and modify the article of charges. It is also contended that the petitioners' substantial appointment was not against any reserved quota and at the time of his appointment he did not disclose that he is a member of SC community. But subsequently, he submitted a copy of SC certificate for recording his SC status in the official records and the same was considered by the department in good faith and the service records were also modified. Accordingly the petitioner was promoted to the post of Forest Ranger against SC quota. Subsequently, on verification the DM and Collector, West Tripura intimated that the SC certificate produced by the petitioner was false and the State Level Scrutiny Committee also declared the said certificate as cancelled. Therefore, the petitioner obtained the promotion to the rank of Forest Ranger fraudulently and accordingly his order of promotion was cancelled. It is the case of the respondents that the employer is free to proceed with as many departmental proceedings as it considers desirable and the employer is not debarred from initiating another disciplinary proceeding against an employee on the ground that earlier one proceeding against the some employee was dropped. As the earlier proceeding was withdrawn lawfully, the report submitted by the earlier enquiry officer has no relevance to the subsequent disciplinary proceeding. The respondents' further contention in the counter affidavit is that the action of the enquiry officer cannot be called into as he has not been made a party in the instant writ petition. Under the above circumstances it is the contention of the respondents that the writ petition has no merit which deserves dismissal. 5. Mr. The respondents' further contention in the counter affidavit is that the action of the enquiry officer cannot be called into as he has not been made a party in the instant writ petition. Under the above circumstances it is the contention of the respondents that the writ petition has no merit which deserves dismissal. 5. Mr. Das, learned senior counsel while supporting the case of the petitioner would contend that the proceeding in question is hopelessly barred by time and suffers from serious laches on the part of the department and in support of his aforesaid contention he relied on the judgment and order of this Court dated 26.5.2008 in the case of Sri Dilip Kr. Bhattacharjee v. State of Tripura and Ors. WP(C) 396/2007 wherein this Court upon consideration of the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board AIR 2006 SC 207 , State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308 and State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishnan (1998) 4 SCC 154 , set aside the departmental proceeding on the ground of delay alone. He also contended that the second inquiry on the same charge, which could not be proved during the first inquiry, is not permissible and in the instant case, according to him, it is the admitted position that on earlier occasion a disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner vide memorandum dated 20.4.2004 (Annexure F to the writ petition), and an officer was also appointed to enquire into the allegation made therein, who after hearing the parties and recording the evidences available held that the allegations against the petitioner did not sustain and thereafter on the some charge the departmental proceeding in question was drawn up by the impugned memo dated 30.8.2007. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kanailal Bera v. Union of India and Ors. (2007) 11 SCC 517 wherein the Apex Court held - Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. (2007) 11 SCC 517 wherein the Apex Court held - Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In a given situation further evidence may be directed to be adduced by the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the self same charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. 6. He finally contended that if sufficient materials are not available on record, a direction for holding further inquiry can be issued in terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 so as to enable the department to lead further evidence before the inquiring authority and Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10 also empowers the Disciplinary Authority to disagree with the findings of the enquiring authority on any of the article of charges and can record the reasons for such disagreement. But in the instant case, the disciplinary authority did not follow the requirement of Sub-rule (2) or Sub-rule (3) of Rule, 10. Without following the prescription of the aforesaid provisions, the Disciplinary Authority is not empowered to initiate a second proceeding against an employee on the same charge. In support of his aforesaid contention, he relied on the case of Mathura Prasad v. Union of India (2007) 1 SCC 437 . 7. Per contra, Mr. Dutta Majumdar, learned Addl. Government Advocate would contend that in the writ petition no plea regarding delay has been taken by the petitioner and now at this stage of final hearing of the writ petition it is not permissible to raise such a plea of delay. He also contended that factually there was no delay in initiating the departmental proceeding against the petitioner. The authority initiated no second proceeding against the petitioner on 30.8.2007 only after cancellation of his SC certificate by the State Level Scrutiny Committee. Therefore, there was no such delay so far initiation of the departmental proceeding is in question. He further contended that the instant writ petition is a pre-mature one as the petitioner has impugned the charge sheet, not any final order which affects any of his rights. Therefore, there was no such delay so far initiation of the departmental proceeding is in question. He further contended that the instant writ petition is a pre-mature one as the petitioner has impugned the charge sheet, not any final order which affects any of his rights. According to him, mere issuance of show-cause notice or charge sheet does not infringe the right of an employee. It is only when some final order imposing some punishment or otherwise affecting adversely an employee is passed, the said employee can be said to have any grievance. But in the instant case, admittedly there was no final order passed affecting any right of the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority or any other respondent. He also contended that second inquiry is maintainable even where charge had already been inquired earlier subject to the inquiry did not culminate into exoneration. According to him, second inquiry is not permissible on the same charge when the competent authority after proper inquiry exonerated the delinquent employee. In the instant case, it is the admitted position that the earlier disciplinary proceeding was withdrawn with a condition that modification of charge sheet was required and the withdrawal was without prejudice to further action which may be considered in the circumstances of the case including issue of fresh charge sheet in accordance with the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 vide order dated 28.7.2007 (Annexure G to the writ petition) which has not been challenged by the petitioner in the instant case. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana (2006) 12 SCC 28 , particularly paragraphs 13, 15 and 16. He also contended that when alternative remedy available under the statute, the High Court should not entertain the writ petitions as a routine manner, rather it would be proper for the court to direct the petitioner to appear before the inquiring authority so that the authority can continue with the disciplinary proceeding and pass the final older and if aggrieved by such an order, the petitioner can approach the court after exhausting the statutory remedies. In support of his aforesaid contention, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghutam Ghouse and Anr. In support of his aforesaid contention, he referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghutam Ghouse and Anr. (2004) 3 SCC 440 , particularly paragraph 5 wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia, This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues else can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. His further contention is that as the petitioner did not challenge the decision of the State Level Scrutiny Committee regarding cancellation of his castes certificate he has no right to challenge the order of cancellation of his promotion dated 2.5.2006 (Annexure H to the writ petition), particularly when such promotion to the post of Forest Ranger was issued on the basis of the said SC Certificate produced by him and as such he obtained promotion to the rank of Forest Ranger through fraud, hence, he has no right on such promotional post. He further contended that the authority did not commit any wrong cancelling such an order of promotion. In support of his above contention he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170 . 8. He further contended that the authority did not commit any wrong cancelling such an order of promotion. In support of his above contention he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Regional Manager, Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir and Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170 . 8. Before traveling to the thoughts loaded vehicle of the learned Counsel for the parties in their submission, it would be proper for this Court to first consider the order of withdrawal of the proceedings under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 ['CCS (CCA) Rules'] against the petitioner vide order dated 28.7.2007 (Annexure G to the writ petition) as well as the Article of Charge in the subsequent proceeding (Annexure I to the writ petition) under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules which is impugned in the instant writ petition. For ready reference the said order dated 28.7.2007 and the Article of Charge are quoted herein under: ORDER A disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) vide this office Memo No. F.19(590)/Vig/For-2004/11,256-59 dated 20.8.2004 and the said proceeding case was remitted to the Inquiring Authority vide this office No. F.19(590)/Vig/For-2004/20,472-76 dated 6.12.2004 for holding an enquiry and to submit report. Since some modifications in the charge sheet are required, the" proceedings under Rule 14 of CCS (CC&A) Rules, 1965 against Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) vide this office Memo No. F. 19 (590)/Vig/For-2004/11,256-59 dated 20.8.2004 are hereby withdrawn without prejudice to further action which may be considered in the circumstances of the case, including issue of fresh charge sheet in accordance with CCS (CC&A) Rules. 1965. Sd/- (R.P. Tangwan) Principal Chief Conservation of Forests Tripura: Agartala ARTICLE No. 1 Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) was initially appointed to the post of Forest Guard w.e.f. 27.11.1970 and subsequently appointed to the post of Forester w.e.f. 1.8.1971 under the Forest Deptt., Government of Tripura. Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) had not put forward his claim of belonging to Schedule Caste community at the time of initial recruitment but he submitted his claim for recording his name under the Schedule Caste community by a letter dated 29.6.1981 along with a copy of the Schedule Caste certificate issued vide No. 543/DM/GJ-CVI-11/63 dated 30.1.1968. Subsequently, it was established that the said Schedule Caste certificate is false. Subsequently, it was established that the said Schedule Caste certificate is false. Thus, Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) has deceived the Department by submitting false Schedule Caste certificate with mala fide intention for personal gain. Thus, Shri Dhirendra Sutradhar, FR (now Fr.) is charged for serious misconduct, willful submission of fabricated/false schedule caste certificate for the purpose of deceiving the Government for personal gain which amounts to grave misconduct in violation of Rule 3 of TCS (Conduct) Rules, 1988. 9. In the instant case it is the admitted position that the petitioner did not challenge either the aforesaid conditional order of withdrawal of disciplinary proceedings or the order of cancellation of the SC Certificate issued in favour of him. It is also the admitted position that the petitioner was promoted to the post of Forest Ranger on 5.10.2002 against the reserved quota on the basis of his submission of the SC Certificate to his employer on 29.6.1981. 10. Upon hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the relevant records, the questions that fall for decision before this Court are as follows: (a) Whether an order of promotion issued on the basis of SC certificate can be cancelled without providing any opportunity to the promotee employee only on the basis of subsequent cancellation of the SC certificate by the appropriate authority? (b) Whether a long delay by itself would be a sufficient ground for quashing a departmental proceeding when the initiation of the departmental proceeding does not either prejudice the petitioner in any way or affect any of his fundamental or legal rights? 11. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan (surpa) the Apex Court relying its earlier two decisions in Bani Singh and Anr. (surpa) and N. Radhakishan (supra) noted, inter alia, It is now settled that the appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr. R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay. It also noted that, Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government officer under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. 12. In the case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana (surpa) the Apex Court taking note of its earlier decisions in the case of State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma (1987) 2 SCC 179 , Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh (1996) 1 SCC 327 , Ulagappa v, Divisional Commr., Mysore (2001) 10 SCC 639 , and Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440 noted, inter alia, that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or a show-cause notice The Apex Court further noted - The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. The Apex Court also noted that while considering the fact that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and such discretion should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet except in a rare and exceptional case where it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. It is further noted that ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter. In the case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra) question also came before the Apex Court, whether a second inquiry is permissible on the same charge after completion of the first inquiry? The Apex Court answered it in paragraph 18 which is quoted hereunder: 18. We agree with the learned Counsel for the respondent that if the charge which has been leveled under the memo dated 23.12.2003 had earlier been inquired into in a regular enquiry by a competent authority and if the respondent had been exonerated on that very charge, a second enquiry would not be maintainable. However, in the present case, we are of the opinion that the charges leveled against the respondent under the charge memo dated 23.12.2003, had not been enquired into by any authority and he had not been exonerated on those charges. Hence, we are of the opinion that it is not a case of double jeopardy. 13. The Apex Court in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India (supra) in paragraph 15 discussed when an act should be treated as fraud. Paragraph 15 is reproduced hereunder: 15. An act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due tantamounts to fraud. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a respond to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. In the said report the Apex Court taking note of the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80 noted - The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality amongst citizens. In the said report the Apex Court taking note of the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80 noted - The makers of the Constitution laid emphasis on equality amongst citizens. The Constitution of India provides for protective discrimination and reservations so as to enable the disadvantaged group to come on the same platform as that of the forward community. If an when a person takes an undue advantage of the said beneficent provision of the Constitution by obtaining the benefits of reservation and other benefits provided under the Presidential Order although he is not entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud on the society, but in the effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is not otherwise entitled thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter. 14. In Regional Manager, Central Bank of India (supra), particularly in paragraph 18, the Apex Court also considered what should be the affect of the acceptance of the finding of the inquiring authority holding that the castes certificates furnished by the officer was false. Paragraph 18 of the said law report is quoted hereunder 18. Having considered the matter in the light of the aforesaid legal position, in our judgment, the decision of the High Court is untenable. As noted supra, the employee having accepted the finding of the Scrutiny Committee, holding that the caste certificate furnished by the employee was false, the very foundation of her appointment vanished and her appointment was rendered illegal. Her conduct renders her unfit to be continued in service and must necessarily entail termination of her service. Under these circumstances, there is absolutely no justification for her claim in respect of the post merely on the ground that she had worked on the post for over twenty years. The post was meant for a reserved candidate but she usurped the same by mis-representation and deception. In our opinion, the fact that caste certificate was referred to the Scrutiny Committee for verification after ten years of her joining the service and a long time was taken by the Scrutiny Committee to verify the same is of no consequence inasmuch as delay on both the counts does not validate the caste certificate and the consequent illegal appointment. 15. 15. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the law reports as well as considering the fact that the petitioner got promotion as Forest Ranger against the reserved quota, meaning thereby for a person belonging to the SC community, on the basis of his submission of castes certificates which was subsequently cancelled by the State Level Scrutiny Committee and the said order of cancellation has not been questioned or challenged by the petitioner in the instant writ petition, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the order of cancellation of his promotion to the post of Forest Ranger. As the petitioner has admittedly accepted the finding of the scrutiny committee holding that the castes certificate furnished by the petitioner was false, the very foundation of his promotion to the post of Forest Ranger vanished as the same is contrary to the constitutional scheme. 16. Therefore, according to this Court, the cancellation of order of promotion of the petitioner vide order dated 2.5.2006 (Annexure H to the writ petition) cannot be held to be without jurisdiction and illegal. Hence, the same is not required to be interfered with. Accordingly, this Court is not interfering with the said order of cancellation of promotion of the petitioner to the post of Forest Ranger. 17. Now question remains whether a charge sheet can be challenged merely on the ground of long delay in initiation of departmental proceeding? In view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra) in which the Apex Court also relied on its earlier decision in Bani Singh (supra) and N. Radhakishan (supra) that inordinate delay in the initiation of departmental proceeding is undoubtedly one of the ground for setting aside the disciplinary proceeding but at the same time in the case of P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India (2006) 8 SCC 776 wherein the doctrine of prejudice urns considered by the Apex Court stating that, if there exists a satisfactory explanation for delay, same may not be a bar in directing initiation of a fresh proceedings (emphasis supplied). 18. It appears from the case of Sri Dilip Kr. 18. It appears from the case of Sri Dilip Kr. Bhattacharjee (supra) that the incident in respect of which the departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner has been drawn up took place way dock in the year 1993 and the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year 2007, meaning thereby, that there was a delay of near about 14 years, and which was also not properly explained, and a coordinate Bench of this Court after taking note of the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra), interfered with the departmental proceeding initiated by the charge memo dated 11.1.2007. When the co-ordinate Bench of this Court interfered with the disciplinary proceeding initiated after an inordinate delay against the petitioner in the case of Sri Dilip Kr. Bhattacharjee (supra), the case of Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board and Anr. v. Ram Sajivan and Anr. (2007) 9 SCC 86 wherein the Apex Court considering the case of P.D. Agrawal (supra) and M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India (2006) 5 SCC 88 allowed the appeals with an order to the effect, that, "We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be met if liberty is granted to the appellant herein to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the respondents whereafter the appellants may pass appropriate order in accordance with law.", was not placed before the co-ordinate Bench. Had it been placed before the co-ordinate Bench of this Court, the court might not have interfered with the disciplinary proceeding initiated after a long delay against the petitioner of that case. Inordinate delay for initiation of the disciplinary proceeding relating to an incident deemed to be a misconduct is no doubt a ground for quashing the departmental proceeding as stated supra but at the same time it is the duty of the court also to see the nature of the charges leveled against the delinquent officer. If the nature of the charges are serious in nature and affect the administration in maintaining the discipline then the Court should not normally interfere with the disciplinary proceeding unless the petitioner is seriously prejudiced due to such delay in initiation of proceeding. In the instant case, it appears from the record that the SC certificate bearing No. 543/DM/XVI-11/63 dated 30.1.1968 was cancelled on 13.12.2005 and the disciplinary proceeding as impugned in the instant case was initiated on 30.08.2007. In the instant case, it appears from the record that the SC certificate bearing No. 543/DM/XVI-11/63 dated 30.1.1968 was cancelled on 13.12.2005 and the disciplinary proceeding as impugned in the instant case was initiated on 30.08.2007. It also appears from the order dated 28.7.2007 (Annexure G to the writ petition), i.e., order of withdrawal of initial disciplinary proceeding that the petitioner was not wholly exonerated from the charge leveled against him rather the disciplinary proceeding was withdrawn without prejudice to further action including issue of a fresh charge sheet in accordance with the CCS(CCA) Rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that subsequent departmental proceeding is not permissible as by this time it is settled that second inquiry on the same charge would not be maintainable only when the delinquent officer had been exonerated. More so, when the initiation of subsequent disciplinary proceeding, as impugned, is in no way adversely affecting the fundamental right and/or any legal right of the petitioner and he is also in no way going to be prejudiced due to such action and the departmental proceeding is not initiated without jurisdiction and when the petitioner is entitled to be urged, the question raised by him here before the adjudicating authority of the disciplinary proceeding and if he is aggrieved by the decision of the adjudicating authority of the disciplinary proceeding, then also he can avail himself of the alternative remedy available under the statute before approaching the court of law. 19. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of considered opinion that it is not a fit case for quashing the disciplinary proceeding initiated by the respondents vide memorandum dated 30.8.2007 (Annexure I to the writ petition). 20. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.