Judgment :- 1. Being aggrieved by the order dated 23.3.2004, made by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Amravati in W.C.A. No.3/2002, rejecting the application (Exh.1), the present appeal was filed in this Court by the claimants. 2. Heard learned Counsel for appellants, who argued that the appellants were entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs.3,32,580/- as claimed in the application but the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation upheld the stand of the respondents that amount of Rs.1,69,510/- only was payable as the amendment to Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,1923, made by Act No.30 of 1995 w.e.f. 15.9.1995 was not applicable in the case of the appellants, which is contrary to the judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd...Versus...Asokan, reported in 1997 (1) CLR 1039, in which reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909, decided on 6.11.1996 between New India Assurance Co. Ltd. ...Versus...V.K. Neelakandan and others. He then submits that the issue is covered by the said supreme Court judgment, dated 6.11.1996 and accordingly this Court should dispose of the present appeal. 3. Per contra, learned Counsel for respondents opposed the appeal and argued that the amendment by Act No.30 of 1995 effective from 15.9.1995 cannot have retrospective application and therefore, the amount payable under Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act cannot be claimed retrospectively by virtue of amendment of 1995. I had adjourned the matter to enable learned Counsel for respondents to find out if there is any judgment contrary to the one in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Limited...Versus...Asokan, cited supra, and the Supreme Court judgment in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd...Versus...V.K. Neelakandan and others. However, on 15.7.2009 when the case was heard finally, learned Counsel for respondents stated at the bar that there is no contrary judgment of any High Court or the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Following substantial question of law arises for my determination. Whether the amendment of Sections 4 and 4-A of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, made by Act No.30 of 1995 w.e.f. 15.9.1995, enhancing the amount of compensation and rate of interest, would be attracted to cases where the claims in respect of death or permanent disablement resulting from an accident caused during the course of employment, took place prior to 15.9.1995? 4. 4. I have gone through the impugned order in the present appeal and the said judgment of Kerala High Court cited by learned Counsel for appellants. In the absence of any assistance from both the learned Counsel for the rival parties, I found that following is the existing legal position. 5. In Pratap Narain Singh Deo...Versus...Srinivas Sabata and another, reported in 1976 (1) Supreme Court Cases 289, the four-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the employer became liable to pay compensation as soon as personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of employment. There was no suspension of the compensation pending settlement. In the aforesaid judgment, thus, it was clearly held that what was relevant was the date of accident for calculating the amount of compensation and not the date of adjudication while interpreting unamended provisions of Section 4-A. In New India Assurance Company Limited…Versus…V.K. Neelakandan and others (Civil Appeal Nos.16904 to 16909 of 1996, decided on 6.11.1996) [judgment quoted at page No.256 in 1999 (8) Supreme Court Cases, 254] the two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the wages of the workmen on the date of accident though were @ Rs.1,000/- per month, what was relevant was the date of adjudication on which date the workmen would have drawn wages @ Rs.1800/- per month and therefore, the Supreme Court took into account wages @ Rs.1800/- per month i.e. on the date of adjudication and accordingly granted the compensation. Thus, the Supreme Court in that judgment held that since rights of the workmen were being determined, the relevant date would be the date of adjudication and not the date of accident since the Act is a special legislation for the benefit of labour. In the decision in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ..Versus...Asokan, cited supra, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court relied on the said observation of the Supreme Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd...Versus...V.K. Neelakandan and others and held that the date of adjudication and not the date of accident was relevant for applying the amendment. 6. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd.…Versus…Alavi, reported in 1998 (1) KLT 951 , the Full Bench of Kerala High Court held thus: “There is nothing to indicate that the amended provisions would operate retrospectively. Ltd...Versus...V.K. Neelakandan and others and held that the date of adjudication and not the date of accident was relevant for applying the amendment. 6. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd.…Versus…Alavi, reported in 1998 (1) KLT 951 , the Full Bench of Kerala High Court held thus: “There is nothing to indicate that the amended provisions would operate retrospectively. In fact S. 1 (2) of Act 30 of 1995 itself says that the amended provisions would come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act. In fact, Legislature has left it to the Central Government to fix the dates from which various provisions have come into effect. Further, when an Amendment Act proposes to give different dates of commencement to different Sections, there is a presumption against retrospectivity. If the Legislature wanted to have the provisions of the Act to operate retrospectively the same would have been provided in the Amendment Act itself. It is a well settled rule of construction that no provisions in a statute should be given retrospective effect unless the Legislature by express terms or by necessary implication has made it retrospective, and that when a provision is made retrospective, care should be taken not to extend its retrospective effect beyond what was intended. The general presumption is that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect. Right to claim compensation as well as the obligation to pay the same are created by the statute itself. It is well settled rule of interpretation that if the law is procedural, there is, no doubt, a presumption that it applies to pending proceeding. If the law is substantive in nature, the normal presumption against retrospectivity still holds good, subject to the principle that the court must look to the question whether the rights of the parties at the commencement of the proceedings were intended to be modified either expressly or by necessary implication. If the amended provisions are given effect to in the matter of awarding enhanced compensation even with regard to the accident which occurred prior to 15.9.1995, that will affect the existing rights and obligations of the parties. If the amended provisions are given effect to in the matter of awarding enhanced compensation even with regard to the accident which occurred prior to 15.9.1995, that will affect the existing rights and obligations of the parties. Suppose an accident occurred prior to 15.9.1995, and the claim was decided prior to the said date, the law applicable is the unamended provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. But if the claim could not be settled prior to 15.9.1995 going by the Division Bench decision in Asokan’s case, those claimants would get the benefits of the Amendment Act. In other words, the benefit would depend on when the case is decided, either prior to 15.9.1995 or subsequent. This was never the intention of the Legislature. If the Legislature wanted to give the benefit to all pending proceedings the same could have been provided in the Amendment Act itself. There must be some provision in the statute which either expressly or by necessary implication would lead to an interference that the rights and liabilities of the parties were intended to be altered. We do not find anything in the Amendment Act which seeks to alter the liability of employer as it stood on the date of accident. The amended provisions may be beneficial to the victims or their legal representatives or the Act may be a welfare legislation, but it does not automatically lead to the inference that such provisions are retrospective in nature. The amended provisions of S. 4 and 4A were intended to operate only prospectively, that too from the dates fixed by the Central Government in accordance with S. 1 (2) of Act 30 of 1995.” 7. The judgment in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd....Versus...Asokan, cited supra, was therefore, overruled by the Full Bench of Kerala High Court. In Kerala State Electricity Board and another…Versus…Valsala K. and another, reported in 1999 (8) Supreme Court Cases 254, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the conflicting judgments and after framing question, which I have framed earlier in paragraph No.1, it answered the same in negative. It would be useful to quote paragraph Nos.2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 from the said judgment. “2. It would be useful to quote paragraph Nos.2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 from the said judgment. “2. Various High Courts in the country, while dealing with the claim for compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of the accident. 3. A four-Judge Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata speaking through Shinghal, J. has held that an employer becomes liable to pay compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by the accident which arose out of and in the course of employment. Thus, the relevant date for determination of the rate of compensation is the date of the accident and not the date of adjudication of the claim. 4. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. V.K. Neelakandan however, took the view that the Workmen’s Compensation Act being a special legislation for the benefit of the workmen, the benefit as available on the date of adjudication should be extended to the workmen and not the compensation which was payable on the date of the accident. The two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case however, did not take notice of the judgment of the larger Bench in Pratap Narain Singh Deo case as it presumably was not brought to the notice of their Lordships. Be that as it may, in view of the categorical law laid down by the larger Bench in Pratap Singh Deo case the view expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Neelakandan case is not correct. 5. Our attention has also been drawn to a judgment of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Alavi wherein the Full Bench precisely considered the same question and examined both the above-noted judgments. It took the view that the injured workman becomes entitled to get compensation the moment he suffers personal injuries of the types contemplated by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and it is the amount of compensation payable on the date of the accident and not the amount of compensation payable on account of the amendment made in 1995, which is relevant. The decision of the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, to the extent it is in accord with the judgment of the larger Bench of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata lays down the correct law and we approve it. 6. Having answered the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment in the negative, we shall take up this batch of special leave petitions for consideration.” 8. Perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs in the said judgment of the Supreme Court clearly show that they held that the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd...Versus...V.K. Neelakandan and others was not correctly decided but the judgment in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo...Versus...Srinivas Sabata and another, cited supra, being of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court i.e. being of four Judges, the same was approved so also the Full Bench judgment of Kerala High Court. It is, thus, clear that the three-Judge Full Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and another...Versus...Valsala K. and another, cited supra, in clear terms clarified the legal position that the relevant date for applying amendment would be the date of accident and consequently, the amendment made by Act No.30 of 1995 w.e.f. 15.9.1995 cannot be made applicable to the claims arising out the accident caused prior to 15.9.1995. Thus, following the law laid down as above, I have no other alternative but to dismiss the appeal. 9. It is unfortunate that both the learned Counsel for the rival parties did not at all assist the Court properly in the matter by pointing out the correct legal position. In the result, first appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.