Judgment :- 1. By this petition the employer assails the order dated 17/12/1998 passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Nagpur in ULP (Complaint) case No. 92 of 1988, whereby the learned Member set aside punishment of reducing the pay of respondent No. 1 to initial stage in the pay scale of Senior Foreman. 2. The facts which are material for deciding this petition are as under: Respondent No. 1 was working as Senior Foreman in Divisional Workshop of M.S.R.T.C. at Nagpur. He seems to have been also a leader of a union. On 03/12/1985 the respondent entered the cabin of Mechanical Engineer Shri Kokate. He abused Shri Kokate, instigated the workers and brought about strike at the workshop between 1530 hrs. to 1925 hrs. on that day. The officer under whom respondent No. 1 was working at Nagpur, therefore, issued charge sheet on 22/12/1986 charging respondent No. 1 of indiscipline, extremely negligent conduct, instigating workers to resort to illegal strike, stoppage of work and behaving arrogantly and rudely with employees while on duty, under Clauses 10, 11, 14, 16 and 29 of Schedule A of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. An inquiry was accordingly held and at the inquiry the respondent was found guilty of all the charges. A show cause notice was issued to the respondent indicating that the petitioner proposed to punish the respondent by bringing down his basic pay to the initial stage in the pay scale of Senior Foreman for a period of three years. 3. Respondent No.1 filed complaint before the Industrial Court at Nagpur under Items 2 and 4 of Schedule II and Items 5 and 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1972. This complaint was contested by the petitioners. After considering the material before him, the learned Member, Industrial Court by his impugned order, held that the enquiry was fair and proper, but that the punishment imposed upon respondent No. 1 for the misconduct was shockingly disproportionate. He, therefore, set aside the impugned order of punishment. Aggrieved thereby, the employer is before this Court in this petition. 4. I have heard Advocate Shri Charpe for the petitioners and Advocate Shri Jaiswal for respondent No. 1. He, therefore, set aside the impugned order of punishment. Aggrieved thereby, the employer is before this Court in this petition. 4. I have heard Advocate Shri Charpe for the petitioners and Advocate Shri Jaiswal for respondent No. 1. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that after having held that the enquiry was fair and proper, the learned Member, Industrial Court should have seen that the scope for interfering with the finding or punishment was extremely limited. He further submitted that apart from all other charges, there is a charge of abusing a superior by entering into his cabin, which itself should have warranted stringent punishment. Yet the employer has merely chosen to inflict the punishment of bringing down the pay of respondent No. 1 to initial stage of the pay scale. He submitted that the learned Member, Industrial Court does not seem to have apprehended the gravity of abusing a superior since he observed in para 13 of the judgment as under: “.....The fact of uttering abuses by complainant to the Mechanical Engineer Shri Kokate sufficiently came on record through the witnesses. But respondents have treated it very serious to the extent of imposing punishment of lowering down the basic pay of complainant to the initial stage of his pay scale for a period of three years, which is shockingly disproportionate...” 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the learned Member of the Industrial Court did not see that after holding respondent No. 1 guilty, the learned Member has virtually let off respondent No. 1 without any punishment by setting aside the impugned order. He wondered as to how punishment of merely reducing the pay would be shockingly disproportionate. He submitted that, had the petitioner chosen to impose punishment of termination or dismissal, may be, the Tribunal would have had some scope to interfere with the punishment terming it as disproportionate. But, here the punishment itself was lenient, and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, it would not have been interfered with. 6. Learned Counsel for respondent No.1 on the other hand submitted that respondent could not at all have been held guilty of any misconduct, since misconduct would have to be as defined under the Model Standing Orders or under the relevant Rules. 6. Learned Counsel for respondent No.1 on the other hand submitted that respondent could not at all have been held guilty of any misconduct, since misconduct would have to be as defined under the Model Standing Orders or under the relevant Rules. He submitted that the conduct attributed to respondent No. 1 was in the workshop at Wardha, where respondent No. 1 was not at all serving. Thus, the conduct was not at the place where respondent No. 1 was posted for duty, and, therefore, all the items of charge levelled against respondent No. 1 were not at all attracted. He submitted that respondent No. 1 was office bearer of the union, and, therefore, had gone to meet Shri Kokate, which he was entitled to do, and, therefore, the Enquiry Officer could not have held respondent No. 1 guilty and the department could not have punished him at all. For this purpose, he placed reliance on judgments of the Supreme Court in M/s Glaxo Laboratories Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut reported at AIR 1984 S.C. 505 and Shri Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel vs. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation reported at 1985 (II) CLR S.C. 65, wherein the decision in Glaxo Laboratories was followed. 7. In Glaxo Laboratories, the question of misconduct pertained to manhandling the loyal workers during the journey by bus hired by the Company for commuting the workers between the city and the factory. The Supreme Court observed that; “keeping in view the larger objective sought to be achieved by prescribing conditions of employment in certified Standing Orders, the only construction one can put on clause 10 is that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misconduct for the purpose of Standing Order 22 punishable under Standing Order 23, if committed within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof.” And, therefore, held that the employees concerned could not be punished for misconduct allegedly committing in course of bus journey. 8. In Rasiklal Vaghajibhai’s case the workman had suppressed material fact that he had been removed from service and suggested falsely that he had left service because of transfer. When this came to light, he was charge sheeted by the new employer. The Labour Court as also the High Court rejected the workman’s claim that he could not have been charge sheeted. When this came to light, he was charge sheeted by the new employer. The Labour Court as also the High Court rejected the workman’s claim that he could not have been charge sheeted. Though the Supreme Court rejected the Special Leave Petition, it reiterated the legal position that ; “unless either in the Certified Standing Orders or in the service regulations an act or omission is prescribed as misconduct, it is not open to the employer to fish out some conduct as misconduct and punish the workman even though the alleged misconduct would not be comprehended in any of the enumerated misconducts...” 9. Advocate Shri Jaiswal for respondent No. 1 submitted that in view of this, it has to be held that conduct of respondent No. 1 in the workshop at Wardha where he was not an employee, would not amount to misconduct. This argument has to be rejected for two reasons. First, the case of Glaxo Laboratories would not apply since in that case the conduct which was complained of had taken place during the bus ride and not in the premises of the employer. Here, respondent No. 1 had misconducted in the premises of his employer. Whether it was a workshop at Wardha or the place where he was supposed to report for duty regularly, is inconsequential since the place where he had allegedly misconducted was a workshop of the employer itself. Secondly, it is not the case of respondent No. 1 that he had gone to the office of Shri Kokate as a stranger or in private capacity as a friend to meet someone. He claims to have gone there as a office bearer of a union, which character he would get only if he was an employee of the Corporation. If respondent No. 1 had gone to the workshop at Wardha as a leader of workers, he should not have forgotten his limitation as an employee of the Corporation while behaving with the superior. The language attributed to respondent No. 1 is already a part of record and it is filthy. 10. Therefore, apart from all other things, namely as to whether the workers were already on strike or not, for this one act of misconduct namely giving filthy abuses to an officer, the finding of guilt of respondent No. 1 which was recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the employer, could not have been faulted. 10. Therefore, apart from all other things, namely as to whether the workers were already on strike or not, for this one act of misconduct namely giving filthy abuses to an officer, the finding of guilt of respondent No. 1 which was recorded by the Enquiry Officer and the employer, could not have been faulted. In fact, even the learned Member, Industrial Court holds that respondent No. 1 did abuse the Officer concerned. The learned Member forgot that such abusing is intimidatory tactic which eventually results in good sensitive person to either give up a job to avoid such insults or to surrender to the bullies. Therefore, the learned Member should not have treated the incident as trifle and should have seen that the punishment imposed was not at all harsh. 11. In view of this, the petition is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Member, Industrial Court is quashed and set aside. 12. Rule is made absolute.