Judgment : BANERJEE, J. (1.) These two appeals were heard by us on the above mentioned dates. Since both these appeals arise out of the same order, both are disposed by this common judgment and order. (2.) BACK DROP: Premises No. 59, Canal Circular Road, Kolkata was owned by one Narayan Chandra Dutta during his life time. After his demise his heirs sold and conveyed the said premises to Smt. Tilak Sundari Debi and Sidhubhusan Mukherjee vide conveyance dated April 6,1949. The said premises was a vacant land. After purchase Tilak Sundari Debi and Sidhubhusan Mukherjee applied for a redemption certificate which was issued by the then Collector of District 24-Parganas on June 15, 1953. Tilak Sundari Debi subsequently came to learn that M/s. Hindustan Housing and Development Trust Limited (hereinafter referred to as "Hindustan") attempted to mutate the said land in their favour on the strength of a deed of conveyance dated June 15,1957 executed by M/s. Guin Brothers claiming to be the successor in interest of Sidhubhusan Mukherjee. (3.) Tilak Sundari Debi filed a title suit being Title Suit No.79 of 1960, inter alia, praying for a declaration that Sidhubhusan Mukherjee was her benamder and had no independent right over the land in question. Tilak Sundari Debi prayed for recovery of possession. Tilak Sundari Debi filed the title suit as aforesaid as against Sidhubhusan and Hindustan. It transpired from the written statement that there had been a partition suit in this Court in its Original Side being Partition Suit No. 1493 of 1939. Receiver was appointed in the said suit who sold the premises in question to one Bijoy Kumar Guin who in turn sold it to Hindustan vide conveyance dated June 15,1957. (4.) Tilak Sundari Debi succeeded in the said suit before the Civil Court proving her title. Being aggrieved by the decision of the first Court Hindustan filed a Title Appeal being Title Appeal No. 437 of 1964. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the first Court but held that Tilak Sundari Debi had not acquired interest independently by adverse possession. Hindustan preferred a second appeal to this Court being Second Appeal No. 384 of 1967. The First Appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the first Court but held that Tilak Sundari Debi had not acquired interest independently by adverse possession. Hindustan preferred a second appeal to this Court being Second Appeal No. 384 of 1967. (5.) During the pendency of the second appeal M/s. Orient Beverages Limited also known as Orient Properties Limited (hereinafter referred to as "Orient" purchased the property from Hindustan vide registered deed of conveyance dated November 30, 1967. Orient made a prayer for their substitution in place of Hindustan that was allowed by this Court. The second appeal was ultimately dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court by judgment and decree dated July 25, 1986. (6.) By virtue of the decree of the Civil Court so affirmed upto the second appellate stage, Tilak Sundari became the absolute owner of the premises in question. However, during the pendency of the second appeal the respondent No.1 in the above appeals, Somnath Chakraborty purchased a portion of the said premises in question measuring more or less 5 katha 13 chitak 12 sq. ft. from the heirs of Tilak Sundari Debi who died during pendency of the second appeal, vide registered deed of conveyance dated November 28, 1985. Similarly the other respondent Debi Prasad Chakraborty vide conveyance dated November 20,1985 purchased the balance portion of the said land in question measuring about 5 katha 13 chitak 12 sq. ft. (7.) In view of the sequence of events so narrated the respondents became jointly entitled to claim ownership of the premises in question measuring 11 katha 10 chitaks 25 square feet. (8.) LAND CEILING PROCEEDING : With effect from February 17, 1976 the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act of 1976") came in force within the State of West Bengal. (9.) Since the total area of the land in question was beyond the ceiling limit under the said Act of 1976 the owner was obliged to submit return under Section 6 so that appropriate proceeding could be drawn up by the Land Ceiling Authority to declare the excess land vested in the State after permitting the owner to retain a portion of the land in question within the ceiling limit. (10.) Orient submitted a return under Section 6 on September 15, 1976. (10.) Orient submitted a return under Section 6 on September 15, 1976. Orient made an application for retention of the land in question under Section 21 of the said Act of 1976 that was refused by the authority on September 27, 1986. The authority prepared the draft statement under Section 8 of the said Act of 1976 and served the same upon Orient. Orient ultimately agreed to surrender the excess vacant land vide application dated January 25, 1990 and agreed to have the excess land vested in the State. The draft statement was made final under Sections 8(4) and 9 of the said Act of 1976 by the authority on February 1, 1990. Appropriate notification under Section 10(1) of the said Act of 1976 was issued on February 12, 1990 giving particulars of the excess vacant land. Such notification was published in Calcutta Gazette on February 15, 1990 inviting claims/objections from the interested persons. Since no objection was received from any corner appropriate notification dated May 4, 1990 under Section 10(3) of the said Act of 1976 was published in Calcutta Gazette on May 11, 1990 and the excess land became the property of the State with effect from May 5, 1990. Orient was asked to hand over the possession vide letter dated May 23, 1990. The General Manager, Orient handed over possession on May 28, 1990. (11.) APPOLLO CHAPTER: On June 21,1991 the State handed over the land in question along with other adjacent lands to M/s. Janapriya Hospital Corporation Limited for the purpose of setting up a private hospital through a registered deed of lease for a period of twenty years with option for renewal. The said hospital authority paid premium to the State for the entire property for a sum of Rs. 94,41,300.00. (12.) The Janapriya Hospital was renamed as Appollo Gleaneagles who set up a hospital on the entire land in question including the land belonging to the respondents and is running a hospital there. The lease is going to expire in the year 2021. (13.) PRESENT WRIT PROCEEDING : In July, 1993 the respondents filed the instant writ petition, inter alia, challenging the declaration made in the notification issued under Section 10 of the said Act of 1976 as well as for a declaration that the respondents were entitled to hold the said land in question as predecessor in interest of Tilak Sundari Debi. (13.) PRESENT WRIT PROCEEDING : In July, 1993 the respondents filed the instant writ petition, inter alia, challenging the declaration made in the notification issued under Section 10 of the said Act of 1976 as well as for a declaration that the respondents were entitled to hold the said land in question as predecessor in interest of Tilak Sundari Debi. (14.) The writ petition was moved upon notice to the State. The learned Single Judge admitted the writ petition and passed an interim order on July 12,1993 in presence of the State Counsel, directing maintenance of status quo as of that date until further orders. His Lordship gave directions for filing affidavits. (15.) The State took inordinate time to file affidavit. The affidavit was ultimately filed on April 1, 2002. The matter was heard by the learned Single Judge. His Lordship allowed the writ petition by judgment and order dated May 2, 2005 appearing at pages 132-171 of the Paper Book in the appeal filed by the State. (16.) JUDGMENT ANALYSIS : (i) His Lordship considered the entire fact situation as summarised by us hereinbefore. (ii) His Lordship also considered the sequence of events apropo the notifications issued from time to time by the State on the basis of the return submitted by Orient. (iii) His Lordship considered the Apex Court decision in the case of Regional Manager v. Pawan Kumar Dubey, reported in All India Reporter, 1976, Supreme Court page 1766 and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, reported in 1999, Volume - VI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 172 on the applicability of the Division Bench decision in the Second Appeal. (iv) His Lordship negated the contentions made by the appellants to the effect that since the issue involved was dependant upon adjudication of the respective right, title of the parties writ Court should not interfere. His Lordship held that the writ petitioners had been able to prove the title over the property in question by referring to the decree of the Civil Court crystalising rights and liabilities of the respective parties in the civil suit. (v) His Lordship held, once the title was adjudicated by the Civil Court upto the second appellate stage Orient got no right to submit any return claiming title over the property derived from the original debtor. (vi) His Lordship interpreted the phraseology to hold as defined in the said Act of 1976. (v) His Lordship held, once the title was adjudicated by the Civil Court upto the second appellate stage Orient got no right to submit any return claiming title over the property derived from the original debtor. (vi) His Lordship interpreted the phraseology to hold as defined in the said Act of 1976. His Lordship held that mere possessory right over the land would not suffice to show that the possessor was holding the vacant land as an owner. His Lordship held that the doctrine of lis pendence would be applicable in the instant case. (vii) His Lordship relied upon the fact that on January 10, 1990 the authority got a notice under Section 26(1) of the said Act of 1976 from one of the writ petitioners, inter alia, praying for permission to sell a portion of the property in question. Despite such knowledge the competent authority proceeded to pass the order of vesting under Section 10 thereof. His Lordship also held that State had knowledge of the legal proceeding pending in High Court at material time. (viii) His Lordship held, the competent authority committed gross illegality by entertaining the return filed under Section 6 by Orient. (ix) His Lordship also observed that the order of status quo was subsisting with effect from July 12, 1993 and the hospital authority failed to satisfy the Court that the construction was completed before the said date. In this regard His Lordship relied on the decision in the case of Clarke and Ors. v. Chadburn and Ors., reported in 1985, Volume -1, All England Law Reporter, Page 511 and Krishna Kumar Khemka v. Grindleys Bank, Plc and Ors., reported in All India Reporter 1991, Supreme Court, Page 899 and Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., reported in 1996 All India Reporter, Supreme Court, Page 2005. (x) His Lordship allowed the writ petition and quashed the notifications issued by the State. (xi) His Lordship also observed that the hospital authority would be entitled to have refund of the lease premium and rental paid to the State. (xii) His Lordship directed the hospital authority to hand over possession of the said land to the writ petitioners. His Lordship, however, gave liberty to the State to proceed against the writ petitioners afresh after giving liberty to the writ petitioners to submit return under the said Act of 1976. (xii) His Lordship directed the hospital authority to hand over possession of the said land to the writ petitioners. His Lordship, however, gave liberty to the State to proceed against the writ petitioners afresh after giving liberty to the writ petitioners to submit return under the said Act of 1976. APPEALS (17.) Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order both the hospital authority as well as State preferred the above appeals which were heard by us on the above mentioned dates. (18.) CONTENTION OF THE STATE/APPELL ANTS: The learned Advocate General appearing in support of the appeal filed by the State contended as follows: - (i) The land was admittedly a vacant land. Orient submitted return under Section 6. The State bona fide proceeded on the basis of such return and invited objections. The respondents or their predecessor did not file any objection contemporaneously. (ii) The decree of the Civil Court being a declaratory one had no binding effect on the State. (iii) The State was statutorily entitled to proceed against the owner of the land in question in respect of the excess land- kept beyond the ceiling limit. Such action was within the ambit of the statute and was not liable to be questioned. (iv) Even if by virtue of the decree their predecessor in title of the respondent became owner of the said premises in question the transfer made by them in favour of the respondents was void being contrary to the provisions of Section 5(3) of the said Act of 1976. (v) The respondents were not in possession. Notices were given inviting objections from the interested parties. Having received no objection the State was entitled to proceed in accordance with law. Hence, the learned Single Judge was not right in directing the State to proceed de novo. (vi) State was not a party to the intra party fued before the Civil Court and as such Civil Court decree was not in any way binding upon the State. (19.) CONTENTION OF THE HOSPITAL/APPELLANTS : Mr. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appollo contended as follows: -(i) The property stood vested on the State in 1990. The possession was taken from Orient on May 28, 1990. The possession was handed over to Hospital authority on April 4, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Lease executed in their favour upon payment of appropriate consideration. The possession was taken from Orient on May 28, 1990. The possession was handed over to Hospital authority on April 4, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Lease executed in their favour upon payment of appropriate consideration. Hence, the hospital authority being a bona fide transferee without any knowledge of the civil litigation could not be dispossessed. (ii) The hospital authority got the possession in 1991 and constructed the hospital. Hence, a belated writ petition of 1993 could not be of any help to the respondents as by that time the hospital authority altered their status by spending huge sums on construction. (iii) Under Section 12 of the said Act of 1976 the respondents had alternative remedy of appeal as against the final order of vesting, having not exhausted such remedy the writ petition was not maintainable. (iv) Orient was in possession of the land in question. They voluntarily handed over the excess vacant land and took appropriate compensation therefor. Hence, belated proceeding at the instance of the respondents could not invalidate the subsequent action of the State. (20.) Mr. Mitra in support of his contention cited two Apex Court decisions in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D. R. Laxmi and Ors., reported in 1996, Volume -VI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 445 and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment (Private) Ltd. and Ors., 1996, Volume - XI, Supreme Court Cases, Page 501. (21.) CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENTS: Mr. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents contended as follows: - (i) The land was a horticultural land and could not come within the purview of the said Act of 1976 empowering the State to initiate proceedings on the basis of the purported return. (ii) As far back in 1959 the then owner got the redemption certificate by virtue of which the ownership became absolute and State was only entitled to the rental revenue. (iii) The State had all through out knowledge of the Civil Court proceedings. Such fact would be evident as the State did not object when the land was intended to be transferred on the basis of the application made on December 1, 1989 under Section 26(1) of the said Act of 1976. (iv) No notice under Section 8(2) or 10(1) of the said Act of 1976 was received by the then owner of the land in question. (iv) No notice under Section 8(2) or 10(1) of the said Act of 1976 was received by the then owner of the land in question. (v) When the writ petition was moved in 1993 order of status quo was passed in presence of the State Advocate. Hence, State was not entitled to proceed further in the matter by allotting the land to the hospital authority to construct the hospital in violation of the order of status quo. (vi) The mandate of Section 10(1) was complied in breach, requirement of the Rule 6 of the Urban Land Ceiling Rules was performed in breach. No evidence with regard to the service of notice was evident. Hence, follow up proceeding under Section 10(3) was void. (vii) Before proceeding on the basis of the return purported to have been submitted under Section 6 the State was duty bound to make an enquiry to come to a conclusion that the land was a vacant land within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the said Act of 1976. Such venture was not made by the State although the land records were maintained by them. (viii) The State was obliged to make an enquiry to the title of Orient before proceeding on the return submitted by them. (22.) Mr. Banerjee in support of his contention cited two Apex Court decisions in the case of Raja Anand Brambhma Shah v. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in All India Reporter, 1967, Supreme Court, Page 1081 and SBP and Company v. M/s. Patel Engineering Company Limited and Anr., reported in All India Reporter, 2006, Supreme Court, Page 450. (23.) CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANTS IN REPLY : The learned Advocate General in his reply reiterated what he had submitted earlier. In addition he contended that the enquiry was duly made on the basis of the return submitted under Section 6. The State relied upon the Deed of Conveyance submitted by Orient. Rule 6 was duly complied with. The respondents having raised no contemporaneous objection was not entitled to raise the issue at the belated stage. He also contended mat Khas Mahal record could not prove the nature of the land and it was the duty of the respondents to prove that the land was a horticultural land and not a vacant land within the meaning of the said Act of 1976. He also contended mat Khas Mahal record could not prove the nature of the land and it was the duty of the respondents to prove that the land was a horticultural land and not a vacant land within the meaning of the said Act of 1976. He further contended that the Single Bench was satisfied about the nature of the land and as such gave liberty to the State to proceed de novo. (24.) Mr. Mitra in reply reiterated that he was a bona fide allottee without any knowledge of the decree and as such should not be disturbed. (25.) OUR VIEW: The second appellate decree might be binding only upon the parties to the said proceedings. However, it is otherwise a judgment in rem, at least against any person claiming title derived from the judgment debtor. Hence, State deriving title by way of vesting from Orient was not entitled to deny the right, title and interest of the respondents in question. (26.) It is true that the respondents should have been vigilant enough to get their names mutated in the appropriate records of the State as well as Municipal authorities contemporaneously. They must be aware of the laws of the land. It was a vacant land as found out by His Lordship. The respondents miserably failed to prove it otherwise. The learned Judge also gave liberty to the State to proceed de novo under the said Act of 1976. Such decision of the learned Single Judge was not assailed by the respondents by way of cross-appeal and/or cross-objection. Hence, the respondents were not entitled to contend otherwise at this belated stage. We are, however, not able to convince ourselves to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General to the effect that the transfer in favour of the respondents was void and as such they had no locus standi to challenge the notification. The title was in dispute. Hence, the doctrine of lis pendence would apply. During the pendency of the second appeal the present respondents purchased the interest of the then owner on the said land in question which was yet to be adjudicated upon. They stepped into the shoes of their predecessor in interest. The declaration was made in their favour by the Division Bench of this Court. Hence, the State was obliged to proceed against them under the provisions of the said Act of 1976.. They stepped into the shoes of their predecessor in interest. The declaration was made in their favour by the Division Bench of this Court. Hence, the State was obliged to proceed against them under the provisions of the said Act of 1976.. The learned Single Judge rightly observed as such and we are in full agreement with His Lordship on that score. (27.) It is true that the hospital was constructed by Appollo by spending huge sum. They did it at their own risk and peril as it was a lease for thirty years which is going to expire in 2021. The hospital authority took that risk before proceeding further. Hence, the contention made by Mr. Mitra on that score cannot be accepted. (28.) We, however, feel that although it is a private hospital it is serving people of the State giving medical services and it would not be proper to stop such activity at this stage. We are prompted to say so as we also find the respondents guilty of laches. They did not approach the appropriate authority at the right moment. They should have raised objection contemporaneously. However, such laches cannot take away their right to claim appropriate relief without disturbing the hospital, if possible. (29.) RESULT: The order of the learned Single Judge is thus modified to the extent that the hospital authority need not hand over actual physical possession to the State before a final declaration, if any, is made under Section 10(3) considering the return to be submitted by the respondents in terms of the liberty granted by His Lordship to them. (30.) The hospital authority would be obliged to compensate the respondents to the extent of the land, if any, allowed to be retained by them, by the competent authority under the said Act of 1976 and for the balance part of the land the State would be obliged to pay compensation in accordance with law. (31.) With these directions we modify the order of the learned Single Judge and dispose of both the appeals without, however, any order as to costs.