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2009 DIGILAW 890 (KAR)

Bheemaraya v. P. Vasantkumar

2009-11-23

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR, K.N.KESHAVANARAYANA

body2009
Judgment :- Shylendra Kumar, J. Contempt petition under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Complaint is that the order dated 5.9.2006 passed by this Court in W.P. 24222/05 and the directions issued therein have not been complied with by the respondent-accused. Assistant Commissioner, Yadgir, and the Land Acquisition Officer. 2. The contempt petition is listed before this Court for orders on Misc. W.80863/09 seeking for condonation of delay in filing the contempt petition. The application seeking for condonation of delay is filed under Section 5 of the limitation Act accompanied by the affidavit sworn to by the complainant. The explanation offered is that the complainant was making efforts to get relief at the level of the accused persons itself, by giving applications/representations dated 8.11.2006, 28.7.2008, 23.8.2008, etc. 3. The direction issued in the writ petition to the 1st respondent and Assistant Commissioner, Yadgir, was to consider and dispose of the application said to have been filed by the complainant under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984, on 16.9.1992 as per Annexure-C annexed to the writ petition. 4. The writ petition itself appears to have been disposed of at the stage of preliminary hearing by directing Sri.T.A. Ramachandraiah, Government Pleader, to take notice. The version of the complainant was that his lands bearing Survey Nos.89/1, 90/1 and 90/4 measuring an extent of 3 acres 17 guntas, 2 acres 10 guntas and 33 guntas respectively situated in Shahpur Town, Gulbarga, were acquired for integrated Urban Development Project in the year 1984 and the Land Acquisition Officer had fixed compensation in the range of Rs.4,500/-to Rs.6,000/-per acre. It was further averred that some of the land owners being not satisfied with this amount of compensation, sought for reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act. The reference Court in terms of its judgment and award dated 17.6.1992, it appears, had enhanced the quantum of compensation to Rs.78,750/-per acre. 5. It is based on this judgment and award of the Reference Court, the complainant had approached the Land Acquisition Officer seeking enhancement in terms of the judgment and award by filing an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 5. It is based on this judgment and award of the Reference Court, the complainant had approached the Land Acquisition Officer seeking enhancement in terms of the judgment and award by filing an application under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The application, according to the complainant, was never disposed of and it is not known as to why the complainant happily slept over the matter, but woke up only to file the writ petition before the High Court in the year 2005 seeking for writ of mandamus to the respondents to pass orders on the application filed under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. The writ petition, though had been filed after a lapse of 13 years from the purported date of the application, the Learned Single Judge of this Court very magnanimously allowed the writ petition even without calling upon the respondents to file reply, and without an opportunity to the Govt. Pleader who was directed to take notice. The matter was disposed of at the preliminary hearing stage in the following manner: ORDER The respondent No.2 is directed to consider and decide the applications in the light of the judgment of the reference Court in LAC. No. 72/88 (disposed of on 17th June 1992) filed by the petitioners on 16.9.92 under Section 28(A) of the Land Acquisition Act, as expeditiously as possible, but not later than the outer limit of six months from the date of receipt of this order. It is made clear, if the petitioners have not filed application within the prescribed period of limitation, after the judgment and award of the reference Court, the same shall not be considered by the respondents. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of.’ 7. Be that as it may, as we are only examining the contempt petition filed under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and not exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the order of the Learned Single Judge, we have noticed these facts only for ascertaining the manner in which we have to exercise contempt jurisdiction which is, undoubtedly, a hallowed jurisdiction meant to be exercised only to preserve and protect the dignity of judicial proceedings and to ensure that the authorities who are to obey the court orders, do not go astray and at any rate, do not deliberately thwart Court orders. It is in this context, we have noticed the merits of the writ petition. 8. The application for condonation of delay, perhaps, should have been considered on its merits, but if there was scope for such examination. On a perusal of the provisions of Section 20 of the contempt of Courts Act which reads as under: 20.Limitations for actions for contempt: No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed., We find there is no scope for invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the limitation Act in a situation like the petition under Section 20. However, Sri Chaitanya Kumar, Learned Counsel for the complainant would submit that assuming that Section 5 of the limitation Act is excluded, the contempt petition though styled under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, can, nevertheless be treated as a petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, for the reason that the direction issued by this Court is in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Articles 2256 and 227 of the Constitution. Perhaps this is a plausible argument in respect of a writ petition, or even a petition under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, as no period of limitation for initiating contempt is prescribed under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. Nevertheless, judicial thinking has been that any person approaching the Court for relief in writ jurisdiction should approach within a reasonable time with due diligence and not sleep over the matter, definitely not inordinately which amounts to laches on the part of such person. 9. While we find there was inexplicable lethargic attitude on the part of the complainant while invoking writ jurisdiction, even after this Court issued the mandamus, the complainant has not become alert, but has continued in his earlier state of stupor, and has not woken up to his rights and remedies. 10. Normally though the period of limitation is not strictly applied to writ proceedings, the period prescribed under the Limitation Act is taken to be basis for examining whether the petitioner has approached the Court within a reasonable time and whether a petition can be said to be suffering from delay and laches. 10. Normally though the period of limitation is not strictly applied to writ proceedings, the period prescribed under the Limitation Act is taken to be basis for examining whether the petitioner has approached the Court within a reasonable time and whether a petition can be said to be suffering from delay and laches. For example, a mandamus in respect of a money matter is normally not entertained by the Court if it is presented beyond three years from the date of cause of action, as the limitation prescribed for civil suit for recovery of money is three years and any claim beyond three years is generally taken to be one suffering from delay and laches, unless some worthwhile explanation is forthcoming on the part of the writ petitioner. The test is apt in a contempt case also, presuming that it is one under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. 11. Though the present contempt petition is not styled as one under Article 215 of the Constitution and no worthwhile reason is forthcoming in the body of the petition explaining the delay in approaching the Court for taking action, nevertheless, we have examined the merits of the petition on such premise, but we do not find any merit to exercise contempt jurisdiction at this point of time, particularly as the order passed by this Court on 5.9.2006 is complained of as not being obeyed or as being disregarded deliberately, by filing the contempt petition only on 21.1.2009. 12. Though period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order was granted to the respondent/accused for compliance of direction issued and thereafter cause of action to initiate contempt proceedings arose, and even after allowing all these things, we notice that the cause of action arose some time during the early part of May 2007 and the petition filed on 21.1.2009 is much beyond the period of one year and definitely no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming even in the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act except saying that the complainant was busy in giving representations and pursuing the matter with the authorities. That is an ideal explanation as the complainant had burnt his fingers already where 28-A application filed in the year 1982 had not been disposed of even, according to the complainant, till 2005 and because of this reason alone, the complainant had approached this Court seeking for a writ of mandamus. 13. The complainant should have been diligent at least after getting a favourable order in the writ petition, but such is his conduct/diligence. In a matter of this nature, we are not at ll enthuse to exercise contempt jurisdiction even to call upon the respondent-accused to answer the contempt petition, though Sri Chaitanya Kumar, Learned Counsel for the complainant has made a fervent and passionate plea that at lest notice may be issued to the accused and they may be called upon to answer. 14. Contempt jurisdiction is not a sympathetic jurisdiction exercised by the Court to provide some relief or the other to the complainant, but to ensure that the majesty and dignity of this Court is maintained and not to all and sundry. We do not find that the present situation warrants initiation of contempt proceedings and in any way, the petition deserves to be dismissed not only as barred by time and also for delay and laches. Both the petition and Misc. W. 80863/09 are dismissed.