Judgment : The petitioner has sought the modification of the order, dated 10-4-2000 (Annexure-F), passed by the Educational Appellate Tribunal, Gulbarga in KEA No.40 so as to direct the first and second respondents to give consequential arrears of salary for the period from 29-3-1985 till May 2000 and to give all other consequential benefits. Further he has also sought the direction to the respondents to count the period from 11-4-1984 upto the date of his retirement (31-5-2000) as the qualifying service for the purpose of re-fixation of pension and other benefits. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner was working as the lecturer in the Department of Mathematics, P.D.A. College of Engineering, Gulbarga, being run by the first respondent-society. He sought to go on leave on medical grounds from 11-10-1984. The first respondent advised him to appear before the medical board. What was the medical opinion tendered is not forthcoming. But what cannot be disputed is that the sought medical leave was not granted. The petitioner claims to have asserted his right of resuming his duties. The first respondent alleges that he remained habitually absent and that therefore it issued the show-cause notice dated 10/14-4-1985 seeking the petitioner’s explanation. The show-cause notice reads as follows.- “Sri .B.N. Patil, Lecturer in Maths was asked to submit himself to medical board he failed to do so and they remained unauthorized absence. It clearly shows that his ailment is false. He did the same thing during last year and drawn the salary for the whole year without actually working in the college. His long absence has paralysed the teaching work in the Department and was forced to appoint a temporary Lecturer to his place. All the above facts amount misconduct… provisions of the disciplinary action. Hence Sri B.N. Patil is directed to hereby to show cause as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you. His explanation should reach this office within a week’s time after receipt of the notice”. 3. The petitioner refused to appear before the first Enquiry Officer alleging the bias against him. Thereafter the petitioner did not appear before the second Enquiry Officer also for the reasons best known to himself. His explanation should reach this office within a week’s time after receipt of the notice”. 3. The petitioner refused to appear before the first Enquiry Officer alleging the bias against him. Thereafter the petitioner did not appear before the second Enquiry Officer also for the reasons best known to himself. Two years after the issuance of the show-cause notice, the petitioner filed Appeal No.40 of 1987, seeking the setting aside of the show-cause notice, enquiry proceedings and seeking his reinstatement with retrospective effect, continuity of service, etc. The Tribunal by its judgment, dated 10-4-2000 dismissed the said appeal with a direction to the respondents 1 and 2 to conclude the enquiry within four months from 10-4-2000. Meanwhile, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 4-5-2000. On 11-11-2000 the first respondent issued the memo. Its sum and substance is that Enquiry Officer found him guilty of the charge and that the further action of dismissing him has not been taken, as the petitioner has already attained the age of superannuation of 58 years on 4-5-2000. 4. The third respondent-Director called upon the second respondent-Principal to prepare and send the petitioner’s pension papers. Based on the pension papers submitted by the respondent 2, the respondent 3 has taken into account the service put in by the petitioner from 9-2-1974 to 5-10-1981. However, the Accountant General’s office has calculated his qualifying service as 15 years, three months, six days. 5. This petition is presented agitating the petitioner’s claim for the pensionary and other terminal benefits from 11-4-1984 to 31-5-2000. Sri S.M. Chandrashekar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has made umpteen number of efforts to resume his duties in the college. But he was prevented from doing so by its principal. In support of his submission, he has also produced two memos dated 28-3-1985 and 6-4-1985 both issued by the principal. If the petitioner was prevented from discharging his duties without any contribution from his side and for the circumstances created by the respondents 1 and 2, the petitioner cannot be penalized for the same, so contends Sri S.M. Chandrashekar. 6. The learned Counsel also submits that the scope of the appeal under the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 is wider than the appeal provided under the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. 6. The learned Counsel also submits that the scope of the appeal under the Karnataka Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 is wider than the appeal provided under the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. As the respondent 1 orally ordered that the petitioner is permitted to resume his work, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to examine the tenability or otherwise of such an oral order. While disposing of the appeal the Tribunal has not taken into account the petitioner’s prayer for reinstatement. The perusal of the order gives an impression that it was concerned only the challenge to the show-cause notice and enquiry proceedings. 7. Sri S.M. Chandrashekar has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah 2008 (1) Kar.L.J.249 (SC): AIR 2007 SC 3100 : (2007) 7 SCC 689 :2007 AIR SCW 5577. The relevant paragraph is extracted herein below: “24. We are unable to uphold the argument. In our judgment, the submission of the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner is well-founded that in the instant case also express and unequivocal direction was issued by the Court to grant to the writ petitioner “such other consequential benefits that he might get consequent upon the revision of ranking”. It was also observed that such benefits should be paid to him by December 30, 1997 as the writ petitioner was to retire in February 1998. The said decision, to reiterate, has become final and binding. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant-Board to contend that the respondent is not entitled to such benefits under 1973 Act and hence no such direction could have been issued by the Court”. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner in the course of his argument has also produced a letter dated 15-7-2005 issued by the Administrative officer of the first respondent-Society. It reads as follows:- “Ref.No.1/HKES/A6/2005-06/524, date:15-7-2005 To The Principal, P.D.A. College of Engineering, Sir, Sub: Sanction of earned leave to Prof.B.N.Patil, Lecturer in Maths. With reference to the above subject, 141 days earned leave from 11-10-1984 to 28-3- 1985 has been sanctioned to Sri B.N. Patil, Lecturer in Maths, on Medical grounds, subject to approval of Competent Authority. The necessary entries may be made in the S.R. of Official. With reference to the above subject, 141 days earned leave from 11-10-1984 to 28-3- 1985 has been sanctioned to Sri B.N. Patil, Lecturer in Maths, on Medical grounds, subject to approval of Competent Authority. The necessary entries may be made in the S.R. of Official. Yours faithfully, Administrative Officer Copy to: Sri B.N. Patil, Lecturer, PDA Engineering College, Hno.8-11-210, Raghavendra Colony, Bidar, Received on 2-8-2005” 9. Sri Veeresh B. Patil, the learned Counsel or the respondents 1 and 2 submits that the petitioner is a chronic absentee. As the petitioner has not challenged the third respondent’s order dated 28-8-2003, he is not entitled to get any relief in these proceedings. The third respondent has taken into account the petitioner’s service register, etc., while arriving at the decision for holding that the period between 1974 and 1981 alone can be considered for the computation of the petitioner’s pensionary benefits. He also submits that the Tribunal’s order cannot modified and that too after four years of its passing. 10. Sri M. Kumar, the learned Additional Government Advocate submits that the petitioner has not made any efforts to get himself reinstated by filing the I.A. for stay or I.A. for direction before the Educational Appellate Tribunal. He submits that it will be unlawful and unfair for the petitioner to claim pensionary benefits for the period during which he has not worked. The learned additional Government Advocate further submits that the possibilities of the petitioner being gainfully employed elsewhere cannot be ruled out. After four long years of his attaining the superannuation, this petition is filed. He submits that there is no justification for requesting that the Tribunal’s order be modified. 11. The submission of the learned Counsel have received my anxious consideration. 12. In the light of the facts of the case and the submissions made at the bar, the prayer for modifying the Tribunal’s order and for giving the directions to the third respondent for treating the period from 11-4-1984 to 31-5-2000 as the qualifying service for the re-fixation of the pension, etc., are to be examined. 13. The judgment by the Educational Appellate Tribunal is pronounced on 10-4-2000. The writ petition is filed after four long years of its passing. The challenge to the appeal is liable to be rejected on the short ground of delay and laches. 14. 13. The judgment by the Educational Appellate Tribunal is pronounced on 10-4-2000. The writ petition is filed after four long years of its passing. The challenge to the appeal is liable to be rejected on the short ground of delay and laches. 14. For two other reasons also, the Tribunal’s order cannot be altered or modified. The correctness of the Tribunal’s order has to be tested with reference to the points urged, the facts stated and the materials placed on the record. The subsequent event of the petitioner retiring and the exclusion of certain period by the respondent for the computation of the pensionary benefits cannot be a ground for modifying the Tribunal’s order. The third reason is the conduct of the petitioner in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The petitioner took 15 adjournments to argue on the maintainability of the appeal. To examine him further after 25-10-1990, he took 28 adjournments. He took 8 adjournments for addressing arguments on the main matter. 15. Now I am left with the tenability of the request for the direction to the third respondent. The third respondent has already passed the order, dated 28-8-2003, wherein he has counted the period from 9-2-1974 to 5-10-1981 for the purpose of computing the petitioner’s pensionary benefits. Though this order is passed prior to the filing of the writ petition, the said order is not challenged. 16. Further, the third respondent has passed the order based on the proposal submitted by the respondent 2. The respondent 3 cannot be directed to count the period, for the computation of the pensionary benefits, during which the petitioner was not worked for whatever reason. Therefore, the petition as against the respondent 3 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 17. However, there is some dispute as to whether the petitioner unauthorisedly remained absent or was prevented from discharging his duties at the college by the respondent 2. The enquiry proceedings initiated and further directed by the Tribunal to be concluded within four months have not seen their logical culmination. 18. It is not known as to why the respondent 1 did not call for the remarks of the petitioner on the enquiry report. It is only after complying with this requirement that the respondent 1 has to pass the disciplinary order. I am afraid in the instant case, the things are done in a slipshod manner. 18. It is not known as to why the respondent 1 did not call for the remarks of the petitioner on the enquiry report. It is only after complying with this requirement that the respondent 1 has to pass the disciplinary order. I am afraid in the instant case, the things are done in a slipshod manner. The respondent 1 is content by issuing a letter dated 7-7-2000 that as the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation on 5-4-2000, further action of dismissing him from service is unnecessary. In my considered view this order does not withstand the scrutiny of law. 19. Whatever may be wanting on the part of the petitioner, the 2nd respondent-College, an aided institution is expected to act fairly and in compliance with the requirements of law. No doubt, fairness is not a one way traffic, but at the same time certain amount of adherence to the requirements of law and the principles of natural justice are expected of the respondents 1 and 2. There is nothing like deemed or notional order. It has to be express. The dismissal order has got to be express and certain. 20. This Court therefore deems it necessary and just to mould the relief and direct the respondent 1 to pass the appropriate orders in the matter after calling for and considering the remarks of the petitioner on the enquiry report, if any. As the dismissal is too a serious matter, the gravest of the grave penalties, it is obligatory for the respondent 1 to observe all the principles of natural justice. If the Disciplinary Authority based on the enquiry report and the reply submitted by the petitioner thereon or independently of the Enquiry Officer’s report, holds that the petitioner is not guilty of the charges or in the alternative holds the petitioner guilty of the charges, but imposes only a lesser penalty, then the petitioner is entitled to seek appropriate damages from the respondent 1. If the respondent 1 after observing all the requirements of law and the principles of natural justice holds him guilty and reiterates the major penalty of dismissal, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the same in a manner known to law. The respondent 1 is directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within an outer limit of four months from the issuance of the certified copy of today’s order. The respondent 1 is directed to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within an outer limit of four months from the issuance of the certified copy of today’s order. The petitioner is directed to co-operate with the Disciplinary Authority in the matter. 21. In the result, this petition is dismissed as against respondents 3 and 4 and allowed in part as against the respondent 1 and 2 in the above terms. No order as to costs.