Judgment : MUKHERJEE, J. (1.) This is an appeal against Order No. 29 dated September 26,2008 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Alipore, South 24-Paraganas, in Title Suit No. 14 of 2008, thereby rejecting an application for temporary injunction filed in connection with the said suit. (2.) The suit was filed, inter alia, for declaration that the plaintiff was the owner in respect of the suit property, which was purchased by the plaintiff in terms of two deeds of conveyance and a deed of declaration dated July 24, 2007, August 16, 2007 and January 24, 2008 for which the plaintiff paid necessary consideration. (3.) The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that the property originally belonged to Burdwan Raj Estate, which executed a Bandobastnama in favour of the defendants No. 2 to 7 in respect of the suit property. By virtue of the said Bandobastnama, the defendants No. 2 to 7 became the raiyats and their names have been mutated in the records of the authorities concerned, (4.) The defendants No. 2 to 7, in their turn, gave an irrevocable Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant No.1, namely, Amit Kumar Mitra, empowering him to deal with the property- in- suit. Amit Kumar Mitra transferred the property in suit in favour of the plaintiff. After purchasing the suit property, the plaintiff noticed that some constructions were going on in the suit promises and, as such, to protect the interest of the plaintiff, the suit was instituted and a prayer for injunction was made. (5.) It is, however, pertinent to note that, although, the plaintiff paid Rs. 26,02,00,000/-(Rupees twenty six crore two lakh) only to the said defendant No.1, but, the possession has never been handed over to it. (6.) The defendant No.1 filed a written objection, but he chose not to appear before the Court below. The defendants No.2 and 7, jointly, filed a written objection alleging that they did not execute any Power of Attorney empowering the said Amit Kumar Mitra to transfer, alienate and/or encumber the property- in-suit in favour of the plaintiff or any other person whatsoever. (7.) It seems that the defendants No.2 to 7 are now divided house. The defendants No.2 and 7, jointly, filed a written objection alleging that they did not execute any Power of Attorney empowering the said Amit Kumar Mitra to transfer, alienate and/or encumber the property- in-suit in favour of the plaintiff or any other person whatsoever. (7.) It seems that the defendants No.2 to 7 are now divided house. The defendants No. 3 to 6, however, filed a supplementary written objection or an independent written objection against the application for temporary injunction, where they admitted that they executed a Power of Attorney in favour of the said Amit Kumar Mitra and received a sum of Rs. 4,00,00,000/- (Rupees four crore) only. (8.) Neither in the written objections of the defendant No.1 nor of the defendants No. 2 to 7, there was any indication that the possession of the suit property was ever handed over to the plaintiff. (9.) The stand taken by the defendant No. 8, in its written objection to the application for temporary injunction, was that a portion of the property was acquired by the State of West Bengal under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The acquired portion was 2.71 acres. The Government of West Bengal has settled that acquired portion of land in favour of the defendant No. 8. The defendant No. 8 acquired some other adjacent properties and having obtained sanction from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation started to construct the Alipore Institute of Management and Technology. The defendant No. 8 contended that they were making construction in their acquired portion and, as such, the order of injunction of any kind would operate against them harshly. (10.) The defendants No. 9,10 and 11 were added subsequently by an order dated March 19, 2008, passed by the learned Trial Judge. The added defendants, also, filed their written objection and asserted that the Burdwan Raj Estate was the actual owner excepting the portion of land that has been acquired by the Government of West Bengal under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. They, further, asserted that no Bandobastnama was ever created in favour of the defendants No. 2 to 7 and, therefore, they have no occasion to execute the Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant No. 1 and, as such, any transfer made by the defendant No. 1 was of no use for the plaintiff. They, further, asserted that no Bandobastnama was ever created in favour of the defendants No. 2 to 7 and, therefore, they have no occasion to execute the Power of Attorney in favour of the defendant No. 1 and, as such, any transfer made by the defendant No. 1 was of no use for the plaintiff. (11.) The learned Trial Judge, as we have noted hereinabove, rejected the application for temporary injunction holding, inter alia, that the plaintiff has failed to make out any prima facie case to obtain the order of injunction. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff has come up with this appeal. (12.) Mr. Shyama Prasanna Roy Chowdhury, learned senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff/appellant, strenuously argues that his client has made out a prima facie case to go to trial and if any construction is permitted, the situation will become irreversible by the time the suit is decided finally and will preclude fair and just decision in the suit. (13.) Mr. Roy Chowdhury points out that the defendants had raised rival contentions in the matter; each set of defendants is claiming independent title in the property- in-suit. When the suit is pending and the title of the parries is required to be adjudicated, status quo in relation to the property- in- suit should be maintained. (14.) Mr. Roy Chowdhury, in support of his contentions, cites the decisions in the cases of Israil and Ors. v. Samser Rahman and Ors. reported in 18 Cal WN 176; Dalpat Kumar and Anr. v. Prahlad Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 1993 SC 276 ; Gangubai Bablya Chaudhary and Ors. v. Sitaram Bhalchandra Sukhtankar and Ors. reported in AIR 1983 SC 742 ; Dhariwal Industries Ltd. and Anr. v. M.S.S. Food Products reported in (2005)3 SCC 63 and Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors. reported in (2006)5 SCC 282 . (15.) We have, also, heard Mr. Sudhish Dasgupta, learned senior Advocate appearing for the defendants/respondents No. 2 and 7; Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the defendant/respondent No. 8; Mr. Tapas Kumar Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing for the defendants/respondents No. 3 to 6 and Mr. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the added defendants/respondents No. 9,10 and 11. (16.) Mr. Sudhish Dasgupta, Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra and Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the defendant/respondent No. 8; Mr. Tapas Kumar Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing for the defendants/respondents No. 3 to 6 and Mr. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, learned senior Advocate appearing for the added defendants/respondents No. 9,10 and 11. (16.) Mr. Sudhish Dasgupta, Mr. Anindya Kumar Mitra and Mr. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, learned senior Advocates, submit that the plaintiff miserably failed to make out any prima facie case to go to trial and, as such, the learned Trial Judge was justified in rejecting the application for temporary injunction. They, further, submit that granting of an order of temporary injunction, purely, depends on the discretion of the learned Trial Judge and as the learned Judge has exercised his discretion properly, no appeal lies against such order denying temporary injunction. (17.) Mr. Tapas Bhattacharya, learned Advocate appearing for the defendants/respondents No. 3 to 6, however, submit that in the suit his clients had taken out an application for injunction to restrain the defendant No. 8 from making any construction. The said application has, since, been rejected and, being aggrieved, his clients have filed an appeal before this Court, but the same has not yet been admitted for hearing under Order XLI, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (18.) We have, already, indicated that the defendants No. 2 to 7 are now divided house. Initially, it was stated that the Bandobastnama was obtained by the defendants No. 2 to 7 jointly, but, in the supplemental or independent written objection filed by the defendants No. 3 to 6, it was asserted that the Bandobastnama was obtained only by the predecessor- in- interest of the defendants No. 3 to 6 and, as such, the defendants No. 2 and 7 have no interest in the property in suit. (19.) It is settled law that grant or refusal of temporary injunction is covered by well-established principles, that is, whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff and, lastly, whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss and injury. To get an order of temporary injunction, while the first condition is sine qua non, the plaintiff is, also, to establish two other conditions conjunctively. Mere proof of any one of the said three conditions does no entitle a petitioner to get an order of temporary injunction. To get an order of temporary injunction, while the first condition is sine qua non, the plaintiff is, also, to establish two other conditions conjunctively. Mere proof of any one of the said three conditions does no entitle a petitioner to get an order of temporary injunction. When none of the three conditions is fulfilled, the application for temporary injunction is liable to be rejected. (20.) Let us now first consider, of course, prima facie, as to whether the Bandobastnama could create any title in favour of the defendants No. 2 to 7 jointly or in favour of Sailendra Nath Bhattacharya, the predecessor- in-interest of the defendants No. 3 to 6. A photocopy of the Bandobastnama has been incorporated in the paper book (part-II). It is a vernacular document purportedly executed by the Nayeb to the Burdwan Raj Estate on March 21,1953. There is no indication in the said Bandobastnama as to how the Nayeb was authorised to execute the said document on behalf of the Burdwan Raj Estate. (21.) With regard to the Power of Attorney, as we could understand, the stand of the defendants No. 2 to 7 was that they have not executed any power of attorney, but, they executed a general power of attorney empowering the defendant No. 1, namely, Amit Kumar Mitra, to look after the property- in-suit only and no authority was given to Amit Kumar Mitra to transfer, alienate or sell the property in question. A photocopy of the general power of attorney is produced before us. On a cursory look, it appears that pages 2 and 4 were typed in one typewriter and page 3 was typed in a different typewriter. Pages 2 and 3 bear no signature either any of the principals or of the attorney. It is quite possible that there were some interpolations in the power of attorney as alleged by some of the defendants. Of course, we are not deciding the said issue here. WBLR-70 (22.) It is pertinent to note here that the District Sub-Registrar was, also, apprehensive and he lodged a complaint with the Alipore Police Station alleging tampering in the Power of Attorney. Of course, we are not deciding the said issue here. WBLR-70 (22.) It is pertinent to note here that the District Sub-Registrar was, also, apprehensive and he lodged a complaint with the Alipore Police Station alleging tampering in the Power of Attorney. From the First Information Report, which was, also, incorporated in the paper book (part- II), it appears that the District Sub-Registrar expressed his doubt inasmuch as such irrevocable power of attorney could not be executed upon payment of a paltry stamp duty of Rs. 60/-(Rupees sixty) only because under clause 48 to Schedule 1A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the stamp duty for such irrevocable power of attorney is similar to that of deed of conveyance. (23.) What is surprising further, the deeds on which the plaintiff is relying, there are contradictory statements. Sometime Amit Kumar Mitra claims himself as an Attorney; sometime he asserts himself as the owner of the property and sometime as the assignor. The statements in all the documents create some doubt in our mind about the genuineness of the transaction. It is surprising that the documents were executed sometime in the year 2007. The property is in prime location of the presidency town of Calcutta. The property has been described in the deed by dag numbers. We feel, prima facie, that this was deliberately done to create confusion. Our apprehension is further strengthened because the boundary of the property was described mentioning the number of the municipal premises. It is surprising that a builder/developer paid Rs. 26,02,00,000/- (Rupees twenty six crore two lakh) only for acquisition of a property without getting possession of even one inch of the said property. (24.) We are at one with the learned Trial Judge that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case to obtain the order of temporary injunction. The question of balance of convenience is, certainly, in favour of the defendants, particularly, the defendant No. 8. The defendant No. 8 has obtained settlement from the Government of West Bengal upon payment of premium in respect of a land, which was acquired as excess land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The question of balance of convenience is, certainly, in favour of the defendants, particularly, the defendant No. 8. The defendant No. 8 has obtained settlement from the Government of West Bengal upon payment of premium in respect of a land, which was acquired as excess land under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The Burdwan Raj Estate, which was the owner of the property in question, accepts that the property was acquired by the Government of West Bengal and they have no interest in the said 2.71 acres of land, which was settled in favour of the defendant No. 8. Moreover, the defendant No. 8 has, also, acquired some other adjacent properties and is constructing a building after obtaining the sanctioned plan from the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. If, at this stage, the construction is stopped, irreparable loss and injury would cause to the defendant No. 8. (25.) We do not find any merit in the appeal. (26.) The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only. (27.) On the prayers made by the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, we clarify that all our findings are limited for the purpose of disposal of the application for temporary injunction filed in the suit. The learned Trial Judge shall decide the issues involved in the suit independently in accordance with law and uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court in this appeal or in the order passed by the learned Trial Judge rejecting the application for temporary injunction. (28.) In view of dismissal of this appeal, all connected interlocutory applications become infructuous and those are, also, dismissed. Let xerox plain copies of this order duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be made available to the learned Advocates for the parties on usual undertakings and for taking steps in the matter.