JUDGMENT Rajiv Sharma, J.:- Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this petition are that the petitioner was appointed as Sub Judge on 14.1.1975. He was inducted as Member of the Higher Judiciary on 19.4.1995. He was granted the selection grade on 20.11.2003. He was conveyed adverse entry in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 on 30.10.2004. He sought the clarification from the Registrar (Vigilance) on 22.11.2004 whether remarks recorded in column No. 13 were ‘advisory’ or ‘adverse’ in nature. He was informed by the Registrar (Vigilance) on 1.12.2004 that remark “does not enjoy good general reputation” against column No.13 in Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 was ‘adverse’ and the entry made in column No. 14 ‘average’ was advisory in nature. He sought for the relevant record on the basis of which entry/remark was incorporated in his Annual Confidential Report in order to make the exhaustive and detailed representation on 28.12.2004. The Registrar (Vigilance) of the Registry of the High Court asked the petitioner vide communication dated 4.1.2005 to specify the record which he wanted to inspect. He informed the Registrar (Vigilance) on 12.1.2005 that he had no idea/knowledge about the record on the basis of which the remarks in column No.13 of his Annual Confidential Report were incorporated and, therefore, to enable him to specify the record which he intended to inspect be made available to him on the basis of which entry was made. He was informed by the Registrar (Vigilance) on 5.3.2005 that such adverse entry as it often happens normally came to be recorded on the basis of the perception that the Hon’ble Members of the Full Court might have been having about his functioning and the reputation that he had been enjoying as a Judicial Officer. The text of letter dated 3.5.2005 reads thus: “With reference to your letter dated 12.1.2005 on the captioned subject I have been directed to inform you that upon consideration of the entire matter, the Hon’ble Full Court feels that the adverse entry “Does not enjoy good general reputation” in column No. 13 of your Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 was not specifically relatable to any particular record as such nor it had specific genesis to any particular record of your service. Such an adverse entry as it often happens normally, came to be recorded on the basis of the perception that the Hon’ble Members of the Full Court might have been having about your functioning and the reputation that you had been enjoying as a Judicial Officer.” 2. He made a representation against the adverse entry and the same was rejected and conveyed to him on 29.3.2005. He was retired vide notification dated 20.4.2005. The text of notification 20.4.2005 reads thus: “Hon’ble the Chief Justice and Hon’ble Judges of the HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT are pleased to order that Shri P.D. Goel, District and Sessions Judge, Chamba (a Member of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service), shall stand retired from service on and with effect from the afternoon of 31st July, 2005 i.e. last day of the month in which he attains the age of superannuation, that is, 58 years, under Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004.” 3. The petitioner has assailed specifically Annexure P-14 dated 30.10.2004, Annexure P-15 dated 29.3.2005 whereby his representation was rejected and notification dated 20.4.2005 Annexure P16 vide which he has been retired with effect from 31.7.2005. The principal stand of the petitioner is that adverse entry conveyed to him on 30.10.2004 is based on subjective satisfaction and the same is in contravention of the notification issued by the Registry of the High Court and as per dicta of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is also contended in the writ petition that no adverse entry except P-14 dated 30.10.2004 has ever been conveyed to him. He has given the example of three Judicial Officers, namely, Sh. K.C.Negi, Sh. B.D.Sharma and Sh. Inder Ram, who have been permitted to remain in service upto the age 60 years having inferior service record vis-à-vis him. It is also contended that he was entitled to continue upto the age of 60 years on the basis of Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 notified on 16.3.2004. It is further averred in the petition that the representation has been rejected without assigning any reasons. It is also stated in the petition that the matter could not be decided by the Full Court once the committee was constituted as per directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further averred in the petition that the representation has been rejected without assigning any reasons. It is also stated in the petition that the matter could not be decided by the Full Court once the committee was constituted as per directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The petitioner has also given reference that the adverse entry has been made in his Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 when he was dealing with the matter pertaining to the Minister of the Himachal Pradesh under the Prevention of Corruption Act. He has relied upon various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to substantiate his claim. 4. The stand of the respondent is that the decision to retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years is in conformity with Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004. It is also averred in the reply that the entire service record of the petitioner was considered for being continued in service. According to the reply, the petitioner’s past service record, quality of judgments and other relevant matters were taken into consideration while deciding not to grant extension to the petitioner beyond 58 years of age. As far as the recording of the Annual Confidential Report is concerned, the stand of the respondent is that it was the general perception of the Full Court vis-a-vis the reputation of the petitioner during the relevant period and the same is not related to any particular service record of the petitioner. It is also stated in the reply that the reasons for rejection of the representation need not be conveyed to the petitioner and no illegality was committed while rejecting the representation of the petitioner against the adverse entry made in his Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04. The stand of the respondent is also that the age of retirement is 58 years and not 60 years. The stand of the respondent is also that the age of retirement is 58 years and not 60 years. It is further averred in the reply that there was no question of making any recommendations to the Governor as stated in the petition under proviso to rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 and the High Court is required to take the decision in accordance with the requirement of the Rule whether to grant the extension to Judicial Officer or to retire on attaining the age of 58 years and neither any specific order much less to support such order with reasons was required to be communicated in that behalf nor any approval from the Government was required for retiring the petitioner on his attaining the age of 58 years. The respondent has relied upon (2001) 2 SCC 305 in the reply to superannuate the petitioner at the age of 58 years. As far as the grant of selection grade to the petitioner is concerned, the stance of the respondent is that it will not entitle the petitioner to continue beyond the age of 58 years. As far as the representation made by the petitioner is concerned against the notification, whereby he has been retired, the stand of the respondent is that there was no provision under the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 for considering the representation against the decision taken by the Full Court under Rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004. However, it was stated that the representation was considered and rejected and the record shall be produced before the Court as and when directed. 5. The petitioner has filed a detailed rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondent. The stand taken in the writ petition is reiterated. The Registrar General of the High Court has also filed the supplementary affidavit verified on 4.1.2008 whereby a reference has been made to the instructions issued from time to time for recording the Annual Confidential Reports for the cadre of District/Additional District and Sessions Judges. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the Registrar General sworn on 11.5.2007, it is stated that the entire record was considered by the Full Court in its meeting held on 12.4.2005. 6. Mr. In the supplementary affidavit filed by the Registrar General sworn on 11.5.2007, it is stated that the entire record was considered by the Full Court in its meeting held on 12.4.2005. 6. Mr. R.L. Sood, Senior Advocate has strenuously argued that the entries in the Annual Confidential Report cannot be made on the basis of mere perception without any material on record relating to the same. He then contended that any information, which may have led to the recording of Annual Confidential Report was required to be divulged to the petitioner. According to him, the age of superannuation as per rule 14 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 is 60 years and not 58 years. According to him, the respondent has misconstrued the provisions of rules 14 and 15 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004. He further contended that the notification dated 20.4.2005 was required to be issued by the Governor and not by the Hon’ble Chief Justice. He then contended that the representation made by his client has been rejected without assigning any reason vide Annexure P-15. He further contended that his client has always earned ‘outstanding’ to ‘good’ entries and it was for the first time that he was conveyed adverse entry for the year 2003-04. According to him, his client has always been granted ‘outstanding’ as far as the disposal of the cases is concerned. He lastly contended that the matter was also looked into by the Registrar General after the receipt of the complaint, but nothing substantial was found against his client and his client has been found suitable on the basis of merit for the release of selection grade on 20.12.2003. 7. Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent has submitted that the adverse entry has been conveyed to the petitioner on the basis of perception of the Full Court about the integrity of the petitioner. She also contended that the age of superannuation under rule 14 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 is 58 years and not 60 years as contended by Mr. R.L. Sood. She then contended that under rule 14 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004, the Hon’ble Chief Justice was competent to issue notification dated 20.4.2005 and neither the State Government nor the Governor has any role to play. R.L. Sood. She then contended that under rule 14 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004, the Hon’ble Chief Justice was competent to issue notification dated 20.4.2005 and neither the State Government nor the Governor has any role to play. She further contended that no reasons are required to be assigned while rejecting the representation made by the petitioner against the adverse entry. She also contended that the record of the petitioner was seen by the Full Court on 12.4.2005. She further contended that it was the prerogative of the Hon’ble Chief Justice whether to continue with the committee of two Hon’ble Judges to review the case of the petitioner or to refer the matter to the Full Court. According to her there was nothing unconstitutional to refer the matter to the Full Court though initially it was referred to the committee of two Hon’ble Judges. 8. The respondent was directed to produce the entire record for the perusal of the Court. The record was made available by the respondent. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record carefully. 10. The Court first will advert to the issue pertaining to the Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-2004. The petitioner was conveyed adverse entry for the year 2003-04 and against column No. 13 ‘general reputation’, “does not enjoy good general reputation” has been mentioned. Against column No.14, net result is ‘average’. He was permitted to make a representation within 60 days. He sought clarification, as noticed above, whether the remarks recorded in column No. 13 were ‘adverse’ or ‘advisory’ in nature. He was informed on 1.12.2004 that the remarks made against column No.13 in his Annual Confidential Report for the year 200304 were ‘adverse’ whereas the remarks made against column No.14 were ‘advisory’ in nature. He requested on 28.12.2004 for making him available the record for the purpose of making representation. He was directed by the Registrar (Vigilance) of the High Court to specify on 4.1.2005 the record which he wanted to inspect. He requested on 28.12.2004 for making him available the record for the purpose of making representation. He was directed by the Registrar (Vigilance) of the High Court to specify on 4.1.2005 the record which he wanted to inspect. He was informed on 5.3.2005 that the ‘adverse’ entry made in column No.13 was not specifically relatable to any particular record as such nor it has specific genesis to any particular record and adverse entry as it often happens normally came to be recorded on the basis of the perception that the Hon’ble Members of the Full Court might have been having about his functioning and the reputation. The text of letter has already been reproduced hereinabove. His representation was rejected on 29.3.2005. The text of letter dated 29.3.2005 reads thus: “Please refer to your representation/letter dated 10.3.2005. have been directed to say that the representation was considered and has been rejected.” 11. It is evident from the record that the following entries were made in his Annual Confidential Reports with effect from 1989-90 till 24.3.2004: “1. 1989-90 Good (4.12.1989 to 31.3.1990) 2. 1990-91 Very Good 3. 1991-92 Good 4. 1992-93 (22.5.1992 to 12.11.1992) Good (25.11.1992 to 31.3.1993) Good 5. 1993-94 Very Good 6. 1994-95 Outstanding (26.8.1994 to 31.3.1995) 7. 1995-96 Average 8. 1996-97 Good 9. 1997-98 Very Good 10. 1998-99 Very Good 11. 1999-2000 Very Good 12. 2000-2001 Good (27.7.2000 to 31.3.2001) 13. 2001-2002 Good 14. 2002-2003 (1.4.2002 to 28.8.2002) (9.9.2002 to 31.3.2003) Good Good 15. 2003-2004 Average.” (1.4.2003 to 24.3.2004) 12. It is for the first time that the petitioner has been conveyed adverse remarks for the year 200304. The moot question involved in this petition is: Whether the adverse entry “does not enjoy good general reputation” could be recorded against column No.13 or not? The case of the petitioner is that these entries could not be made subjectively and there ought to have been some material available on record and he was further required to be confronted with the same. The stand, as noticed above, of the respondent is that these remarks have been recorded on the basis of the perception of the Members of the Full Court vis-à-vis the reputation of the petitioner during the relevant period and not related to any particular service record of the petitioner. The Court is of the firm view that the opinion could only be formed objectively and not subjectively. The Court is of the firm view that the opinion could only be formed objectively and not subjectively. The petitioner was required to be confronted with the material, if any, available on the record and thereafter only this entry could be incorporated. In fact, the petitioner has tried to obtain the record from respondent No.1 to enable him to file an effective representation against the adverse entry. This request of the petitioner was spurned by the respondent by asking him to specify the record, which he was seeking from the Registry of the High Court. The petitioner has again insisted that the record forming the basis of the opinion may be supplied to him. It was only on 5.3.2005 that he has been informed that it was upon the consideration of the entire matter, the Full Court felt that the adverse entry “does not enjoy good general reputation” in Column No.13 of the Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 was not specifically relatable to any particular record as such nor it had specific genesis to any particular record of his service. Further explanation was that such an adverse entry as it often happens normally, came to be recorded on the basis of the perception that the Hon’ble Members of the Full Court might have been having about his functioning and the reputation he had been enjoying as a Judicial Officer. The explanation given by the Registry of the High Court was subjective and not based on any material available on record. This adverse entry has very far reaching ramifications as far as the career of the petitioner was concerned. He has earned, as noticed above, nine ‘good’ entries with effect from 1989-90 to 2003-04. He has earned one ‘outstanding’ entry and has earned four ‘very good’ entries. He was conveyed ‘average’ entry for the year 1995-96 and it is only thereafter for the year 2003-04 that ‘average’ entry was recorded in his Confidential Report. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases have held that as and when the adverse entry is to be conveyed, there must be sufficient foundation for the same and it cannot be based on subjective satisfaction and the person against whom this entry is made must be confronted with material, if available. 14. 13. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the following cases have held that as and when the adverse entry is to be conveyed, there must be sufficient foundation for the same and it cannot be based on subjective satisfaction and the person against whom this entry is made must be confronted with material, if available. 14. Their Lordships in State of U.P. versus Yamuna Shanker Misra and another, (1997) 4 SCC 7 have held that the purpose of maintaining confidential report is to enable an employee to improve his performance in public service in accordance with his fundamental duty to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity. Their Lordships have further highlighted that there should be objectivity in writing of Confidential Reports and there is need to write report accurately on the basis of facts and overall assessment. Their Lordships have further held that as far as adverse remarks, conduct, reputation and character are concerned, the assessment regarding, may sometimes, not be based on records but based on knowledge of the officer writing the report, the reporting officer should therefore confront the reported officer with his knowledge before forming an opinion to make adverse remarks so that the reported officer gets opportunity to improve himself or to explain his conduct. Their Lordships have held as under: “It would, thus, be clear that the object of writing the confidential reports and making entries in the character rolls is to give an opportunity to a public servant to improve excellence. Article 51A(j) enjoins upon every citizen the primary duty to constantly endeavour to prove excellence, individually and collectively, as a member of the group. Given an opportunity, the individual employee strives to improve excellence and thereby efficiency of administration would be augmented. The officer entrusted with the duty to write confidential reports, has a public responsibility and trust to write the confidential reports objectively, fairly and dispassionately while giving, as accurately as possible, the statement of facts on an overall assessment of the performance of the subordinate officer. It should be founded upon the facts or circumstances. Though sometimes, it may not be part of record, but the conduct, reputation and character acquire public knowledge or notoriety and may be within his knowledge. It should be founded upon the facts or circumstances. Though sometimes, it may not be part of record, but the conduct, reputation and character acquire public knowledge or notoriety and may be within his knowledge. Before forming an opinion to be adverse, the reporting officers writing confidential should share the information which is not a part of the record with the officer concerned, have the information confronted by the officer and then make it part of the record. This amounts to an opportunity given to the erring/corrupt officer to correct the errors of the judgment, conduct, behaviour, integrity or conduct/corrupt proclivity. If, despite giving such an opportunity, the officer fails to perform the duty, correct his conduct or improve himself necessarily, the same may be recorded in the confidential reports and a copy thereof supplied to the affected officer so that he will have an opportunity to know the remarks made against him. If he feels aggrieved, it would be open to him to have it corrected by appropriate representation to the higher authorities or any appropriate judicial forum for redressal. Thereby, honesty, integrity, good conduct and efficiency get improved in the performance of public duties and standards of excellence in services constantly rises to higher levels and it becomes successful tool to manage the services with officers of integrity, honesty, efficiency and devotion.” 15. However, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swatantar Singh versus State of Haryana and others, (1997) 4 SCC 14 have held that adverse remarks regarding integrity and honesty can be based on general reputation of the employee without making reference to specific instances. Their Lordships have held as under: “We find no force in the contention. It is true that in view of the settled legal position, the object of writing the Confidential Reports or Character Roll of a Government Servant and Communication of the adverse remarks is to afford an opportunity to the concerned officer to make amends to his remiss; to reform himself; to mend his conduct and to be disciplined, to do hard work, to bring home his lapse in his integrity and character so that he corrects himself and improves the efficiency in public service. The entries, therefore, require an objective assessment of the work and conduct of a Government servant reflecting as accurately as possible his sagging inefficiency and incompetency. The entries, therefore, require an objective assessment of the work and conduct of a Government servant reflecting as accurately as possible his sagging inefficiency and incompetency. The defects and deficiencies brought home to the officer, are means to the end of correcting himself and to show improvement towards excellence. The confidential report, therefore would contain the assessment of the work, devotion to duty and integrity of the officer concerned. The aforesaid entries indicate and reflect that the Superintendent of Police had assessed the reputation of the officer, his honesty, reliability and general reputation gathered around the officers performance of the duty and shortfalls in that behalf. It is sad but a bitter reality that corruption is corroding, like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralising the honest officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. The reputation of corrupt would gather thick and unchaseable clouds around the conduct of the officer and gain notoriety much faster than the smoke. Sometimes, there may not be concrete or material evidence to make it part of the record. It would, therefore, may be impracticable for the reporting officer or the competent controlling officer writing the confidential report to give specific instances of shortfalls, supported be evidence, like the remarks made by the Superintendent of Police. More often the corrupt officer manipulates in such a way and leaves no traceable evidence to be made part of the record for being cited as specific instance. It would, thus, appear that the order does not contain or the officer writing the report could not give particulars of the corrupt activities of the petitioner. He honestly assessed that the petitioner would prove himself efficient officer, provided he controls his temptation for corruption. That would clearly indicate the fallibility of the petitioner, vis-a-vis the alleged acts of corruption. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the remarks made in the confidential report are vague without any particulars and, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is seen that the officers made the remarks on the basis of the reputation of the petitioner. That would clearly indicate the fallibility of the petitioner, vis-a-vis the alleged acts of corruption. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the remarks made in the confidential report are vague without any particulars and, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is seen that the officers made the remarks on the basis of the reputation of the petitioner. It was, therefore, for him to improve his conduct, prove honesty and integrity in future in which even, obviously, the authority would appreciate and made necessary remarks for the subsequent period. The appellate authority duly considered and rejected the contention of the petitioner. Repeated representation could render little service. Rejection, therefore, is neither arbitrary nor illegal.” 16. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.S. Bindra versus Union of India and others, (1998) 7 SCC 310 have held that doubt about integrity should not be entertained merely on surmises. It should be based on preponderance of probability as judged from the standard of a reasonable man. Their Lordships have held as under: “While viewing this case from the next angle for judicial scrutiny i.e. want of evidence or material to reach such a conclusion, we may add that want of any material is almost equivalent to the next situation that from the available materials no reasonable man would reach such a conclusion. While evaluating the materials the authority should not altogether ignore the reputation in which the officer was held till recently. The maxim "Nemo Firut Repente Turpissimus" (no one becomes dishonest all on a sudden) is not unexceptional but still it is salutary guideline to judge human conduct, particularly in the field of Administrative Law. The authorities should not keep the eyes totally closed towards the overall estimation in which the delinquent officer was held in the recent past by those who were supervising him earlier. To dunk an officer into the puddle of "doubtful integrity" it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That doubt should be of such a nature as would reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to ram an officer with the label "doubtful integrity". Mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then there is justification to ram an officer with the label "doubtful integrity". Here, out of the three instances on which the Screening Committee relied to dub the officer as a case of "doubtful integrity" the first is his action against M/s. Orkay Silk Mills. The fact is that it was the appellant who headed the operation. A task which unearthed such a huge sum of a concealed excise duty would normally evoke appreciation for his work. But what was noted against him in that affair is that he willfully created lacunae in the confiscation proceedings for providing an escape route to the defaulter. One is that the confiscation order contains nearly 100 pages and the period was too short for preparing such an order. What is the inference to be drawn? Normally it is an achievement that an order of 100 pages was made during such a short period. So what is then to be thought of against it? Is it that he would have taken too much pain to finish his work or is it that he would have caused it to be written by somebody else? Is there not a clear possibility that the officer hearing the adjudication case for several days would have prepared its prefatory portion as well as statement of summary of evidence during the days when arguments were proceeding and before conclusion of the hearing, leaving out the crucial discussion to be dictated after conclusion of the hearing? That is not an objectionable course. If so, the achievement in preparing an order of confiscation within such a short span should not have been frowned at, instead there is scope to pay admiration for its promptitude. Another lacuna is that he imposed a huge penalty and fine without issuing a show cause notice. To say that he did it for helping the defaulter is too farfetched. The appellate authority which may be persuaded to set aside such an order on that ground could as well direct the authority to pass a fresh order after issuing the show cause notice. So it is unreasonable to conclude that the imposition of penalty was made calculatedly to have it upset by the superior authority. The appellate authority which may be persuaded to set aside such an order on that ground could as well direct the authority to pass a fresh order after issuing the show cause notice. So it is unreasonable to conclude that the imposition of penalty was made calculatedly to have it upset by the superior authority. We have no doubt that there is utter dearth of evidence for the Screening Committee to conclude that appellant had doubtful integrity. Such a conclusion does not stand judicial scrutiny even within the limited permissible scope. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order under attack including the order by which premature compulsory retirement was imposed on the appellant. The department concerned shall now work out the reliefs to be granted to the appellant as sequel to this judgment.” 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat and another versus Suryakant Chunilal Shah, (1999) 1 SCC 529 have held that the purpose of communication of adverse remarks is to afford an opportunity to employee to improve himself or to explain his conduct. Their Lordships have held as under: “The performance of a government servant is reflected in the annual character roll entries and, therefore, one of the methods of discerning the efficiency, honesty or integrity of a government servant is to look at his character roll entries for the whole tenure from the inception to the date on which decision for his compulsory retirement is taken. It is obvious that if the character roll is studded with adverse entries or the overall categorisation of the employee is poor and there is material also to cast doubts upon his integrity, such a government servant cannot be said to be efficient. Efficiency is a bundle of sticks of personal assets, thickest of which is the stick of "integrity". If this is missing, the whole bundle would disperse. A government servant has, therefore, to keep his belt tight. Purpose of adverse entries is primarily to forewarn the government servant to mend his ways and to improve his performance. Efficiency is a bundle of sticks of personal assets, thickest of which is the stick of "integrity". If this is missing, the whole bundle would disperse. A government servant has, therefore, to keep his belt tight. Purpose of adverse entries is primarily to forewarn the government servant to mend his ways and to improve his performance. That is why, it is required to communicate the adverse entries so that the government servant to whom the adverse entry is given, may have either opportunity to explain his conduct so as to show that the adverse entry was wholly uncalled for, or to silently brood over the matter and on being convinced that his previous conduct justified such an entry, to improve his performance. Applying the principles laid down above to the instant case, what comes out is that in compulsorily retiring the respondent from service, the authorities themselves were uncertain about the action which was to be taken ultimately against him. In fact, there was hardly any material on the basis of , which a bona fide opinion could have been formed that it would be in public interest to retire the respondent from service compulsorily. The material which was placed before the Review Committee has already been mentioned above. To repeat, the respondent was promoted in 1981: the character roll entries for the next two years were not available on record; there were no adverse entries in the respondents character roll about his integrity; he was involved in two criminal cases, in one of which a final report was submitted while in the other, a charge-sheet was filed. Although there was no entry in his character roll that the respondents integrity was doubtful, the Review Committee on its own, probably on the basis of the FIRs lodged against the respondent, formed the opinion that the respondent was a person of doubtful integrity. The Review Committee was constituted to assess the merits of the respondent on the basis of the character roll entries and other relevant material and to recommend whether it would be in public interest to compulsorily retire him from service or not. The Review Committee, after taking into consideration the character roll entries and noticing that there were no adverse entries and his integrity was, at no stage, doubted, proceeded, in. The Review Committee, after taking into consideration the character roll entries and noticing that there were no adverse entries and his integrity was, at no stage, doubted, proceeded, in. excess of its jurisdiction, to form its own opinion with regard to the respondents integrity merely on the basis of the FIRs lodged against him. Whether the integrity of an employee is doubtful or not, whether he is efficient and honest, is the function of the appointing authority or the immediate superior of that employee to consider and assess. It is not the function of the Review Committee to brand, and that too, offhand, an employee as a person of doubtful integrity. Moreover, the Review Committee did not recommend compulsory retirement. It was of the opinion that the respondent had committed grave irregularity and that he must be retained in service so that he may ultimately be dealt with and punished severely. The secretary and the Chief secretary, who considered the recommendations of the Review Committee, had other ideas. They thought that the investigation and subsequent prosecution of the respondent would take a long time and that it would be better to immediately dispense with his services by giving him the temptation of withdrawing the criminal cases and retiring him compulsorily from service, provided he does not approach the court against the order of compulsory retirement. This proposal too was not immediately acted upon and it was thought that nobody could say whether the order of compulsory retirement would be challenged by the respondent before the court or he would merely submit to it on the temptation that the criminal cases against him would be withdrawn. It was at this stage that the order of compulsory retirement was passed.” 18. Mr. R.L. Sood has drawn the attention of the Court to the instructions issued by the Registry of the High Court from time to time dealing with the recording of the Annual Confidential Reports. It is clear from these instructions that the entries with regard to integrity should not be made in a routine manner but should be supported by instances which existed for making such entry in the report. The underline principle is that the person against whom the entry is made must be confronted with that information/material. The decision to record entries in the Confidential Report cannot be left to the entire subjective satisfaction of the authorities. 19. The underline principle is that the person against whom the entry is made must be confronted with that information/material. The decision to record entries in the Confidential Report cannot be left to the entire subjective satisfaction of the authorities. 19. If it is resorted to, it will amount to arbitrary action being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It must be based on objective assessment. The ancillary issue which is required to be decided by the Court is: Whether the representation could be rejected without assigning any reasons? The submission of Mr. R.L. Sood is that it was necessary for the respondent to assign reasons while rejecting the representation made vide Annexure P-15. The submission of Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua is that no reasons were required to be assigned while rejecting the representation. It is now well settled law that the orders, which have civil consequences, must assign reasons. The reasons are necessary to be recorded in those cases where the party has to approach the appropriate fora / authorities for the redressal of his grievances. The assigning of reasons is also sine qua non to show that there is due application of mind by the authorities at the time the decision is taken. 20. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held in State of West Bengal v. Atul Krishna Shaw and another, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 2205, that unless adequate reasons are given, merely because it is an appellate authority, it cannot brush aside the reasoning or findings recorded by the primary authority. Their Lordships have held as under:- “The appellate authority being final authority on facts is enjoined and incumbent upon it to appreciate the evidence; consider the reasoning of the primary authority and assign its own reasons as to why he disagrees with the reasons and findings of the primary authority. Unless adequate reasons are given, merely because it is an appellate authority, it cannot brush aside the reasoning or findings recorded by the primary authority.” 21. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Narinder Mohan Arya versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (2006) 4 SCC 713 have held that the order passed by the Appellate Authority should be reasoned order. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Narinder Mohan Arya versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others (2006) 4 SCC 713 have held that the order passed by the Appellate Authority should be reasoned order. Their Lordships have opined as under:- “The Appellate Authority, therefore, while disposing of the appeal is required to apply his mind with regard to the factors enumerated in sub-rule (2) of Rule 37 of the Rules. The judgment of the civil court being inter partes was relevant. The conduct of the appellant as noticed by the civil court was also relevant. The fact that the respondent has accepted the said judgment and acted upon it would be a relevant fact. The authority considering the memorial could have justifiably come to a different conclusion having regard to the findings of the civil court. But, it did not apply its mind. It could have for one reason or the other refused to take the subsequent event into consideration, but as he had a discretion in the matter, he was bound to consider the said question. He was required to show that he applied his mind to the relevant facts. He could not have without expressing his mind simply ignored the same. An appellate order if it is in agreement with that of the disciplinary authority may not be a speaking order but the authority passing the same must show that there had been proper application of mind on his part as regards the compliance with the requirements of law while exercising his jurisdiction under Rule 37 of the Rules. In Apparel Export Promotion Council V. A.K. Chopra which has heavily been relied upon by Mr. Gupta, this Court stated: (SCC p. 770, para 16) "16. The High Court appears to have overlooked the settled position that in departmental proceedings, the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts and in case an appeal is presented to the appellate authority, the appellate authority has also the power/and jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion, on facts, being the sole fact-finding authorities." (emphasis supplied) 22. The Appellate Authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 23. The order of the Appellate Authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The Appellate Authority, therefore, could not ignore to exercise the said power. 23. The order of the Appellate Authority demonstrates total non-application of mind. The Appellate Authority, when the Rules require application of mind on several factors and serious contentions have been raised, was bound to assign reasons so as enable the writ court to ascertain as to whether he had applied his mind to the relevant factors which the statute requires him to do. The expression “consider’ is of some significance. In the context of the Rules, the appellate Authority was required to see as to whether (i) the procedure laid down in the Rules was complied with; (ii) the enquiry officer was justified in arriving at the finding that the delinquent officer was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him; and (iii) whether penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was excessive. 24. In R.P. Bhatt V. Union of India this Court opined: (SCC p. 654, paras 4-5) "4. The word ‘consider’ in Rule 27(2) implies ‘due application of mind’. It is clear upon the terms of Rule 27(2) that the Appellate Authority is required to consider (1) whether the procedure laid down in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and (3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit back the case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 27(2) casts a duty on the Appellate Authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. “5. There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had been complied with; and if not, whether such noncompliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. We regret to find that the Director General has also not given any finding on the crucial question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the evidence on record. It seems that he only applied his mind to the requirement of clause (c) of Rule 27(2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the requirements of Rule 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by the Director General is liable to be set aside." 25. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in latest pronouncement in Divisional Forest Officer, Kothagudem and others v. Madhusudhan Rao, 2008 (2) Scale 322, have held that though it is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given by the appellate authority, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order confirming the view of the lower forum. Their Lordships have held as under:- “It is no doubt also true that an appellate or revisional authority is not required to give detailed reasons for agreeing and confirming an order passed by the lower forum but, in our view, in the interest of justice, the delinquent officer is entitled to know at least the mind of the appellate or revisional authority in dismissing his appeal and/or revision. It is true that no detailed reasons are required to be given by the appellate authority, but some brief reasons should be indicated even in an order confirming the view of the lower forum.” 26. Consequently, in view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the analysis made hereinabove, the adverse entry made in the Annual Confidential Report of the petitioner is liable to be struck down. 27. Now, the next question, the Court has to answer is: Whether the petitioner could be retired at the age of 58 years vide Annexure P-16 dated 20.4.2005 or not? The text of notification dated 20.4.2005 has already been quoted hereinabove. 28. It will be apt at this stage to take into consideration few relevant rules called “the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004”. These rules were notified on 16.3.2004. Sub-rule (d) of rule 1 defines the Governor to mean the Governor of Himachal Pradesh. Sub-rule (4) of rule 3 deals with grant of selection grade. It reads thus: “3 (4). 28. It will be apt at this stage to take into consideration few relevant rules called “the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004”. These rules were notified on 16.3.2004. Sub-rule (d) of rule 1 defines the Governor to mean the Governor of Himachal Pradesh. Sub-rule (4) of rule 3 deals with grant of selection grade. It reads thus: “3 (4). Holders of 25% of the total number of posts in the cadre of District Judges and who have put in not less than five years of service in the cadre shall be granted selection grade and they shall be selected for inclusion/placement in this grade on the basis of merit-cum-seniority from the cadre of District Judges by the High Court & such District Judges who have been placed in the Selection Grade shall called “Selection Grade District Judges” Holders of 10% of the total number of posts in the cadres of District Judges, who have put in not less than three years of service as “Selection Grade District Judges” in the cadre, shall be granted “Super Time Scale” of pay. They shall be selected in this scale of pay on merit-cum-seniority basis by the High Court and shall be called as “Super Time Scale District Judges.” Rule 4 provides that the District Judges shall be appointed by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. Rule 14 deals with the age of superannuation, which reads thus: “14. Age of Superannuation. - The age of superannuation of a member of the service shall be sixty years. Provided that before the completion of fifty eight years of service, the High Court, with reference to the record of the Officer, quality of judgments and his potential of utility in service, shall decide either to retire the Officer on completion of fifty eight years of service or grant him extension upto sixty years.” Rule 15 deals with retirement in public interest, which reads thus: “15. Retirement in public interest.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Governor shall on the recommendations of the High Court, if he is of the opinion that it is in the public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any member of the service who has attained the age of fifty years by giving him notice of not less than three months, in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. (2) Whether a member of the service should be retired in public interest under sub-rule (1) shall be considered at least three times, that is, when he is about to attain the age of 50 years, 55 years and 58 years. Provided that nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be construed as preventing the consideration of question of retirement of a member of the service in the public interest at any time other than those mentioned therein.” 29. Mr. R.L. Sood on the basis of rule 14 submits that the age of retirement for the members of Judicial Service is 60 years and his client could not be retired at the age of 58 years. His submission is that his client has been given ‘outstanding’ entry for the quality of judgments and as per his service record, he has earned ‘outstanding’, ‘very good’ and ‘good’ entries except two average reports i.e. for the year 1995-96 and 2003-04 in his Annual Confidential Reports. 30. The respondent has not specifically replied to the averments contained in paragraph 22 of the writ petition whereby according to the petitioner, Judicial Officers, namely, S/Sh. K.C. Negi, B.D. Sharma and Inder Ram were permitted to serve upto 60 years having inferior service record vis-à-vis the petitioner. The comparative Chart of the ACRs for the last ten years of these Judicial Officers as produced by the respondent reads thus: Comparative Chart of the ACRs of S/Sh. B.D. Sharma, K.C. Negi and Inder Ram for the last ten years as supplied by the Registry. B.D. Sharma 1987-88 1988-89 198990 1990-91 1991-92 Net result Good Good Good Good Good 1992-93 199 3-94 1994-95 199596 1996-97 Good Good Good Good Good K.C. Negi 1990-91 1991-92 199293 1993-94 1994-95 Net result Very Good Very Good Very good Very good outstandin g 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998 1999-2000 99 (1.4.99 31.12.99) to Not shown Not shown Very Good Very Good Outstanding Inder Ram 1986-87 1987-88 198889 1989-90 1990-91 Net result Very Good Very Good Very Good Good Good 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 199495 1995-96 Very Good Good Very Good Very Good Good 31. The plea raised by the petitioner was required to be dealt with by the respondent instead of making bald assertion that the entire record shall be produced before the Court as and when directed. The plea raised by the petitioner was required to be dealt with by the respondent instead of making bald assertion that the entire record shall be produced before the Court as and when directed. The respondent was required to place on record the material on the basis of which these persons were granted extension to meet the case of the petitioner of discrimination. 32. The submission of Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua is that the age of retirement is 58 years and it is extendable by two years after assessing the suitability of the Member of the Judicial Service. The bare perusal of rule 14 leads to only one conclusion that the age of retirement is 60 years with a rider that his suitability will be adjudged at the age of 58 years. 33. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Registrar, High Court of Madras versus R. Rajiah, (1988) 3 SCC 211 while dealing with the compulsory retirement of the Members of the subordinate judiciary have held that the decision of the High Court should be based on material otherwise it would be arbitrary, illegal and invalid. Their Lordships have held as under: “We may now come to the merits of the case. It has been upheld by both the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court that the impugned orders were not supported by any material. Further, it has been held that no material has been placed before the High Court to show that the impugned orders have been passed in public interest. This finding has not been challenged by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the High Court. All that has been submitted by him is that the High Court was not justified in considering the adequacy or otherwise of the materials in support of the orders of compulsory retirement. There can be no doubt that when the High Court takes the view that an order of compulsory retirement should be made against a member of the subordinate judicial service, the adequacy or sufficiency of such materials cannot be questioned, unless the materials are absolutely irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. But, in the instant case, there is no question of adequacy or sufficiency of the materials in support of the impugned orders of compulsory retirement. But, in the instant case, there is no question of adequacy or sufficiency of the materials in support of the impugned orders of compulsory retirement. According to the High Court, no material has been placed in justification of the impugned orders of compulsory retirement of the respondents. It is true that the High Court in its administrative jurisdiction has power to compulsorily retire a member of the judicial service in accordance with any rule framed in that regard, but in coming to the conclusion that a member of the subordinate judicial service should be compulsorily retired, such conclusion must be based on materials. If there be no material to justify the conclusion, in that case, it will be an arbitrary exercise of power by the High Court. Indeed, Article 235 of the Constitution does not contemplate the exercise by the High Court of the power of control over subordinate courts arbitrarily, but on the basis of some materials. As there is absence of any material to justify the impugned orders of compulsory retirement, those must be held to be illegal and invalid.” 34. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and another versus Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, (1992) 2 SCC 299 while dealing with the issue of compulsory retirement have held that opinion of the authority regarding compulsory retirement is his subjective satisfaction which has to be formed on the basis of entire record of service and the judicial review of the order is open only on grounds of mala fides, arbitrariness and perversity. Their Lordships have held as under: “We may not be understood as saying either that adverse remarks need not be communicated or that the representations, if any, submitted by the government servant (against such remarks) need not be considered or disposed of. The adverse remarks ought to be communicated in the normal course, as required by the Rules/ orders in that behalf. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the Rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation as the case may be. Any representations made against them would and should also be dealt with in the normal course, with reasonable promptitude. All that we are saying is that the action under F.R. 56(j) (or the Rule corresponding to it) need not await the disposal or final disposal of such representation as the case may be. In some cases, it may happen that some adverse remarks of the recent years are not communicated or if communicated, the representation received in that behalf are pending consideration. On this account alone, the action under F.R. 56 (j) need not be held back. There is no reason to presume that the Review Committee or the Government, if it chooses to take into consideration such uncommunicated remarks, would not be conscious or cognizant of the fact that they are not communicated to the government servant and that he was not given an opportunity to explain or rebut the same. Similarly, if any representation made by the government servant is there, it shall also be taken into consideration. We may reiterate that not only the Review Committee is generally composed of high and responsible officers, the power is vested in Government alone and not in a minor official. It is unlikely that adverse remarks over a number of years remain uncommunicated and yet they are made the primary basis of action. Such an unlikely situation, if indeed present, may be indicative of malice in law. We may mention in this connection that the remedy provided by Article 226 of the Constitution is no less an important safeguard. Even with its wellknown constraints, the remedy is an effective check against mala fide, perverse or arbitrary action. At this stage, we think it appropriate to append a note of clarification. What is normally required to be communicated is adverse remarks, not every remark comment or observation made in the confidential rolls. There may be any number of remarks, observations and comments, which do not constitute adverse remarks, but are yet relevant for the purpose of F.R. 56 (j) or a Rule corresponding to it. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well settled in J. N. Sinha, (AIR 1971 SC 40) and other decisions referred supra. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. The object and purposes for which this power is to be exercised are well settled in J. N. Sinha, (AIR 1971 SC 40) and other decisions referred supra. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the Government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the Government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate Court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is Passed (a) mala fide, or (b) that it is based on no evidence, or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasoanble person would form the requisite opinion on the given material in short; if it is found to be a perverse order. (iv) The Government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/ character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This object has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” 35. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This object has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.” 35. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in High Court of Punjab and Haryana through Registrar General versus Ishwar Chand Jain and another, (1999) 4 SCC 579 have quashed the compulsory retirement of Judicial officer by holding that the compulsory retirement was not based on valid material and, therefore, arbitrary. Their Lordships have held as under: “Keeping in view the aforesaid principles we may examine the background under which the order compulsorily retiring Jain came to be passed. In December, 1995 judges comprising the Full Court were not the same as that in the year 1985 when probation of Jain was terminated. There were new appointments of Judges and there were judges, who had come on transfer from other High Courts. They could not be aware of the circumstances leading to termination of the probation of Jain and ACR given to him for the year 1984-85. In the precis of the ACRs for the Full Court ACR given to Jain for the year 1984-85 was shown a "C-Below Average". The inspecting Judge for the year 1984-85 had graded the officer as "B+Good" but the Full Court modified the same to "C-Below Average". This Court in earlier appeal filed by Jain against termination of his probation held that the modification of the entry by High Court was without any material and was not sustainable in law. It meant that the Supreme Court restored the grading of Jain in his ACR for the year 1984-85 as "B+Good". There is no indication of this in the precis prepared by the Registry which certainly would have misled many of the judges of the Full Court. There is no ACR recorded for the years 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and for nine months of 199596 when the Full Court met on December 12, 1995. In its earlier meeting on September 22, 1995 it recorded ACR for the year 1991-92 grading Jain as "C-integrity doubtful". In coming to this conclusion Full Court relied on the inspection report prepared by the inspecting Judge on February 22, 1992 where he graded Jain as "integrity doubtful" and gave his note which we have quoted above. In its earlier meeting on September 22, 1995 it recorded ACR for the year 1991-92 grading Jain as "C-integrity doubtful". In coming to this conclusion Full Court relied on the inspection report prepared by the inspecting Judge on February 22, 1992 where he graded Jain as "integrity doubtful" and gave his note which we have quoted above. There is no material forthcoming as to why the inspection report of February 1992 came to be considered by the Full Court in September, 1995 and why there could be no inspection from that year till holding of the Full Court meeting. Inspection note by the inspecting Judge gives an impression that he inspected the Court of Jain and visited the bar room before he gave his report. Fact, however, remains that the inspecting Judge inspected the Court of Jain only in March, 1992. Inspecting Judge also noted that there were some complaints which formed the subject-matter of the disciplinary proceedings against him. This also does not appear to be correct inasmuch as on the date of the inspection report no disciplinary proceedings were pending against Jain. There were also no particulars of the complaints whether these were in writing or oral and if these related to the judicial work performed by the officer. At least some of the cases in which Jain was found to have acted improperly could have been mentioned when there were many complaints from the members of the Bar. The inspection note is certainly flawed and could not have formed the basis by the Full Court to record that integrity of the officer was doubtful and to grade him "C". Moreover we were told at the Bar and it was not contradicted that the Inspecting Judge took charge of Jind district only on November 21, 1991 and within three months. i.e. on February 25, 1992 gave his inspection report. This is certainly not satisfactory. The ACR for the year 1991-92 is therefore, to be kept aside. That being the position if we now refer to the precis of the ACRs of Jain there were only four ACRs and these are for the years 1983-84 (B-Average/satisfactory), 1984-85 (B+Good), 1988-89 (B-Satisfactory) and 1989-90 (B+Good). This is certainly not satisfactory. The ACR for the year 1991-92 is therefore, to be kept aside. That being the position if we now refer to the precis of the ACRs of Jain there were only four ACRs and these are for the years 1983-84 (B-Average/satisfactory), 1984-85 (B+Good), 1988-89 (B-Satisfactory) and 1989-90 (B+Good). On the basis of these ACRs it is difficult to hold that the recommendation of the High Court could be justified under Clause (c) of third principle laid in Baikunth Nath Das case (1992 AIR SCW 793).” 36. The judgment in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and others versus Jag Mohan Lal, 1989 Supp. (1) SCC 221 cited by Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua is distinguishable on the facts. In that case, the petitioner was seeking extension after superannuation. In the present case it has already been held that the age of superannuation is 60 years with the rider that the suitability of the petitioner was to be seen at the age of 58 years. 37. The judgment in Major General I.P.S. Dewan versus Union of India and others, (1995) 3 SCC 383 cited by Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua is distinguishable on the facts. In that case, the adverse remarks as to manhandling of CBI cases were given by the appropriate authority and were based not merely on observation but on the report of the Court of Enquiry which had held an elaborate enquiry and recorded the statements of the officers concerned including the officer against whom the adverse remarks were given. She has strongly relied upon Union of India versus E.G. Nambudiri, AIR 1991 SC 1216 that the order rejecting the representation against the adverse remarks need not be reasoned. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that in the absence of any statutory rule or statutory instructions requiring the competent authority to record reasons in rejecting a representation made by a Government servant against the adverse entries the competent authority is not under any obligation to record reason. But Their Lordships have held that the competent authority has no licence to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner. The authority is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the officer awarding the adverse entries. But Their Lordships have held that the competent authority has no licence to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner. The authority is required to consider the questions raised by the Government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the officer awarding the adverse entries. Their Lordships have further held that no order of an administrative authority communicating its decision is rendered illegal on the ground of absence of reasons ex facie and it is not open to the court to interfere with such orders merely on the ground of absence of any reasons. Their Lordships have further held that it does not mean that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. Their Lordships have further held that if the order as communicated to the Government servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law. 38. If such an order is challenged in a court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. However, their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s Ajantha Industries and others versus Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi and others AIR 1976 SC 437 have held that an order is bad on account of non-communication of reasons and it would be no ground that the reasons exist in the file. Their Lordships have held that merely recoding the reasons is not enough. 39. Communication of the reasons to the effected party is essential. Their Lordships have held as under: “The reason for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known to the assessee is to enable an opportunity to the assessee to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or even this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is mala fide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. Whether such a writ or special leave application ultimately fails is not relevant for a decision of the question. Whether such a writ or special leave application ultimately fails is not relevant for a decision of the question. We are clearly of opinion that the requirement of recording reasons under Section 127 (1), is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee. Mr. Sharma drew our attention to a decision of the Delhi High Court in Sunanda Rani Jain v. Union of India, (1975) 99 ITR 391 = (1975 Tax LR 865 Delhi) where the learned single Judge has taken a contrary view. For the reasons, which we have given above, we have to hold that the said decision is not correct. The appellant drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Pragdas Umar Vaishya v. Union of India, 1967 MPLJ 868 (SC) where Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, providing for exercise of revisional power by the Central Govt. was noticed. It was held that under R. 55 the Central Government in disposing of the revision application must record its reasons and communicate these reasons to the parties affected thereby. It was further held that the reasons could not be gathered from the notings in the files of the Central Government. Recording of reasons and disclosure thereof is not a mere formality. Mr. Sharma drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Kashiram v. Union of India, (1965) 56 ITR 14 = (AIR 1965 SC 1028). It is submitted that this Court took the view that orders under Section 127 (1) are held in that decision to be "purely administrative in nature" passed for consideration of convenience and no possible prejudice could be involved in the transfer. It was also held therein that under the proviso to Section 127 (1) it was not necessary to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard and there was consequently no need to record reasons for the transfer. This decision is not of any assistance to the Revenue in the present case since that was a transfer from one Income-tax Officer to another Income-tax Officer in the same city, or, as stated in the judgment itself, "in the same locality" and the proviso to Section 127 (1), therefore, applied. This decision is not of any assistance to the Revenue in the present case since that was a transfer from one Income-tax Officer to another Income-tax Officer in the same city, or, as stated in the judgment itself, "in the same locality" and the proviso to Section 127 (1), therefore, applied. When law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expiated. The judgment in (1976) 1 SCC 1001 has been rendered by three Hon’ble Judges and the judgment in AIR 1991 SC 1216 has been rendered by two Hon’ble Judges. 40. The representation made by the petitioner has been dealt with by the Full Court in the following manner against the adverse remarks in its meeting held on 24.3.2004: “Item No.4: Consideration of representation of Sh. P.D. Goel, District & Sessions Judge, Chamba against the adverse entry in his ACR for the year 2003-04. The representation of Shri P.D. Goel was considered. On consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the matter and looking to the tone and tenor of the adverse entry in question, “does not enjoy good general reputation”, the Full Court is of the opinion that the aforesaid adverse entry in the Annual Confidential Report of the Officer for the year 2003-2004 was recorded on the basis of the satisfaction arrived at by the Full Court. The Full Court was of the opinion that the adverse entry was justified as the remark was recorded on the basis of collective wisdom of all the Judges constituting Full Court at that time, as the Judges were in fact aware of the general reputation of the Officer. There being in existence no change of circumstances warranting the recalling of the aforesaid adverse entry, resolved that the representation be and is hereby rejected.” 41. In view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1976) 1 SCC 1001 (supra), it was necessary to convey the reasons why his representation has been rejected against the adverse entry. 42. In view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1976) 1 SCC 1001 (supra), it was necessary to convey the reasons why his representation has been rejected against the adverse entry. 42. It is also desirable to deal with the entire gamut the manner in which the age of Judicial Officers has been increased from 58 years to 60 years on the basis of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court beginning from the judgment in All India Judges’ Association versus Union of India and others, (1992) 1 SCC 119 till the Rules were framed by the various High Courts, including this High Court, whereby the age of superannuation has been raised from 58 years to 60 years. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in (1992) 1 SCC 119 (supra) have held as under: “The recommendation that superannuation should be fixed at 58 for judicial officers was made at a time when in public services retirement was prescribed at the age of 55. Considering the enhancement of the longevity of human life and taking all other relevant considerations into account, all the States and all the Union Territories have now enhanced the age of retirement to 58 years excepting, as already pointed out, in the case of the State of Kerala. We are of the view that on the logic which was adopted by the Law Commission and for the reasons which we have indicated the age of retirement of judicial officers should be 60 years. We accordingly direct that appropriate alterations shall be made in the Rules obtaining in the States and Union Territories in respect of judicial service so as to fix the age of retirement at 60 years with effect from December 31, 1992. We have given a long period so that appropriate amendments may be made in the meantime.” 43. Thereafter their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association and others versus Union of India and others, (1993) 4 SCC 288 have held as under: “There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To what extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. Thereafter their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association and others versus Union of India and others, (1993) 4 SCC 288 have held as under: “There is, however, one aspect we should emphasise here. To what extent the direction contained in the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for continued utility shall. be assessed and evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the evaluation shah be made on the basis of the judicial officers past record of service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters. The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time by following the procedure for compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service Rules applicable to the judicial officers. Those who will not be found fit and eligible by this standard should not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the said procedure for compulsory retirement. The exercise should be undertaken before the attainment of the age of 58 years even in cases where earlier the age of superannuation was less than 58 years. It is necessary to make it clear that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. It is in addition to the assessment to be undertaken for compulsory retirment and the compulsory retirement at the earlier stage/s under the respective Service Rules.” 44. It is in addition to the assessment to be undertaken for compulsory retirment and the compulsory retirement at the earlier stage/s under the respective Service Rules.” 44. The judgments in (1992) 1 SCC 119 and (1993) 4 SCC 288 (supra) were considered by their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court again in Rajat Baran Roy and others versus State of W.B. and others, (1999) 4 SCC 235. 45. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have considered (1992) 1 SCC 119 and (1993) 4 SCC 288 (supra) again in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad through Registrar versus Sarnam Singh and another, (2002) 2 SCC 339 whereby their Lordships have held that there should have been a scrutiny of the service record and only those who were found suitable for continuance in service alone should have been given that benefit in terms of the directions issued by this court in second All India Judges’ Association case. Their Lordships have further held that the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for scrutiny of the service records of the Judicial Officer before allowing them to continue in service beyond 58 years, was of a transitory character, yielding place to the new Rules made by the State Govt. and, therefore, it was no longer incumbent upon the High court to resort to the procedure of scrutiny of the service records of the Judicial Officers before allowing them the benefit of extension in the retirement. Their Lordships have held as under: “These observations indicate that the procedure indicated by this court for evaluating the work, performance and conduct of Judicial Officers, before allowing them to continue in service upto the age of 60 years, was evolved as a temporary measure and was not to be adopted as a permanent feature. The choice was thus left to the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority itself had made necessary Service Rules extending the age of retirement, the above procedure was to be given up as the Officers would continue in service in accordance with the Service Rules made by the Appointing Authority in the respective States. The choice was thus left to the Appointing Authority. If the Appointing Authority itself had made necessary Service Rules extending the age of retirement, the above procedure was to be given up as the Officers would continue in service in accordance with the Service Rules made by the Appointing Authority in the respective States. If it was not done, then the Judicial Officers were to continue in service till the age of 60 years in accordance with the directions of this court in the earlier case, provided the Officers, on a scrutiny of their service records, in accordance with the directions issued in the Review Petition, were found suitable for the benefit of extended service. As pointed out above, the State Govt., acting upon the directions of this court in the earlier case JT 1991 (4 SC 285 = [1992 1 SCC 119], made new Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution, and that too within the time fixed by this court, by which the age of retirement of all Judicial Officers was raised from 58 to 60 years. In view of these Rules, which also had the overriding effect over F.R. 56, the Judicial Officers in the State of U.P. became entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years. The directions of this court for scrutiny of their service records before allowing them to continue in service beyond 58 years, being of a transitory character, yielded place to the new Rules made by the State Govt. under Article 309 of the Constitution and, therefore, it was no longer incumbent upon the High court to resort to the procedure of scrutiny of the service records of alt Judicial Officers before allowing them the benefit of extension in the age of retirement. The contention of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the High court, that the directions of this court about the scrutiny of the service record should be read as supplemental to the new Service Rules cannot be accepted as this court itself had indicated clearly that the directions were intended to serve as a "transitional measure". A Three-Judge bench of this court in Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors. A Three-Judge bench of this court in Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors. JT 1999 (3 SC 89 = 1999 4 SCC 235, relating to the Judicial Service of the State of West Bengal, has taken a similar view and has held that if a Rule is made by the State Govt. extending the age of retirement of the Judicial .Officers, the directions of this court in the Review Petition for scrutiny of the service record would not be applicable as the Judicial Officers, by virtue of the new Rule, would continue upto the age of superannuation fixed under the new Rule.” 46. In the present case though the retirement age is 60 years as per rule 14, however, there is condition that the Judicial Officer has to prove his mantle. In (2002) 2 SCC 339 (supra), their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have also held that while recording adverse remarks, an opportunity of hearing is not required to be given though their Lordships have held in that case that adverse entry made by the High Court (judicial side) was unjustified, arbitrary and based on non-existing facts. This finding of the High Court was upheld. Their Lordships have also held that the Inspecting Judge should objectively consider the work and conduct of the Judicial Officers who sometimes have to work under difficult and trying circumstances. 47. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Chandra Acharya versus Registrar, High Court of Orissa and another, (2000) 6 SCC 332 while interpreting rule 71 (a1)) of Orissa Service Code have held that the rule does not straight away extend the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years but only enables the High Court to retain in service a Judicial Officer belonging to the State Judicial Services up to the age of 60 years, if it is of the opinion that such Judicial Officer has potential to continue in useful service. Their Lordships have further held that for finding out whether the officer has the potential for continuing in useful service, assessment is to be made on the basis of past record of service, character rolls, quality of the judgments and other relevant matters, which may include overall assessment with regard to integrity, reputation and utility. 48. Their Lordships have further held that for finding out whether the officer has the potential for continuing in useful service, assessment is to be made on the basis of past record of service, character rolls, quality of the judgments and other relevant matters, which may include overall assessment with regard to integrity, reputation and utility. 48. The Apex Court in Bishwanath Prasad Singh versus State of Bihar and others, (2001) 2 SCC 305 has again considered (1993) 4 SCC 288. In this case the petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner, who was a member of Bihar Superior Judicial Service and posted as District and Sessions Judge, Riridih and sought issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State of Bihar to frame rules for enhancement of age of superannuation of the Judicial Officers of the State as per directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges’ Association i.e. (1992) 1 SCC 119. 49. Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua has strongly relied upon (2001) 2 SCC 305 contending that it is not necessary for the High Court to make recommendations to the State Government for issuing necessary notification by the Governor. Her contention is that once the High Court finds that the person is not suitable, the necessary notification can be issued by it and need not be issued by the Governor. The judgment is distinguishable on the facts. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh versus State of Bihar and others (supra), the petitioner has sought the direction for increasing the age from 58 to 60 years. Thus, the case of the petitioner and similarly situate persons was directed to be considered as per their suitability beyond 58 years upto 60 years as per the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time. In the present case the age of superannuation is 60 years and the suitability of the person is to be seen at the age of 58 years taking into consideration his past service record, quality of judgments and his utility in service. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh versus State of Bihar and others since the age was not increased from 58 years to 60 years, there was no need for the notification being issued in the name of the Governor. In Bishwanath Prasad Singh versus State of Bihar and others since the age was not increased from 58 years to 60 years, there was no need for the notification being issued in the name of the Governor. But in the case in hand since the age of superannuation is 60 years, the impugned notification was required to be issued by the Governor alone. This question has been considered by the Apex Court in Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Orissa, Cuttack versus Sisir Kanta Satapathy (dead) by LRS and another, (1999) 7 SCC 725. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the order of compulsory retirement have held that it was wrong for the High Court to pass an order of compulsory retirement itself and the judicial side of the High Court has rightly decided the petition in favour of the petitioner and held the order dated 5.2.1987 to be bad. 50. The entire case law under Articles 233 and 235 of the Constitution of India has been considered by their Lordships in this case as under: “That the High Court could not itself have passed an order of compulsorily retirement as above, which amounts to termination of service is borne out from the plain language of the above Articles and in particular of Article 235 read with Article 311. This question has been debated and answered by this Court in a number of cases. In State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, (1966 1 SCR 771 : (AIR 1966 SC 447), A Constitution Bench of this Court while setting aside an order of dismissal of an officiating District and Sessions Judge passed after consulting the State Public Service Commission but without consulting the High Court, elaborately considered the scope of Article 235, Hidayatullah, J., (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed that there is nothing in Art. 311 which compels the conclusion that the High Court is ousted of the jurisdiction to hold the inquiry if Art. 235 vested some power in it. The Control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges. The Control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges. With the exercise of the Control vested in the High Court, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal subject however to the conditions of service, to a right of appeal if granted by the conditions of service, and to the giving of an opportunity of showing cause as required by Cl. (2) of Art. 311. Unless such an opportunity is dispensed with by the Governor acting under the provisos (b) and (c) to that clause. In State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand H.C.S., (1976) 2 SCC 977 : (AIR 1976 SC 1841), a four-Judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the scope and width of Article 235 of the Constitution. That was a case in which the State Government compulsorily retired a senior Subordinate Judge though the High Court recommended only for his reversion. This Court held :- Para 15 - This Court in Bagchis case (AIR 1966 SC 447) said that control vested in the High Court is over the conduct and discipline of the members of the Judicial Service. Orders passed in disciplinary jurisdiction by the High Court are subject to an appeal as provided in the conditions of service. The High Court further deals with members of the Judicial Service in accordance with the rules and conditions of service. This Court in Bagchis case said that the word "deal" points to disciplinary and not merely administrative jurisdiction. The order terminating the appointment of a member of the service otherwise than upon his reaching the age fixed for superannuation will be passed by the State Government on the recommendation of the High Court. This is because the High Court is not the authority for appointing, removing, reducing the rank or terminating the service. Para 16 - It is true that the fixation of the age of superannuation is the right of the State Government. The curtailment of that period under rule governing the conditions of service is a matter pertaining to disciplinary control as well as administrative control. Disciplinary control means not merely jurisdiction to award punishment for misconduct. Para 16 - It is true that the fixation of the age of superannuation is the right of the State Government. The curtailment of that period under rule governing the conditions of service is a matter pertaining to disciplinary control as well as administrative control. Disciplinary control means not merely jurisdiction to award punishment for misconduct. It also embraces the power to determine whether the record of a member of the service is satisfactory or not so as to entitle him to continue in service for the full term till he attains the age of superannuation. Administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over members of the judicial Service is vested solely in the High Court. Premature retirement is made in the exercise of administrative and disciplinary jurisdiction. It is administrative because it is decided in public interest to retire him prematurely. It is disciplinary because the decision was taken that he does not deserve to continue in service up to the normal age of superannuation and that it is in the public interest to do so. Para 18 - The control vested in the High Court is that if the High Court is of opinion that a particular judicial officer is not fit to be retained in service the High Court will communicate that to the Governor because the Governor is the authority to dismiss, remove reduce in rank or terminate the appointment. In such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution that the Governor as the head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High Court. If the recommendation of the High Court is not held to be binding on the State consequences will be unfortunate. It is in public interest that the State will accept the recommendation of the High Court. The vesting of complete control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State. "The Government will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of Article 235". 51. The vesting of complete control over the subordinate judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State. "The Government will act on the recommendation of the High Court. That is the broad basis of Article 235". 51. In State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, (1978) 2 SCC 102 : (1978 Lab IC 839), a Constitution Bench of this Court again had an occasion to consider the validity of an order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Governor on the recommendation of the Administrative Committee of the High Court. The High Court set aside the order compulsorily retiring the District Munsiff on the ground that the recommendation by the Administrative Committee cannot be construed as the recommendation of the High Court (Full Court). Reversing the judgment of the High Court and approving the procedure of the recommendation through the Administrative Committee, this Court observed (Para 14 of Lab IC):- "Here, the decision to compulsory retire the respondent was taken by the Judges of the High Court itself, though not by all. If some but not all Judges of the High Court participate in a decision relating to a matter which falls within the High Courts controlling jurisdiction over subordinate Courts, the High Court does not efface itself by rendering its power to an extraneous authority. The procedure adopted by the High Court under its Rules is not subversive of the independence of the subordinate judiciary, which is what Article 235 recognises and seeks to achieve. The learned Judges further held that the recommendation made by the Administrative Committee cannot be said to suffer from any legal or constitutional infirmity. 52. In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu, (1979) 2 SCC 34 : (AIR 1979 SC 193), a Constitution Bench of this Court again considered the validity of an order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. That order was challenged before the State Administrative Tribunal and this Court while holding that the State Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, observed as follows: (SCC pp.41,46-47 and 48 paras 18, 40 and 42) :- "18. Respondent 1, Shri V.V.S. Krishna-murthy, in that appeal was, at the material time, a member of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service. Respondent 1, Shri V.V.S. Krishna-murthy, in that appeal was, at the material time, a member of the Andhra Pradesh State Judicial Service. He attains the age of 50 years on November 24, 1974. He was prematurely retired, in public interest, by an order dated September 29, 1975 of the State Government on the recommendation of the High Court. Before the Government passed this order, a Committee of Judges appointed by the High Court, considered the entire Service record of respondent 1 and records of other Judicial Officers and decided to prematurely retire the first respondent in public interest. * * * * 40. The interpretation and scope of Article 235 has been the subject of several decisions of this Court. The position crystallised by these decisions is that the control over the subordinate judiciary vested in the High Court under Article 235 is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. It comprehends a wide variety of matters. Among others, it includes : (a) to (f) * * * (g) Premature or compulsory retirement of Judges of the District Courts and of Subordinate Courts. * * * * In the last-mentioned case (Inder Prakash Anand) the Government servant was officiating in the cadre of District Judges. The High Court recommended that he should be reverted to his substantive post of senior Subordinate Judge/Chief Judicial Magistrate and, as such, allowed to continue in service till the age of 58 years. Contrary to the recommendation of the High Court, the State Government passed an order under Rule 5.32(c) of the Punjab Civil Service Rules, compulsorily retiring him from service at the age of 55 years. Holding that the order of compulsory retirement was invalid, this Court stressed that the power of deciding whether a judicial officer should be retained in service after attaining the age of 55 years up to the age of 58 years, vests in the High Court, and to hold otherwise "will seriously affect the independence of the judiciary and take away the control vested in the High Court". The formal order of retirement, however, is passed by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the High Court, that being "the broad basis of Article 235". The formal order of retirement, however, is passed by the Governor acting on the recommendation of the High Court, that being "the broad basis of Article 235". It was explained that "in such cases it is the contemplation in the Constitution, that the Governor as the head of the State will act in harmony with the recommendation of the High Court". It was concluded that "the vesting of complete control over the Subordinate Judiciary in the High Court leads to this that the decision of the High Court in matters within its jurisdiction will bind the State". In other words, while in form, the High Courts decision to compulsorily retire a subordinate judicial officer in the exercise of its administrative or disciplinary jurisdiction under Article 235 is advisory, in substance and effect, it is well-high peremptory." In Tej Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (1986) 3 SCC 604 ; (AIR 1986 SC 1814), a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider a question whether the impugned order of premature retirement passed by the Governor without having before him the recommendation of the Administrative Committee or of the Full Court was void and ineffective. The learned Judges, after referring to earlier judgments of this Court, held as follows :- "Para 4 - Article 235 of the Constitution provides that the control over district Courts and Courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of and the grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service of the State and holding any post inferior to the post of District Judge shall be vested in the High Court. It has been held in State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, (1978 Lab IC 839) that premature retirement of Judges of District Courts and of subordinate Courts is a matter which falls squarely within the power of control vested in the High Courts by Article 235 of the Constitution. Without the recommendation of the High Court it is not open to the Governor to issue an order retiring prematurely Judges of District Courts and of subordinate Courts. * * * * Para 13 - . . . . . . . . . . Without the recommendation of the High Court it is not open to the Governor to issue an order retiring prematurely Judges of District Courts and of subordinate Courts. * * * * Para 13 - . . . . . . . . . . In the instant case the Government had sought the opinion of the High Court regarding the question whether the appellant could be prematurely retired and that question was certainly a very important matter from the point of view of the subordinate judicial service. The Administrative Judge before giving his opinion in support of the view expressed by the Government should have either circulated the letter received from the Government amongst the members of the Administrative Committee or placed it before them at a meeting. He did not adopt either of the two courses. But he on his own forwarded his opinion to the Government stating that the appellant could be prematurely retired. That he could not do. Ordinarily, it is for the High Court, on the basis of assessment of performance and all other aspects germane to the matter to come to the conclusion whether any particular judicial officer under its control is to be prematurely retired and once the High Court comes to the conclusion that there should be such retirement, the Court recommends to the Governor to do so. The conclusion is to be of the High Court since the control vests therein. Under the Rules obtaining in the Allahabad High Court, the Administrative Committee could act for and on behalf of the Court but the Administrative Judge could not have. Therefore, his agreeing with the Government proposal was of no consequence and did not amount to satisfaction of the requirement of Article 235 of the Constitution. It was only after the Governor passed the order on the basis of such recommendation, the matter was placed before the Administrative Committee before the order of retirement was actually served on the appellant. The Administrative Committee may not have dissented from the order of the Governor or the opinion expressed by the Administrative Judge earlier. But it is not known what the Administrative Committee would have done if the matter had come up before it before the Governor had passed the order of premature retirement. The Administrative Committee may not have dissented from the order of the Governor or the opinion expressed by the Administrative Judge earlier. But it is not known what the Administrative Committee would have done if the matter had come up before it before the Governor had passed the order of premature retirement. In any event the deviation in this case is not a mere irregularity which can be cured by the ex post facto approval given by the Administrative Committee to the action of the Governor after the order of premature retirement had been passed. The error committed in this case amounts to an incurable defect amounting to an illegality. We may add that while it may be open to the Government to bring to the notice of the High Court all materials having a bearing on the conduct of a District Judge or a subordinate judicial officer, which may be in its possession, the Government cannot take the initiative to retire prematurely a District Judge or a subordinate judicial officer. Such initiative should rest with the High Court." 53. In Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah, (1988) 3 SCC 211 : (AIR 1988 SC 1388), this Court had an occasion to consider the validity of an order of compulsory retirement passed by the High Court. The learned Judges held that the proper procedure for the High Court was to recommend the case for compulsory retirement and it was for the Governor on whom the recommendation of the High Court was binding, to pass the formal order. This Court in the said case observed as follows (Paras 11, 15 and 17 of AIR):- "The test of control is not the passing of an order against a member of the subordinate judicial service, but the decision to take such action. It may be that so far as the members of the subordinate judicial service are concerned, it is the Governor, who being the appointing authority, has to pass an order of compulsory retirement or any order of punishment against such a member. But passing or signing of such orders by the Governor will not necessarily take away the control of the High Court vested in it under Article 235 of the Constitution. An action against any Government servant consists of two parts. But passing or signing of such orders by the Governor will not necessarily take away the control of the High Court vested in it under Article 235 of the Constitution. An action against any Government servant consists of two parts. Under the first part, a decision will have to be made whether an action will be taken against the Government servant. Under the second part, the decision will be carried out by a formal order. The power of control envisaged under Article 235 of the Constitution relates to the power making a decision by the High Court against a member of the subordinate judicial service. Such a decision is arrived at by holding an enquiry by the High Court against the member concerned. After the High Court comes to the conclusion that some action either in the nature of compulsory retirement or by the imposition of a punishment, as the case may be, has to be taken against the member concerned, the High Court will make a recommendation in that regard to the Governor and the Governor will act in accordance with such recommendation of the High Court by passing an order in accordance with the decision of the High Court. The Governor cannot take any action against any member of a subordinate judicial service without, and contrary to, the recommendation of the High Court. * * * It is apparent from the observation extracted above that this Court also understood the power of control of the High Court as the power of taking a decision against a member of the subordinate judicial service. The High Court is the only authority that can take such a decision. The High Court will hold an enquiry and decide on the result of such enquiry whether any action will be taken against a member of the subordinate judicial service. If it comes to the conclusion that such an action is required to be taken, it will make a recommendation in that regard to the State Governor who will make an order in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court. * * * The control of the High Court, as understood, will also be applicable in the case of compulsory retirement in that the High Court will, upon an enquiry, come to a conclusion whether a member of the subordinate judicial service should be retired prematurely or not. * * * The control of the High Court, as understood, will also be applicable in the case of compulsory retirement in that the High Court will, upon an enquiry, come to a conclusion whether a member of the subordinate judicial service should be retired prematurely or not. If the High Court comes to the conclusion that such a member should be prematurely retired, it will make a recommendation in that regard to the Governor inasmuch as the Governor is the appointing authority. The Governor will make a formal order of compulsory retirement in accordance with the recommendation of the High Court." 54. No doubt, the learned Judges also found that there was no sufficient material warranting an order of compulsory retirement in that case. In High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, (1998) 3 SCC 72 : (1998 AIR SCW 867 : AIR 1998 SC 1079), a two-Judge Bench of this Court while construing the scope and extent of Articles 233 to 235 of the Constitution, held as follows (Para 36 of AIR) :- "This article shows that the High Court has to exercise its administrative, judicial and disciplinary control over the members of the Judicial Service of the State. The word "control", referred to in this article, is used in a comprehensive sense to include general superintendence of the working of the subordinate Courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding Officers of the subordinate Courts and to recommend the imposition of punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of compulsory retirement. "Control" would also include suspension of a member of the Judicial Service for purposes of holding a disciplinary enquiry, transfer, confirmation and promotion. (See State of Haryana v. Inder Prakash Anand (AIR 1976 SC 1841); State of U.P. v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi (1978 Lab IC 839). In State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Chandra Mashruwala it was held that "control" in Article 235 means exclusive and not dual control. (See also Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu (AIR 1979 SC 193); State of W.B. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (AIR 1966 SC 447)". 55. In State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Chandra Mashruwala it was held that "control" in Article 235 means exclusive and not dual control. (See also Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu (AIR 1979 SC 193); State of W.B. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (AIR 1966 SC 447)". 55. On going through the judgments of this Court right from Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. (1955) 1 SCR 26 : (AIR 1954 SC 369) down to High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, 1998 3 SCC 72 : (1998 AIR SCW 867 : AIR 1998 SC 1079), one cannot but reach one conclusion regarding the power of the High Court in the matter of ordering compulsory retirement. That conclusion is that the High Courts are vested with the disciplinary control as well as administrative control over the Members of the Judicial Service exclusively, but that does not mean that they can also pass orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service while exercising administrative and disciplinary control over the Members of Judicial Service. Undoubtedly, the High Courts alone are entitled to initiate, to hold enquiry and to take a decision in respect of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination from service, but the formal order to give effect to such a decision has to be passed only by the State Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. It is well settled again by a catena of decisions of this Court that the recommendation of the High Court is binding on the State Government/Governor (vide para 18 in Inder Prakash Anands case (AIR 1976 SC 1841) (supra)). 56. We are clearly of the view that while the High Court retains the power of disciplinary control over the subordinate judiciary, including the power to initiate disciplinary proceedings, suspend them pending enquiries and impose punishment on them but when it comes to the question of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of the services of the judicial officer, on any count whatsoever, the High Court becomes only the recommending authority and cannot itself pass such an order (vide Inder Prakash Anands case and Rajiahs case (AIR 1988 SC 1388) (supra)). 57. In the instant case, the decision of the Orissa High Court dated 4-2-87 (on the Administrative Side) was required to be forwarded to the Governor for passing an order of compulsorily retirement. 57. In the instant case, the decision of the Orissa High Court dated 4-2-87 (on the Administrative Side) was required to be forwarded to the Governor for passing an order of compulsorily retirement. That was not done. It was wrong for the High Court to have passed the order of compulsory retirement itself. The judicial side of the High Court rightly decided the writ petition in favour of the judicial officers and held the order dated 5-2-87 to be bad. In the words of the Division Bench of the High Court : "There is a stronger constitutional objection to accept the submission of Shri Nayak for regarding the High Court as the appointing authority of the Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of what has been provided in Rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963, inasmuch as it has been laid down in Article 234 of the Constitution that appointments of persons other than District Judges to the Judicial Service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with the rules made by him in that behalf. The aforesaid rules are one set of such rules. So, no provision in the rules could have altered the constitutional position that the Governor of the State is the appointing authority of persons other than District Judges also. Conferment of this power on the High Court by virtue of what is stated in Rule 10 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules would have clashed with the constitutional mandate. We would, therefore, not accept because of what is stated in Rule 10 that the High Court is the appointing authority of a Chief Judicial Magistrate." * * * 58. In view of all that is stated above, we would hold that the High Court is not the appointing authority of Chief Judicial Magistrate to clothe it with the power of compulsory retirement conferred by the First proviso to Rule 71(a) of the Orissa Service Code. In this connection, may we also point out that it would be really incongruous where, though the High Court cannot retire a Munsiff, or for that matter a District Judge, as fairly conceded by Shri Nayak it would be in a position to retire a Chief Judicial Magistrate. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take this view. 59. We do not think if the concerned provisions permit us to take this view. 59. Before closing this aspect of the discussion, we may say that we are conscious of the legal position that passing of an order of compulsory retirement by the Governor is a formal matter as stated in Rajiahs case (AIR 1988 SC 1388) (supra) because, according to this decision, the Governor in such cases merely acts on the recommendation of the High Court by signing an order in that regard; but the procedure of the Governor formally passing an order of retirement has to be complied with. So long as there is no formal order of the Governor, the compulsory retirement as directed by the High Court cannot take effect, as opined in Rajiahs case itself. 60. Having come to the aforesaid conclusion, it is not necessary to deal with the second submission of Shri Ray that there were no materials in the present case to order for the compulsory retirement of the petitioner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . The judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is strictly in accord with the catena of judgments referred to above and in particular with the judgment in Rajiahs case (AIR 1988 SC 1388) (supra). We, therefore, see no error in the orders under appeal.” 61. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have again considered (1993) 4 SCC 288 in S.D. Singh versus Jharkhand High Court through Registrar General and others, (2005) 13 SCC 737. 62. Their Lordships have held that in the absence of the rules framed by the Jharkhan High Court, the directions issued in All India Judges’ Association case were prevailing in that court. In this case the Evaluation Committee has taken into consideration the petitioner’s ACRs for the year 1976-77 and it was also noted that the vigilance proceedings were initiated against the petitioner on the basis of several allegations made including a report made by the Inspecting Judge who had made an inspection and had reported that the petitioner did not have a good reputation. It was in these circumstances that their Lordships have held that it cannot be said that there was no material on the basis of which the Evaluation Committee and subsequently the Full Court of the High Court formed the opinion that the petitioner was not suitable for continuing in service beyond the age of 58 years. 63. Now, the Court has to advert whether the exercise has been undertaken by the High Court strictly in conformity with the rule 14 of the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004? It is evident from the record that a committee of two Hon’ble Judges consisting of Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S. Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Verma was constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice to adjudge the suitability of the petitioner to continue beyond 58 years. One of the members of the committee Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Verma rescued himself. Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Verma was substituted by Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.C. Sood. It is also clear from the record that there had been consistent precedents in the Registry to appoint a committee of two Hon’ble Judges to see the suitability of the Members of the Judicial Service to continue beyond the age of 58 years. The Registry has made available the following details of Officers whose suitability was adjudged by the committee comprising of two Hon’ble Judges from time to time: Statement regarding granting of extension/declined of age from 58 years to 60 years to the judicial officers Sr. No. Name of the Judicial officer Name of the Committee Constituted for the purposes Remarks 1. Shri R.C.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N.Phukan (Chief Justice) Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma 2. Shri M.D.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Mr. justice K.C. Sood 3 Shri D.D.Sharma Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma 4. Shri P.C.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.C. Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 5 Shri B.S.Chouhan Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma, Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Sarup 6 Shri Janeshwar Goyal Hon’ble Mr. D.Raju C.J. and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 7 Shri O.P.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.L.Khurana and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R.Verma 8 Shri Inder Ram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh (ACJ) Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P.Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 9 Shri K.C.Negi Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh(ACJ) Hon’ble Mr. D.Raju C.J. and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 7 Shri O.P.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.L.Khurana and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R.Verma 8 Shri Inder Ram Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh (ACJ) Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.P.Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 9 Shri K.C.Negi Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh(ACJ) Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.L.Vaidya 10 Shri J.C.Sood Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Goel 11 Shri B.D.Sharma Hon’ble Mr. justice S.N.Phukan(CJ), Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh, and Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.L.Vaidya 12 Shri T.N.Vaidya Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Goel. 13 Shri Rameshwar Sharma Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma,, Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Goel 14 Shri Pritam Singh Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 15 Shri Ravinder Parkash Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 16 Shri V.K.Gupta Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 17 Shri Sher Singh Sen. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 18. Shri A.C.Thalwal Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.C.Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 19 Smt Aruna Kapoor Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 20 Shri J.L.Gupta Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh At the first instance Extension was declined. The representation received from the officer, was considered and the report of the Hon’ble Justice committees was accepted and extension in service from 58 years to 60 years was granted 21 Shri George Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 22 Shri Bhim Chand Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surender Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Karol 23 Shri M.S.Mandiyal Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma, Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surinder Sarup 24 Dr. J.N.Barowalia Hon’ble Mr. Justice Deepak Gupta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh 25 Shri M.R.Chaudhary Hon’ble Ms. Justice Kamlesh Sharma and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta and Hon’ble Justice Mr. Arun Kumar Goel. 26 Shri P.D.Goel Extension not granted 27 Shri J.L.Chauhan Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh, Acting Chief Justice, Hon’ble Mr. justice D.P.Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 64. However, in the present case, a note was put up by the Registrar General of the High Court on 5.4.2005 vide notes No. 63 to 68 before the Hon’ble Chief Justice. 26 Shri P.D.Goel Extension not granted 27 Shri J.L.Chauhan Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhawani Singh, Acting Chief Justice, Hon’ble Mr. justice D.P.Sood and Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S.Panta 64. However, in the present case, a note was put up by the Registrar General of the High Court on 5.4.2005 vide notes No. 63 to 68 before the Hon’ble Chief Justice. She has proposed for the reconstitution of the committee and in alternative she has suggested that the matter be submitted before the Full Court for reconsideration instead of reconstitution of the committee. This note was put up on 5.4.2005. The Hon’ble Chief Justice has made the following note on 5.4.2005: “I have read your note which is quite exhaustive and very well written. I have also myself gone through Supreme Court judgment in question. On totality of circumstances, I feel that it shall be in the fitness of things and more appropriate if the issue of granting or not granting extension beyond 58 years up to 60 years is considered and decided by the Full Court, rather than it being first referred to a two Judge committee and then being taken before the Full Court. While revoking the earlier order dated 15th December, 2004, therefore, I direct that the case of Mr. P.D. Goel with respect to grant of extension to him beyond 58 years be placed before the Full Court for its consideration in its next meeting. Please inform brothers Panta and Sood, JJ, about this decision.” 65. Thereafter the matter was put up before the Full Court as item No.1, which reads thus: “Item No.1: Evaluation and assessment of service record of Shri P.D. Goel, District & Sessions Judge, Chamba for his continued utility in service after attaining the age of 58 years. Submitted that Shri P.D. Goel, learned District & Sessions Judge, Chamba will be attaining the age of 58 years on 18.7.2005. As per decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association Vs. Submitted that Shri P.D. Goel, learned District & Sessions Judge, Chamba will be attaining the age of 58 years on 18.7.2005. As per decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association Vs. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC-2493) read with Rule 14 of the H.P. Judicial Officers Rules, 2004, age of superannuation of a Member of the Service shall be 60 years provided that before completion of 58 years of service, the High Court with reference to the record of the Officer, quality of judgments and his potential of utility in service shall decide either to retire the Officer on completion of 58 years of service or grant him extension upto 60 years. The matter was submitted to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Committee to evaluate the potential for continued utility of the Officer in service and Hon’ble the Chief Justice, vide order dated 15.12.2004 constituted a Committee comprising of Hon’ble Mr. Justice L.S. Panta and Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Verma. The Committee was, however, reconstituted by the orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice on 23.2.2005 and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.C. Sood was nominated in place of Hon’ble Mr. Justice M.R. Verma. In a decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges’ Association Vs. Union of India (AIR 1993 SC-2493), it is observed that “the potential for continued utility in service shall be assessed and evaluated by an appropriate Committee of Judges of the respective High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justice of the High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of Judicial Officer’s past service, character rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters.” The matter was, therefore, again submitted to Hon’ble the Chief Justice for orders in view of the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment in All India Judges’ Association (supra). Hon’ble the Chief Justice after considering the matter was pleased to revoke the earlier order constituting the Committee and has instead directed that the case of Shri P.D. Goel with respect to grant of extension to him beyond 58 years be placed before the Hon’ble Full Court for its consideration in the next meeting. Hence, the matter is submitted to the Hon’ble Full Court for consideration and orders, please.” 66. The matter came before the Full Court meeting held on 12.4.2005. Hence, the matter is submitted to the Hon’ble Full Court for consideration and orders, please.” 66. The matter came before the Full Court meeting held on 12.4.2005. The following decision was taken vide item No.1: “Item No.1: Evaluation and assessment of service record of Shri P.D. Goel, District & Sessions Judge, Chamba for his continued utility in service after attaining the age of 58 years. Considered. Looking to the overall service record of the Officer, quality of his judgments, his general reputation and keeping in view all other relevant factors and considerations, and finding that the Officer does not have potential for continued utility is service beyond the age of 58 years, resolved that the Officer may not be granted extension beyond the age of 58 years, in public interest. Consequential action shall follow.” 67. What is intriguing in this case is that why the matter was not got evaluated by the Committee constituted by the Hon’ble Chief Justice. It is apparent from the note put by the Registrar General before the Hon’ble Chief Justice that she had requested for the reconstitution of the Committee and it was in the alternative that the matter was required to be put up before the Full Court. There is no reason forthcoming why this unusual course of referring the matter to the Full Court has been adopted in the present case. If there had been practice, as observed hereinabove, for constitution of the Committee of two Hon’ble Judges to evaluate the entire service record under rule 14, why departure was made in the present case. It is settled law by now that Article 14 also applies to procedure. In case certain practice is being followed, the same should not be abruptly changed and if that is done it will amount to procedural ultra vires. The Full Court recommended his retirement at the age of 58 years. The case of the respondent is that his entire service record was seen by the Full Court at the time of deliberation. Having said so, now the Court has to see what was required to be seen by the Full Court while considering his suitability to go beyond the age of 58 years. There are three parameters which are required to be seen as per proviso to rule 14. Firstly, the record of the Officer has to be seen. Having said so, now the Court has to see what was required to be seen by the Full Court while considering his suitability to go beyond the age of 58 years. There are three parameters which are required to be seen as per proviso to rule 14. Firstly, the record of the Officer has to be seen. The record of the Officer will be reflected through his Annual Confidential Reports. In the present case, as noticed above, the petitioner has earned only two ‘average’ entries for the year 1995-96 and 2003-04. His entries prior to 2003-04 preceding five years were ‘very good’ or ‘good’. It appears that the Full Court was influenced by the adverse entry made in the Annual Confidential Report for the year 2003-04 to the effect that he was not commanding good reputation. This entry has been recorded against the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience. The other factor which is required to be seen as per proviso to rule 14 is the quality of the judgments of the Members of the Judicial Service. The petitioner has placed sufficient material on record whereby for the months of October, 2002, November, 2002, December, 2002, January, 2003, February, 2003, March, 2003, April, 2003, May, 2003, June, 2003, July, 2003, August, 2003, September, 2003, October, 2003, November, 2003, December, 2003, January, 2004, February, 2004, March, 2004, April, 2004, May, 2004, July, 2004, August, 2004, September, 2004, October, 2004, December, 2004January, 2005, February, 2005, March, 2005, April, 2005, the entries were recorded either ‘outstanding’ or ‘very good’. The Registry was requested to supply the statement regarding the remarks recorded against the column ‘quality of judgment’ of the petitioner. The same has been supplied which reads as under: 68. In view of these entries, could it be said that the qualities of the judgments were not up to the mark? The answer is ‘no’. 69. The matter is required to be looked into from another angle. Sub rule (4) of rule 3 provides that 25% of the total number of posts in the cadre of District Judges and who have put in not less than five years in the cadre shall be granted selection grade and they shall be selected for inclusion/placement in this grade on the basis of merit-cum-seniority from the cadre of District Judges. Sub rule (4) of rule 3 provides that 25% of the total number of posts in the cadre of District Judges and who have put in not less than five years in the cadre shall be granted selection grade and they shall be selected for inclusion/placement in this grade on the basis of merit-cum-seniority from the cadre of District Judges. In the present case the petitioner has been granted selection grade with effect from 20th November, 2003. It is borne out from the record that this selection grade was granted pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee after assessing merit-cum-seniority of the petitioner and similarly situated persons. It is thus clear that there was nothing adverse against the petitioner till 1989-90 (4.12.1989 to 31.3.1990) Clarity of facts and correct application of law. 1990-91 Exhaustive reasoned and clear. 1991-92 Elaborate, Clarification of facts and law. 1992-93 (22.5.92 to 12.11.92) (25.11.1992 to 31.3.1993) I had no occasion to go through his judgment in appeal, hence no remarks. Same impression with addition that he is making improvement with respect to his knowledge of law and procedure. 1993-94 Good 1994-95 (26.8.1994 to 31.3.1995) No assessment slip received from the Hon’ble High Court. Very Good. 1995-96 Average 1996-97 Good 1997-98 Reliable 1998-99 N.A. 1999-2000 N.A. 2000-2001 Good 2001-2002 Good 2002-2003 (1.4.2002 to 28.8.2002) (9.9.2002 to Good 31.3.2003) Good 2003 to 2004 (1.4.2003 to 24.3.2004) Average the date of granting him selection grade. The selection grade is given to the members of the Judicial Service on the basis of merit-cum-seniority. The concept of merit-cumseniority is that merit has to be given primary consideration. The selection grade was granted to the petitioner with effect from 20.11.2003. Thus the record of the petitioner was up to the mark till November, 2003 when he has been granted the selection grade. The only adverse material which is borne out from the record is ‘adverse’ entry made in the Annual Confidential Report of the petitioner for the year 2003-04 and if this entry is excluded, there is nothing adverse against the petitioner. 70. Consequently the decision to retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years is declared ultra vires and struck down being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 71. In the gradation list issued by the respondent as it stood on 1.1.2005, the date of retirement of the petitioner has been shown as 31.7.2007. 70. Consequently the decision to retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years is declared ultra vires and struck down being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 71. In the gradation list issued by the respondent as it stood on 1.1.2005, the date of retirement of the petitioner has been shown as 31.7.2007. It further belies the stand of the respondent that the age of superannuation of the Members of the Judicial Service is 58 years. 72. There is also considerable force in the submission of Mr. R.L. Sood that the impugned order could only be passed by the Governor on the basis of the recommendations made by the High Court. The Appointing Authority of the petitioner as per rule 4 is the Governor. The Governor only was competent to issue the notification and not the High Court. The issuance of notification in violation of rule 4 is also bad in law. 73. Consequently, in view of the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed. The Annexure P4 dated 30.10.2004, Annexure P-15 dated 29.3.2005 whereby his representation was rejected and notification dated 20.4.2005 Annexure P-16 are quashed and set aside. The petitioner is held entitled to all the consequential benefits. There will, however, be no order as to costs.