Judgment : When this second appeal brought from the judgment and decree of learned 6th Additional District Judge, Ernakulam in A.s. No.48 of 2009 came up for admission, respondent who had filed a caveat entered appearance through counsel. The first appeal arose from judgment and decree passed by learned Additional Sub Judge, Ernakulam in O.S. No.369 of 2007. The issue involved is whether departmental enquiry initiated by respondent No.1 against the appellant should be injected till trial of the criminal case against the appellant should be injected till trial of the Criminal case against him involving one of the incidents referred to in the memo of charges is over. Though learned counsel for respondents submitted that no question of laws and much less any substantial questions of law is involved in the second appeal, after hearing both sides, the appeal is admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. When the Supreme Court of India has declared law and laid down the precedent in Capt.M. Paul Anthony’s case (1999 (3) SCC 679) that when criminal case is pending on similar facts and issues constituting the cause of action, it is desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till culmination of trial in the criminal case, has not the first appellate court erred in distinguishing the dictum laid down in Captain Paul Antony’s case which has the effect of nullifying the dictum laid down by in Supreme Court? 2. Is the first appellate court justified in reversing the decree passed by the trial court on the ground that the trial in criminal case is delayed inspite of specific direction from this court of dispose the criminal case with in the time frame fixed, especially when criminal trial is at the fag end and many of the prosecution witnesses are already examined? 2. Short facts are necessary for a decision of the above substantial question of law are: Appellant/plaintiff was working as Assistant Manager with respondent No.1, Federal Bank at its Marine Drive Branch till 16.01.2007. That day, he was sent on deputation to the Regional Office of respondent No.1. Case is that on 21.01.2007 when officials of respondent No.1 checked the ATM counter cash chest under the Marine Drive Branch (where appellant had been the Assistant Manager till 16.01.2007) there was found to be a shortage of Rs.1,13,500/-. That day, he was sent on deputation to the Regional Office of respondent No.1. Case is that on 21.01.2007 when officials of respondent No.1 checked the ATM counter cash chest under the Marine Drive Branch (where appellant had been the Assistant Manager till 16.01.2007) there was found to be a shortage of Rs.1,13,500/-. The then Manager of Marine Drive Branch lost no time in preferring a complaint to the Central Police who registered case as crime No.119 of 2007 and started investigation. Appellant was arrested on 21.01.2007 and questioned by the police. On the information allegedly given by the appellant 227 currency notes, all of 500 rupee denomination (total value is Rs.1,13,500/-) were recovered from his house by the Investigating Officer on 21.01.2007. Investigation revealed, according to the respondent No.1 that on 19.01.2007 at about 12.05 pm appellant unauthorisedly entered the ATM counter, opened the cash chest and dishonestly removed the said amount. Appellant was place under suspension on 22.02.2007. Respondent No.1 issued ext.A4, memo of charges to the appellant raising various allegations and misconduct on his part including the alleged theft of Rs.1,13,500/-from the cash chest of the ATM counter. Appellant replied by Ext.A5. Since that reply was not satisfactory, respondent No.1 initiated disciplinary action and a domestic enquiry was ordered. Respondent No.2 was appointed as Enquiry Officer. Appellant approached the second Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam with the suit, O.S. No.369 of 2007 stating that conduct of domestic enquiry before completion of trial of the criminal case is unjust, would prejudice him and that he will be constrained to disclose all his defences in the criminal case which would affect him prejudicially in the domestic enquiry and praying that conduct of domestic enquiry be injuncted until completion of trial of the criminal case. Learned 2nd Additional Sub Judge granted an order of temporary injunction restraining respondent No.1 from proceeding with domestic enquiry until police submitted final report in the criminal case. Not satisfied with that, appellant preferred a C.M. Appeal. The first appellate court, allowing the C.M appeal ordered that domestic enquiry shall not be conducted until culmination of the criminal case pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam. Not satisfied with that, appellant preferred a C.M. Appeal. The first appellate court, allowing the C.M appeal ordered that domestic enquiry shall not be conducted until culmination of the criminal case pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Ernakulam. In the meantime, police completed investigation of crime No.119 of 2007 and submitted final report against appellant in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam on 14.03.2007 for offences punishable under sections 454, 461 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code. I am told that respondent No.1 challenged the judgment in C.M. Appeal in this court by way of a Writ Petition. But, by that time the suit itself was disposed of by learned sub Judge and thus Writ Petition became infructuous. In the meantime at a time when there was no order for injunction domestic enquiry commenced and the Vigilance officer of respondent No.1 who had collected evidence for the purpose of domestic enquiry was examined as witness for respondent No.1. He was cross-examined by the appellant. Atleast one of prosecution witnesses in the criminal case who was to say that when he came out of the ATM Counter on 19.01.2007 at the relevant time he found appellant near that ATM counter has also been examined. Learned Sub Judge found that the conduct of domestic enquiry before culmination of the criminal case would prejudicially affect the appellant in the domestic enquiry and relying on decision of the apex court in Capt.M.Paul Anthony’s case (1999 (3) SCC 679) granted decree for prohibitory injunction. Aggrieved, respondent No.1 took up the matter in appeal. Learned 6th Additional District Judge held that no complicated questions of fact and law is involved in the matter, appellant has already taken up his defence in Ext.A5 and hence the conduct of criminal case would not in any way prejudice the appellant. Learned Additional District Judge also took note of the delay that has occurred in the conduct of the criminal case. Judgment and decree of the trail court were reversed and the suit was dismissed. Judgment and decree of the first appellate court are challenged in the second appeal on the substantial questions of law raised above. It is contended by learned senior counsel for appellant that interpretation of decision of the Supreme Court in Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Judgment and decree of the trail court were reversed and the suit was dismissed. Judgment and decree of the first appellate court are challenged in the second appeal on the substantial questions of law raised above. It is contended by learned senior counsel for appellant that interpretation of decision of the Supreme Court in Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and another (1999 (3) SCC 679) made by learned Additional District Judge is not correct and has the effect of nullifying effect of the decision. The decision has been misunderstood and misapplied. Learned Additional District Judge has reversed judgment and decree of the trial court which is based on a proper appreciation of the questions of fact and law involved and evidence on record. Learned Counsel for respondent No.1, in response contended that the decision has been correctly applied by learned Additional District Judge with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case and hence, judgment and decree of first appellate court require no interference. Learned counsel on both sides placed reliance on the decisions in Capt.M.Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and another (1999 (3) SCC 679), State Bank of India and Others Vs. R.B. Sharma (AIR 2004 SC 4144), Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd Vs. Sarvesh Berry (AIR 2005 SC 1406), T.N.C.S Corpn.Ltd and others Vs. K. Meerabai (2006 (2) SCC 255) and Indian Overseas Bank, Annasalai Vs. P. Ganesan and others (2008 (1) SCC 650). Learned counsel for respondent No.1 further contended that appellant was holding a managerial post in a financing institution which is required to maintain confidence of the public and that acts of the nature committed by the appellant must be viewed seriously and dealt with iron hand. According to the learned counsel no leniency is required in respect of such matters and to buttress his contention placed reliance on the decisions in State Bank of India and another Vs. Bela Bagchi and others (2005 (7) SCC 435) and State Bank of India and Others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006 (7) SCC 212). 3. Though, maintainability of the suit was challenged by respondents in the trial court and issue No.1 was raised regarding that, no serious argument was advanced on behalf of respondent No.1 on that issue in the courts below and the suit has been found to be maintainable. Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006 (7) SCC 212). 3. Though, maintainability of the suit was challenged by respondents in the trial court and issue No.1 was raised regarding that, no serious argument was advanced on behalf of respondent No.1 on that issue in the courts below and the suit has been found to be maintainable. No contention is advanced on behalf of respondents that the relief prayed for does not come within the four corners of section 38 of the Specific Relief Act which deals with the grant of perpetual injunction to prevent breach of an obligation. But it is apposite to consider whether relief of the nature sought for is allowable. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short, “Act”) deals with the grant of perpetual injunction and subsection (1) which is relevant here says, “subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication” Section 2(a) of the Act defines the expression “obligation” thus, “(a)” obligation” includes every duty enforceable by law”. A ‘duty’ must correspond to a ‘right’. It could be said that the inclusive definition of “obligation” embraces every kind of duty enforceable by law and hence that duty may arise from a contract, quasi-contract, tort or as created by a statue. It is not shown in this case that there is any duty enforceable by law on respondent No.1 either by contract, quasi-contract or by any statue, regulation or order to postpone the domestic enquiry till trial of criminal case is over. Hence section 38 of the Act can have no application. 4. Then question arises whether section 38 of the Act is exhaustive as to the power of courts in India to grant injunction. Sir Arthur Wilson said in Tituram Mukerji and Others v Cohen and Others (15 MLJ 379), “.. The right to an injunction depends in India upon statue and is governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1887). Sir Arthur Wilson said in Tituram Mukerji and Others v Cohen and Others (15 MLJ 379), “.. The right to an injunction depends in India upon statue and is governed by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1887). Section 52 of that Act places the grant of an injunction in the discretion of the court, a discretion to be exercised of course as the discretion of courts always is..” (emphasis supplied) Mookerji, J, relying on Tituram Mukerji and Others v Cohen and Others held in Ram Kissen Joydoyal V Pooran Mull ((1920) 47 Calcutta 733) that the Specific Relief Act 1887 is exhaustive and that injunction asked for (in that case) was not justified under the relevant provision of that Act. 5. The above view was not followed by the Bombay High Court. In Ramdas Khatan and Co. Vs Atlas Mills Co. (AIR 1931 Bomb. 151) it was held that the Specific Relief Act (1887) is not exhaustive and therefore a court in India is entitled to look at the English cases dealing with the right of a court to restrain arbitration proceedings as the courts in India have inherited from the Supreme Court the equity jurisdiction which was conferred upon it in any case where the jurisdiction had not been taken away by subsequent legislation. Beaumont, C.J., held, “I am not prepared to accept the view that the Specific Relief Act, is exhaustive. I rely on the nature of the Act and on the preamble which is in very similar terms to the preamble of the contract Act, which Act the privy council has held is not exhaustive…” Blackwell, J in his concurring, but separate judgment observed that in Tituram Mukerji’s case or Ram Kissen Joydoyal’s case (referred Supra) question whether there was any other jurisdiction for the courts in India to grant injunction was not raised or considered. Learned Judge referring to those cases held, “In my opinion, these cases are of no assistance in determining the question whether the court has any jurisdiction to grant an injunction apart from the Specific Relief Act, because the matter does not appear to have been discussed in either of them. In my opinion the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive. Learned Judge referring to those cases held, “In my opinion, these cases are of no assistance in determining the question whether the court has any jurisdiction to grant an injunction apart from the Specific Relief Act, because the matter does not appear to have been discussed in either of them. In my opinion the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive. The preamble to that Act is in precisely the same form as the preamble to that Contract Act, and it has been said by the privy council with regard to the Contract Act that Act is not exhaustive in Jwaladutt Pillani V Bansilal Motilal (AIR 1929 PC 132). By parity of reasoning it seems to me clear that the true view is that Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive. I think, therefore, that a court in India is entitled to look lat the English cases dealing with the right of the courts to restrain arbitration proceeding, in as much as the courts in India have inherited from the Supreme Court the equity jurisdiction which was conferred upon it in any case where that jurisdiction had not been taken away by subsequent legislation…” (emphasis supplied) 6. The apex court has held in H.I. Trust V Haridas Mundhra (AIR 1972 SC1826) that the Act is not an exclusive enactment and that it does not consolidate the whole law on the subject. That decision has been followed by a division bench of this court in Joseph George V Chacko Thomas (1992(1)KLT 6). The Supreme Court referring to the jurisdiction of the courts in India to grant declaratory relief outside the scope of section 34 of the Act has held in Ashok Kumar Srivastav V National Insurance Co.Ltd (AIR 1998 SC 2046) that the said provision is not excessive. The preamble to the Act states, “An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief” In Ashok Kumar Srivastav’s case Supreme Court pointed out that the Act widened the sphere of the civil courts but the preamble shows that it is not exhaustive of all kinds of specific reliefs. Courts in India are to administer common law and equity jurisdiction. Hence section 38 of the Act cannot be said to be exhaustive as to the power of the courts to grant injunction. Courts in India are to administer common law and equity jurisdiction. Hence section 38 of the Act cannot be said to be exhaustive as to the power of the courts to grant injunction. Even in cases where section 38 of the Act does not as such apply, if a person has suffered a legal wrong due to the act of the defendant or there is a violation of an equitable right, he can ask for the relief of injunction. 7. Then the question is whether on the substantial questions of law raised, judgment and decree of the first appellate court can be said to be legal and proper. The decisions of the apex court relied on by learned counsel on both sides state the circumstances under which it is desirable to grant stay/injunction of departmental enquiry till conclusion of the criminal trial. Gist of the decisions is that there is no hard and fast rule or straight jacket principle regarding the grant of such relief but, in cases where complicated questions of law and facts are involved and the domestic enquiry is likely to cause substantial prejudice to the delinquent employee it is desirable that the domestic enquiry is put off until the trial of the criminal case is over. In Capt.M.Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and another (1999 (3) SCC 679) it is held, “Conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of the Supreme Court (referred to in paras 14 to 22 of the judgment) on this point, are as follows: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately; (ii)If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it is desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till conclusion of the criminal case; (iii) Whether the nature of charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of the offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet; (iv) Factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed; (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of pendency of criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with, so as to conclude them at an early date. The purpose is that if the employee is found not guilty, his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 8. In State Bank of India and Others V R B Sharma (AIR 2004 SC 4144) the above principle was followed and applied. However, it was observed, “It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. Thus, there can be no straight jacket formula as to in which case the departmental proceedings are to be stayed. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by delinquent official. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending.” It is pertinent to note that in that case, order of the High Court granting stay was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for proper consideration in accordance with the law and facts and circumstances of the case. 9. The next decision relied by both sides in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd and others V Sarvesh Berry (AIR 2005 SC 1406). There also, reliance is placed on decision in Capt.M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and another (1999 (3) SCC 679). There, stay granted by the High Court against the departmental enquiry was set aside and the appeal was allowed. The principle stated in T.N.C.S Corpn.Ltd and others V k Meerabai (2006 (2) SCC 255) is also not in any way different from the law laid down in Capt.M.Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd and another (1999 (3) SCC 679). 10. In State Bank of India and another V Bela Bagchi and Others (2005 (7) SCC 435) relied by learned counsel for respondents in paragraph 15 it is stated about the responsibility of a bank officer, “bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity since he deals with money of the depositors and the customers and that officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible efforts to protect the interest of the bank and to discharge his duty with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It was held that the very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. It was held that the very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself is a breach of discipline and is misconduct.” 11. In State Bank of India and Others V Ramesh Dinkar Punde (2006 (7) SCC 212) in para 21 again dealing with the responsibility of the bank officer it is held, “the respondent was a manager of the bank and it needs to be emphasized that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer so that the confidence of the public/depositors is not impaired. It is for this reason that when a bank officer commits misconduct, as in the present case, for his personal ends and against the interest of the bank and the depositors, he must be dealt with iron hands and he does not deserve to be dealt with leniently.” I do not forget that in the last two decisions I have referred to question considered was not whether departmental enquiry has to be stayed until criminal proceedings. The above decisions are referred to only to indicate the position of a bank employee vis-a-vis the depositors and the public. 12. Now, I have to refer to the facts of this case to ascertain whether the first appellate court is justified in reversing judgment and decree of the trial court granting permanent injunction. It is seen from Ext.A4 that the entire details of the charges against the appellant, the delinquent employee have been narrated. It is seen from Ext.A4 that every circumstance relied on by respondent No.1, the witnesses to be examined on each point and all other relevant aspects are stated in Ext.A4. To Ext.A4, appellant has given a detailed reply, Ext.A5. I do not forget that towards the end it is stated in Ext.A5 that appellant reserves his right to file further explanation as disclosure of all his defence at that stage would affect his defence in the criminal case. It is pointed out by learned counsel for respondents that whatever defence appellant has, has already been disclosed in Ext.A5. I do not forget that towards the end it is stated in Ext.A5 that appellant reserves his right to file further explanation as disclosure of all his defence at that stage would affect his defence in the criminal case. It is pointed out by learned counsel for respondents that whatever defence appellant has, has already been disclosed in Ext.A5. I find from Ext.A4 that the charges levelled against the appellant are not merely in respect of the alleged unauthorized entry into the ATM counter on 19.01.2007 and removal of the cash from cash chest. There is an allegation regarding another incident which is concerning the alleged temporary misappropriation of a such of Rs.6,000/- which a depositor by name, M J Davis had deposited in the bank where appellant was then the manager. In Ext.A4, as clause 8A it is stated that the chief manager of the Marine Drive Branch of respondent No.1 received a complaint dated 20.11.2006 from the said M J Davis, holder of SB account at the branch at Ernakulam South Stating that he had deposited Rs.6,000/- in cash into the ATM attached to the Marine Drive Branch (Where appellant was then the Assistant Manager) on 15.11.2006 but later it was revealed that the said amount was not credited to his account. On 26.12.2006 appellant remitted the said sum of Rs.6,000/- for credit of the SB account of M J Davis. It is stated in clause 8E of Ext.A4 that the customer came to the bank, had detailed discussion on the matter and that matter has been settled amicably. In clause 10 of Ext.A4 it is stated that the lapses/omissions on the part of the appellant if proved would amount to case of misconduct (a) any act/omission involving dishonesty such as theft, cheating, forgery, falsification of records, misappropriation etc, (b) the dereliction of duty (c) acting prejudicial to the interest of the bank as per Officers Service Rules, Chapter II Rule 2.2 clause 1 (a and d). 13. Learned counsel for appellant has a contention that the allegation regarding temporary misappropriation of Rs.6,000/- had been amicably settled even as per Ext.A4 and that the said charge was intentionally included in Ext.A4 to make it appear that the domestic enquiry is on different facts than involved in the criminal case. 13. Learned counsel for appellant has a contention that the allegation regarding temporary misappropriation of Rs.6,000/- had been amicably settled even as per Ext.A4 and that the said charge was intentionally included in Ext.A4 to make it appear that the domestic enquiry is on different facts than involved in the criminal case. Learned counsel for respondents in response contended that ‘amicable settlement’ referred to in Ext.A4 is between respondent No.1 and the customer and that it is not an amicable settlement between respondent No.1 and the appellant, the delinquent employee and further that the misconduct on the part of the appellant in retaining the sum of Rs.6, 000/- deposited by the customer of respondent No.1 remained as such and is required to be enquired into departmentally. Learned counsel also submitted that the said incident was on 21.11.2006 while the alleged dishonest removal of cash from the cash chest of the ATM counter was immediately thereafter on 19.01.2007. I am however not required to go into the question whether settlement referred to in Ext.A4 is between appellant and respondent No.1 and whether that could be the subject matter of disciplinary action against the appellant. That is a matter which respondent No.2 or such other authority as is concerned has to decide. The limited purpose of referring to the said allegation in Ext.A4 in this judgment is to point out that the domestic enquiry is not merely concerning the incident that happened on 19.01.2007 but there is another charge also against the appellant included in Ext.A4. 14. I must also note that in the criminal case, what is attributed to the appellant is offences punishable under sections 454, 461 and 380 of the penal Code while going by clause 10 of Ext.A4 there are allegation against him concerning forgery, falsification of records, misappropriation, dereliction of duty, misconduct and violation of the Service Rules with which appellant was bound. Therefore, it is not possible to say that though the incident regarding alleged theft referred to in the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings is one on the same, the domestic enquiry and criminal case are not on the same set of facts. 15. Therefore, it is not possible to say that though the incident regarding alleged theft referred to in the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings is one on the same, the domestic enquiry and criminal case are not on the same set of facts. 15. So far as question of prejudice caused to the appellant due to the domestic enquiry proceeding simultaneously or before culmination of the criminal trial is concerned, I must bear in mind that as I have already stated above, in Ext.A4 details of the allegations made against the appellant, the circumstance which the respondent No.1 is relying and the witnesses to be examined in the departmental enquiry together with the gist of their statements has been given. To that, a detailed reply is already been given by the appellant. As per final report in the criminal case on the information given by the appellant a Sum of Rs.1,13,500/-was recovered by the police from his house on 21.01.2007 and for its seizure, a mahazar also has been drawn up. Regarding that also appellant has given explanation in Ext.A5. I said this only to point out that appellant has already taken up his defence in the criminal case. I pointed out that in the domestic enquiry Vigilance Officer who enquired into the matter for respondent No.1 has already been examined and cross examined at length by the appellant as seen from Ext.B1, enquiry file. I also stated that at least one witness has been examined in the criminal case. That being the situation, it is idle for appellant to contend that he has still defences in stock for him to be taken out in the criminal case and hence domestic enquiry has to wait till culmination of criminal trial. 16. Learned counsel for appellant referred me to Ext.A13, order passed by this court in W.P.(C).No.2071 of 2008 on 21.01.2008 to support his contention that charges levelled against appellant in the criminal case are of a grave nature. What learned Judge has stated in Ext.A13 is the contention of appellant. It is not a finding. At any rate, respondent No.1 was not a party in Ext.A13 proceeding. 17. What learned Judge has stated in Ext.A13 is the contention of appellant. It is not a finding. At any rate, respondent No.1 was not a party in Ext.A13 proceeding. 17. True, it is not shown by respondents that appellant had attempted to delay trial of criminal case and it is seen from Ext.A13 that appellant came to this court seeking a direction to the criminal court for expeditious trial and disposal of the case. These aspects are considered by learned Additional District Judge and found in favour of appellant. It is pertinent to note that final report was submitted by the police in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 14.03.2007 and even now, examination of the main witnesses in the criminal case still remain to commence. A number of witnesses remain to be examined for prosecution. After examination of prosecution witnesses is over appellant has to be questioned under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and may be, he has defence evidence to let in. All these things will consume time. There could be a variety of reasons for the criminal case to prolong even if it is not due to any fault of either of the parties hereto. Respondent No.1 has no role in the conduct of the criminal case. Prosecution witnesses may not be available as and when summons is attempted to be served on them. The police, on account of other duty may seek time for service of summons. It is relevant to note from Ext.A13, order dated 21.03.2008 that this court directed early disposal of the criminal case, at any rate within six months from the date of receipt of copy of that order. But even now trial of the criminal case is only at the initial stage. Learned counsel fro respondent No.1pointed out that though final report was filed on 14.03.2007 even after the expiry of three years, the criminal case has not reached anywhere, in the sense that a number of witnesses including main witnesses are yet to be examined and in the meantime respondent No.1 is paying entire salary by way of allowance to the appellant who is not doing any work. According to the learned counsel this would affect credibility of respondent No.1 as a banking institution and discipline among its employees and hence early disposal of domestic enquiry is essential. 18. According to the learned counsel this would affect credibility of respondent No.1 as a banking institution and discipline among its employees and hence early disposal of domestic enquiry is essential. 18. It is seen from the judgment of learned Sub Judge that in paragraphs 1 to 17, reference is made to the statement of facts pleaded by the parties and in paragraphs 18 to 20, reference is made to the various decision on the point. It is in paragraph 21 that learned Sub Judge has observed that whether appellant had any role in the theft and misappropriation are questions involved in both the proceedings and that if departmental proceeding is proceeded with, appellant will be obliged to reveal his defence and it may prejudice him. In paragraph 22 again reference is made to the decision of Supreme court and in paragraph 23, it is observed that the witnesses to be examined in both the proceedings are the same and hence appellant will be prejudiced. I find from the judgment of learned Sub Judge there is no consideration of the question whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved. There is also no consideration of the charge in Ext.A4 concerning alleged temporary misappropriation of Rs.6, 000/-, or the detailed defence already taken up by the appellant in Ext.A5. There is no consideration of the details and evidence given in Ext.A4 which respondent No.1 is proposing to adduce in the departmental enquiry. On going through the judgment of learned Sub Judge it is revealed that relevant facts are not considered before concluding that appellant is entitled to the relief prayed for. I have also gone through the judgment of the first appellate court. Though, there is a factual mistake committed by the appellate court in that it is stated that some of the “main witnesses” in the criminal case are already examined, it is seen that appellate court has considered and found that no complicated questions of law and fact are involved in the case and judgment and decree of the trial court are reversed. On going through the judgment and decree of the first appellate court I am satisfied that relevant decision of the apex court have been considered and applied correctly on the facts of the case. On going through the judgment and decree of the first appellate court I am satisfied that relevant decision of the apex court have been considered and applied correctly on the facts of the case. It is not shown that due to any act of respondents, appellant has suffered any legal wrong or that appellant has any legal or equitable right in his favour which is to be protected by the grant of the discretionary relief of injunction. I do not find reason to interfere with the judgment and decree of the first appellant court. Answering the substantial questions of law raised in the above manner, the second appeal is dismissed. I make it clear that this judgment will not in any way prevent respondent No.1 from considering whether the departmental enquiry could wait until the witnesses for the prosecution in the criminal case are examined. Parties are directed to suffer their respective cost.