JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This criminal appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 23.10.2008 passed by the learned Judge. Fast Track Court, Shillong in FTC (S) Case No. 24 of 2007 convicting the Appellant under Section 364-A Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 13.5.2005, a report was lodged by one Birendra Dudhoria of Paltan Bazar, Shillong with the officer-in-Charge of Lumdiengjri Police Station stating therein that his cousin, namely, Arihant Dudhoria, aged about 16 years old, s/o Malchand Dudhoria, was found missing on 11.5.2005 at about 5.30 pm from his shop at Paltan Bazar. The written report of this incident was stated to be preceded by verbal report on 12.5.2005, for which G.D. Entry No. 304 dated 12.5.2005 had been made. A regular case, namely, Lumdiengjri Police Station Case No. 51(5)05 under Section 364-A Indian Penal Code was accordingly registered and investigated into. On completion of the investigation, the police filed charge sheet against three persons, namely, Ram Naresh Rai, Ram Prakash Rai and Shinod Shah to stand the trial for the offence punishable under Section 364 IPC. On commitment, the learned Judge, Fast Track Court proceeded with the case against the Appellant herein only as the other two accused absconded, which had earlier resulted in splitting up of the case under Section 317(e) Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Sessions Judge after declaring them as proclaimed absconders. The learned Judge, Fast Track Court then framed the charge under Section 364-A Indian Penal Code against the Appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty whereupon the trial proceeded with. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses and exhibited documents and material objects to bring home the charge against the Appellant. No evidence was adduced by the Appellant in his defense. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial Court convicted and sentenced the Appellant in the manner indicated earlier. The trial Court formulated the following three points for determination of the case: 1. Whether PW 8, the victim, was kidnapped or abducted on 11.5.2008? 2. Whether any ransom had been demanded for his release? 3. Whether the Accused Shinod Shah along with Accused Ram Naresh Rai and Ram Prashad Rai, who were absconders, were perpetrators of the crime? 3. The trial Court formulated the following three points for determination of the case: 1. Whether PW 8, the victim, was kidnapped or abducted on 11.5.2008? 2. Whether any ransom had been demanded for his release? 3. Whether the Accused Shinod Shah along with Accused Ram Naresh Rai and Ram Prashad Rai, who were absconders, were perpetrators of the crime? 3. On the first point, the learned Judge recorded the finding that as there was no challenge to the testimony of the victim (PW 8) that he was abducted by two men on his way home from Police Bazar on 11.5.2005 while walking through a by lane, it was established that he was kidnapped/abducted. We have perused the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of PW 8 and the depositions of PW 3 and PW 4 in juxtaposition and have no reason to agree with her finding. The finding of the trial Court with respect to the second point so formulated, namely, the demand of ransom to the tune of rupees one crore for the release of PW 8 on the un-rebutted evidence of PW 3 and PW 4, cannot also be faulted with. PW 3 is the father of the victim while PW 4 is his cousin brother. In his evidence, PW4 testified that PW 3 woke him up the next morning at around 6-6.30 A.M. telling him that his call to the number of Arihant (PW 8) was responded by another person who demanded one crore from him and then told him to talk his son after ten minutes and that after ten minutes, PW 3 rang up Arihant's phone again when he was present, and the call was responded with hello only and the line got cut off. In our opinion, the statement of PW 3 has been fully corroborated by PW 4 that a demand of rupees one crore as ransom money was made to him for the release of PW 8. As rightly pointed out by the trial Court, the aforesaid statements of PW 3 and PW 4 were not denied by the defense in cross-examination. 4. It is however, against the findings of the trial Court on the identity of the Appellant and of the delay in lodging the FIR that serious grievances have been made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. 4. It is however, against the findings of the trial Court on the identity of the Appellant and of the delay in lodging the FIR that serious grievances have been made by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. The trial Court mainly relied on the evidence of the victim (PW 8), PW 1 and PW 2 and the statement of the Appellant recorded under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure to convict the Appellant. It is true that no identification parade was made by the police to identify the Appellant. However, the trial Court took into account the statement of PW 8 that he could recognize the two persons who caught him; that one of them was the Appellant, who was standing in the dock and that he was also present when he was released by them. The trial observed that PW 8 withstood his cross examination by the defense and that his testimony was consistent and reliable. The trial Court recorded the finding that the statement of PW 1 and PW 2 proved that the Appellant was the tenant of PW1 with respect to her house at Oakland and that the Appellant himself admitted in his examination under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure that he was a tenant and had left the house on the day of the incident. Though PW 1 had stated in her evidence that she had locked the room occupied by the Appellant two-three months before the police came, the trial Court took note of the fact that the Appellant himself admitted in the accused examination that he was occupying the room till the day of the incident. From this, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the Appellant was the tenant of the house of PW 1 where PW 8 was kept confined. On the refusal of PW 8 to participate in the TIP, the trial Court refused to draw adverse inference against the case of the prosecution on the ground that the trauma and his future security might have impelled him to keep silent over this and also the abscondence of the other co-accused who were still at large. That apart, the trial Court took into account the fact that PW 8 identified the Appellant in Court and that PW 8 had given the details on how he could recognize the Appellant as one of the culprits. That apart, the trial Court took into account the fact that PW 8 identified the Appellant in Court and that PW 8 had given the details on how he could recognize the Appellant as one of the culprits. On the question of delay in lodging the FIR, the learned Judge held that it was natural for the father of PW 8 to not immediately inform the police about the abduction as he did not want to put his son in a dangerous position and had decided to search by themselves every parent in such a situation would naturally like to protect their child. In our judgment, the findings so recorded by the trial Court do not suffer from any informity. The trial Court has properly appreciated the evidence on record and came to the one, repeat, only one possible conclusion on the case for more than one reason. 5. To begin with, the entire statement of PW 8 is quite natural, credible and consistent throughout. The contention of Mr. S.P. Sharma, the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the identification of the Appellant by PW 8 for the first time in Court, that too, after a lapse of considerable period of time, in the absence of TI parade, cannot be acted upon to convict the Appellant. It is dangerous to rely on such uncorroborated evidence of PW 8. Strong reliance is placed by him upon the following decisions in support of his contention: (i) Ravi @ Ravichandran v. State 2007 AIR SCW 2740, (ii) Malkhan Singh v. State of MP (2003) 5 SCC 746 , (iii) Rajesh Dalai v. State, 2008 (1) Acq 623 (Del.) and (iv) Rajesh Kumar v. State of Haryana 2006 (1) Acq 523. On the other hand, Mr. K. Khan, the learned Public Prosecutor, vehemently supports the impugned judgment and contends that the prosecution has marshalled sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond any shadow of doubt. According to him, apart from the reliable evidence of PW 8, which alone can form the basis of conviction of the Appellant, there is also adequate circumstantial evidence to bring home his guilt. According to him, apart from the reliable evidence of PW 8, which alone can form the basis of conviction of the Appellant, there is also adequate circumstantial evidence to bring home his guilt. He submits that it is not the duty of the prosecution to meet any and every hypothesis put forwarded by the Appellant, and the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case tested on the touchstone of the standard of proof required in a criminal case clinchingly establish the guilt of the Appellant to the hilt, for which no interference is called. 6. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties. We have also perused the relevant statements and materials on record upon which the trial Court proceeded to convict the Appellant. On the question whether in the absence of TI parade, conviction can be made on the basis of identification of accused by a witness for the first time in Court, there are already a number of decisions rendered by the Apex Court. Suffice it to refer to the leading authority of the Apex Court in Budhsen and Anr. v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC128, the relevant para whereof reads thus: (SCC. pp. 132-3, para 7). Now, facts which establish the identity of an accused person are relevant under Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act. As a general rule, the substantive evidence of a witness is a statement made in Court. The evidence of mere identification of the accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The evidence in order to carry conviction should ordinarily clarify as to how and under what circumstances he came to pick out the particular accused person and the details of the part the accused played in the crime in question with reasonable particularity. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. The purpose of a prior test identification, therefore, seems to be to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. It is accordingly a safe rule of prudence to generally look for corroboration of the sworn testimony of witnesses in Court as to identity of the accused who are strangers to them, in the form of earlier identification proceeding. There may, however, be exceptions to this general rule when, for example, the Court is impressed by a particular witness, on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. The identification parades belong to the investigation stage. They are generally held during the course of investigation with the primary object of enabling the witnesses to identify persons concerned in the offence, who were not previously not known to them. This serves to satisfy the investigating officer of the bona fides of the prosecution witnesses and also to furnish evidence to corroborate their testimony in Court. Identification proceedings in their legal effect amount simply to this: that certain persons are brought to jail or some other place and make statements either express or implied that certain individuals whom they point out are persons whom they recognized as having been concerned in the crime. They do not constitute substantive evidence. These parades are essentially governed by Section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. It is for these reasons that the identification parades in this case seem to have been held under the supervision of a Magistrate. Keeping in view the purpose of identification parades the Magistrates holding them are expected to take all possible precautions to eliminate any suspicion of unfairness and to reduce the chance of testimonial error.... (Emphasis mine) 7. In the case at hand, the victim i.e. PW 8 admittedly refused to participate in the TI parade conducted by the investigation. However, he identified the Appellant for the first time in the trial Court by stating that "I could recognize those two persons who caught me, one of them is the accused in the dock today. The accused was also present when I was released by them. However, he identified the Appellant for the first time in the trial Court by stating that "I could recognize those two persons who caught me, one of them is the accused in the dock today. The accused was also present when I was released by them. I had never seen these two persons prior to the incident." He further deposed in the examination-in-chief that when his blindfold was removed, he could see that he was in Oakland, Shillong and that he tried to run away but they caught him and again blindfolded him and took him to a car and the car was moving. As he apparently spent four-five days with the Appellant and his other abductors during the abduction and as his blindfold was removed off and on, there is absolutely no reason to doubt that he must have adequate opportunity to identify, and could recognize the Appellant. In his cross-examination, he disclosed that: When these two people caught me in the lane they did not tie me up or blindfold me. The taxi that I was taken to by these people was parked in the Assam Studio side. When I got inside the taxi these people did not blindfold me or tie me up. I did not shout as they were having a gun. Apart from these two people there were no other people in the taxi. One of these two people drove the taxi.... Curiously, instead of denying the identification statement of PW 8, the defense in the cross-examination chose to extract this damning piece of evidence against him. He also disclosed in his cross-examination that he could not now remember which side these people ran away in the taxi after releasing him, but he could see their face as they had by then unfolded the blindfold. In our judgment, this un-rebutted evidence of PW 8 sufficiently clarified as to how and under what circumstances he came to pick out the Appellant and also the details of the part which he played in the abduction with reasonable particularity. Besides, the trial Court was apparently impressed by PW 8 so mush so that it considered it safe to rely on his sole testimony without further corroboration. According to us, such findings cannot be assailed by the defense on the evidence available on record. Besides, the trial Court was apparently impressed by PW 8 so mush so that it considered it safe to rely on his sole testimony without further corroboration. According to us, such findings cannot be assailed by the defense on the evidence available on record. To allay the apprehension of the learned Counsel that such uncorroborated evidence should not be used as the basis for conviction of the Appellant, we have re-examined the entire evidence adduced by the prosecution. As per Ext. 2, one toy pistol was found and seized from the room rented out by PW 1 to the Appellant. That apart, the Appellant himself admitted in the accused examination that he had been a tenant of PW 1 and had left that house on the day of incident. Though he immediately retracted this statement by saying that there was no incident, the trial Court disbelieved this change in his statement. From this, the trial Court observed that surprisingly the Appellant in his 313 statement had not stated that he left the room in the month of March, but he rather stated that he was occupying the room till the day of the incident. In our opinion, the appellate Court should not ordinarily interfere with the trial Court's opinion as to the credibility of an accused examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure as the trial judge alone knows the body language as well as demeanor of the accused; she alone can appreciate the manner in which the questions are answered whether with honest candor or with doubtful plausibility. Therefore, we do not find any reason to upset the finding of the trial Court on this aspect of the matter also. 8. Once it is found that the Appellant was the one who occupied the room where the victim was kept confined during the days of his abduction, the burden of proof is upon him to show that he was not responsible for the confinement of the victim in his rented house. Thus, the fact that a toy pistol was found at the room occupied by the Appellant at Oakland Street and the further fact that it was the same room in which the victim was kept confined probablise the case of the prosecution that it was the Appellant who was involved in the abduction of the victim (PW 8). Thus, the fact that a toy pistol was found at the room occupied by the Appellant at Oakland Street and the further fact that it was the same room in which the victim was kept confined probablise the case of the prosecution that it was the Appellant who was involved in the abduction of the victim (PW 8). In the light of the findings arrived at by us, we are of the firm view that the statement of the victim (PW 8) also stand corroborated by the aforesaid circumstantial evidence. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution has proved to hilt the involvement of the Appellant in the abduction of PW 8. The doubts raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant on the evidence adduced by the prosecution are not really serious and cannot otherwise have the effect of destroying the core of the prosecution case. In this connection, we may remind ourselves of the observations of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271 , which read thus:(SCC, pp. 279, para 12). 12. Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defense. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. (See Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh). The prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. (See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava). A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial, if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. (See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. "A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. (See Inder Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. "A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." (Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution quoted in State of U.P. Anil Singh. SCC p. 692, para 17). Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zeal for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than the truth. See: Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa). 9. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is absolutely no infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence. Necessarily, the appeal, being devoid of merit, shall have to be dismissed, which we hereby do. The Appellant shall serve out the remaining period of his sentence. Transmit the L.C. record. Appeal dismissed