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2009 DIGILAW 910 (KER)

Aboobaker v. Mohammed Shaffin

2009-09-22

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON, P.R.RAMAN

body2009
JUDGMENT : P.R. Raman, J. This appeal is filed challenging the award dated 30.11.2006 passed by the M.A.C.T., Ottappalam in O.P. (MV) No. 418 of 2004. The Appellants are the claimants before the Tribunal, who are the legal representatives of the deceased Rasheed alias Hamza, who sustained injuries in a motor accident and subsequently died. The accident occurred on 4.11.2002 at about 9.50 p.m. while the deceased was driving the motor cycle bearing No. KRO 6064. He was proceeding from Aluva to Chengamanad. The accident occurred when the motor cycle skidded on the road and capsized, causing serious injuries to the deceased. Mohammed Shaffin, Respondent No. 1, was impleaded as the owner of the motor cycle and the Respondent No. 2 was impleaded as insurer of the motor cycle. The Appellants-claimants have claimed a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 towards compensation. The claim petition was filed u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The deceased was stated as an employee of a hotel belonging to Respondent No. 1. 2. The Respondent No. 1 in his counter-affidavit denied the employer-employee relationship between him and the deceased. According to him, the deceased was not employed in the 'Royal Fast Food' stated as owned by him. At the time of the accident, the Respondent No. 1 was only a student and the deceased took the motor cycle of the Respondent No. I for seeing cinema and the motor cycle is stated to have hit a scooter bearing registration No. KL 7-F 6350 and he died. It is alleged that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motor cycle by the deceased. The insurer, Respondent No. 2, contended that the accident was due to negligence of the rider of the motor cycle, viz., the deceased and that the claim petition was not maintainable u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was also contended that the death was due to collision between the motor cycle and the scooter and hence owner, rider and insurance company of the scooter were necessary parties. It was also contended that the deceased had no driving licence to ride the motor cycle. But it was admitted that the motor cycle was insured with Respondent No. 2. 3. In the additional written statement, they also contended that the policy was issued only to cover 'third party'. It was also contended that the deceased had no driving licence to ride the motor cycle. But it was admitted that the motor cycle was insured with Respondent No. 2. 3. In the additional written statement, they also contended that the policy was issued only to cover 'third party'. It is stated that since the deceased was the rider of the motor cycle, he cannot be considered as a third party and hence no compensation is payable. 4. The Tribunal framed necessary issues for trial as to whether the deceased sustained, serious injuries and whether the Appellants are entitled for compensation u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and if so, what is the quantum. The evidence consists of oral testimony of PWs 1 to 3 and documentary evidence, produced as Exhs. A1 to A12. None was examined from the side of the Respondents. There was no dispute that Petitioners-Appellants are legal heirs of the deceased Rasheed and that the deceased sustained injuries in a motor accident on 4.11.2002 at Chengamanad and died in the hospital. Exh. Al is the F.I.R. registered by the police. The inquest report prepared by the police would show that the deceased died in the motor accident on 4.11.2002. Exh. A2 is the scene mahazar prepared by the police, as per which, the road was having a width of 7.5 metres. Exh. A4 is the death certificate of the deceased. Exhs. A5 and A6 are copies of the inspection report of the vehicles involved in the accident. Exh. A8 is the copy of the driving licence of the deceased. It was after considering the above documentary evidence that the Tribunal entered into a finding that the death of Rasheed was in a motor accident. Gazette notification Exh. A7, shows that Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are the parents of the deceased. The Respondent No. 1, admittedly, is the owner of the motor cycle and Respondent No. 2 is the insurer. Exhs. B3 and B4 are copies of the policy and final report in the crime respectively. The insurance coverage is proved and admitted by Exh. B4. 5. Proceeding further, Claims Tribunal found that the deceased had no connection with the Petitioners-Appellants; that he had left the home about six years back and his whereabouts were not known to the father. Exhs. B3 and B4 are copies of the policy and final report in the crime respectively. The insurance coverage is proved and admitted by Exh. B4. 5. Proceeding further, Claims Tribunal found that the deceased had no connection with the Petitioners-Appellants; that he had left the home about six years back and his whereabouts were not known to the father. The inquest report shows that the statement given by the father to the police is true. This inquest report was produced by the Petitioners themselves. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the dependency factor is not proved. But considering the fact that Petitioners are relatives of the deceased, a nominal amount of Rs. 2,000 for funeral expenses and a further sum of Rs. 2,500 towards 'loss to the estate' were awarded. Besides the award amount of Rs. 4,500, a further amount of Rs. 5,000 was also awarded towards cost of the proceedings. Since the vehicle was covered by a valid policy, the insurer, Respondent No. 2, was directed to indemnify the insured. 6. Claimants-Appellants are aggrieved by the inadequate compensation awarded by the Tribunal, hence this appeal. Both the sides argued the matter at length touching various aspects of the matter. 7. Mrs. Preetha, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, contended that Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act being a provision for compensation under the structured formula, the Appellants are entitled for the amount as quantified in terms of Section 163-A; for which the Appellants need not prove any negligence. It is also contended that since the deceased was an employee under the Respondent No. 1, the deceased would be entitled for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act in terms of the proviso to Section 147 under the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, even if the deceased was riding the motor cycle, since the death occurred during the course of employment, the deceased is liable to be compensated under the said Act. Since the accident occurred while using the motor cycle, the Appellants-parents had an option to prefer the claim in terms of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and compensation be quantified adopting the structured formula. In this case, the victim of the accident died, whatever be the compensation payable to him under law, ought to have been paid to the parents of the deceased as they succeed to the estate of the deceased. In this case, the victim of the accident died, whatever be the compensation payable to him under law, ought to have been paid to the parents of the deceased as they succeed to the estate of the deceased. It is, therefore, contended that the dependency factor need not be proved in such a situation. She also placed reliance on some of the decisions of the Apex Court in this regard. 8. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the Respondent No. 2 contended that the Appellants did not adduce any cogent evidence to prove that deceased was employed in a hotel and that it was owned by the father of the Respondent No. 1. If so, in the absence of any evidence to prove that there was employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the Respondent No. 1, the Appellants cannot be heard to contend that the deceased will be entitled to any compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. If so, this has to be treated as a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act and since the deceased was driving the vehicle, it is a 'self-accident' and, therefore, no compensation is payable. He also placed reliance on charge-sheet, Exh. B4, to contend that in the absence of any employer-employee relationship, the accident cannot be treated as one arising in the course of employment. As contended by the Respondent No. 1, the deceased had only borrowed the vehicle for personal use of the deceased. In the said circumstances, the Appellants are to be non-suited and no liability can be fastened on the insurance company. Insofar as the motor vehicle in question was driven by deceased himself, he cannot be treated as a 'third party' and in the said circumstances, in the absence of any offending vehicle, no fault can be lodged against any other vehicle, since the fault, if any, is that of the deceased himself. In the absence of any liability on the Respondent No. 1 to compensate, the insurance company in turn has no contractual liability to indemnify the Respondent No. 1. 9. In the absence of any liability on the Respondent No. 1 to compensate, the insurance company in turn has no contractual liability to indemnify the Respondent No. 1. 9. Before we consider the legal contentions raised before us, we shall first consider as to whether the Appellants could prove, based on materials on record, that the deceased was employed in the hotel by name 'Royal Fast Food' and whether it was owned by the Respondent No. 1 and further whether any employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the Respondent No. 1 could be established in the case. 10. PW 2 is Kunhumuhammed. He has deposed that Rasheed, the deceased, was working in the hotel by name 'Royal Fast Food', adjacent to his own shop. According to him, that hotel was run by Shaffin and he is the Respondent No. 1 in this case. Shaffin's father is Abdul Khader. PW 2 is the owner of the building where the hotel is functioning. According to him, he has rented out the building to Shaffin, Respondent No. 1. The deceased was doing almost every work in the hotel and he also used to go for purchasing things required for the hotel. PW 2 is running a bakery. One Sakheer is running a telephone booth near the shop of PW 2. On the eventful day, when the accident took place, he deposed that he saw the deceased travelling on the motorbike. He also stated that Shaffin had told him that an amount of Rs. 4,000 way being given to him as wages. The hotel building was given on rent on daily basis. There was no written rent deed, the building was given on rent four years back and at that time, Shaffin was aged 18. Shaffin's father also used to sit in the hotel. PW 2 was cross-examined by the Respondent No. 1. He deposed that he was not aware as to how the accident took place and he has only 'hearsay' information regarding the accident; that the building was given on rent five years back; that there are seven rooms in the building; that for every building there is a rent deed and for some of the rooms, rent deed was also executed. But for the rooms given to Sakheer who was running a telephone booth as also to the Respondent No. 1, there is no written agreement. But for the rooms given to Sakheer who was running a telephone booth as also to the Respondent No. 1, there is no written agreement. In the cross-examination by the Respondent No. 2, he deposed that it was the Respondent No. 1 who told him that an amount of Rs. 4,000 was being paid by way of salary and since Shaffin was his neighbour, there was no necessity for him to utter a lie in this regard. 11. PW 3 is Sakheer who is running a telephone booth in a room, owned by the PW 2 in the same building. He deposed that he knew Rasheed alias Hamsa; that Royal Fast Food was a hotel run by Shaffin; that Hamsa was employed in the hotel; that it was while travelling on the Bullet bike to market that the accident occurred; that the deceased was working in the hotel for about 5 years; that his telephone booth was in the third room in the building; and that the motorbike was owned by the hotel owner, the Respondent No. 1. In the cross-examination by the Respondent No. 1, he stated that he was not aware as to whether every one has executed any rent deed. As far as his shop is concerned, he was paying Rs. 350 per month towards rent. There was no cross-examination by the Respondent No. 2. 12. PW 1, the father of the deceased, also deposed that his son, the deceased Rasheed alias Hamsa, was employed in the hotel by name, 'Royal Fast Food'. While both the owner and the deceased together travelled on the motorbike for purchasing things for the hotel, the scooter which was going ahead of the motorbike made a sudden turn, the motorcyclist applied brakes and as a result the vehicle skidded and fell down. He did not depose the actual salary received by the deceased, but according to him, it will be Rs. 4,000 to Rs. 5,000. He also deposed that the deceased was a permanent employee in the hotel; that he was not married and was aged 29 years at the time of death and that he possessed valid driving licence for riding the motorbike. It is through him that Exhs. Al to A8 were marked. He denied the statement that the accident occurred while the deceased was travelling on the bike while going to the cinema theatre. It is through him that Exhs. Al to A8 were marked. He denied the statement that the accident occurred while the deceased was travelling on the bike while going to the cinema theatre. In the cross-examination by the Respondent No. 1, he deposed that he was not in possession of any document to show that his son was employed in the hotel; but he denied the statement that at the time of accident, the Respondent No. 1 was studying in the Engineering College. He also denied the statement that the Respondent No. 1 was not managing the hotel and the suggestion that his son was not employed therein. 13. The material evidence to prove that the hotel was run by the Respondent No. 1 is that of Kunhumuhammed, PW 2. One of the rooms, in a row of seven rooms in the building owned by him, was let out to the Respondent No. 1 for running a hotel. He also admits that in case of the Respondent No. 1 as also PW 3, Sakheer, there was no rent agreement executed. He being the owner of the building and in the absence of any other contra evidence adduced in the case, we do not find any reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW 2. As a matter of fact, in his cross-examination by the Respondent No. 1 no suggestion was made to him as to whether the hotel was run by the father of Respondent No. 1 or that the building was let out to the Respondent No. 1's father. The dispute, if any, is only as to whether the Respondent No. 1 or his father was running the hotel. As against the plea raised by the Appellants that the hotel was run by the Respondent No. 1, supported by the oral testimony of PWs 2 and 3, though the Respondent No. 1 denied the same in his written statement and pleaded that it is his father who was running the hotel, no documentary evidence was adduced by him to prove that licence for running the hotel, if any, was issued in the name of the father. Further, the Respondent No. 1 did not enter the witness-box to give evidence in support of his plea raised. Therefore, considering these circumstances, we find that the hotel by name 'Royal Fast Food' was run by Respondent No. 1. 14. Further, the Respondent No. 1 did not enter the witness-box to give evidence in support of his plea raised. Therefore, considering these circumstances, we find that the hotel by name 'Royal Fast Food' was run by Respondent No. 1. 14. The next question is as to whether the deceased was employed by the Respondent No. 1. The evidence of PWs 1 to 3 supports the case of the Appellants that the deceased, during the relevant time, was employed in the hotel belonging to the Respondent No. 1. There is no contra evidence adduced in the case. As already stated above, Respondent No. 1 was not even prepared to mount the witness-box to deny that the deceased was not employed by him or by his father. In the circumstances, we find that based on the evidence, as discussed above, the fact that the deceased was employed in the hotel by the Respondent No. 1 also stands proved. 15. Now we come to the legal question as to whether the deceased is entitled to be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act, for short Section 2(1)(n) of the Act reads as follows: (n) 'workman' means any person who is-- xxx xxx xxx (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of His Majesty's naval, military or air forces [sic the Armed Forces of the Union]; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead, include a reference to his dependants or any of them. 16. 16. As per Second Schedule to the Act, any person employed, otherwise than in a clerical capacity, in any premises wherein or within the precincts whereof a manufacturing process as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, is being carried on, or in any kind of work whatsoever incidental to or connected with any such manufacturing process or with the article made (whether or not employment in any such work is within such premises or precincts) and steam, water or other mechanical power or electrical power is used, is a workman, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act. 17. Therefore, we have to consider whether a hotel is a place where any manufacturing process is carried on, as defined in Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act. Section 2(k) of the Factories Act reads as follows: (k) 'manufacturing process' means any process for-- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal; 18. In P. Laxmana Rao and Sons v. Additional Inspector of Factories, 1959 1 LLJ 5, Andhra Pradesh High Court had considered the question as to whether preparation of foodstuff, coffee and eatables for serving to customers in a restaurant is 'manufacturing process' within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act. It was held that though at the first blush, it might seem incongruous that a culinary process should be regarded as a 'manufacturing process', yet the language employed in Section 2(k) of Factories Act is wide enough to include the process of preparing foodstuffs and other eatables supplied to customers in a restaurant. It does satisfy the test of "making, altering or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale or disposal". 19. In G.L. Hotels Limited and Others Vs. T.C. Sarin and Another, (1993) 4 SCC 363 the point involved was as to whether the hotel run by Appellants therein is a factory within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and hence covered by Section 1(4) of the said Act. 19. In G.L. Hotels Limited and Others Vs. T.C. Sarin and Another, (1993) 4 SCC 363 the point involved was as to whether the hotel run by Appellants therein is a factory within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 and hence covered by Section 1(4) of the said Act. The main contention of the hoteliers was that the entire premises of the hotel cannot be treated as 'factory' within the meaning of the said section, merely because the process of cooking food is carried on in its kitchen which forms only a part of the said premises. It was not disputed, though vehement arguments were raised before the court, that kitchen is a 'factory' since a manufacturing process within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Factories Act is carried on there. It was further stated that the activities which are carried on in the rest of the premises of the hotel must have a connection with the activity carried on in the kitchen, and since there is no such connection, the definition of 'factory' should not be extended to the other premises of the hotel. In this connection, the Apex Court held that the nature of the connection with the rest of the premises so as to constitute the entire premises as a factory need not be there in all respects, and only a broad connection is sufficient. The activities in the kitchen and in the rest of the premises of a hotel have such a connection and hence a hotel is a factory and is covered by Section 1(4) of the Employees' State Insurance Act. 20. It may be noticed in this connection that for the limited purpose of considering as to whether there is any manufacturing process in a hotel, it is not necessary that there is any power used. Then the only other question is whether he is a workman. As per Schedule II to Section 2(1)(n) of the Act, it is sufficient, if the employment is not in clerical capacity and is employed in any premises, where any manufacturing process is carried out, as defined under Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act. We have already extracted the above section. As per Schedule II to Section 2(1)(n) of the Act, it is sufficient, if the employment is not in clerical capacity and is employed in any premises, where any manufacturing process is carried out, as defined under Clause (k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act. We have already extracted the above section. Therefore, in view of the above definition and following the above decisions cited, it has to be held that a hotel is a premises wherein manufacturing process as defined u/s 2(k) of the Factories Act is being carried out and deceased was a workman within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 21. The evidence, as discussed above, clearly shows that it was while proceeding to buy articles for the hotel that the deceased met with the accident, and that the motorbike on which the deceased travelled belonged to the owner of the hotel, the Respondent No. 1. Therefore, the accident occurred while he was in the course of his employment. 22. Now, turning to the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reads as follows: 147. Therefore, the accident occurred while he was in the course of his employment. 22. Now, turning to the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reads as follows: 147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.--(1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which-- (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)-- (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required-- (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee-- (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. So, however, as per the proviso to Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, a policy shall not be required to cover the liability in respect of a death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee, engaged in driving the vehicle or; if it is a public service vehicle, engaged as conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle or; if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or; to cover any contractual liability. It has been found that the liability arises under Workmen's Compensation Act to compensate the deceased by the employer in terms of the provisions contained in the said Act, but as far as the policy is concerned, such a policy needs be issued to cover an employee who is engaged in driving the vehicle. Insofar as the term 'engaged' in driving the vehicle is not restricted to a driver 'employed', the expression 'engaged' need not and cannot confine to cases of a regular employment, and will extend to any person 'engaged' by the owner to drive the vehicle. It is also not necessary that the vehicle involved should be a public carrier vehicle. Since the liability to pay compensation, if the death occurs in the course of employment, arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the only other condition to be satisfied so as to attract the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act is that such a person should have driven the vehicle, with authority. 23. When the owner himself has permitted the employee to travel on the motorbike for attending to the work connected with employment, the mere fact that he was self-driving the vehicle will not take his case out of the expression 'engaged in driving the vehicle' used in Clause (a) of proviso (i) to Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Being a two-wheeler and since the deceased was permitted to ride the motorbike for attending to the work connected with the establishment and thus he was 'engaged' in driving the vehicle at the time of accident. Being a two-wheeler and since the deceased was permitted to ride the motorbike for attending to the work connected with the establishment and thus he was 'engaged' in driving the vehicle at the time of accident. Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act gives an option regarding the claims for compensation in certain cases. That is a non obstante clause, which has an overriding effect over the Workmen's Compensation Act. If the death or bodily injury arises out of an accident, a person has option to prefer the claim either under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under Motor Vehicles Act, but not under both. Therefore, in this case, the accident occurred as a user of the motor cycle; that the deceased was riding the motor cycle and he was 'engaged' to drive the vehicle; that he is found entitled to be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act and, therefore, this is a case where the claim for compensation arises under both the enactments. Hence, the Appellants had option to choose either of these two enactments. The Appellants having chosen to file an application u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the only other question to be considered is as to what is the compensation payable under the said provision. 24. Before we proceed further, we have yet to dispose of another contention raised by the insurance company. According to them, this being an accident arising out of user of a motor vehicle, self-driven by the deceased, there arises no liability to compensate. In this connection, the insurance company has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Vijayarajan and Others, (2010) ACJ 280 That was a case where deceased was not the owner of the motorbike in question and he borrowed the said bike from its real owner. It was held that the deceased cannot be held to be an 'employee' of the owner of the motorbike, although he was authorised to drive the said vehicle by its owner and, therefore, he would have stepped into shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle, who could not claim compensation u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, unless it is covered by a policy wherein such liabilities are undertaken. 25. 25. It is true that if the claim did not arise under Workmen's Compensation Act and if the claim has to be independently considered under the Motor Vehicles Act only, as held by this Court in Vijayarajan's case (supra), following the decision of the Apex Court in Ningamma and Another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2009) 13 SCC 710 the claimants, in such a situation, may not be entitled to claim compensation u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. But by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as referred to earlier, an 'employee' who is liable to be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act is liable to be covered by a policy of insurance, if he is engaged in driving the vehicle. Therefore, in the case on hand, the facts are quite distinguishable and even the Division Bench has noticed that the deceased therein cannot be held to be an employee of the owner of the motor vehicle, but the deceased in this case was an employee under the owner of the vehicle and he was employed in a hotel belonging to the Respondent No. 1, who also happened to be the owner of the vehicle. 26. In the factual situation, as narrated above, we find that the Appellants are entitled to be compensated in terms of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, the Tribunal did not quantify the amount, but proceeded on the basis that the compensation will be payable, only if dependency is proved. In a case where a person dies as a result of the user of the motor vehicle, the claim of the legal heirs is not based on the dependency factor, as representatives who stepped into the shoes of the estate of the deceased. In Smt. Manjuri Bera Vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and Another, (2007) 10 SCC 643 the Supreme Court held that even if there was no dependency, the Appellants are entitled to compensation under the no fault liability, as the legal representatives. 27. True, that the above claim arose u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. But it is contended that same principles should be extended to a claim u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as well. 27. True, that the above claim arose u/s 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. But it is contended that same principles should be extended to a claim u/s 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as well. However, it is not necessary to consider in this case as to whether Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act will apply by extending the same principles arising in a claim u/s 140 of the Act. Here the word 'dependant' itself is defined under the Workmen's Compensation Act. So, if the claimants fall under the definition of the term 'dependant' then a further proof of dependency does not arise. When the legislature by its wisdom has chosen to define the term, all that is required to be shown is that the claimant is 'dependant' as defined. The same is not to be adjudicated further. So the Tribunal was not right in rejecting the application on the ground of absence of economic dependency. In the absence of any argument raised or considered, we leave the actual amount to be awarded to be considered by the Tribunal at the first instance. 28. We may, at the risk of repetition, state that a claim for compensation arising both under the Workmen's Compensation Act as also under the Motor Vehicles Act and the option having been exercised u/s 167 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, legal compensation payable should have been worked out. That does not depend upon the dependability factor at all. The liability to pay compensation having arisen under the Workmen's Compensation Act and in this case when accident occurred as a result of the user of the motor vehicle, the further question as to whether the Appellants were dependent on the deceased will not arise. As we have already pointed out, such question may arise in a case where the claim rests mainly on the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. But when the claim having been proved to be sustained under Workmen's Compensation Act and an option u/s 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act having been given to the claimants, it is impermissible to reject the claim on the ground of non-proof of dependency. Otherwise, it will nullify the effect of Section 147 read with Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Otherwise, it will nullify the effect of Section 147 read with Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act. All that is to be proved in a situation where the deceased is an employee entitled to be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation Act is to show that he died as a result of a motor accident. Once both these factors have been proved, necessarily, instead of working out the compensation payable under Workmen's Compensation Act, the option is available to claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. In such cases, it is not necessary to prove dependency factor and the Tribunal ought to have quantified the amount as available to the claimants under the law. 29. In such circumstances, we set aside the award passed by Claims Tribunal and remand the case to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, in accordance with law, and subject to what is stated above. 30. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 22.10.2009. Registry is directed to send back the records to the Tribunal immediately.