JUDGEMENT Mihir Kumar Jha, J. 1. Heard Dr. S.N. Jha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the State. 2. The prayer of the writ petitioner in this writ application is as follows: "(1) That this writ application is directed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the office order bearing Letter No. 396 dt. 11.2.2004, issued by Executive Engineer, Flood Control Division No. 1, Jhanjharpur and further for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to not interfere with function and duty of petitioners on the post of Correspondence Clerks, upon which they are working since 1981." 3. it is not in dispute that the petitioners were only engaged on daily wage and were later on brought in work charge establishment. The State Government by a policy decision dated 19.2.1981 had formulated a scheme for absorption of such continuing Class-Ill and Class-IV employees in the work charge establishment into regular establishment. Said scheme is Annexure-A to the counter affidavit which would go to show that absorption/regularization was possible only against equivalent posts. There was no concept of promotion at the time of regularization from Class IV posts to Class III posts nor possessing of academic qualification of the concerned class-IV employee in the work charge establishment could weigh for regularization against a Class-Ill post. That being the scheme of regularization, petitioners regularization on Class-Ill posts contrary to scheme was itself illegal. In fact, the Government also immediately within a span of two years had clarified that if any person from Class-IV work charge establishment was regularized as Class-Ill employees in terms of the aforesaid scheme on 19.2.1981 that should be cancelled and regularization should be made only on a Class-IV posts. This clarification of the Government dated 2.4.1983 (Annexure-B) therefore left nothing for the field officials to take a contrary view. Unfortunately in complete defiance of the Government decision in the scheme dated 19.2.1981, by an order dated 29.8.1981 the petitioners working as peon in the work charge establishment were absorbed on the post of clerk. Such absorption has been only cancelled by the impugned order on the ground that the same was not in consonance with the policy of the State Government. 4. Dr. Such absorption has been only cancelled by the impugned order on the ground that the same was not in consonance with the policy of the State Government. 4. Dr. Jha, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would not contend that the said scheme of regularization of the year 1981 had ever envisaged even regularization of Class-IV work charge establishment employee against Class-Ill posts but then he would contend that the petitioners have continued against Class-Ill posts at least for a period of more than 23 years and as such the impugned order even passed at a very belated stage was fit to be set aside especially when no departmental proceeding was conducted before passing the order of their reversion. In this context he has placed an unreported judgment of this court dated 30.6.2006 passed in CWJC No. 5467 of 2004 (Medha Nand Ray vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.). 5. Counsel for the State on the other hand with reference to the pleadings in the counter affidavit averments whereof has also not been controverted by the petitioners by filing a rejoinder, would submit that not only the Government policy of regularization dated 19.2.1981 was flouted by the Field Officials/Executive Engineer in regularizing the service of the petitioners but also the subsequent order issued by the State Government dated 2.4.1983 was not complied. He would further submit that continuation of the petitioners even at the behest of the Field Officer cannot bind the State Government and therefore the impugned order passed at a belated stage should not be interfered specially when such decision has been taken as follow up measure in the judgment passed by this Court upholding such reversal. 6. In this context, counsel for the State has referred two unreported judgments in the case of Shashi Bhushan Singh vs. the State of Bihar & Ors., CWJC No. 1342 of 1999 and CWJC No. 1374 of 1999 as also yet another case of Kushum Lal Mehta vs. State of Bihar & Ors., CWJC No. 199 of 1999 disposed of on 3.7.2003. 7. 7. In view of the fact that the petitioners have not tried to even make an attempt to justify their regularization and in fact even in the show cause reply to the notice issued to them for reverting and also they did not choose to contend that such regularization from Class-IV work charge establishment to Class-Ill regular establishment was permissible. This Court must held that the petitioners did not have any right for being regularized against the higher posts. The only submission on behalf of the petitioners that they have been continued for very long span of time in fact has been answered by this court in the case of Shashi Bhushan Singh (supra) where an exactly identical argument was answered in the following terms: "Counsel for the petitioners do not contend that the adjustment/absorption of Class-IV employees of work charged establishment against Class-Ill post in the regular establishment was permissible. That they contend is that having adjusted have two decades at the fag end of their service they should not be reverted to lower post. Reference is made to the case of Union of India Others vs. Kishorilal Sablani, AIR 1999 SC 517 . It is also submitted that in terms of the letter no. 941 dated 19.2.1981, adjustment on the basis of qualification was permissible and thus those possessed requisite qualification could be absorbed/adjusted against Class-Ill post. The later submission in my opinion, is based on misreading of the letter dated 19.2.1981. The said letter provides for constitution of Committee at the level of Chief Engineer for appointment/promotion/regularization of the employee appointed upto 21.8.1975 on the basis of qualification and eligibility. This only means that those who did not possess the requisite qualification could not be adjusted/absorbed. It cannot be read to mean that those working on Class-IV posts could be adjusted/absorbed against Class-Ill post on the ground that they possessed the qualification for the post. It is true that action has been taken at a very late stage. The respondents should have taken steps to revert the petitioners soon after adjustment/absorption were made. However, according to the respondents, the particular instance which is subject matter of this case, could not come to the notice of the authorities and, therefore, order could not be passed earlier. It is true that action has been taken at a very late stage. The respondents should have taken steps to revert the petitioners soon after adjustment/absorption were made. However, according to the respondents, the particular instance which is subject matter of this case, could not come to the notice of the authorities and, therefore, order could not be passed earlier. In the past all such persons who were absorbed against higher post, have been reverted to lower post on which they were initially appointed in the work charged establishment and it would be not proper to pass a different order in the case of the petitioner. I find substance in the contention of the respondents passing a different order in the case of the petitioners would result in giving a dis-similar treatment to similarly situate person. As indicated above, it is not the case of the petitioners that absorption/adjustment of a Class-IV employees in work charged establishment against Class-IV post in regular establishment was permissible. The absorption against the post of Blue Printer/Typist, thus being contrary to the Government order then reversion cannot be said to be illegal and arbitrary." 8. Almost identical view has been taken by this Court in other order of this Court dated 3.7.2003 in Kushum Lal Mehtas case (supra). 9. This Court, however, must consider the judgment of Medha Nand Ray (supra) where the learned Single Judge has proceeded to decide the question only on the issue of delay in passing the impugned order of reversal. The earlier cases decided to contrary have been simply stated without referring much less considering them on the ground that earlier a Division Bench in LPA No. 330 of 1998 had refused to interfere against an order of learned Single Judge as with regard to not permitting the reopening of the absorption after 16 years. In the said judgment of Medha Nand Ray (supra) learned Single Judge did not address, himself to the scheme of regularization dated 19.2.1981 or the impermissibility of such regularization of a Class-IV work charge employee in regular establishment on Class-Ill post. In this view of the matter, judgment of Medha Nand Ray (supra) is simply per incurium as if it has failed to consider relevant statute (the policy decision of the State Government). In this view of the matter, judgment of Medha Nand Ray (supra) is simply per incurium as if it has failed to consider relevant statute (the policy decision of the State Government). Additionally this Court would find that all these judgments including one in the case of Medha Nand Ray (supra) can no longer be treated to be precedent in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. vs. Uma Devi (3) & Ors. reported in (2006)4 SCC 1 [: 2006(2) PLJR (SC) 363] wherein the earlier judgments laying down the law contrary to the judgment of Uma Devi have been denuded of the precedential value. The Apex Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra) in fact as with regard to the plea of long continuation, an aspect repeatedly emphasized by Dr. Jha, learned counsel for the petitioner had held as follows: "Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee, if it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as "litigious employment in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The Courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates." 10. Reference at this stage may also be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in Pinaki Chatterjee vs. Union of India & Ors., (2009)5 SCC 193 and General Manger, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs. Laxmi Devi & Ors. Reference at this stage may also be made to the decisions of the Apex Court in Pinaki Chatterjee vs. Union of India & Ors., (2009)5 SCC 193 and General Manger, Uttaranchal Jal Sansthan vs. Laxmi Devi & Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 205 where the Apex Court has followed Uma Devis case (supra) and declared that regularization cannot be granted if the same would have the effect of violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 11. The submission of Dr. Jha that departmental proceeding alone could have led to reversion seems to be an argument of desperation. It is not the case of the petitioners that they were entitled for such regularization in Class-III posts or the Government had given any opportunity to Field Officials to do the needful because of absence of suitable number of employees for Class-Ill posts rather from the scheme of regularization, it would appear that a large number of persons of Class-Ill and Class-IV work charge establishment were still waiting for their regularization. The Government had put a cut-off date and strictly the number of such employees for their absorption on equivalent posts. 12. In this view of the matter, when the petitioners even did not choose to dispute the fact in their show-cause reply, it cannot be said that a departmental proceeding in terms of Classification Appeal Rules was necessary. 13. The petitioners have already retired and there is no prayer in this writ application for staying the recovery. The order was passed way back in the year 2004 and no interim order was passed in this case and therefore after a lapse of more than 5 years this Court would not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order which has already been given effect to. 14. Considering all the aforesaid aspect of the matter, this Court would find no error in the impugned order and consequently, this application must be and is hereby dismissed.