( 1 ) THIS Criminal Appeal under Section 378 (4)of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short "cr. P. C"), is filed by the petitioner against the judgment dated 13-5-2003 in criminal Appeal No. 126 of 2001 passed by the learned V Additional Sessions Judge, (Fast track Court), Ranga Reddy District, whereunder and whereby the conviction of respondent No. 1 - accused of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short 'the NI Act') and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six (6) months recorded in the judgment dated 19-9-2001 in C. C. No. 573 of2001 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First class, Special Mobile Court, Ranga Reddy district, were reversed. ( 2 ) THE brief facts that are necessary for disposal of this appeal may be stated as follows: it is alleged that respondent No. 1 herein- accused borrowed an amount of rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs. 75,000/- on 2-5-1995 and 17-6-1995 respectively from the complainant, petitioner herein, and executed two promissory notes. To discharge the said debt, the accused issued two cheques for rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs. 75,000/- on 04-12-1997 drawn on State Bank of India, HAL campus, hyderabad in favour of the complainant. When the cheques were presented for realization, they were returned for the reason insufficient funds. Then the complainant got issued the statutory legal notice on 8-12-1997, for which the accused gave a reply on 22-12-1997 disowning the liability. Therefore, the complainant filed the present complaint against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. ( 3 ) WHEN the accused was examined under section 251 Cr. P. C. for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 4 ) TO substantiate the case of the complainant, P. W. 1 was examined and exs. P-l to P-10 were marked. After closure of the evidence on complainant's side, the accused was examined under Section 313 of cr. P. C. with regard to incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence of witnesses, for which he denied the same. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the accused, D. W. I was examined and got marked Exs. D-l and D-2. After closure of the evidence on complainant's side, the accused was examined under Section 313 of cr. P. C. with regard to incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence of witnesses, for which he denied the same. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the accused, D. W. I was examined and got marked Exs. D-l and D-2. ( 6 ) THE trial Court after considering the evidence on record, came to the concision that the accused gave the cheques in question towards discharge of legally enforceable doubt and that as per the suggestions given to P. W. 1, the accused received the statutory legal notice on 10-12-1997, the complaint was within time and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him. On appeal, the appellate court came to the conclusion that Exs. P-l and P-2 cheques were issued towards discharge of legally enforceable debt i. e. to discharge the amounts take, but the complaint is barred by limitation as the compliant is filed beyond the time, as there was no evidence to show that the accused received the statutory notice issued by the complainant under Section 138 of the N. I. Act and accordingly, acquitted him. Challenging the same, the present appeal is filed by the complainant. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant-complainant contended that the complainant filed the complaint within the statutory period of limitation and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned judgment. ( 8 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 - accused contended that well reasoned findings of the first appellate court need no interference and hence prays to dismiss the present appeal. ( 9 ) NOW the point for determination is whether the judgment of the first appellate court is correct, legal and proper? ( 10 ) IN dealing with the appeals against the acquittal, though, the appellate court has got full power to re-appreciate the evidence, but ordinarily, the appellate Court would be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal not for the reason that it has no power to re-appreciate the evidence but for the reason that the accused is presumed to be innocent unless contrary is proved. That presumption is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse or contrary to law or not based upon any admissible evidence, ordinarily this Court would not interfere with the same. That presumption is further strengthened by the order of acquittal. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse or contrary to law or not based upon any admissible evidence, ordinarily this Court would not interfere with the same. ( 11 ) THE concurrent findings of the two courts below with regard to accused borrowing Rs. 1,75,000/- under Exs. P-7 and p-8 two promissory notes on 17-6-1995 and 2-5-1995 respectively, remained unchallenged. Similarly, the findings of the trial Court as well as the appellate Court with regard to issuance of Exs. P-l and P-2 cheques for discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability remained unchallenged. Therefore, there is no need to re-appreciate the evidence with regard to such concurrent findings of the Courts below. Even otherwise, the evidence of P. W. 1 that the accused borrowed a sum of Rs. , 1,00,000/- under ex. P-8 dated 2-5-1995 and Rs. 75,000/- under ex. P-7 dated 17-6-1995and that, to discharge the said debt, he issued two cheques exs. P-l and P-2, remained unchallenged. Once, the initial burden stands on the complainant stood discharged, the burden shifts on the accused under Section 139 of the n. I. Act and if the accused has not discharged the said burden, the presumption can be drawn. If the presumption is drawn, it can be said that the cheques in question were given towards discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability. Therefore, bothh the Courts below have rightly held that Exs. P-l and P-2 cheques were given by the accused to the complainant for discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability. ( 12 ) COMING to the limitation aspect, clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the n. I. Act reads as follows: "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. Therefore, bothh the Courts below have rightly held that Exs. P-l and P-2 cheques were given by the accused to the complainant for discharge of legally enforceable debt or liability. ( 12 ) COMING to the limitation aspect, clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the n. I. Act reads as follows: "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. , of funds in the account:- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: provided that nothing contained in this sections hall apply unless - (a) xxx (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) xxx ( 13 ) THE above provisions makes it clear that within 15 days of the receipt of the notice the amount covered by cheque has to be paid. If the accused fails to pay the amount within 15 days, the cause of action arises from the 16th day onwards. Under Clause (b) of section 142 of the N. LAct, a complaint can be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the n. I. Act. ( 14 ) IN this case, admittedly, the complainant has not produced any postal receipt. According to him, he issued Ex. ( 14 ) IN this case, admittedly, the complainant has not produced any postal receipt. According to him, he issued Ex. P-5 legal notice on 8-12-1997. There is no evidence to show when the accused actually received the notice. The purposeof giving thenotice is to enable the accused to pay the amount due to the complainant. When a question was put to P. W. 1, with regard to receipt of notice, p. W. 1 stated that he was not aware the accused received the notice on 10-12-1997. Similarly, counsel for accused gave a specific suggestion to P. W. 1 to the effect that the notice gotissued by him (P. W. 1) was received by the accused on 19-12-1997. So, from the evidence of P. W. 1, with reference to the cross examination done by the accused, it can be safely said that the accused must have received the notice on 10-12-1997. That appears to be more possible because P. W. 1 got issued Ex. P-5 on 8-12-1997. If the same was taken into consideration, the accused has to pay the amount covered under exs. P-1 and P-2 cheques on or before 25-12-1997. If the accused fails to pay that amount on or before 25-12-1997, the cause of action arises from 26-12-1997 onwards for the complainant to lodge a complaint. But the same has to be filed within one month. If the date 26-12-1997 is taken into consideration, the complaint has to be filed on or before 26-1-1998. It is not in dispute that admittedly, the complaint was filed on 27-1-1998, as 26-1-1998 happened to be republic Day. The Court can take judicial note of the fact that 26-1-1998 was a public holiday. Such is the case, the complainant can lodge the complaint on the next working day i. e. , 27-1-1998. Therefore, the complaint was filed well within time and the same is not barred by limitation. But, the finding of the appellate Court is that: "from the above authority, it is clear that when the notice issued under ex. P-5 dated 8-12-1997 it shall be deemed to have been received by the accused on 10-12-1997 or 11-12-1997. If such is the case, the accused must have complied within 15 days thereafter, which comes to 25-12-1997 or 26-12-1997. Since the accused failed to repay the amount, the complaint should be filed within 30 days from 25-12-1997 or 26-12-1997. P-5 dated 8-12-1997 it shall be deemed to have been received by the accused on 10-12-1997 or 11-12-1997. If such is the case, the accused must have complied within 15 days thereafter, which comes to 25-12-1997 or 26-12-1997. Since the accused failed to repay the amount, the complaint should be filed within 30 days from 25-12-1997 or 26-12-1997. In this case, the complaint was filed on 27-1-1998 which was beyond 30 days period as provided under Section 142 of the n. I. Act. " ( 15 ) HAVING come to such a conclusion that the accused might have received the notice on 10-12-1997, it came to conclusion that complaint is barred by limitation. If the finding of appellate Court is taken into consideration, cause of action arose even from 26-12-1997 onwards, the complaint has to be filed within one month thereafter. If one month is taken, the complaint has to be filed on or before 26-1-1998. Since 26-1-1998 happened to be a public holiday, the complaint can be filed on the next working day. Therefore, the finding of the appellate court is perverse, as it has not properly calculated the period of limitation. Hence, the impugned judgment is set aside and the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. Considering the fact that the transaction relates to the year 1997, at this point of time, it is not desirable to send the accused to jail. However, he can be ordered to pay the compensation. ( 16 ) IN the result, the accused is found guilty of the offence punishable under section 138 of the N. I. Act, accordingly convicted and sentenced to pay a compensation of Rs. 3,50,000/- (Rupees three lakhs and fifty thousand only) within a period of six (6) weeks from today, failing which, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six (6) months. ( 17 ) THE Criminal Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. Appeal is accordingly allowed