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2009 DIGILAW 913 (BOM)

R. R. Tripathi v. Union of India

2009-07-23

KUMAR SWATANTER, S.C.DHARMADHIKARI

body2009
JUDGMENT KUMAR SWATANTER, C.J.: - Heard. Rule in both the writ petitions. By consent, I the rule in both the writ petitions made returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service. By consent, both the petitions are taken up for hearing and final disposal at the admission stage itself. 2. In both the above writ petitions, the petitioners primarily question the order of extension of service of the Chief Secretary, State of Maharashtra, Mumbai, vide order dated 30th May, 2009 Exhibit-A. Writ Petition No. 3568 of 2009 had been filed at Aurangabad Bench of this High Court, while Writ Petition Lodging No. 63 of 2009 has been filed at the Principal Bench. Vide order dated 17th June, 2009, both these petitions were ordered to be listed and heard together as common question of law is raised in these petitions and somewhat common reliefs are sought. Thus, by this judgment, we will dispose of both the petitions together. 3. The petitioners in both these petitions claim to be public spirited persons. one is a Journalist and Social Worker, while the other was Social Journalist in the past and is Lawyer at present and both of them, in the past, have taken up various issues of public importance by filing public interest litigations in the Courts. Shri Johny Joseph, the Chief Secretary of the State of Maharashtra is stated to have attained the age of 60 years on 29th May, 2009, his date of birth being 29th May, 1949. Upon attaining that age, he would superannuate from the service on 30th May, 2009. However, the Union of India upon recommendation of the State of Maharashtra through the Principal Secretary, General administrative Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai, extended the period of superannualon of the said respondent. In Writ Petition No. 3568 of 2009, the petitioner thus challenges the impugned order of extension on the ground that the same is not in public interest and is even contrary to the judgment of the High Court dated 29th April, 2009 passed in PIL No. 85 of 2008. According to this petitioners, the extension is only for political reason and is not covered under Rule 16(1) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said "Rules") and no extension in any case could be granted exceeding a period of three months even in public interest. According to this petitioners, the extension is only for political reason and is not covered under Rule 16(1) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the said "Rules") and no extension in any case could be granted exceeding a period of three months even in public interest. Thus, it is prayed that this order be set aside, eligible officers from the IAS existing cadre should be considered for being selected to the post of Chief Secretary, Maharashtra State and the extension order should not be given effect to. 4. While in Writ Petition (L) No. 63 of 2009, the petitioner desires to impugn the order of extension dated 30th May, 2009 and has also taken up a plea that it is not covered under the said Rules . He has also taken up the point that the Government Notification issued by the State, dated 30th May, 2005 though contempl11tes extension of service but it is for a very limited period, if the officer is dealing with the Budget Work or is working as Full Time Member of the committee to be wound up soon. No such circumstances existed under the present case and as such extension to the said respondent ought not to have been granted. Reliance was placed on the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of (R.R. Tripathi Vs. Union of India)1, 2008(4) Bom.C.R. 688 (O.S.). 5. The petitioner has also raised a vague challenge to the notification issued by the Government vide which third proviso was added to Rule 16 dealing with the extension, of tenure of the Chief Secretary as being irregular and without mandatory consultation with other States, and therefore, being void and ineffective in law. The grounds taken up in this petition in addition to the grounds taken in the other petition are that the other eligible officers are deprived of proper consideration which affects moral of service cadre by undue and unjustified extension. According to the petitioner, no proper proposal, as required under the Rules and the Appendix to those Rules, was made by the State Government and approval of the Central Government is unreasoned without basis and is made in undue haste. According to the petitioner, no proper proposal, as required under the Rules and the Appendix to those Rules, was made by the State Government and approval of the Central Government is unreasoned without basis and is made in undue haste. Relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in R.R. Tripathi's case (supra), it is contended that the action of the State and the Union of India is discriminatory and arbitrarily. 6. The respondents produced the original records in the Court being .the me containing the noting and decisions resulting in the passing of extension order in favour of the private respondent and argued that there is hardly any challenge to the Notification issued by the Central Government adding third Proviso to Rule 16 as the Notification itself opens with the words "the Central Government, after consultation with the Government of the States concerned hereby makes the following rules to amend the All India Services (Death-Cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. 7. Thus, the Notification is neither bad in law nor suffers from element of discrimination. According to the respondents, there is full justification for and public interest is served by giving extension to the Chief Secretary. The decision being for valid reason and free of arbitrariness would fall beyond the scope of judicial review. There was, according to the respondents, a definite detailed proposal submitted to the Central Government which upon due application of mind was approved and resultantly •the Government resolution granting extension to the respondent was issued. 8. In addition to the above, the respondents have raised a question of maintainability of the present writ petitions as Public Interest Litigations, the matter being one relating to the service matter. 9. Our attention was also drawn to an order dated passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 85 of 2008 where certain directions were issued by the Court in relation to the Circular issued by the State Government dated 9th November, 1995. It was not in dispute before us that the said Circular has no application to the members of Indian Administrative Service whose conditions of service are controlled by the All India Services Act, 1951 and for whom the Central Government is the Competent Authority. In view of this, this point does not need any further deliberation. 10. It was not in dispute before us that the said Circular has no application to the members of Indian Administrative Service whose conditions of service are controlled by the All India Services Act, 1951 and for whom the Central Government is the Competent Authority. In view of this, this point does not need any further deliberation. 10. Now we will proceed to examine the merit or otherwise of the contentions raised before us during the course of hearing. It will be useful to reproduce the impugned Government resolution dated 30th May, 2009, at the very outset, which reads as under: "Shri Johny Joseph, IAS, Chief Secretary to the Government Extension in service to ..... GOVERNMENT OF MAHARASHTRA General Administration Department, Resolution No. AEO 1109/C.R. 280/2009X Mantralaya, Mumbai - 400 032. Dated: 30th May, 2009 Reference: Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India's letter No. 26014/ 2009 AIS(II), dated 15 May, 2009. . RESOLUTION : Government is pleased to grant extension in service to Johny Joseph, IAS (MH: 72) in the post of Chief Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra for a period of six months from 1st June, 2009 to 30th November, 2009 with the approval of the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Training vide letter mentioned above. By order and in the name of the Government of Maharashtra. Sd/ (V.N. More) Joint Secretary to the Government" 11. Both the parties have placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra), while relying upon different paragraphs of the said judgment. According to the respondents, they have fully satisfied the criteria and principles stated in the judgment while according to the petitioners there is a glaring violation of the principles stated therein and extension granted to the respondents is arbitrary and unfair. In that case, the Court was concerned with the grant of extension to Dr. P.S. Pasricha, Director General of Police, Maharashtra State, and Shri D.N. Jadhav, Commissioner of Police, Mumbai. The' State Government had claimed that keeping in view their service profiles and for the purposes of setting up police establishment Board and State Security Commission, the services of those respondents were necessary in public interest. Both those officers were to retire from service on 30th November, 2007 upon attaining the age of superannuation. The' State Government had claimed that keeping in view their service profiles and for the purposes of setting up police establishment Board and State Security Commission, the services of those respondents were necessary in public interest. Both those officers were to retire from service on 30th November, 2007 upon attaining the age of superannuation. The Home Department of the State of Maharashtra had sent a proposal to the Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, for approval of the Central Government for extension of their service which was granted. These extensions were challenged on the ground that they were contrafy to the Rule 16(1) of the said Rules as well as they were ex fad£ arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court in the facts of that case held that the order granting extension suffers from vice of arbitrariness and there was no justifiable reasons for granting extension and set aside the said order. Various principles governing the subject -matter were stated by the Bench after discussing various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this Court at some length. The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced as under: "10. The Central Government in exercise of its vested power had framed All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. Rule 16 of these Rules has a substantial bearing on the matter in the controversy before us which reads as under: "16. Superannuation gratuity of pension.- (1) A member of the Service shall retire from the service with effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age sixty years: Provided that member of the Service whose date of birth is the first day of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month of attaining the age of sixty years: Provided further that" a member of the service dealing with budget work or working as a full-time member of a committee which is to be wound up within a short period may be given extension of service for a period not exceeding three months in public interest, with the prior approval of the Central Government. [(a) for an aggregate period no exceeding six months (i) by the State Government. [(a) for an aggregate period no exceeding six months (i) by the State Government. if the officer is working in connection with the affairs of the State Government: and (ii) by the Central Government, if the officer is working in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State other than the State on whose cadre he is borne; (b) for any period beyond six months (i) by the State government with the prior sanction of the Central Government, if the officer is working in connection with the affairs of the State; and (ii) by the Central Government, if the officer is working in connection with the affairs of the Union or a State other than the State on whose cadre he is borne.] Provided further that a member of the Service shall not be retained in service whose the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-rule, a member of the Service whose date of birth falls on the 1st day of any month shall have attained the age of fifty-eight years on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-rule, a member of the Service whose date of birth falls on the 1st day of May, 1998 and is on extension in service, shall retire from the service on the expiry of his extended period of service or on the expiry of any further extension granted by the Central Government in public interest, and that on such extension in service shall be granted beyond the age of sixty years.] (2) A member of the Service may, after giving at least three months previous notice in writing, to the State Government concerned, retire from service on the date on which such member completes thirty years of qualifying service on the date on which such member attains fifty years age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice; Provided that no member of the Service under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the State Government concerned. (2-A) A member of the service may, after giving three months previous notice in writing to the State Government concerned, retire from service on he date on which he complete 20 years of qualifying service or any day thereafter to be specified in the notice: Provided that a notice of retirement given by a member of the service shall require acceptance by the State Government concerned if the date of retirement on the expiry of the period of notice would be earlier than the date on which the member of the Service could have retired from service under sub-rule (2): Provided further that a member of the Service who is on deputation, a corporation or company wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government or to a body controlled or financed by the Government, shall not be eligible to retire from Service under this rule for getting himself permanently absorbed in such corporation, company or body. (3) The Central Government may, in consultation with the State Government concerned and after giving a member of the Service at least three months, previous notice in writing, [or three months pay and allowance in lieu of such notice) require that member to retire in public interest from service on the date on which such member completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. [Note 1. In computing the period of three months, notice referred to in sub-rule (2) and (3) the date of service of the notice and the date of expiry shall be excluded. Note 2. In the case of a member of the service, who retires under sub-rule (2) or (2-A) or who has retired under sub-rule (3), the date of retirement shall be treated as a non-working day]. [(4) A superannuation gratuity or pension shall be granted to a member of the service who is required to retire under sub-rule (1) of this Rule. 11. These rules were amended vide notification dated 30th November, 2005 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personal Public Grievances & Pension (Department of Personnel and Training) whereby extension of service for a period not exceeding six months to a member of the service holding post of Chief Secretary to a State Government was provided. 12. 11. These rules were amended vide notification dated 30th November, 2005 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Personal Public Grievances & Pension (Department of Personnel and Training) whereby extension of service for a period not exceeding six months to a member of the service holding post of Chief Secretary to a State Government was provided. 12. By notification dated 12th June, 2006, sub-rule (I-A) has been inserted which reads thus : "(I-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), the Central Government may, if it considers necessary in the public in terest to do so, give extension in service-to the incumbents of the posts of the Cabinet Secretary, Defence Secretary, Home Secretary, Director, Intelligence Bureau, Secretary, Research and Analysis Wing and Director, Central Bureau of Investigation for such period as it may deem proper: Provided that the total term of the Cabinet Secretary who is granted such extensions of service shall not exceed three years; Provided further that the total term of the other Secretaries and Directors who are granted such extensions of service under these Rules shall not exceed two years." 12-A. Section 3 of the All India Services Act, 1951 also empowers the Central Government to make rules for regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed in service after consultation with the Government of the State concerned. Sub-section (I-A) further extends this power empowering the Government to give retrospective effect to the rules so framed from the date not earlier than the date of commencement of this Act. In exercise of the power vested by the Central Government under this provision, they had framed The All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. Rule 3 of the Rules, vested power to relax the rules and regulations in certain cases. In this provision, the satisfaction to be recorded is that of the Central Government in line with the Principles enunciated in the rules. The Rule reads as under: "Power to relax rules and regulations in certain cases. Rule 3 of the Rules, vested power to relax the rules and regulations in certain cases. In this provision, the satisfaction to be recorded is that of the Central Government in line with the Principles enunciated in the rules. The Rule reads as under: "Power to relax rules and regulations in certain cases. Where the Central Government is satisfied that the operation of (i) any rule made or deemed to have been made under the All India Services Act, 1951 (61 of 1951), or (ii) any regulation made under any such rule, regulating the conditions of service of persons appointed to an All India Service causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may, by order, dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule or regulation, as the case may be, to such extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. 13. There is no provision specifically empowering the Central Government to grant extension to the members of the service. The Rules require that every employee shall superannuate at the age of sixty but Rule l6( 1) of All India Services (Death -cum- Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 make an exception that the Government in public interest and limited to the grounds indicated in the proviso could grant extension of service and permit the employee to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation but for a limited period of three months. In the case of Chief Secretary, the extension could be granted in public interest for a period of six months while in the case of Cabinet Secretary, Defence Secretary, Horne Secretary, Director, Intelligence Bureau, Secretary, Research and Analysis Wing and Director, Central Bureau of Investigation, covered under sub-rule (I-A) of Rule 16 of the 1958 Rules, extension could be for such period as the Central Government may deem proper. It is implicit from the language of these provisions that the Government has power to extend the tenure of the service of a person to whom these rules are applicable but not beyond the prescribed period specified under these rules. 14. Besides this specific provision, the Central Government has the power to relax the rigours of any rule or regulation in exercise of the powers vested in it under Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. 14. Besides this specific provision, the Central Government has the power to relax the rigours of any rule or regulation in exercise of the powers vested in it under Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960. The very heading and object of these rules is to deal with the residuary matter which are not specifically dealt with or provided for under other rules. Where the Central Government is satisfied that operation of any rule made or deemed to have been made in regulation causes undue hardship in any particular case, it may order to dispense with or relax the requirement of the rules or regulations to such an extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner. This Rule on its plain reading is to receive a liberal construction. The rule has been worded so widely as to cover unspecified situations. It is a basic rule of service jurisprudence that no rule or provision may comprehend and contemplate all possible situations which may arise. 15. The petitioners challenge is to the orders issued on 30th November, 2007 extending the period of superannuation for respondent Nos. 6 and 7 respectively. Rule 16(1) was framed earlier but was amended for the first time on 13th May, 1998, then on 30th November, 2005 and finally on 12th June, 2006. By virtue of these amendments, provisos were added and Rule 16(I-A) was inserted but misdescribed in the amended notification as 'substituted'. This Rule provides power to the Central Government to grant extension of service after the date of superannuation on the recommendation of the State Government while under the fourth proviso, the term of Chief Secretary of the State could be extended in public interest for a period not exceeding six months. Under the second proviso, the services of a member of the service could be extended su bject to the satisfaction of the conditions postulated therein i.e. he was dealing with the budget work or working as a full time member of a Committee which is to be wound up within a short period could be given extension for a period not exceeding three months in public interest and with prior approval of the Central Government. Rule 16(I-A) contemplates grant of extension to the specified authorities in that Rule. Rule 16(I-A) contemplates grant of extension to the specified authorities in that Rule. Grant of extension to these designated authorities could be made but the proviso to Rule 16(I-A) puts an embargo on grant of extension not to exceed three years in the case of a Cabinet Secretary and for others not in excess of two years. 16. Besides this, Rule 3 of the All India Services (Conditions of Service-Residuary Matters) Rules, 1960 empowers the Central Government to relax the operation of any rule or regulation under any of the Rules framed in furtherance to exercise of power of subordinate legislation. In other words, there is statutory power given to the Central Government which, as contemplated under section 3 of the Act, is the rule framing authority to relax , and/or to grant extension. 17. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that firstly there is no power with the authorities to grant extension beyond the specified period and the Rule should be strictly construed in consonance with the language of the rule and secondly the ground s stated in the Rules have not been specified in the order granting extension. In fact, according to the Counsel appearing for the petitioners, the Central Government hardly has the power to grant extension particularly in the facts of the present case. This contention is based upon misconception of the relevant rules and is opposed to the basic concept of service jurisprudence. The rules are to be framed by the Central Government. Thus, the Government, in any case, would have the powers to frame such rules or to pass such orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of a given case but certainly not contrary to the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed thereunder. The residuary powers vested to meet extraordinary situations which have not been specifically provided for in the Rules cannot be circumvented or limited and it must be left to the authorities to exercise their powers objectively and in consonance with the spirit of the Rules. Besides the power to extend, power to relax the rule in its absolute term to a given case and to remove hardship or otherwise is clear indication of the powers of the rule framing authority and there should not be unnecessary embargoes upon the exercise of such powers. Besides the power to extend, power to relax the rule in its absolute term to a given case and to remove hardship or otherwise is clear indication of the powers of the rule framing authority and there should not be unnecessary embargoes upon the exercise of such powers. We may refer to the language of Rule 3 which clearly says that the rule could be relaxed to such an extent and subject to such exceptions and conditions as it may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner (emphasis supplied by us). The expression "just and equitable manner" is a well known expression in the Administrative law and within the domain of service jurisprudence. The decision will have to be left to the discretion of the authority concerned and the Court would not sit as an Appellate Authority to examine the extent and degree of justness and equitability. 18. The Supreme Court enunciated the principles relating to grant of extension and relevant factors for taking any executive decision and that the executive must furnish reasons in support of their decision. Reference can be made to the cases of (i) (State of Assam Vs. Basanta Kumar Das)2, 1972 DGLS (soft) 591 : A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1252, (ii) (M/s. Hoehtief Gammon Vs. State of Orissa and others)3, 1975 DGLS (soft) 322 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2226 and (ill) (M/s. Star Enterprises & others Vs. City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & others)4, 1990 DGLS (soft) 271 : 1990(3) S.C.C. 280 . This clearly indicates that discretion is vested in the authorities, whether to grant or not extension to a particular member of the service but this has to be exercised within the framework of Rules and bonafidely in the public interest and in the interest of public service. In terms of the Rules, the Central Government has the power to grant extension and/ or to relax the operation of any of the Rules applicable to the member of the service. 19. We may now deal with the argument that in absence of any specific Rules and strictly construing the relevant provisions, whether there is power with the Government to grant extension in service. This argument suffers from fallacy that in the absence of specific rules, the Government would not have discretion even to prepare guidelines or to issue administrative instructions. 19. We may now deal with the argument that in absence of any specific Rules and strictly construing the relevant provisions, whether there is power with the Government to grant extension in service. This argument suffers from fallacy that in the absence of specific rules, the Government would not have discretion even to prepare guidelines or to issue administrative instructions. The competent rule making authority, and in the present case the Central Government, will have the power to issue appropriate orders even in individual cases in absence of any specific Rule. Issuance of executive instructions which are in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, can hardly be questioned on the ground of inherent jurisdiction. In the case of (Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Yadaorao Jagannath Kumbhare and others)5, 2000(3) Bom.C.R. 631 (S.C.) : 1999 DGLS (soft) 798: (1999)8 S.C.C. 99 , the Supreme Court held as under. "It is, no doubt, true that under section 21 of the Act, the State Government is required to make rules prescribing the conditions under which members of the staff requiring professional skill could be appointed by the Trust. But when the State Government has not made any such rules even if the rules can be held to be of mandatory nature as has been held by the High Court, then it is difficult to comprehend that the Board is denuded of its general power of appointing and promoting people to different posts as provided under section 22 of the Act. If the view of the High Court under the impugned judgment is taken to be correct then all appointments to different posts ever since 1936 have to be held to be invalid inasmuch as no rules have been framed by the State Government in exercise of the power under section 21 of the Act. While interpreting the provisions of section 21 of the Act, the High Court has lost sight of the general principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any statutory rules governing the service conditions of the employees, the executive instructions and/or decisions taken administratively would operate in the field and appointments/promotions can be made in accordance with such executive instructions/ administrative directions. In this view of the matter and concededly, no rules having been framed by the State Government in exercise of power under section 21 of the Act, the Trust/Board was fully empowered to take administrative decisions in the matter of appointments and promotions to different posts including the posts requiring professional skill and consequently the resolution of the Board taken in accordance with subsection (2) of section 22 of the Act deciding to promote the employees to the post of Assistant Engineer cannot be said to be invalid or inoperative. The High Court, therefore, in our view fell in error in holding that the appointments made to the posts of Assistant Engineer are invalid in law." 20. It may also be noticed that extension of service would also squarely fall within the expression "condition of service" and would squarely bring within its ambit the power of the Government to issue appropriate directions even in this regard. A Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of (Sajan Mannali Vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice and others)6, 1994(2) L.L.J. 817 held as under. "9. The expression "conditions of service" is one of wide import. It means all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment, till his retirement and even beyond it, in matters like pension, etc. The dismissal of a Government servant or his compulsory retirement are all matters which fall within his conditions of service. (North West Frontier Province Vs. Suraj Narain A nandj1 , A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 112: (State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Shardul Singh)8, 1969 DGLS (soft) 490 : 1970(1) S.C.C. 108 . The expression would include age of superannuation as also the right to reduce it. (State of Bihar Vs. Yogendra Singh)9 1982 DGLS (soft) 67 : A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 882 (Srinivasan V s. State of KeralaJ1° A. I. R. 1968 Ker. 158 (F.B.). Compulsory retirement, dismissal and reduction in age of retirement being part of conditions of service, extension of service is equally a condition of service. We are unable to find any difference in principle between the two. 10. We do not find any rhyme or reason to exclude extension of service alone from conditions of service. 158 (F.B.). Compulsory retirement, dismissal and reduction in age of retirement being part of conditions of service, extension of service is equally a condition of service. We are unable to find any difference in principle between the two. 10. We do not find any rhyme or reason to exclude extension of service alone from conditions of service. In fact, Counsel for the petitioner frankly admitted (not that he can contend otherwise in the light of the Binding Authorities on the point that conditions relating to age of retirement and retirement benefits pertain to the realm of conditions of service of a Government servant and cannot be disassociated therefrom. The only contention necessitated by exigencies of the case is that extension of service of a Government servant is not a condition of service." xx xx xx xx 27. The public interest is a term of wide magnitude and covers within its ambit efficiency, exigencies of service and interest of the public at large. These are some of the relevant considerations which the Executive Authorities are required to take into consideration before arriving at a final decision. Absence of any reasons or valid reasons would be a ground which would attract the scrutiny by courts. In the case of M/s. Hoehtief Gammon Vs. State of Orissa, 1975 DGLS (soft) 322 : A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2226, the Supreme Court held as under. "The Executive have to reach their decision by taking into account relevant considerations. They should not refuse to consider relevant matter nor should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only such a decision will be lawful. The courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that the Executive acted bonafide not nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the Court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant matters, though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts. Even if the Executive considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers they should state their reasons and there must be material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts. xx xx xx 31. The reason reflects the cause or the grounds during the decision making process which led to ultimate decision. The discretion must be exercised reasonably. Reasonable and/ or unreasonable, both are the terms of general description and indicate how things mayor may not be done or not. The Court essentially is concerned to find out if the concerned authorities left out relevant factors or had taken into account irrelevant factors and whether the decision was within the four corners of law. Whether the administrative decision is patently irrational or suffers from the defect of procedural impropriety would have to be examined. The most important principle of law dealing with fairness in State action under the administrative law is regulated by the Wednesbury's principle essential in English Law principle which has now been consistently applied by Indian courts with approval. In the case of (Union of India and another Vs. G. Ganayutham (Dead) by L.RS.j11, 1997 DGLS (soft) 1084: A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3387, it is held thus "11. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarised in 1985 by Lord Diplock in (CCSU Vs. Minister for Civil Servicesj12, 1985(1) A.C. 374 as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which as a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock' observed in that case as follows: "......... Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by ,Judicial review. The first ground I would call 'illegality', •the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. The first ground I would call 'illegality', •the second 'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality', which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community....." Lord Diplock explained 'irrationality' as follows: "By irrationality, I mean what can now be succinctly be referred to as 'Wednesbury unreasonableness'.... It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards hat no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at." xx xx xx 45. Proper analysis of the factual matrix of the case and the principles of law stated supra, would lead us to only one conclusion that the orders dated 30th November; 20p7 are not reasoned, rational and are also not in larger public interest. They do not satisfy the basic ingredients of the relevant provisions and instructions issued by the Government itself for grant of extension to the members of the All India Service. The action of the Government thus, suffers from vice of arbitrariness. Resultantly, these orders are quashed". 12. The above stated reasonings and the principles provide the outline within the ambit of which the power of judicial review needs to be exercised by the Court. We are quite aware that we are not to examine the soundness of the decision taken by the Government but would have to see whether the decision making process is just, fair and in accordance with law. The fairness in administrative action and the scope of judicial review has been the subject-matter of various judgments either relating to the service jurisprudence or even in relation to contractual matters. Judicial review of administration action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made lawfully and not to check whether the choice or decision is sound. It is also settled principle that the power of judicial review need not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest. (Jagdish Mandal Vs. Stale of Orissa&ors.j13, 2006 DGLS (soft) 990 : 2007(14) S.C.C.517. 13. It is also settled principle that the power of judicial review need not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest. (Jagdish Mandal Vs. Stale of Orissa&ors.j13, 2006 DGLS (soft) 990 : 2007(14) S.C.C.517. 13. In the case of (K. Vinodkumar Vs. S. Palaniswamy & ors.)14, 2003 DGLS (soft) 473 : 2003(10) S.C.C. 681 , the Court held as under: "11. The law is settled that over proceedings and decisions taken in administrative matters, the scope of judicial review is confirmed to the decision-making process and does not extend to the merits of the decision taken." 14. Applying Wednesbury principle, the Supreme Court in the case of (Union of India & ors. Vs. Flight Cadet Ashish Ram)15 2006 DGLS (soft) 31 : 2006(2) S.C.C. 364 , also held that there should be judicial restraillt while making judicial review in administrative matters. Where irrelevant aspects have been eschewed from consideration and no relevant aspect has been ignored and the administrative decisions have nexus with the facts on record, the Court may not interfere. 15. The principles stated by the Supreme Court in the case of (Sterling Computers Limited Vs. M/ s. M & N Publications Limited & ors.j16 1993 DGLS (soft) 36: 1993(1) S.C.C. 445 , have been repeatedly applied to different cases of judicial review by Courts. The Supreme Court in this case stated that there is nothing paradoxical in imposing legal limits on such authorities by courts in administrative matters including contractual matters as the whole concept of unfettered discretion is inappropriate to a Public Authority and the power is to be exercised in good faith. The Court held as under:"17. It is true that by way of judicial review the Court is not expected to act as a Court of appeal while examining an administrative decision and to record a finding whether such decision could have been taken otherwise in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the book Administrative Law, Prof. Wade has said: "The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament appointed to take the decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires. The Court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choices which legislature is presumed to have intended. The decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be legitimate. But if the decision is within the confirms of reasonableness, it is no part of the Court's function to look further into its merits. With the question whether a particular policy is wise or foolish the Court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue it is beyond the powers of the authority." But in the same book Prof. Wade has also said: "The powers of public authorities are therefore essentially different from those of private persons. A man making his will may, subject to any rights of his dependents, dispose of his property just as he may wish. He may act out of malice or a spirit of revenge, but in law this does not affect his exercise of his power. In the same way a private person has an absolute power to allow whom he likes to use his land, to release a debtor, or. where the law permits, to evict a tenant, regardless of his motives. This is unfettered discretion. But a public authority may do none of these things unless it acts reasonably and in good faith and upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. There are many cases in which a public authority has been held to have acted from improper motives or upon irrelevant considerations, or to have failed to take account of relevant considerations, so that its action is ultra vires and void." 16. Having stated the general principles as well as principles specifically applicable to the cases of the present kind, let us examine the first contention raised by the petitioner that the induction of third proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules is ultra vires the Constitution and is arbitrary and discriminatory and thus liable to be quashed. Having stated the general principles as well as principles specifically applicable to the cases of the present kind, let us examine the first contention raised by the petitioner that the induction of third proviso to Rule 16 of the Rules is ultra vires the Constitution and is arbitrary and discriminatory and thus liable to be quashed. As already noticed, the challenge to this Rule is only in one writ petition filed by R.R. Tripathi, and the only ground of challenge taken in the writ petition has been stated in paragraph 3.5 of the petition that the said decision has been taken in a hurry and without mandatory consultation with other States and, therefore, is void and illegal. This argument is without any substance. Firstly, it gives no details of any kind as to which of the States have not been consulted by the Central Government much less placing some material. documents on record in support of this averment. Even the averments are vague and are so general in nature that in law it would be difficult to determine the controversy raised by such averments. 17. As noticed above, the said Notification opens with the words which would raise a presumption in favour of the Notification that it was issued after consultation with the States. In section 3 of the All India Service Act, 1951, it is specifically provided that the Central Government may after consultation with Government of the States concerned make Rules for regulation of recruitment and conditions of service of the persons appointed to All India Service. Thus, Central Government is competent to frame Rules relating to all matters and conditions of service of the members of the All India Service and the Notification adding amended third proviso to Rule 16( 1) complies with the requirements of section 3 and the presumption in its favour has not been rebutted by the petitioner. The onus to show that the Notification was issued without proper consultation was upon the petitioners. Except making a bald statement in the petition, no documents have been produced or even specific averments have been made in the petition as to which of the States were not consulted. It is also the stand of the respondents that there has been reasonable classification between the Officers of the IAS Cadre simplicitor on one hand and the group of Chief Secretaries of the States on the other. It is also the stand of the respondents that there has been reasonable classification between the Officers of the IAS Cadre simplicitor on one hand and the group of Chief Secretaries of the States on the other. Being distinct classes they could have been treated differently by providing different criteria. 18. It is a settled principle of law that there is a presumption in favour of validity of a Legislation. However, the learned advocate General appearing for the State has informed us that due consultation with all the concerned States was effected before issuing such a Notification. Third proviso to Rule 16 was inserted vide Notification dated 30th November, 2005 and which all through this period has been implemented without any objection or protest. The petitioner himself claims to be a public 'spirited person and has filed various writ petitions from time to time. Even when he filed the writ petition in the case of Dr. Pasricha, the Rule was in existence and no challenge or protest to this proviso was raised. Not that it would per se disentitle the petitioner from urging the point but these are some of the relevant factors which the Court has to keep in mind while examining the challenge. 19. It is significant to consider subsequently inserted proviso to Rule 16( 1) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, which reads as under: "Provided also that a member of the service holding the post of Chief Secretary to a State Government may be given extension of service for a period not exceeding six months on the recommendations made by the concerned State Government with full justification and in public interest with prior approval of the Central Government. Provided also that member of service who has attained age of 58 years on or before the first day of May 1998 and is on extension in service, shall retire from the service on the expiry of his extended period of service or on the expiry of any further extension granted by the Central Government in public interest and that no such extension in service shall be granted beyond the age of 60 years." 20. Rule 16 provides for superannuation, gratuity or pension. Rule 16 provides for superannuation, gratuity or pension. Sub-rule (1) thereof provides for retirement from service and states that a member shall retire with effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 60 years. In this matter we are concerned with third proviso, viz., extension of service in case of a member of service holding the post of Chief Secretary. 21. Apart from the fact that both conditions stipulated in the third proviso have to be complied with, it must be stated that the normal rule of retirement from service on attaining the age of retirement viz., 60 years in this case is the rule and the proviso are in the nature of execution. The apprehension of the petitioner that exception will become the rule is in this case without any foundation or basis. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that continuation in service beyond the age of superannuation by giving an extension cannot become rule, if the rule in question in its entirety is perused together with the other rules. 22. It is also clear from the third proviso itself that it is applicable only to the persons in service who are holding the post of Chief Secretary of a State Government that too for a period not exceeding six months. It further provides a dual check before such an order can be made. The concerned State Government should have made such recommendations for extension; it has to be in public interest; and prior approval of the Central Government is the prerequisite for issuing the order of extension of service to an officer. Once these three conditions are satisfied, there would hardly be any scope for the Court to interfere. This provision thus provides sufficient check and balance and inbuilt guidelines to the authorities exercising their discretion while granting or declining extension to a officer in terms of third proviso of Rule 16(1). A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that it does not vest the Government with arbitrary or unguided power. 23. Further more, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra) had clearly held that even under Rule 16( 1) after reading the first two provisos together, the Government has the power to grant extension which is constitutional and does not violate the basic rule of law. "21. 23. Further more, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra) had clearly held that even under Rule 16( 1) after reading the first two provisos together, the Government has the power to grant extension which is constitutional and does not violate the basic rule of law. "21. The above Rules, and in any case, the Government's decision to grant extension or to relax the applicability of Rule 16(1) in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7 thus cannot be termed as one without authority of law. Of course, exercise of such power has to be for valid reasons . in public interest and the proposal should satisfy the ingredien 18 of the specified Rules. Therefore, we have no hesitation in answering this question against the petitioners." We have no reason to differ from the said reasoning and it woukl support the view that we are taking even in the present writ petition. 24. Rule 16 requires that a person in service would retire from the service with effect from the afternoon of the last date of month in which he attains the age of 60 years. The private respondent being the Chief Secretary could thus be granted extension of service for a period not exceeding six months in accordance with the third proviso to Rule 16(1). As already noticed, there has to be a full justification on the part of the State Government while it is recommending the case of the member of the service for extension in service. The proposal must essentially be in public interest and would have to be examined by the Central Government and after it gets approval from Central Government, the order of extension of service would be issued. The emphasis in the rule is on "full justification" and "in public interest". The expression "full justification" has to be given its correct and appropriate meaning. The "Justification" so given should also satisfy that the proposal is in public interest. Both these ingredients must be satisfied independently as their existence is a condition precedent to the approval by the Central Government. The Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) explains the word "justification" as: "a lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or omissions, any fact that prevents an act from being wrongful". 25. The expression "full justification" thus requires that it has to be a justification in fact and in law. The Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) explains the word "justification" as: "a lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or omissions, any fact that prevents an act from being wrongful". 25. The expression "full justification" thus requires that it has to be a justification in fact and in law. It should be a clear case of justification in contra distinction to imperfect justification, that is to say that justification should be work and need based. The requirement of the State Government should fully substantiate that the continuation of member of the service in service by way of limited extension is the 'need' of the State and is also 'in public interest'. 26. The expression "public interest" is well known connotation in service jurisprudence. The Business Dictionary defines "public interest" as: "Welfare of the general public (in contrast to the selfish interest of a person, group, or firm) in which the whole society has a stake and which warrants recognition, promotion, and protection by the government and its agencies. Despite the vagueness of the term, public interest is claimed generally by governments in matters of state secrecy and confidentiality. It is approximated by comparing expected. gains and potential costs or losses associated with a decision, policy, program, or project." 27. In common parlance, public interest means the general welfare of the public that warrants recognition and protection. It is a matter in which the public as a whole has the stake and interest. A Government resolution must justify that besides its own job necessity, Government has formed a bona fide opinion that the extension is in public interest as well. 28. In the case of (Onkar Lal Baja) etc. Vs. Union of India & anr.)17, 2002 DGLS (soft) 266: A.I.R 2003 S.C. 2562 the Supreme Court explained the terms "public interest" or "probity in governance" as follows: "35. The expressions 'public interest' or 'probity in governance' cannot be put in a State jacket. 'Public interest' takes into its fold several factors. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to determine what is public interest. The circumstances in each case would determine whether Government action was taken is in public interest or was taken to uphold probity in governance. 36. The role model for governance and decision taken thereof should manifest equity, fair play and justice. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to determine what is public interest. The circumstances in each case would determine whether Government action was taken is in public interest or was taken to uphold probity in governance. 36. The role model for governance and decision taken thereof should manifest equity, fair play and justice. The cardinal principle of governance in a civilized society based on rule of law not only has to base on transparency but must create an impression that the decision-making was motivated on the consideration of probity. The Government has to rise above the nexus of vested interests and nepotism and eschew window dressing. The act of governance has to withstand the test of judiciousness and impartiality and avoid arbitrary or capricious actions. Therefore, the principle of governance has to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play and if the decision is not based on justice, equity and fair play and has taken into consideration other matters, though on the face of it, the decision may look legitin1ate but as a matter of fact, the reasons are not based on values but to achieve popular accolade, that decision cannot be allowed to operate." 29. In the case of (Meerut Development Authnrity Vs. Association of Management Studies & anr.jI8 2009 DGLS (soft) 528 : 2009(6) S.C.C. 171 , the Supreme Court held as under: "67. The expression "public interest" if it is employed in a given statute is to be understood and interpreted in the light of the entire scheme, purpose and object of the enactment but in the absence of the same it cannot be pressed into service to confer any right upon a person who otherwise does not possess any such right in law. In what manner has this Court to arrive at any conclusion that MDA's decision in calling for fresh tender from the interested persons for making the land available for residential use is not in public interest? Repeated attempts were made before us to say that providing the land in question for educational use will be more appropriate and subserve public interest than making it available for residential use. Public interest floats in a vast, deep ocean of ideas, and "imagined experiences". It would seem to us wise for the courts not to venture into this unchartered minefield. We are not exercising our will. Public interest floats in a vast, deep ocean of ideas, and "imagined experiences". It would seem to us wise for the courts not to venture into this unchartered minefield. We are not exercising our will. We cannot impose our own values on society. Any such effort would mean to make value judgments. 68. The impugned judgment illustrates "the danger of Judges wrongly though unconsciously substituting their own views for the views of the decision-maker who alone is charged and authorised by law to exercise discretion". With respect, we find that the High Court virtually converted the judicial review proceedings in to an inquisitorial one. The way proceedings went on before the High Court suggest as if the High Court was virtually making an inquiry into the conduct and affairs of MDA in a case where the Court was merely concerned with the decision-making process of MDA in not accepting the offer/tender of AMS in respect of the disputed plot on the ground that the offer so made was less than that of the reserved price fixed by MDA." 30. The need is for balancing the public interest against the interest of an individual i.e. the member of the service to whom the extension is sought to be given and this has to be balanced by the Government with reference to the record-based opinion and settled canons of administrative jurisprudence. The public interest must be construed in relation to its true context and with reference to the facts of a given case. It is so because this expression is capable of being given a very different meaning in different contexts. The public interest may have a restricted meaning and scope in relation to service jurisprudence while in relation to a public interest litigation or discharge of obligations by the state towards public it may have a different meaning. 31. Now we will have to examine whether these two essential conditions for grant of extension stand satisfied in the facts of the case in hand. As already noticed, the original records have been produced in Court. We have perused the same. There is rio doubt that the date of birth of the private respondent is 29th May, 1949 and as per Rule 16 he would retire from service in the afternoon of the last date of the month in which his date of birth falls i.e. on 30th May, 2009. We have perused the same. There is rio doubt that the date of birth of the private respondent is 29th May, 1949 and as per Rule 16 he would retire from service in the afternoon of the last date of the month in which his date of birth falls i.e. on 30th May, 2009. From the record, it appears that the Chief Minister on 12th May, 2009 wrote a detailed letter to the Prime Minister with a copy to the Cabinet Secretary requesting for favourable consideration for grant of extension to respondent No. 4 for six months from 1st June, 2009 in terms of third proviso to Rule 16( 1). This letter refers to the Role of the Chief Secretary in the implementation of stipulated safety and security measures taken by the State in preventing terrorists act in the wake of 26/ 11 terrorist attack. The State of Maharashtra having taken up number of vital projects in Mumbai and other important Cities in the State with regard to airports, urban Transport, water supply and sanitation, on going revival process of the Ratnagiri Gas & Power Project Limited and lastly Budget Session of the State Legislature, it was felt by the State Administration that continuing leadership of the private respondent over next six months as the Chief Secretary as well as Chairman of the various Committees would facilitate implementation of time bound State projects and would help in achieving maximum benefit for the State Agencies and State projects. This proposal was preceded by a detailed Note on the Proposal running into nearly 13 pages describing details of entire projects and other need of the State which, according to the State, was full justification for getting approval of the Central Government for extension of service of private respondent. Unlike the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra), where the entire record produced before the Court only reflected whim of the Chief Minister rather than reasons of the State in public interest, it would be evident from the letter sent by the State Government to the Central Government, to which the note giving details of those projects was attached. that need of the State was discussed in some elaboration in the letter. The extract of the letter is as under :"..... that need of the State was discussed in some elaboration in the letter. The extract of the letter is as under :"..... As the Chief Secretary of the State, Sri Joseph has been very closely involved in the formulation of these measures and the State Government is of the considered opinion that, given his background of efficient handling of the subject of Disaster Management in the past, following the Latur Earthquake and his hands-on experience of dealing with the 26/11 crises, Sri Joseph's continued supervision, inputs, monitoring and co-ordination skills are indispensible for the time-bound execution of these measures, enumerated in detail in the attached note. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx Secondly, the Government of Maharashtra has taken up a number of vital projects in Mumbai and other important cities in the State, covering sectors like development and up gradation of airports, urban transport, water supply and sanitation, storm water management, housing and redevelopment of slums. xxxxx xxxxx The State Government sincerely believes that continued leadership of Sri Joseph over the next six months, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Empowered Committee and as the Head of subject specific High Power Committees, monitoring the implementation of various major projects, would help in timely resolution of major critical issues and facilitate time-bound execution of these major projects, listed in the attached note. Thirdly, the ongoing revival process of the Ratnagiri Gas & Power Project Limited (Formerly known as ENRON Project), which would give to the state 900 MW of additional power by December 09, is absolutely crucial in the context of the State's efforts to reduce its cqronic power deficit and the State Government strongly believes that as the Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee overseeing the revival process, Sri Joseph's deep understanding of the complexities involved in the matter and his problem-solving skills are required for some time for the time bound implementation of the revival programme, as explained in the •attached note. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx .... Here also, the continued stewardship of Sri Joseph would be very much useful in handling the forthcoming monsoon, thanks to his impressive experience of dealing with such problems, both as the Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and the Chief Secretary of the State. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx .... Here also, the continued stewardship of Sri Joseph would be very much useful in handling the forthcoming monsoon, thanks to his impressive experience of dealing with such problems, both as the Municipal Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai and the Chief Secretary of the State. Lastly, in the forthcoming Budget Session of the State Legislature, commencing in June, 2009, the State Government wants to initiate and secure approval for a number of important legislative measures, as this would be the last session of the Legislature before the State Assembly Elections. The role of the Chief Secretary in terms of formulating vital legislative proposals, submitted the same for timely prior cabinet approval and then monitoring submission of the corresponding Bills before the Legislature is going to be very crucial, where Sri .Joseph with his in-depth knowledge of such subjects would definitely be most effective. Keeping in view the above considerations, I am of the considered opinion that it is essential to continue the services of the present Chief Secretary, Sri Jonhy Joseph, IAS [MH: 1972], for six more months, beyond the date of his superannuation i.e. the 31st March, 2009, as Sri Joseph ........" 32. In pursuance of this proposal, the Competent Authority, vide letter dated 15th May, 2009, granted extension in service for a period of six months to the private respondent, in furtherance to which the State Government passed the resolution on 30th May, 2009 granting six months' extension to the private respondent with effect from 1st June, 2009. 33. From the detailed proposal and the letter written by the Chief Minister, it is unambiguously clear that -in the wisdom of the State various projects, security measures and the then ensuing Budget Session could be better performed with further association of the private respondent. We have already stated the principle that it is not the soundness of the decision which we are called upon to adjudicate or determine but it is the decision making process which is within the ambit of judicial scrutiny. It is not the case where there was no material substantiated by facts and figures on the basis of which the Competent Authority had proposed to grant extension of service to the private respondent. The projects referred to in the letters and the proposal in question are certainly of public importance and thus are in public interest. It is not the case where there was no material substantiated by facts and figures on the basis of which the Competent Authority had proposed to grant extension of service to the private respondent. The projects referred to in the letters and the proposal in question are certainly of public importance and thus are in public interest. The expression "public interest" must be understood in the context in which it is proposed to be applied and not in abstract. The proposal has full justification and has been projected to be in public interest. This Court will not examine the aspect of justification of the proposal and public interest involved in it as an appellate body and would not interfere only on the ground that another view was possible. Scrutiny of administrative wisdom of the State in arriving at a conclusion per se would be beyond the scope of judicial review. If the decision making process per se was arbitrary, discriminatory or was contrary to the regulations or basic rule of law, the Court would not have hesitated in interfering with the matter. However, the facts of the present case do not indicate that the decision taken is arbitrary, perverse or is contrary to the regulations. In fact, it completely satisfies the essentials of the third proviso to Rule 16(1). 34. It was also argued by the petitioner that Chief Minister was not the Competent Authority to forward the proposal for extension of service of the private respondent and as such the entire consideration and the impugned order of extension of service is vitiated in law. The Maharashtra Government Rules of Business and Instructions (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules of Business" had been relied upon by the parties before us. According to Rule 4 of the said Rules, the business of the Government shall be transacted in the Departments specified in the First Schedule. The Chief Minister has to allocate the port -folios. In the First Schedule, General Administration Department is in the jurisdiction of the Chief Minister. In terms of Instruction 8, subject to the Rules and other provisions in the Instructions, Minister incharge may dispose of all cases arising from the Departments which he controls. The Chief Minister has to allocate the port -folios. In the First Schedule, General Administration Department is in the jurisdiction of the Chief Minister. In terms of Instruction 8, subject to the Rules and other provisions in the Instructions, Minister incharge may dispose of all cases arising from the Departments which he controls. Under Instruction 15, various proposals are to be submitted to the Chief Minister for his orders and proposals for the appointments, postings, transfers of officers of All India Service and Class I service are required to be submitted before the Chief Minister. The cumulative effect of the above Rules is that the Chief Minister being incharge of the concerned Department and in his capacity as Chief Minister was competent to make the proposal which, as already indicated, was a proposal in accordance with the requirements of Rule 16(1) and thus, in our view, no interference is called for on this count. 35. Lastly, we consider the question, whether the Public Interest Litigation raising such an issue would be maintainable before this Court. Firstly, keeping in view the fact that the post in question affects the entire administration of the State and, therefore, larger public interest, it will be difficult to hold that the present writ petition is not maintainable as a Public Interest Litigation. Furthermore, the question involved in this Public Interest Litigation is in relation to the highest post in State administration and this petition, therefore, would be main1rtinable as the cause does not relate to the matters exclusively falling in the domain of a service jurisprudence but is related to matters of public importance. The very note on proposal forwarded by the State shows the various public projects concerning security of the State and Involvement of the interest of public at large in such affairs, which sufficiently indicates the significance of such petition in the larger public interest rather than terming it as a mere service matter. While referring to various judgments in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the judgment in the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra); the Court found that as the matters were dealt with even on merits, it was not necessary to specifically answer this question though the Court prima facie expressed the view that the petition would be maintainable. The Court said, "... While referring to various judgments in paragraphs 40 to 42 of the judgment in the case of R.R. Tripathi (supra); the Court found that as the matters were dealt with even on merits, it was not necessary to specifically answer this question though the Court prima facie expressed the view that the petition would be maintainable. The Court said, "... We are of the view that it is difficult to hold that this petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of locus or maintainability .....". 36. We adopt the same reasoning and hold that we would not like to dismiss this writ petition on the ground of maintainability or locus standi, keeping in view the larger public interest and impact of extension of service to Chief Secretary based on such public interest. 37. To conclude, we may notice that the State decision and the decision making process have to be free from element of arbitrariness, discrimination and unfairness. They ought not to vitiate statutory provisions or the basic rule of law. Unlike a cipher, the proposal of the Government has to be self speaking and in bona fide exercise of power and essentially must satisfy rudimentary elements postulated under the third proviso to Rule 16(1) of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. It must state full justification and has to be in public interest. The burden to exhibit that these ingredients are satisfied is on the State and to that extent the power of judicial review can be invoked. However, the power of judicial review would require the Court to primarily examine the decision making process and not the [mal decision per se. It is not the soundness of the reasoning but the process of reasoning which has to be the subject-matter of judicial scrutiny. The doctrine that 'power must be exercised reasonably' has to be reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the Public Authority which Parliament appointed to take decision. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. The Court even unconsciously may not substitute their views for the views of the decision maker on whom lies the obligation and who alone is charged and authorized under law to exercise such discretion. Within the bounds of legal reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has genuinely free discretion. The Court even unconsciously may not substitute their views for the views of the decision maker on whom lies the obligation and who alone is charged and authorized under law to exercise such discretion. The very concept of administrative discretion involves a right to choose between more than one possible course of action upon which there is room for reasonable people to hold differing opinions as to which is to be preferred. 38. In a detailed Note on proposal consisting of 13 pages and the letter containing proposal reference is made to various public projects and security of the public at large which need continued supervision of the private respondent. Thus, grant of extension of six months to the private respondent is the discretion exercised by the authorities with specific reasons. The reasons stated in the Note on Proposal are not unconnected with the service and affairs of the State and the wisdom of the State is based upon these detailed documents. The Court can hardly sit as an appellate body to examine the soundness of use of this statutory discretion. The record before us show the full justification and public interest which is sought to be achived. The extension granted to the private respondent cannot be termed as arbitrary, Without any reasonable cause and is not opposed to statutory or basic rule of law. 39. Rule in both the writ petitions is discharged. Writ petitions dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.