JUDGMENT S.B. DESHMUKH, J. 1. We have heard the Senior Advocate for the petitioners, the learned Counsel Mr. N. Sardessai for respondent No.1 the learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4. 2. Rule, made returnable forthwith. The learned Counsel for the respondents, waive rule notice. By consent of the parties, through their respective learned Counsel, we have heard the petition finally. 3. The first petitioner, is a Society registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860. The first petitioner Society, is formed, with an object to provide financial help for children of poor, raise funds and to protect the interest of the first petitioner as also to extend the help to members of society and for helping their legal rights and avail legal facilities provided by the State Government for the benefit of the members. The 93 members of the petitioner No.1, allegedly, are all vendors/stall owners/traders of Budhwarpeth Market (hereinafter referred to as market for short). The petitioner No.2 is stated to be the citizen of India and is a vendor or trader in the market. The apprehension has been expressed by the petitioners in para 4 that the members of the first petitioner, are sought to be displaced from the existing premises by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. According to the petitioners, the market has been established and set up prior to the liberation of the State of Goa i.e. prior to December, 1961 and existed in locality for more than 100 years. It is pleaded in para 5 of the petition that earlier CAMARA Municipal de Ponda was being controlled by the respondent No.1. The market in question is indisputably situate within the limits of the erstwhile CAMARA Municipal de Ponda. Goa Municipalities Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1968), indisputably extends to whole of the State of Goa. Section 2(27) of the Act, 1968, defines Municipal area meaning thereby any local area declared or deemed to be declared as Municipal area by or under this Act. The word market is also defined under Section 2(25) of the Act, 1968. Section 2(27) of the Act, 1968, defines Municipal area meaning thereby any local area declared or deemed to be declared as Municipal area by or under this Act. The word market is also defined under Section 2(25) of the Act, 1968. It provides that market includes for place where persons assemble for the sale of or for the purpose of exposing for sale, live-stock or food for live-stock or meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, drinks, animals intended for human food or any other articles of human foods whatsoever with or without the consent of the owner of such place, notwithstanding there may be no common regulation of concourse of buyers and sellers or whether or not any control is exercised over the business of or the persons frequenting the market by the owner of the c place or any other person. The Budhwarpeth market, is situate within the municipal area of Ponda Municipal Council, which came into existence or took over from erstwhile CAMARA Municipal de Ponda after enactment of Act, 1968. It has been also pleaded by the petitioners that initially, the market was consisting of two places along with main road and third one was added subsequently. These two places, according to the petitioners, consisted of shops, which are leased/tenanted by the respondent No.1 to the traders. These two places are single storied buildings having 35 shops at the ground floor, is the contention raised by the petitioners in para 6 of the petition. According to them, third place, was built in the year 1965, consists of ground floor and the first floor. There are eight shops tenanted to various tenants on the ground floor and there are four flats on the first floor and three are tenanted or let out to the tenants and one flat is retained by the respondent No.1 for its own use. The land whereupon the market is set up and established, it has been pleaded in para 7 that, is owned by the respondent No.1. According to the contentions raised by the petitioners, the members of the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner No.2 themselves are the vendors/stall owners carrying on their respective business activities for their livelihood and for subsistence of their families. It is contended by the petitioners in para 7 that stalls. According to the contentions raised by the petitioners, the members of the petitioner No. 1 and the petitioner No.2 themselves are the vendors/stall owners carrying on their respective business activities for their livelihood and for subsistence of their families. It is contended by the petitioners in para 7 that stalls. of which the members of the petitioners and the petitioner No.2 are the owners are having fixed places marked and allotted by the respondent No.1 within the market area in respective sheds and Annexure "C" is the copy of the plan produced on record depicting building of market area. It has been a further pleaded in para 9 that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society are mainly selling ready made garments and/or toys, groceries, bangles, household utensils including tailoring shops, fruit and vegetable shops. The facility of electricity supply, is made available and some members of the petitioner No.1 society, according to the petitioners, have their own separate electricity connections for their respective stalls. Such pleadings are raised in para 9 of the petition. They have contended that the respondent No.1 has leased by private contract, the right to collect fees or rents imposed by the respondent No.1 under Section 257 of the Act, 1968. A categorical statement is made in para 11 that the members of the petitioner No.1 are regularly paying fees to the person, collector of such fees for the respondent No.1. According to the petitioners, the respondent No.1 had been leasing the right to collect market fee from time to time. The receipts of stallage/stallage charges of rent, according to the petitioners, have been produced along with the petition. In paras 12 and 13, reference to the resolution of the respondent No.1 Council, for providing better amenities to Ponda town somewhere in the year 2005, is made. By this resolution, it has been resolved to construct proposed market complex. 4. According to the petitioners, the market in question, situates in an area of about 7200 square meters within the limits of the property bearing Survey No. 158/12 of Ponda Taluka. Adjoining land Survey No. 168/1, according to the petitioners, has been acquired by the respondent No.1, however, is low lying and is separated from the market area, by a nullah having four meters depth. It has been further pleaded in para 15 that Ponda town does not have a public sewage system. Adjoining land Survey No. 168/1, according to the petitioners, has been acquired by the respondent No.1, however, is low lying and is separated from the market area, by a nullah having four meters depth. It has been further pleaded in para 15 that Ponda town does not have a public sewage system. The area of the acquired land Survey No. 168/1 admeasures 4225 square meters. The proposed market complex, designed by the respondent No.1, is described in para 16 of the petition. Grievance is raised in para 18 that the project of proposed market as designed by the respondent No.1, was not conceptualized to accommodate the members of the petitioner No.1. The request for rehabilitation of the members of the petitioner No.1, was taken up with the respondent No. 2 somewhere in the year 2007 by the respondent No. 1 for the purpose, to enable the respondent No.2 to get the vacant possession of site, by evicting the members of the petitioner No.1 from the respective stalls. Such eviction was intended to commence development of the market complex. In para 19, it has been pleaded that the respondents decided that the members of the petitioner No.1 temporarily accommodated in the land Survey No. 168/1. The members of the petitioner No.1, were given an understanding that the rehabilitation, in land Survey No. 168/1 was temporary rehabilitation and or accommodation of the members of the petitioner No.1 in the said market area was for temporary period. The members of the petitioner No.1 felt that site chosen for temporary rehabilitation i.e. Survey No. 168/1 by the respondent No.1 was not suitable to carrying on their trade and the said plot lacked proper access and was situated at a low level of ground and was experiencing water clogging during monsoon and they also felt that it has been inconvenient to the public require to frequent the market. Along with this, they apprehended that the stalls of the petitioners, were facing danger of being submerged. 5. The members of the petitioner No.1 agitated their displacement from the place where they were carrying out business activities as stall owners/vendors/traders. In substance, they were agitating for their temporary rehabilitation in the property bearing Survey No. 168/1. Along with this, they apprehended that the stalls of the petitioners, were facing danger of being submerged. 5. The members of the petitioner No.1 agitated their displacement from the place where they were carrying out business activities as stall owners/vendors/traders. In substance, they were agitating for their temporary rehabilitation in the property bearing Survey No. 168/1. The petitioners have made a statement in para 23 of the petition that despite their objection, the respondents have erected the sheds and platforms in an uneven terrain and kept said sheds ready to accommodate the members of the petitioner No.1 under the pretext of temporary rehabilitation of the members of the petitioner No.1. The photographs Annexure "D" are placed on record along with the petition. It has been further pleaded in para 25 that planning at the hands of the respondent No.1 apparently seen for market for the shopping complex at the costs of the displacement of the members of the petitioner No.1. The petitioners have also pleaded that the members of the petitioner No.1 society, have right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners thus, urged this Court to grant relief to them in this petition under Articles 19(1)(g), 21, 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. The petitioners have prayed for issuance of writ of mandamus or any other writ directions against the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to rehabilitate the members of the petitioner No.1 by way of temporary rehabilitation in the market with all necessary and adequate amenities to carry on their business. This petition seems to have been filed by the petitioner on 2.3.2009. The petition was taken up for admission before this Court on 6.7.2009. After hearing the Counsel for the d respective parties, on 6.7.2009, this Court permitted the parties to file pleadings. Deeming completion of the pleadings is also contemplated by this order passed on 6.7.2009. It is necessary at this juncture to notice that the order was passed on 29.4.2009 directing the parties to maintain status-quo as of that date till next date of hearing. This ad interim relief, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was/is continued till this date. 7. On behalf of the petitioners, learned Senior Advocate, urged that the petitioners are carrying on business activities, in the market and are the owners of the stalls. This ad interim relief, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was/is continued till this date. 7. On behalf of the petitioners, learned Senior Advocate, urged that the petitioners are carrying on business activities, in the market and are the owners of the stalls. The petitioners, i.e. the members of the petitioner No.1 and the petitioner No.2, have a right to carry on any trade, business, occupation. Trading or business activity, which is being carried on by the members of the petitioner No.1 in the market, is the only source of livelihood of the petitioners and their respective families, the members of the petitioner No.1, are carrying on such business activity in the market since about 25 years. In substance, it has been argued that the petitioners are not hawkers. A nature of the business carried on by the members of the petitioner No.1, cannot be equated to the hawkers. The Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out photographs produced on record. According to the learned Senior Advocate, these photographs do depict the existence of the stall and various objects, articles exposed for sale. If two are considered together, the persons or members of the petitioner No.1 Society cannot be said to be hawkers. It is beyond imagination, according to the Senior Counsel, that such objects and articles can be brought to the stalls every day morning by the members of the petitioner No.1 Society and taken back in the evening. The learned Senior Counsel has also invited our attention to the meaning of the word Hawker. Aid of Shorter Oxford English dictionary is sought for that purpose. There, the meaning of the word Hawker is given as a man, who goes from place to place selling his wares, or who carried them in the street. Stall means a bench, table, board or the like especially one in front of shop upon which the goods are exposed for sale, booth or covered stand for the sale of wares at the market, fair or in the open street. This is one of the meaning of word Stall pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel from Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. In the context of words Hawker and Stall and to emphasis the submission on behalf of the petitioners, the learned Senior Advocate also took us to page No. 36, i.e. Annexure "D" of the petition. This is one of the meaning of word Stall pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel from Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. In the context of words Hawker and Stall and to emphasis the submission on behalf of the petitioners, the learned Senior Advocate also took us to page No. 36, i.e. Annexure "D" of the petition. Page 36 containing the photographs, wherein objects and articles which are exposed for sale, are shown. From these photographs, one of the photograph on page 36 it does appear that some garments or clothes are kept/exposed for sale and a person is sitting nearby the objects. Another photograph from page 36, clearly shows the cold drinks put for sale. Pointing out photographs at page 37, it is contended that first photograph shows the various utensils have been showcased. Photograph second at page 37, according to the petitioners, depicts that stack of chilli, is put for sale. Same is the position in the photograph No. 3 at page 37. Those stacks of chilli are put on the platform. According to the learned Senior Counsel, if these photographs are considered in the context of the word hawker, it cannot be said that the members of the petitioner No.1, are hawkers. He submitted that these are the stalls containing various objects/goods/wares, innumerable in number, exposed for sale. In fact, according to him, these are the stalls in occupation and physical possession of the members of the petitioner No.1. The shops are totally within the control of the respective members of the petitioner No.1 Society. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submitted that members of the petitioner No.1 society, cannot be called as hawkers in fact, they cannot be equated with the activity of hawker. He submitted that they are the stall owners, businessmen carrying on their respective business for subsistence and maintenance of their respective families and are entitled for protection under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 8. The learned Senior Advocate pointed out Section 251 of the Act of 1968. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the power is vested with the respondent No.1 to construct, to purchase to take on lease or otherwise acquire any building or land for the purpose of establishing a municipal market or slaughter house etc. 8. The learned Senior Advocate pointed out Section 251 of the Act of 1968. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the power is vested with the respondent No.1 to construct, to purchase to take on lease or otherwise acquire any building or land for the purpose of establishing a municipal market or slaughter house etc. and such stalls, shops, sheds, pens and other buildings for the use of the persons carrying trade or business in or frequenting, such municipal markets and provide and maintain such municipal market such machines, weighs, scales and measures for weighing and measuring the goods sold therein as the Council thinks fit. The learned Senior Advocate submits that in fact, it is the statutory duty cast upon the respondent No.1 municipal Council to make available such stalls, shops in the market area for the persons carrying on business or trade activity. The Counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to Section 257 of the Act 1968. Levy of the stallages, rents and fees, is the provision made under Section 257 of the Act. 1968. It has been provided that the Council may charge such stallages, rents or fees as may from time to time to be fixed by it in this behalf. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has more specifically pointed out Section 257(1)(a)(ii), which provides that stallages-charges may be fixed by the Council for the right to expose articles for sale in a Municipal market. In substance, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners. Section 251(1) imposes a duty upon the Council to make available market/stall in the market to the persons carrying on any trade, business etc. Such persons carrying on business or any trade in such stall situate in the market area has a right of user of such stall to expose articles for sale in a Municipal market. According to the Senior Advocate for the petitioners, conjoint reading of Section 251(1) with Section 257, confers a right on the members of the petitioner to run or carry on their business in the premises or stall. In the case on hand, the stalls allegedly situate in the market. He further submits that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society. regularly, are making payment of such stallages, charged by the respondent No.1. 9. In the case on hand, the stalls allegedly situate in the market. He further submits that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society. regularly, are making payment of such stallages, charged by the respondent No.1. 9. In support of the pleadings of the petitioners, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, pointed out affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners. One of the affidavits of Mr. Gaurish Kolvekar (page 93), makes reference to the collection of sopo. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, stallage is being paid by the members of the petitioner No.1. Society, regularly, for the use and occupation of the respective stalls, in possession of the members of the petitioner No.1 Society. The Counsel for the respondent has also filed reply affidavit wherein the collection of sopo is being referred. Sopo, is a word, seems to have been derived by the Municipal Council from the Regional language i.e. Konkani. We have referred to the dictionary (Rajhans Konkani English Dictionary). The dictionary meaning of word sopo is (i) seat (ii) collection of rent for a site in a Municipal market. The second meaning given in this dictionary is collection of rent for a site in a municipal market, seems to be more appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. In other words, sopo can be called as sopo tax to be levied and collected, by the Municipal Council i.e. the respondent No.1 in view of the provisions of the Act, 1968. This affidavit of Mr. Gaurish, mentions that he was conferred a tender or authorization for specific period by the respondent No.1 Municipal Council for collection of sopo (sopo tax). In para No.1 of this affidavit, it has been averred that Mr. Gaurish was collecting the sopo for and on behalf of the respondent No.1 for the last 32 months and prior to that in the year 2002. It has been pointed out from this affidavit that Mr. Gaurish was frequenting market every day, for collection of sopo and knows the members of the first petitioner as well as the petitioner No.2 himself. He has made a statement on oath in para 2 of this affidavit that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society are traders, operating in Ponda municipal market, selling ready made garments, bangles, utensils, spices, stationary items etc. He has made a statement on oath in para 2 of this affidavit that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society are traders, operating in Ponda municipal market, selling ready made garments, bangles, utensils, spices, stationary items etc. and have been occupying the stalls in the market area covered with asbestos. A categorical sentence is pointed out to us which we are reproducing herein they have sort of fixed kiosks with arrangements to close and open the same with a door. End of para 2, the affiant states that they have been occupying the said area for number of years, though they used to pay fee on daily basis. In para 3 of this affidavit, affiant states that as a collector of hawker's fee, he was collecting stallages, charges from the members of the petitioner No.1. All of them were there all the time at fixed places. Apart from his status as a sopo collector further statement is made in para 3 that he has seen the members of the first petitioner society at the respective places selling their goods for the last 20 years. Thus, to support the pleadings of the petitioners that they are operating in the market, possessing respective stalls at the respective places with specific area, this affidavit of Mr. Gaurish is pointed out to us. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, the affidavit of this Gaurish has well supported the contentions and the pleadings of the petitioners. Another affidavit on behalf of the petitioners pointed out to us, is of Mr. Tulshidas Naik (page 96 of the petition). This person Mr. Naik claims to be a trader selling coconuts and vegetables in the market since 12 years prior to filing of this affidavit. He has made a statement that he is sitting at the hawkers zone in the open where the other vendors of fruits, vegetables sat for the business activity. In para 2, Mr. Naik states that the members of the first petitioner including the second petitioner has covered place in the market with fixed stalls. They have built in kiosks with arrangement for locking their respective kiosks at night. This affiant claims to be a hawker and, therefore, in para 4 of the affidavit, states that he is attending the market on daily basis. They have built in kiosks with arrangement for locking their respective kiosks at night. This affiant claims to be a hawker and, therefore, in para 4 of the affidavit, states that he is attending the market on daily basis. In the morning, he used to come to the market with his goods and night, returns to his residence. He further states that same is the practise 4, followed by the other vendors in the market. Third affidavit on behalf of the petitioners is of Mr. Gokuldas Narayan Mamlekar (page 100), a person claiming to be a vendor in the market last about 35 years. He claimed that he was holding a kiosks in the market, which was used for selling coconuts, fruits and cigarettes and paid stallage tax till the year 1989. According to him, in the year 1989 under the garb of road widening, his kiosks was removed on the promise of rehabilitation, by the respondent No.1. According to him, he was not having any option but to become daily vendor and, therefore, since then, is selling his goods i.e. coconuts and fruits at the said hawker's zone. In para 3 of this affidavit, the affiant Mr. Gokuldas has made a statement that 15 days back with the help of police, all vendors of perishable commodities sitting in the open area covered by tarpaulin, were shifted to the hawker's zone where inadequate space on the platform is made available to them i.e. for keeping their goods and selling their goods. Fourth is affidavit of Mr. Kashinath Porobo, (page 103), who claims to be a vendor in market since about 8 years. In para 2 of his affidavit, he testifies that the vendors were displaced from the existing places forcefully with the help of police and were lodged in a place, which is inadequate. In para 6 of the affidavit, affiant states that he knows the members of the first petitioner and all of them have fixed stalls in the market under a covered shed, which existed for number of years i.e. for about 25 years. 10. Apart from the pleadings and material brought in support of the case pleaded by the petitioners, the learned Senior Advocate, has also pointed out the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 Municipal Council (page 44) (affidavit of Mr. Jayant Tari, Chief Officer). 10. Apart from the pleadings and material brought in support of the case pleaded by the petitioners, the learned Senior Advocate, has also pointed out the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 Municipal Council (page 44) (affidavit of Mr. Jayant Tari, Chief Officer). The learned Senior Counsel pointed out in para 3(b) of this affidavit. The grievance is raised on the basis of the pleadings of the reply affidavit, that the members of the petitioner No.1 Society are tried to be equated with the hawkers illegally. Para 4 of this affidavit, is also commented upon by the Advocate for the petitioners. There it has been stated by the affiant that the members of the first petitioner society and the petitioner No. 2 are only sopekars (daily tax payers or the persons paying tax on daily basis). The contention in this affidavit para 4 that the members of the first petitioner are sopekar or daily tax payers, is seriously criticized. The learned Senior Counsel has also invited our attention to para Nos. 6, 7 and 15 of this affidavit. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, this affidavit filed on behalf of the Municipal Council, supports the contents of the petition and or their presence in the market indulging business activities. Thus, the petitioners' right to carry on trade or business, according to Advocate for the petitioners, can be seen even from this reply affidavit. During the course of the arguments, the learned Senior Advocate took us to the affidavit in sur rejoinder filed by Mr. Jayant Tari. Chief Officer of the respondent No.1, Municipal Council. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, has brought to our notice the photographs (page 128). According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the photographs on page 128, show that stalls concerned are covered and virtually these are stalls under the actual physical possession of the members of the petitioner No.1. 11. The Senior Advocate for the petitioners, strongly relies on the Annexure "A" (page 114). According to him, the members of the first petitioner society, have sought and have obtained electricity connection in the respective stalls with the permission from the respondent No.1. Annexure "A" (page 114) is a communication addressed allegedly by some members of the first petitioner society on 13.10.1993. This communication, has been replied by the respondent No.1 Council. According to him, the members of the first petitioner society, have sought and have obtained electricity connection in the respective stalls with the permission from the respondent No.1. Annexure "A" (page 114) is a communication addressed allegedly by some members of the first petitioner society on 13.10.1993. This communication, has been replied by the respondent No.1 Council. According to the Senior Advocate for the petitioners, the said reply is Annexure "C" to the petition dated 21.2.1994. The reply is addressed to one member of the first petitioner society namely, Mr. Ramnath R. Naik and others. According to the petitioners, they were permitted by this reply by the respondent No.1 and they have, accordingly, taken separate electricity meters. Two bills have been placed on record on behalf of the petitioners, showing the payment of consumption charges i.e. consumption of electricity. The learned Senior Counsel on this material aspect, submits that the physical presence of the members of the first petitioner society carrying on business in the stalls situated in the market, is thus, buttressed by this piece of document. According to the learned Senior Counsel the members of the first petitioner, in these facts and circumstances, cannot be thrown out from their respective stalls. 12. The Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1, submits that the immovable property of the Municipal Council can be transferred in view of the provisions of the Goa Municipalities (Transfer of Immovable Property) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as Rules of 1970). He points out Rule No.5 from the Rules 1970. According to the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, there is no lease in favour of the members of the first petitioner society. No tenancy rights have been created in favour of the members of the first petitioner society. Section 188 of the Act, 1968, puts prohibition on the Municipal Council to transfer any of immovable property without the sanction of the Government. According to the Counsel for the respondent No.1, the members of the first petitioner society are not lessee. There is no document of lease in their favour. There is no document showing tenancy in favour of the members of the first petitioner and second petitioner. The status of the members of the first petitioner society and the petitioner No.2, according to the Counsel for the respondent No.1, is licencee. There is no document of lease in their favour. There is no document showing tenancy in favour of the members of the first petitioner and second petitioner. The status of the members of the first petitioner society and the petitioner No.2, according to the Counsel for the respondent No.1, is licencee. They are permitted to occupy the portion from the platform constructed in the municipal market, as sopekar, for a day i.e. since morning till evening. In other words, they were/are licencee to occupy the portion of the platform in market area on payment of daily sopo. According to him, these are the reasons as to why no document is coming forward, in favour of the members of the first petitioner, pointing out that they were inducted as a lessee or tenant in the alleged respective stalls. The Counsel for the respondent No.1 further submits that the stall covered with roof and four walls, installed with the doors, which can be locked, is not the phenomena in the case on hand. It is the open space in the market area i.e. platform constructed with bricks and cement. From paras 9 and 10 of the affidavit in sur rejoinder (page 120), the Counsel for the respondent No.1 points out the nature of the sopo collected from the persons carrying on business activity in the market. Thereafter, para 11 has been pointed out to us that the claim of the members of the petitioner No.1 society that they have permanent constructed kiosks/stalls, is out of question. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that for construction of kiosks/stalls in the market, one has to seek and obtain permission from the Municipal Council. Such provision pointed out to us is Section 184 of the Act, 1968. There, it has been provided that the expression to construct a building includes any material alteration, enlargement or reconstruction of any building, or of any wall including compound wall and fencing, verandah, fixed platform plinth, door step or the like, whether constituting part of a building or not. In substance, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that no such valid permission is obtained by the members of the first petitioner society. In substance, the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that no such valid permission is obtained by the members of the first petitioner society. If at all some stalls, according to the contents of the petition, are in existence, it cannot be said to be legal fixtures brought in existence in view of Section 184 of the Act, 1968. He submits that such an illegal activity or illegal construction, cannot be protected by this Court while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It is not in dispute that factually no such permission, is placed on record, but then the learned Senior Counsel for this submission, does have a counter submission that in case of such illegal construction activity by the members of the first petitioner, the respondent No.1 has not taken any action for removal of such construction till this date. 13. The learned Counsel for the respondent No.1 also referred to affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondent Municipal Council. In this affidavit in reply (page 44) para 9, according to him, is material. It has been stated in para 9 that lands Survey No. 168/1 is acquired by the respondent No.1 and declared as hawking zone. This has been done by the Municipal Council the respondent No.1 in view of the directions given by this High Court in Writ Petition No. 148 of 1997 in the matter of Pedestrian Dattatrey Deshpande Road, Vasco-da-gama, Goa vs. Chief Officer Municipal Council, Mormugoa, reported in 1997 (2) GLT 128. The Pedestrian's case (supra), which is relied on by the learned Counsel shows that, the learned Single Bench of this Court, has given various directions. Para 9 of this judgment we have read with the assistance• of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No.1. There, we find that various directions have been given by the learned Single Bench of this Court. Four Municipal Council were put on notice in that writ petition by the learned Single Bench of this Court. Direction, contained in para 9(5), is material in the case on hand. According to the Counsel for the respondent No.1, in view of this directions in para 9(5) hawking zone has been created/constructed by the present respondent No.1. For construction of this hawking zone, it has been stated that, an amount of Rs. Direction, contained in para 9(5), is material in the case on hand. According to the Counsel for the respondent No.1, in view of this directions in para 9(5) hawking zone has been created/constructed by the present respondent No.1. For construction of this hawking zone, it has been stated that, an amount of Rs. 1,45 Crores has been invested by the respondent No.1. The said platforms have been constructed to rehabilitate and facilitate the hawkers-sopo vendors. In para 10 of this affidavit pointed out to us, it has been stated that the respondent No.1 has decided to build state of art market complex at the costs of approximately Rs. 22 Crores. That market complex proposed was to be constructed in Survey No. 158/12 wherein, the Budhwarpeth market existed on the date of proposal. This construction was proposed after demolition of the existing old market c complex (Budhwarpeth market area). The details of the proposed market complex have been given in para 11 and 12. In para 13, it has been stated to shift the traders, sopo payers from old market to hawker's zone. Some package has been offered by the respondent No.1 in the interest of traders/sopo payers. In Para 14, it has been stated that at about 270 sopo payers have been shifted to such hawker's zone and have started their business therein. Further a statement is made that only the members of the petitioner No.1 i.e. 93 members are refusing to shift to the hawker's zone. It was also pointed out from para 17 of this affidavit that 160 platforms can be utilized by the sopo vendors on first come first basis. It is true that for this statement, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, has a strong exception. He maintained the submission that it would not be possible for the members of the first petitioner society, every day to take their articles, objects from their place of residence and carry to this hawker's zone. 14. The Counsel for the respondent No.1, in response to Annexure "A" i.e. communication addressed to the Municipal Council and reply Annexure "C" clarifies that Annexure "C" i.e. reply given by the Municipal Council i.e. the respondent to Mr. Ramanath is with rider. This Annexure "C" according to the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, though grants permission in favour of Mr. Ramanath is with rider. This Annexure "C" according to the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, though grants permission in favour of Mr. Ramnath R. Naik and others to take separate electricity connection in cloth vendors shed, the said is subject to condition that if the Council decides to demolish the said shed or intends to do any development, the connection shall be removed by Mr. Naik and others at their own costs and no compensation will be paid by the Council. The connections be taken by Mr. Ramakant and others and bill would be paid by them without reimbursement from the Council. 15. The learned Senior Counsel and the learned Counsel for the respondent No.1, relied on some judicial pronouncement. The judgment of the High Court and Supreme Court, are in fact deciding the questions brought before the Court. The value of the precedent has been considered by the Supreme Court time and again. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the case is only an authority for what it actually decides. The Courts should not place reliance on the decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits with facts situation of the decision. The judgments are not to be construed as Statutes and the observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. This has been so held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Bank of India and another vs. K. Mohandas and others, reported in 2009 (4) Supreme 538 , keeping in mind, this judgment of the Supreme Court, now we would like to turn to the judgments cited on behalf of the parties in the case on hand. 16. The learned Senior Counsel in support of his submission that the members of the first petitioner society are entitled to enjoy right to carry on business, occupation, under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On behalf of the petitioners, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Constitution .Bench of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sodan Singh and others vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and others reported in (1989) 4 SCC 155 . There, the petitioners have filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court of India. There, the petitioners have filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court of India. The contention raised was that the petitioners were having the rights to engage any trading business on the pavements of the roads of the city of Delhi. Grievance was that they have been using this property with the permission of Municipal Authorities for some time. However, recently, there had been illegal interference. The judgment of the Delhi High Court dismissing the claim of the some of the petitioners, was also challenged. The facts in brief have been mentioned in paras 1, 2 and 3 of the judgment. In para 12 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that under the Indian Constitution, a right to carry on business is one of the freedom expressly protected under Article 19(1)(g). This right under Article 19(1)(g) it is held by the Supreme Court is subject to reasonable restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19 itself. In para 19 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered Article 21 i.e. right to life. There, it has been held that we do not think there is any question of application of Article 21 therein. In, the context of the facts before the Supreme Court, it has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that but can there be at all a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trading business? We have no hesitation in answering the issue against the petitioners. The Supreme Court, however, was hastened to add that the petitioners do have a fundamental right to carry on trade or business of their choice, but not to do soon a particular place. Earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union vs. Union of India, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 568 , has been also noticed. We have also considered para 21 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sodan Singh's case (supra). Another judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is in the matter of Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers' Union and another vs. Municipal Corporation, Mumbai and others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 625 . Another judgment of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is in the matter of Maharashtra Ekta Hawkers' Union and another vs. Municipal Corporation, Mumbai and others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 625 . In the matter of Municipal Corporation Mumbai (supra), the facts have been given in paras 2 and 3 briefly. It appears that in view of the judgments of the High Court, a draft scheme was framed some where in the year 1996 and about 488 zones were shown as hawking zones. There, about 49,000/- hawkers were to be accommodated. 28 sites in different wards were earmarked for construction of the hawkers plazas. Survey was carried on/ undertaken on behalf of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by a private agency. Survey disclosed at about 1,03,000/- hawkers were operating at the relevant time, out of them about 15000 were licensed hawkers and approximately 22000 were issued daily receipts or pautis under the scheme known unauthorized occupation-cum-Refuse Removal Charges. This scheme was thus of unique nature probably on national level. In the background of this scheme and the facts, as well as judgment of the Bombay High Court, various S.L.Ps. were filed in the Supreme Court. There, the Supreme Court considered Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21. With the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, we have considered paras 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 17. With this, now, we shall turn to the case on hand. In forgoing paragraphs, we have referred to pleadings of the petitioners, affidavits filed on behalf of the petitioners, material brought on record by the petitioners, reply affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No.1 Municipal Council. We have carefully perused the photographs produced on record on behalf of the petitioners and the map (page 35) annexed with the petition. Occupation of the premises may be dwelling house or premises used for carrying on business, used for storing the objects, goods, or for whatever purpose, has its own impact upon the premises concerned. The material on record, do not indicate the existence of stalls having four walls covered by the roof, installed with the doors/shutters or some arrangement of lock and key. We do not find a piece of document/evidence permitting the petitioners, their entry/user/occupation of the premise i.e. stall or stalls in the market. The material on record, do not indicate the existence of stalls having four walls covered by the roof, installed with the doors/shutters or some arrangement of lock and key. We do not find a piece of document/evidence permitting the petitioners, their entry/user/occupation of the premise i.e. stall or stalls in the market. There is no evidence even prima facie, pointing out, any circumstance indicating the existence of stall either of permanent or temporary nature. 18. The permission, seeking electricity supply/meter is carefully considered by us. Annexure "A" is the document/communication dated 13.10.1993 addressed to the Chief Officer of the respondent No.1 by some of the members of the first petitioner. The opening sentence reads as. This is to bring to your kind knowledge, that, present electric meter which is fixed for the market is not giving sufficient light to us, and as such we have not obtained any separate connection for our use. It is clear from this opening sentence of this communication that some arrangement for electric light was available, which was found insufficient by the authors of this communication and the fact that they have conceded that they have not obtained any separate connection for their use. Further joint request is made that they may be allowed to obtain electric meters to use, so that they can use the electric power for their Gala and bill for the electricity consumption was promised to be borne by them jointly. From this communication, it appears that the arrangement for electricity over there, was found insufficient. Annexure "C" is the reply to Mr. Ramnath by the Chief Officer of the respondent No.1. This reply cannot be said to be unconditional permission conferred upon Mr. Ramnath and others. The permission granted in this reply is appended with three conditions. The last one is important in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The demolition if desired by the respondent No.1 and or future development intended by the respondent No.1, were the riders. The removal was the right reserved by the respondent No.1 Council that too at the costs of the grantee i.e. Mr. Ramnath Naik and others without compensation. In our view, such type of permission granted by the local Self Government, cannot be read in favour of the petitioners. If such electricity connection is there, it shall have its own existence at the will of the respondent No.1 Municipal Council. Ramnath Naik and others without compensation. In our view, such type of permission granted by the local Self Government, cannot be read in favour of the petitioners. If such electricity connection is there, it shall have its own existence at the will of the respondent No.1 Municipal Council. 19. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Council, relied upon a judgment of the learned Single Bench of this Court in the matter of M/s. Dattaraj Theatre vs. Shri Sanjay Arjun Pednekar reported in 1989 (1) GLT 310. Here, the question considered before the learned Single Judge of this Court, was the provision laid down under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of temporary injunction. This judgment, in our view, does not help to the respondent No.1. The Counsel for the respondent No.1 relied on one more judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and another reported in (1995) 3 SCC 33 . There also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We have noticed the facts, mentioned by the Supreme Court in the matter of Mahadeo (supra). This judgment also, in our view, does not help the respondent No.1. We have considered the prayers of the petitioners. This temporary rehabilitation is not defined in the petition by the petitioners meaning thereby putting span of time. It has been stated in the affidavit of the Chief Officer of the Council that present market needs to be demolished. This issue of the rehabilitation, in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand that too of temporary rehabilitation, is difficult to be directed exercising the power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. We have also given consideration to the prayer clause (b) of para 32 of the petition. This prayer clause relates to the proposed building, accommodation of the members of the petitioner No.1, and provision of adequate status for the members of the first petitioner. The proposed market is yet to come in existence, allotment of the shops/stalls etc. would be the matter to be dealt with by the respondent No.1 in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1968. The proposed market is yet to come in existence, allotment of the shops/stalls etc. would be the matter to be dealt with by the respondent No.1 in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1968. We do not find it appropriate to consider that prayer in the facts and circumstances and considering the nature of the present petition. 20. In our view, right conferred upon citizen or recognized by law can be analyzed in to (i) fundamental rights given by the constitution, constitutional rights not having the status of fundamental rights, contractual rights or rights flowing from subordinate legislation. In the case on hand, we see no such right. The petitioners could not prove their lawful possession over the specified area or stall. The learned Counsel for the petitioner's seeks equity. Equity is not a one way street. In our opinion, Counsel for the respondent No.1 is justified in pointing out nature of project, stage of the project and apprehension of escalation in the cost of the project. One more aspect we have considered. It is a case of competitive interest of section of citizens around 93 (i.e. the members of the first petitioner) and interest of the public at large of Ponda. We shall prefer the interest of largest section of the society. 21. Resultantly, the petition filed on behalf of the petitioners, is sans merits and deserves to be dismissed. We, accordingly, dismiss the petition. Rule discharged. No costs. 22. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner's seeks six weeks suspension of this order. The Counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that two weeks suspension may be granted. We have noticed that there are at about 93 members of the first petitioner society. We have also noticed that the interim relief stands in favour of the petitioners since 29.4.2009. We think it appropriate to suspend this order for six weeks. Petition dismissed.