Karnataka State Financial Corporation, Bangalore v. Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi
2009-11-30
H.G.RAMESH
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- H.G. Ramesh, J. This writ petition by Karnataka State Financial Corporation (‘KSFC’ for Short) is directed against the order dated 05.06.2007 (Annexure-M) passed by the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi, rejecting the petitioner’s Appeal No.304/06. By the impugned order, the Appellate Authority has confirmed the order dated 20.09.2006 (Annexure-L) passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (‘BIFR’ for short) in Case No.321/1998 directing the petitioner-KSFC to issue a ‘no dues certificate’ to respondent No.3 – a Sick Industrial Company. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the orders passed by the BIFR and the Appellate Authority which are produced as Annexures-L and M respectively. 3. The case of the petitioner-KSFC is that it had leased a Diesel Generator Set (3.8 MW/4750 KVA) which was purchased for Rs.10.33 crores to respondent No.3-Company and in that connection, respondent. No.3-Company is due to the petitioner-KSFC to the tune of Rs.17 crores; and it had never agreed for a ‘one-time settlement’ for Rs.210 lakhs and hence the direction issued to it as per the orders at Annexures L and M to issue a no dues certificate’ is not, justified. The Assistant General Manager (HP & FS) of the petitioner KSFC has filed his affidavit dated 27.11.2009 in this Court stating that the Board of the petitioner Corporation has not approved any ‘one-time settlement’ to respondent. No.3-Company. The case of respondent No.3-Company is that the KSFC has received Rs. 210 lakhs as a ‘one-time settlement’ towards the amount due from it. It is stated that the aforesaid Diesel Generator set was later sold to a third party for Rs.210 lakhs with the approval of the petitioner-KSFC. 4. Learned Counsel on both sides took me through the correspondence between the parties and there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner-KSFC had expressly consented for any ‘one-time’ settlement to respondent No.3-Company. However, learned Counsel appearing for respondent No.3-Company strongly contended that time assuming that the petition-KSFC had not consented for any one-time settlement’, in view of the legal fiction created under Section 19(2) of the Sick Industrial Companies Special. Provisions Act, 1985 (‘the SICA Act’ for short), it shall be deemed that the petitioner had consented for the ‘one-time’ settlement’ proposed in the draft rehabilitation scheme, as it did not object to it.
Provisions Act, 1985 (‘the SICA Act’ for short), it shall be deemed that the petitioner had consented for the ‘one-time’ settlement’ proposed in the draft rehabilitation scheme, as it did not object to it. He submitted that the draft scheme – Annexure-RI dated 28.09.2005 was circulated to all the concerned including the petitioner-KSFC for their consent as contemplated under Section 19(2) of the SICA Act and the KSFC did not object to the proposal of ‘one-time settlement’ for Rs.210 lakhs and accordingly the scheme was sanctioned as per Annexure-R2 dated 12.12.2005. 5. Before referring to Section 19 of the SICA Act, it is relevant to refer to the following reasoning of the Appellate Authority. “9. ………………………….. iv) Thereafter, BIFR vide its order dated 28.9.2005 circulated the DRS for consent of all concerned. The DRS envisaged the settlement of the dues of KFC under an OTS of Rs.210 lacs. The objections to the DRS were considered in the hearing held on 12.12.2005 and prior to the said hearing KSFC vide its letter dated 7.12.2005 addressed to the OA affirmed that KFC Board at its meeting held on 20.9.2005 had agreed in principle to transfer the leased asset for a sum of Rs.210 lacs. As there was no objection to the DRS as circulated, the same was sanctioned by the BIFR vide its order dated 12.12.2005. v) A review hearing was convened by the BIFR for 20.9.2006 and the OA invited status report from all concerned. KSFC submitted its status report on 31.8.2006 affirming that the asset had been transferred and that the due procedure for settling the account was under way. Based on the submissions of the OA, BIFR by the impugned order directed that the sanctioned scheme should be implemented and the obligations should be discharged by Bank’s/FI’s. It is in this context that KFC was directed to issue a No Due Certificate since it had affirmed that a payment of Rs.210 lacs had been received. 10. From the foregoing it is evident that the KFC had at no stage objected to the settlement of its dues under an OTS and had repeatedly confirmed that the leased asset had been transferred as per understanding and that a sum of Rs.210 lacs had been received from the respondent company.
10. From the foregoing it is evident that the KFC had at no stage objected to the settlement of its dues under an OTS and had repeatedly confirmed that the leased asset had been transferred as per understanding and that a sum of Rs.210 lacs had been received from the respondent company. Having accepted and affirmed as above, it is now not open to the appellant to decline to issue a No Dues or discharge certificate. In view of the aforestated facts we find that there is no infirmity in the direction issued to KFC by the order dated 20.9.2006 passed by BIFR. (Underlining supplied) 6. To examine as to whether there was deemed consent in law, it is relevant to refer to sub-Section 19 of the SICA Act which read as follows: 19. Rehabilitation by giving financial assistance.-(1) Where the scheme relates to preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures with respect to any sick industrial company, the scheme may provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any scheduled bank or other Bank, a public financial institution or State level institution or other authority (any Government, bank, institution or other authority required by a scheme to provide for such financial assistance being hereafter in this section referred to as the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance) to the sick industrial company. (2) Every scheme referred to in sub-section (1) shall be circulated to every person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance for his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of such circulation or within such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as may be allowed by the Board, and if no consent is received within such period or further period, it shall be deemed that consent has been given. (3) ………………………………………………………..” (Emphasis supplied) As could be seen from Section 19(2) of the SICA Act, it was open to be petitioner KSFC not to give its consent when the draft scheme was circulated to it for its consent by expressly dissenting/objecting to the OTS proposed therein. But it did not do so: it simply kept quiet. In such a circumstance, in my opinion, the legal fiction created under Section 19(2) of the SICA Act would come into play.
But it did not do so: it simply kept quiet. In such a circumstance, in my opinion, the legal fiction created under Section 19(2) of the SICA Act would come into play. Therefore, in the present case, it shall be deemed that the petitioner-KSFC had consented for the ‘one-time settlement’ envisaged in the draft scheme. If the petitioner had objected to the proposed OTS, the BIFR would have resorted to Section 19(4) of the SICA Act in dealing with the matter. The contention of Sri B. Rudra Gowda, learned Counsel for the petitioner, that Section 19 of the SICA Act is not attracted to the facts of the case cannot be accepted as the petitioner is admittedly a public financial institution and the draft scheme had envisaged a certain financial sacrifice from it. It is also relevant to state that the petitioner did not appeal against the sanction of the scheme. On the facts of the case, I find no legal infirmity in the orders of the BIFR and the Appellate Authority in directing the petition to issue a ‘no dues certificate’ to respondent No.3-Company. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.