Judgment :- Bhaskar Bhattacharya, ACJ.: Both these mandamus-appeals were taken up together as a common question of law arises for determination in these appeals which have been preferred against a common judgment dated October 1, 2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court by which His Lordship disposed of several writ applications by a common judgment. In all the writ-applications a Memo dated 26th September, 2007, issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare, was the subject-matter of challenge. Prior to November 26, 2001 the system of supplying diet to the indoor patients of the hospitals under the control of the State Government was that the raw materials for diet were supplied by the selected contractors after competitive bidding and food was cooked in the hospitals’ kitchens by the cooks/GDAs, being the employees of the Government. Receipt of raw materials, cooking of meals and distribution of the same to the patients was supervised by a steward or some other designated employees. This system was discontinued by virtue of the Memo dated 26th November, 2001 issued by the Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of West Bengal, by which it was directed that in the changed circumstances, the agency selected through tendering process should be responsible for providing completely finished diet as per prescribed standards of quality and quantity to the hospital authorities for distribution amongst the indoor patients. Since the system for cooking of diet for indoor patients in different Government hospitals by the departmental staff were discontinued, it was further directed that the existing available facilities should be allowed to be used by the agencies selected for supply of finished diet. The said system of providing cooked diet to the indoor patients of the Government hospital by the agencies selected through tendering process had been continuing with various modifications till such time when the Government decided that the supply of cooked diet to the indoor patients of Rural Hospitals (“RHs”), Block Primary Health Centers (“BPHCs”) and Primary Health Centres (“PHCs”) in the State would be undertaken by Self-help Groups (“SHGs”). Such direction has been issued by the Memo dated 26th September, 2007 issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare, which is subject-matter of challenge in those writ-applications. Such direction has been issued by the Memo dated 26th September, 2007 issued by the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Health and Family Welfare, which is subject-matter of challenge in those writ-applications. The grievance of the writ-petitioners was that the agencies which were earlier participating in the tendering process for selection for supply of cooked diet to various RHs, BPHCSs, PHCs had been sought to be excluded from the field of consideration and thus, the same offended Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. It appears from the perusal of the decision of the Government contained in the Memo dated 26th September, 2007 that Rogi Kalyan Samities (“RKSs”) had been constituted for proper management, monitoring and supervision of different activities being continued in the State health facilities and that the assignment of the function relating to supply of cooked diet to the indoor patients of RHs, BPHCs and PHCs in the State to the RKSs had been under active consideration of the Government and it had been decided by the Health Department to assign such function to RKSs for enabling them to ensure better service to the indoor patients. The RKSs were directed to discharge such function by engaging suitable SHGs to be selected by the Block Health and Family Welfare Samities (“BHFWSs”) in consultation with respective RKSs and while selecting SHGs, the BPFWSs were required to maintain the following guidelines: “i. Only Women SHGs who have passed Grade I will be eligible; ii. Minimum savings of SHGs should be Rs.5,000/-; iii. The groups who have been able to utilize successfully at least one cycle of cash credit/bank credit not less than Rs.25, 000/- will be eligible. Groups having higher access and utilization of cash credit will be given preference. In the event of many SHGs fulfilling these criteria the selection may be made on the basis of a) proximity of the SHG from the hospital concerned, b) CC limit enjoyed by the group; iv. SHGs who are defaulters in repayment of Bank loan will not be considered for selection; v. There should be at least two (2) educated members in the group with minimum qualification up to class VIII; vi. The SHG should be agreeable to undergo training on hospital diet; vii. There should be strong group cohesion among the members of the team; viii. The SHG should be agreeable to undergo training on hospital diet; vii. There should be strong group cohesion among the members of the team; viii. Preference should be given to groups who have participated in C.H.C.M.I. programme and other health related programmes.” (Emphasis supplied). According to the writ-petitioners, apart from Women SHGs, all others, though eligible to supply cooked diet to the indoor patients of RHs, BPHCs and PGCs, would be excluded because discrimination has been made in favour of female sex and total exclusion of male sex categories amounted to 100% reservation for Women SHGs which was not permissible. The learned Single Judge has overruled such contention by relying upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P.B. Vijayakumar reported in (1995) 4 SCC 520 as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the judgment which is quoted below: “7. The insertion of clause (3) of Article 15 in relation to women is recognition of the fact that for centuries, women of this country have been socially and economically handicapped. As a result, they are unable to participate in the socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of equality. It is in order to eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in a manner that would bring about effective equality between men and women that Article 15(3) is placed in Article 15. Its object is to strengthen and improve the status of women. An important limb of this concept of gender equality is creating job opportunities for women. To say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this article. Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). To say that under Article 15(3), job opportunities for women cannot be created would be to cut at the very root of the underlying inspiration behind this article. Making special provisions for women in respect of employment or posts under the State is an integral part of Article 15(3). This power conferred under Article 15(3), is not whittled down is any manner by Article 16.” The learned Single Judge, while upholding the decision of the Government to engage SHGs excluding the agencies, who so long had been providing cooked food, disapproved the guidelines framed for their selection by pointing out that a SHG in spite of having Grade-1 standard in terms of the criteria mentioned in the guidelines may not have the requisite experience and expertise for supply of standard quality of diet for the patients and thus, such qualification would have no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by engaging the SHGs for providing appropriate quality of diet for the indoor patients. The appropriate departments of the State Government was, therefore, directed to reconsider the modalities for selection of SHGs in a manner that would suit the interest of the patients, while keeping in mind that the status of the rural poor woman was also required to be lifted and for the above purpose, the government should identify the eligible SHGs and impart proper training to them before engagement. Being dissatisfied, two of the Writ-petitioners have preferred these appeals. The State has, however, not preferred any counter-appeal or cross-objection against the last part of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, has vehemently contended before us that while relying upon the aforesaid paragraph 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P.B. Vijayakumar (supra), the learned Single Judge totally overlooked the next paragraph, namely, paragraph 8 where the Supreme Court made specific observation that such reservation should not be 100% for Women. By relying upon paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the learned advocate for the appellant contends that the order impugned should be set aside. Mrs. P.B. Vijayakumar (supra), the learned Single Judge totally overlooked the next paragraph, namely, paragraph 8 where the Supreme Court made specific observation that such reservation should not be 100% for Women. By relying upon paragraph 8 of the said judgment, the learned advocate for the appellant contends that the order impugned should be set aside. Mrs. Majumdar, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State respondents, on the other hand, has supported the order impugned and has relied upon the following decisions of the Supreme Court in support of her contention that there was nothing illegal in issuing the Memo which is the subject-matter of the writ-applications and that in such a situation, a writ-court should not interfere with the policy decision adopted by the Government: 1. Ekta Shakti Foundation vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi reported in 2006 (10) SCC 337 ; 2. People Union for Civil Liberties vs. Union of India reported in 2004 (12) SCC 104 ; 3. Indian Drug Pharmaceutical Limited vs. Punjab Drugs Manufacturing Association reported in 1999 (6) SCC 247 ; 4. Krishnan Kakkanth vs. Govt. Of Kerala reported in 1997 (9) SCC 495 ; 5. State of Orissa vs. Radheysyam Meher reported in 1995 (1) SCC 652 ; 6. Balco Employee’s Union vs. Union of India reported in 2002 (2) SCC 333 ; 7. Federation of Rly. Officers’s Association vs. Union of India reported in 2003 (4) SCC 289 . Mrs. Mazumdar, therefore, prays for dismissal of the present appeal. Therefore, the only question that arises for determination in these appeals is whether the learned Single Judge was justified in upholding the legality of the impugned Memo although male sex has been discriminated against female. In order to appreciate the question involved herein it will be profitable to refer to the provisions contained in Article 15 of the Constitution of India which is quoted below: “ Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.— (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to— (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. (5) Nothing in this article or in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall prevent the State from making any special provision, by law, for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to educational institutions including private educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of Article 30.” The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants, vehemently contended before us by relying upon paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. P.B. Vijayakumar (supra), that the learned Single Judge erred in law in not taking into consideration Paragraph 8 of the said judgment although His Lordship relied upon Paragraph 7 thereof. In the said case of Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra), the Government of Andhra Pradesh in the year 1984 felt that women were not getting their due share of public employment. It decided to take certain remedial measures. On January 2, 1984 it issued G.O.MS. No. 2, General Administration (Services-A) Department indicating the policy decisions taken by the State Government in respect of reservations for women in public services, to a specified extent. Pursuant to this policy decision, Rule 22-A was introduced in the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. No. 2, General Administration (Services-A) Department indicating the policy decisions taken by the State Government in respect of reservations for women in public services, to a specified extent. Pursuant to this policy decision, Rule 22-A was introduced in the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It reads as follows:- "22-A : Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules or Special or Ad-hoc Rules- (1) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts for which women are better suited than men, preference shall be given to women; (G.O.Ms. No. 472, G.A. dated 11-10-1985): Provided that such absolute preference to women shall not result in total exclusion of men in any category of posts. (2) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts for which women and men are equally suited, other things being equal, preference shall be given to women and they shall be selected to an extent of at least 30% of the posts in each category of O.C., B.C., S.C., and S.T. quota. (3) In the matter of direct recruitment to posts which are reserved exclusively for being filled by women they shall be filled by women only". Sub-rule (2) of this rule was the subject matter of challenge before the High Court out of which the matter went to the Apex Court. The High Court struck down the second part of Rule 22A (2), as a result, the Government of Andhra Pradesh took the matter before the Apex Court which set aside order of the High Court and restored the said provision. While allowing the appeal the Apex Court relied upon Article 15(3) as indicated in Paragraph 7 of the judgment as quoted earlier and then made following observations in Paragraph 8 which is relied upon by the Appellants: “What then is meant by "any special provision for women" in Article 15(3)? This "special provision," which the State may make to improve womens participation in all activities under the supervision and control of the State can be in the form of either affirmative action or reservation. It is interesting to note that the same phraseology finds a place in Article 15(4) which deals with any special provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens or Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Article 15 as originally enacted did not contain Article 15(4). It is interesting to note that the same phraseology finds a place in Article 15(4) which deals with any special provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens or Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Article 15 as originally enacted did not contain Article 15(4). It was inserted by the Constitution First Amendment Act, 1951 as a result of the decision in the Case of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan, 1951 SCR 525 : ( AIR 1951 SC 226 ), setting aside reservation of seats in educational institutions on the basis of caste and community. This Court observed that the Governments order was violative of Article 15 or Article 29 (2). It said (at P. 228, Para 9 of AIR):- "Seeing, however, that clause (4) was inserted in Article 16, the omission of such an express provision from Article 29 cannot but be regarded as significant." The object of the First Amendment was to bring Articles 15 and 29 in line with Article 16 (4). After the introduction of Article 15(4), reservation of seats in educational institutions has been upheld in the case of M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 439: ( AIR 1963 SC 649 ) and a number of other case which need not be referred to here. Under Article 15(4) orders reserving seats for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Back ward Classes in Engineering, Medical and other Technical colleges, have been upheld. Under Article 15(4), therefore, reservations are permissible for the advancement of any backward class of citizens or of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. Since Article 15(3) contains an identical special provision for women, Article 15(3) would also include the power to make reservations for women. In fact, in the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : (1992 AIR SCW 3682) this Court (in paragraph 846) (of SCC) : (Para 116 of AIR), rejected the contention that Article 15 (4) which deals with a special provision, envisages programmes of positive action while Article 16(4) is a provision warranting programmes of positive discrimination. This Court observed:- "We are afraid we may not be able to fit these provisions into this kind of compartmentalization in the context and scheme of our constitutional provisions. This Court observed:- "We are afraid we may not be able to fit these provisions into this kind of compartmentalization in the context and scheme of our constitutional provisions. By now, it is well settled that reservations in educational institutions and other walks of life can be provided under Article 15(4) just as reservations can be provided in services under Article 16(4). If so, it would not be correct to confine Article 15(4) to programmes of positive action alone. Article 15(4) is wider than Article 16(4) inasmuch as several kinds of positive action programmes can also be evoled and implemented thereunder (in addition to reservations) to improve the conditions of SEBCs, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, whereas Article 16(4) speaks only of one type of remedial measure, namely, reservation of appointments/posts." This Court has, therefore, clearly considered the scope of Article 15(4) as wider than Article 16(4) covering within it several kinds of positive action programmes in addition to reservations. It has, however, added a word of caution by reiterating M.P. Balaji ( AIR 1963 SC 649 ),(supra) to the effect that a special provision contemplated by Article 15(4) like reservation of posts and appointments contemplated by Article 16(4), must be within reasonable limits. These limits of reservation have been broadly fixed at 50% at the maximum. The same reasoning would apply to Article 15(3) which is worded similarly.” (Emphasis supplied by us). In our opinion, the caution given in the last sentence of paragraph 8 quoted above by the Apex Court has no application to the facts of the present case where we are not concerned with Article 16 relating to “appointment” or “employment” to any office under the State. Moreover, the Apex Court in the cases of Vijaylakhmi vs. Punjab University and others reported in AIR 2003 SC 3331 and Toguru Sudhakar Reddy and another vs. Government of A. P. and others reported in AIR 1994 SC 544 has approved reservation of more than 50% of women in service by taking aid of Article 15(3). Thus, we find no substance in the aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant. In the present case we are required to see whether the guidelines challenged in the writ-applications have violated Article 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India in the light of Article 15. Thus, we find no substance in the aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant. In the present case we are required to see whether the guidelines challenged in the writ-applications have violated Article 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India in the light of Article 15. There is no dispute that Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among equals: its aim is to protect persons similarly placed against discriminatory treatment. It does not, however, operate against rational classification. A person setting up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must establish that between persons similarly circumstanced, some were treated to their prejudice and the differential treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law. (See Western U. P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of U. P. reported in AIR 1970 SC 21 ). As regards the scope of Article 15, it should be borne in mind that the discrimination which is not permissible under Article 15(1) is a discrimination which is only on one of the grounds mentioned in Article 15(1). If there is a discrimination in favour of a particular sex, that discrimination would be permissible provided it is not only on the ground of sex, or, in other words, the classification on the ground of sex is permissible provided that classification is the result of other considerations besides the fact that the persons belonging to that class are of a particular sex. We are quite alive to the position of law that Article 15(3) is obviously a proviso to Article 15(1) and proper effect must be given to the proviso. It is true that in construing a proviso to an article one must not nullify the article itself. A proviso merely carves out something from the article itself, but it does not and cannot destroy the whole article. The proper way to construe Article 15 (3), in our opinion, is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1). The proper way to construe Article 15 (3), in our opinion, is that whereas under Article 15(1) discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour of women is permissible, and when the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1). Therefore, as a result of the joint operation of Article 15(1) and Article 15(3), the State may discriminate in favour of women against men, but it may not discriminate in favour of men against women. The provisions contained in Article 19(1)(g) is also subject to Article- 15 and therefore, by limiting the scope of selecting SHGs only among women, the right of the writ-petitioners conferred under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution has not been violated. Once we hold that there is no violation of any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners by the issue of the Memo in question, there is little scope of further investigation in the matter. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the case of Ekta Shakti Foundation vs. Govt. of N.C.T of Delhi (supra), relied upon by Mrs. Mazumadar, the scope of judicial enquiry is confined to the question whether the decision taken by the Government is against any statutory provisions or is violative of the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the position is that even if the decision taken by the Government does not appear to be agreeable to the Court, it cannot interfere. The correctness of the reasons which prompted the Government in decision-making taking one course of action instead of another is not a matter of concern in judicial review and the Court is not the appropriate forum for such investigation. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can decide which policy should be adopted after considering all the points from different angles. In the matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental rights is not shown the Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In the matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental rights is not shown the Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government. We, therefore, find that these appeals are devoid of any substance and are, consequently, dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs.