Judgment :- G. Rajasuria, J. 1. This second appeal is focused by the defendants 1 and 3, animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 211. 2008 passed by the learned subordinate Judge, Bhavani in A.S. No. 29 of 2007 confirming the judgment and decree dated 14. 2007 passed by the learned Principal District Munsif, Bhavani in O.S. No. 51 of 2006, which was one for permanent injunction. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court. 2. The first respondent/plaintiff, filed the suit seeking injunction so as to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession of the suit properties till he is evicted as per law. The defendants entered appearance. D3 filed the written statement resisting the suit, which was adopted by D1; whereupon, the trial Court framed the necessary issues, based on the pleadings. 3. During trial, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws.2 and 3 and Exhibits A-1 to A-5 were marked. On the defendant’s side D3 was examined as D.W.1; D1 was examined as D.W.2 and Exhibits B-1 to B-8 were marked and the exhibits. Exhibits C.W.1 and C.W.2 were also marked. 4. Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit, as against which the plaintiff, preferred appeal before the learned Subordinate Judge, Bhavani, Erode, which reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and allowed the appeal as prayed for and decreed the original suit. Being disconcerted and aggrieved by the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, the defendants 1 and 3 has filed this Second Appeal on various grounds and also suggesting substantial questions of law. 5. After hearing both the sides for sometime, the following substantial questions of law were framed: 1. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in assuming as though the trial Court upheld the validity of Exhibit A-1, the lease deed? 2. Whether the first appellate Court was justified in upsetting the findings of the trial Court, by holding based on revenue records that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property? 3. Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit in to despite admission by D1 and D3 that with the permission of D1 only, the plaintiff took his irrigation pipe across the suit property? 6. 3. Whether the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit in to despite admission by D1 and D3 that with the permission of D1 only, the plaintiff took his irrigation pipe across the suit property? 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants 1 and 3 and the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff on these substantial questions of law. 7. A bare poring over and perusal of the typed set of papers and the judgments of both the Courts below, would display and demonstrate that the plaintiff claiming himself as a tenant over the suit property measuring an extend of 84 cents of land filed the suit seeking the aforesaid relief. It is also the contention of the plaintiff that the first defendant, who is the owner of the suit property permitted the plaintiff to lay pipe across the plaintiffs land, viz., the suit property so as to take water from the defendants land, which is intersected by the plaintiffs property and one public road; D1 attempted to sell the suit property to D2 and D3, whereupon the defendants are trying to evict the plaintiff illegally from the suit property and also trying to remove illegally the said pipeline laid on the defendant’s land. 8. Whereas the records would reveal and convey that D1 sold the suit property in favour of D2. The defendants would contend that there was no tenancy as alleged by the plaintiff who had no right also to retain the pipeline despite the suit property having been sold by D1 in favour of D3. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would/submit that the trial Court unjustifiably ignored Exhibit A-1 and also the admission made by D1 (D.W.2). Whereas the learned counsel for the defendants would advance his argument to the effect that Exhibit A-1 is an unregistered and unstamped document, even though it contemplated one year lease. Learned counsel for the defendants also cited the Division Bench judgment of this Court A.C. Lakshmipathy and Another v. A.M. Chakrapani Reddiar and five Others (2001) 1 MLJ 1 : 2001 (1) CTC 112 . The relevant paragraphs from the said decision would run thus at P. 10 of MLJ: “26. The next question would be what is the position if the said document is not only registered, but it is also not stamped i.e. unstamped. The relevant paragraphs from the said decision would run thus at P. 10 of MLJ: “26. The next question would be what is the position if the said document is not only registered, but it is also not stamped i.e. unstamped. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act reads thus: Section 35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc. – No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted, upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped. Provided that – (a) any such instrument not being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten naye paise only, or a bill of exchange or promissory note, shall; subject to all just exceptions, be admitted in evidence On payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or in the Case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty of deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times of such duty or portion. 27. Courts have interpreted the terms any purpose as for each and every purpose including collateral purposes or in other words such document is inadmissible and such a document cannot be looked into for any purpose. A Division Bench of this Court in Pentapatti Nageswara Rao v. Moka Narayanamurthi and Another, (1937) 2 MLJ 805 , ruled thus at p. 809 of MLJ: “The section itself, in my opinion, provides complete answer to the petitioner’s case. If an unstamped document cannot be admitted for any purpose, it must mean, if the words re to be/given their ordinary and plain meaning that it cannot be admitted under any circumstances in a civil suit. If the legislature in placing this provision of law on the statute book had intended to allow unstamped instruments to be admitted for collateral purposes, it would surely have said so. If the legislature in placing this provision of law on the statute book had intended to allow unstamped instruments to be admitted for collateral purposes, it would surely have said so. It did not say so, but on the other hand, it provided that a negotiable instrument which is insufficiently stamped at the time of execution cannot be properly stamped afterwards, even on payment of a penalty which is allowed in the case of other documents.” A Division Bench of this Court in the ruling yasodamman v. Janaki Ammal, AIR 1968 Mad 294 , held as under: “…………..But in the case of an unstamped document it has been held that as the prohibition contained in Section 35 of the Stamp Act is wide and absolute even though in the pleadings the contesting party may admit the execution of the unstamped document no relief could be granted on the basis of the admission, as it would amount to acting upon the unstamped document” He also cited one other decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and Another AIR 2003 SC 4548 : (2003) 8 SCC 752 . An excerpt from it would run thus: “20………..Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit”, an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior Court.” As such a bare perusal of the aforesaid two judgments as correctly cited by the learned counsel for the defendants would exemplify and spotlight the legal position that even if a document is marked erroneously, without collecting proper stamp duty, later on considering its admissibility as well as validity, could be considered at any stage of such, Exhibit A1 even though contemplates one year lease period turns out to be an unregistered one and it is not at all stamped. Put simply, the first Appellate Court was totally wrong in placing reliance on it and by way of adding fuel to the fire, the first Appellate Court without even taking care to peruse the judgment of the trial Court, which it was enjoined to do so as per law, simply assumed as though the trial Court upheld the validity of Exhibit A-1. 10. I would like to reiterate, without being tautologous, that the lower Court clerly and categorically ignored Exhibit A-1 correctly. But the lower Appellate Court, not only relied upon Exhibit A-1, but also relied upon the same on the ground as though, it was relied on by the trial Court. It is axiomatic that the finding of the trial Court is perverse relating to Exhibit A-1 and as a sequela the view of the trial Court has to be restored. 11. The aforesaid decision of the Division Bench of this Court A.C. Lakshmipathy and Another v. A.M. Chakrapani Reddiar and five Others (supra) would also evince and demonstrate that even for collateral purpose, if an unregistered document has to be relied on, at the first instance stamp duty has to be collected. But, in this case, that was not done so. Hence, the finding of the lower Appellate Court on Exhibit A1 is nothing short of perversity warranting interference by this Court. 12. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would draw the attention of this Court to the deposition of D.W.1 (D3) as observed by the first appellate Court in its judgment and develop his argument that D3 clearly and categorically deposed that D1 told D3 about the lease deed. 13. The learned counsel for the defendants would convincingly and appositely put forth his argument that one stray sentence in the deposition of D.W.1 should not have been relied on by the first Appellate Court ignoring the rest of the deposition that the plaintiff was not the holder of the suit property and he was not in possession. Thesis nothing to indicate that D1, who was examined subsequent to D3 was asked to explain or expound about the alleged statement of D3 (D.W.1). 14. At this juncture, I would like to point out that it is settled proposition of law that D1 should have been examined first and thereafter D3. But, in this case, it was just the opposite. 14. At this juncture, I would like to point out that it is settled proposition of law that D1 should have been examined first and thereafter D3. But, in this case, it was just the opposite. It is not readily known, whether the Court’s permission was obtained for such examination. Be that as it may, before relying on the stray sentence of D.W.1 as though that D.W.2 informed D.W.1 about Exhibit A-1, D.W.2 should have been put on notice about it and he should have been asked to explain about during his cross-examination. But that was not done so; simply because, D3 as D.W.1 stated that D1 informed about Exhibit A-1, the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property and that he was cultivating it. It is the case of the plaintiff that ever since 1985, he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and if that be so, he should have been able to produce some clinching revenue records pointing out that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and paying rent/ 15. The trial Court discussed threadbare in its judgment referring to Exhibits B-3 to B-7, the revenue records and they bespeak about the defendant’s possession only and not the plaintiffs possession. Exhibit B-6, the adangal also speaks in the name of D1 only. The learned counsel for the plaintiff who tried to expound and explain away the draw back in the plaintiffs case relating to non-production of adangal in his favour, by arguing that unless the lease is a registered one with the revenue authority, the name of the tenant would not find a place in the revenue records. 16. I am at a loss to understand as to what prevented the plaintiff from getting his name registered as a tenant and there is nothing to indicate that somebody prevented the plaintiff from doing so. 17. It is a common or garden principle that even in respect of unregistered tenancy, the revenue officials are making various surveys and collecting statistics and in those records. at least the plaintiffs name should have found place and such evidence should have been produced before the Court. However, for the reasons best known to the plaintiff, no such record was produced. 18. at least the plaintiffs name should have found place and such evidence should have been produced before the Court. However, for the reasons best known to the plaintiff, no such record was produced. 18. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also would submit that the first Appellate Court referred to cultivation of ground nut crops around the time of filing of the suit as well as the emergence of the sale deed the instance or D1 in favour of D3. 19. Whereas the learned counsel for the defendants would submit that D1 was an aged person and simply because he replied during cross-examination that he did not know or did not remember what was the crop in existence in the suit property as o9n the date of the filing of the suit or the time of selling the land in favour of D3, no adverse inference could be drawn. 20. The judgment of the Courts should be based on strong and reliable piece of evidence. It is a trite proposition of law that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove his case and he cannot fob off the responsibility on the defendants and he cannot also try to achieve success in the litigative battle by picking holes in the case of the defendants. In fact the first Appellate Court itself adverted to the fact that D3 (D.W.1) would depose that it was D1 who harvested the ground nut crops, which was found in the suit property around the time of filing the suit as well as selling the suit property in favour of D3 by D1. 21. It is a trite proposition of law that the judgment of the first Appellate Court, which happened to be the last Court of fact is expected to discuss threadbare the evidence. The first appellate Court intending to reverse the judgment of the lower Court, should furnish cogent and convincing reason. But, without applying the principles of law, simply on misunderstanding of facts and figures, the lower Appellate Court upset the reasoned judgment of the trial Court relating to the lease aspect of the matter. 22. There are two aspects involved in the matter; one relating to lease of the suit property, which has not been established by the plaintiff and the other aspect is relating to the pipeline of the plaintiff existing across the land of the defendants. 22. There are two aspects involved in the matter; one relating to lease of the suit property, which has not been established by the plaintiff and the other aspect is relating to the pipeline of the plaintiff existing across the land of the defendants. In my considered opinion, the trial Court was not justified in dismissing the suit despite admission on the part of D1 himself without any prevarication that he only permitted orally the plaintiff to lay pipe across his land. However, D1 added a rider to the effect that in the event of D1 selling the property to the third parties, the plaintiff should remove the pipeline. As such, the trial Court failed to visualize this aspect of the case. 23. There is a clear licence granted by D1 in favour of the plaintiff so as to enable him to lay pipeline for taking water from one part of the land of the defendant to another part of his land crossing the plaintiff land, obviously crossing the adjoining road also. In such a case, there is no indication that such licence was cancelled, which is as per Sections 60 and 61 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882. It is quite obvious that the licence should formally be cancelled and thereafter alone the suitable legal action can be taken by the licensor as against the licensee for removal of the pipe. Here, no such revocation could be seen. Hence, the trial Court should have decreed the suit to that much extent upholding the said licence with the observation that it is open for D1 who stepped into the shoes of D3 to revoke the licence of the plaintiff to take water and thereafter initiate legal action for removal of the pipeline As such, the first appellate Court even though in so many words do not contemplate all these niceties in its judgment, the licence aspect of the matter as set out supra has to be confirmed and the lease aspect of the finding of the lower Appellate Court has td be set aside. 24. In the result, the substantial questions of law 1 to 3 are answered to the following effect: In view of my discussion supra, the substantial question of law Nos. 24. In the result, the substantial questions of law 1 to 3 are answered to the following effect: In view of my discussion supra, the substantial question of law Nos. 1 to 3 are decided to the effect that the judgment of the lower Appellate Court has to be partly reversed In respect of the lease aspect of the matter. As such, the second appeal is partly allowed by setting aside in part, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court. Accordingly, there shall be an order of injunction restraining the defendants from forcefully removing the pipeline of the plaintiff running across the suit property until the defendants take steps to revoke the licence and seek for such removal of the pipeline legally through due process of law and the rest of the prayer of the plaintiff for injunction based on lease aspect of the suit is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.