ORDER G.V. Seethapathy, J. (i) W.P.No. 21093 of 2009 is filed seeking writ of Mandamsu declaring the action of the first respondent-Deputy Registrilr of Cooperative Societies, Kurnool in issuing the impugned proceedings RC.No. 1520/2009-Bl, dated 09-09-2009 proposing to conduct no. confidence motion in respect of the post of President of Krishnagiri Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society Limited, in the office of 2nd respondent at 11 a.m. on 01-10-2009 as illegal and void and opposed to Articles 14, 19, and 21 of Constitution of India and also contrary to the provisions of Section 34(A) of A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. (ii) W.P.No. 22613 of 2009 is filed seeking writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the first respondent-deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kurnool in issuing the impugned proceedings R.C.No.1520/ 2009-B1, dated 15-10-2009 proposing to conduct no confidence motion in respect of the post of President of Krishnagiri Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society Limited, in the office of 2nd respondent at 11 a.m. on 9-11-2009 as illegal and void and opposed to Articles 14, 19, and 21 of Constitution of India and also contrary to the provisions of Section 34(A) of A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964. 2. As both the writ petitions involve same questions of fact and law, between the same parties, they are heard together and they are being disposed of by this common order 3. Heard both sides. Perused the record. 4. In the affidavit filed in support of W.P.No. 22613 of 2009, which is later in point of time and therefore, covers the events subsequent to filing of W .P.N o. 21093 of 2009, it is stated by Sri B. Shekar, President, Krishnagiri Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society Ltd., [for shori 'Krishnagiri PACS'] that he was elected as President in the election conducted in the year 2005 unanimously by all 13 members and that he has been discharging his functions without any remarks. It is further stated that subsequently due to political rivalry, some of the members filed no confidence motion before the first respondent, contrary to the provisions of Section 34(A)(2) of A.P.Co-operative Societies Act [for short 'the Act] and based on such proposal, the first respondent issuee proceedings dated 9-9-2009, which was served on the petitioner on 17-9-2009. It is further stated that subsequently due to political rivalry, some of the members filed no confidence motion before the first respondent, contrary to the provisions of Section 34(A)(2) of A.P.Co-operative Societies Act [for short 'the Act] and based on such proposal, the first respondent issuee proceedings dated 9-9-2009, which was served on the petitioner on 17-9-2009. Questioning the same, he filed writ petition i.e., W.P.No. 21093 of 2009 and also filed a petition for stay in W.P.M.P.No. 27430 of 2009.While issuing notice before admission, this Court on 30-8-2009 directed that any resolution proposed to be passed in the meeting of the Managing Committee Members scheduled to be held on 2-10-2009 on 'no confidence motion' shall not be given effect to, for a period of three months. Subsequently, interim direction was extended for a period of two weeks from 20-10-2009. The first respondent without conducting no-confidence motion on 1-10-2009 though there is no order of stay granted by the Court adjourned the meeting without giving any reasons. Subsequently, the first respondent issued another proceedings dated 15-10-2009 proposing to conduct meeting on 9-11-2009 and the same was served on the petitioner on 16-10-2009. The said proceedings are non-est in the eye of law. Second writ petition i.e., W.P. No. 22613 of 2009 is filed questioning the same. 5. According to the petitioner, the impugned proceedings issued by the first respondent are without power and authority and beyond the scope of Section 34(A) of the Act and as per Section 34(A)(3) of the Act, no confidence motion shall be completed within 30 days from the date of receipt of notice under subsection (2) of Section 34(A) of the Act. Notice under Section 34(A)(2) of the Act was issued on 9-9-2009 and no confidence motion has to be convened on or before 8-10-2009. Hence, the impugned proceedings are barred by limitation. As per sub-section (4) of Section 34(A) of the Act, the first respondent can postpone the meeting maximum to next day i.e., 2-10-2009 and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside. 6. Hence, the impugned proceedings are barred by limitation. As per sub-section (4) of Section 34(A) of the Act, the first respondent can postpone the meeting maximum to next day i.e., 2-10-2009 and hence the impugned proceedings are liable to be set aside. 6. The respondents 1 and 3 filed counter affidavit contending that the proposal for moving no confidence motion was received from the majority of the managing committee members i.e., 10 out of 13 members who signed the same in the prescribed form and accordingly, the first respondent issued notice under Section 34(A)(3) of the Act to the Managing Committee Members proposing to convene the meeting on 1-10-2009 at 11 a.m. within the period of 30 days from the date of proposal which was delivered to the first respondent on 2-9-2009. On the scheduled date and time, out of 12 Managing Committee Members [one post vacant], 9 members attended the meeting to participate in the debate of no confidence motion and the remaining 3 members, including the petitioner remained absent. Those nine members present unanimously expressed their decision against the petitioner in the debate and while the minutes of the meeting were about to be recorded, some unknown persons entered the meeting hall and disrupted the meeting and threw away the meeting book out side the meeting hall. In the tense situation, firs1 respondent was forced to adjourn no confidence motion' meeting. Further complaint was also lodged with the Station House Officer, Krishnagiri about the incident. The possibility of conducting the meeting on the next day in such situation was felt impossible. Hence, fresh notice or 15-10-2009 was issued to all the Committee Members informing that the meeting will be convened on 9-11-2009. Instead participating in the earlier no confidence meeting and awaiting further orders from the Court, the petitioner disrupted the proceedings without any regard for law am the orders passed by this Court. The conduct of the petitioner disentitles him from obtaining any relief. 7. The writ petitioner filed reply affidavit denying the averments made in the counter affidavit. 8. Instead participating in the earlier no confidence meeting and awaiting further orders from the Court, the petitioner disrupted the proceedings without any regard for law am the orders passed by this Court. The conduct of the petitioner disentitles him from obtaining any relief. 7. The writ petitioner filed reply affidavit denying the averments made in the counter affidavit. 8. The respondents 4 to 12, who are members of the society and who moved no confidence motion, got themselves impleaded in W.P.N 1.22513 of 2009 by filing W.P.M.P.No. 30531 of 2009, which was ordered on 5-11-2009 in the affidavit filed in support of their application in W.P.M.P. No. 30531 of 2009, the respondents 4 to 12 alleged that after completion of the debate, while minutes of the meeting were about to be recorded, the writ petitioner and local MLA, along with their henchmen, entered the meeting hall and forcibly took away the minutes book and tore it off, beating the members present. The Official respondents were also threatened and they also gave a complaint to the police, which was registered as Cr.No. 127 of 2009 at Krishnagiri P.S. It is further alleged that the writ petitioner, instead of participating in the no confidence motion meeting held on 1-10- 2009, disrupted the proceedings by resorting to the aforesaid criminal acts, making the democratic process a mockery and approached the Court with unclean hands. 9. The undisputed facts, which emerge from the pleadings and contentions of both sides are that the petitioner was elected as President of the Society in the year 2005 and subsequently, no confidence motion was sought to be moved by the majority of the members by giving representation to the first respondent on 2-9-2009 and submitted proposal in the prescribed form 'AAA' on f 8-9-2009. Thereupon, the first respondent issued notice dated 9-9-2009 to all the members, fixing the date for the meeting as 1-10-2009 at 11 a.m. On the eve of the said i meeting, the petitioner filed W.P.No. 21093 t of 2009 questioning the legality of the said 1 proceedings. On 30-9-2009 interim direction was given by this Court to the effect that resolution to be passed in the meeting of the t Managing Committee Members scheduled to be held on 1-10-2009 on no confidence motion, shall not be given effect to, for a e period of three weeks. On 30-9-2009 interim direction was given by this Court to the effect that resolution to be passed in the meeting of the t Managing Committee Members scheduled to be held on 1-10-2009 on no confidence motion, shall not be given effect to, for a e period of three weeks. It is to be noted that J no order of stay against the conduct of the meeting was passed and what all the direction given was that the resolution that may be passed in the meeting shall not be given effect to for a period of three weeks. On 1-10-2009 meeting was held and 9 members out of 12 attended the meeting. It is specifically averred in the counter affidavit filed by the first respondent that 9 members unanimously expressed their decision against the petitioner in the debate. Thus, the meeting was held on 1-10-2009 and the majority of the members of the society i.e., 9 members attended the meeting and unanimously expressed no confidence against the petitioner. However, the minutes could not be recorded, as it is alleged that the meeting was disrupted by some unknown persons, who entered the meeting hall and threw away the minutes book out side the hall and created terror. The first respondent gave a complaint also to the police Krishnagiri on 1-10-2009 regarding the said incident and the police also registered a case in Cr.No. 126 of 2009. Registration of the FIR prima facie shows that the minutes book was thrown out side the hall by some unknown persons, who entered into the meeting hall and created trouble. The first respondent, thereafter, adjourned the meeting. The question as to who caused the disruption of the meeting and who have thrown the minutes book out side the hall and prevented the minutes from being recorded and at whose instance meeting was thwarted, cannot be gone into in the present proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the same has to be ascertained on completion of the investigation, which is underway in pursuance of FIR in Cr.No. 126 of 2009 and the appropriate proceedings that may be initiated pursuant thereto. Suffice to note in the present proceedings that majority of the members of the society expressed no confidence against the petitioner but the said expression of no confidence however, could not be formally reduced in the form of minutes on account of disruption of the meeting by unruly elements. The meeting was, therefore, adjourned by the first respondent on that day and a fresh notice was issued on 15-10-2009 proposing to convene the meeting on 9-11-2009. Questioning the same, the subsequent writ petition in W.P.No. 22613 of 2009 was filed. 10. The learned counsel for the writ petitioner would contend that under subsection (5) of Section 34(A) of the Act, the meeting could not have been adjourned beyond the next day. Sub-section (5) of Section 34(A) of the Act states as follows: "If the Registrar is unable to preside at the meeting he may after recording his reasons in writing adjourn the meting to the next day to be presided over either by himself or by an Officer authorized by him in his behalf. The person authorized under this subsection shall be deemed to be the Registrar for purposes of sub-sections (7), (10) and (11)." 11. A plain reading of the above provision would reveal that its only when the Registrar is unable to preside at a meeting, he may after recording his reasons, adjourn the same to the next day to be presided over by himself or by an authorized officer. It is not the case of the first respondent that he was unable to preside over the meeting and therefore, it has to be adjourned. It is a case where the meeting was convened and during the course of conduct of the said meeting, which 'Was presided over by the first respondent, some unruly elements entered the meeting hall and disrupted the meeting and threw the minutes book out of the hall and prevented recording or minutes. The present situation under which meeting had to be abruptly stopped is not covered by the provisions of sub-section (5) and hence, the requirement of adjourning the meeting to the next day contemplated therein is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 12. The present situation under which meeting had to be abruptly stopped is not covered by the provisions of sub-section (5) and hence, the requirement of adjourning the meeting to the next day contemplated therein is not attracted to the facts of the present case. 12. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that under the provisions of Section 34(A)(3) of the Act, the Registrar shall convene meeting on a day, which shall not be later than 30 days from the date on which the notice under subsection (2) was delivered to him and hence, the meeting proposed to be held on 9-11-2009 being more than 30 days from the date 9-9-2009 on which the proposal in the prescribed form was received by him, is illegal and violative of Section 34(A)(3) of the Act. The proviso to sub-section (3) would state that where the holding of such meeting is stayed by an order of a Court, the meeting shall be adjourned, and the Registrar shall hold the adjourned meeting on a date not later than 30 days from the date on which he received the intimation about the vacation of stay. In the present case, there is no order of stay granted by the Court and hence, the question of time for holding the meeting getting extended on account of operation of order of stay, does not arise. Insofar as the first meeting is concerned, the same was convened on 1-10-2009, which was within the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the proposal in the prescribed form on 9-9-2009. The said meeting did not, however, conclude but got abrupted due to unruly intervention by unsocial elements. The second meeting i.e., adjourned meeting was stated to be held on 9-11-2009, which is beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 9-9-2009. 13. The said meeting did not, however, conclude but got abrupted due to unruly intervention by unsocial elements. The second meeting i.e., adjourned meeting was stated to be held on 9-11-2009, which is beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 9-9-2009. 13. Section 34(A) of the Act contemplates adjournment of the meeting to the next day under two circumstances i.e., firstly under sub-section (4) which states that if within half an hour after the time appointed for the meeting the Registrar is not present to preside at the meeting, the meeting shall stand adjourned to the next day; and secondly, sub-section (5) which states that if the Registrar is unable to preside at the meeting he may after recording his reasons is writing adjourn the meeting to the next day. The adjournment of the meeting on any other ground, including disruption of the meeting leading to abrupt stoppage on account of unruly intervention by unsocial elements as has happened in the present case is not con tern plated under section 34(A). In fact sub-section (6) of Section 34(A) of the Act declares that save as provided in subsections (3), (4) and (5) a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this section shall not for any reason be adjourned. From the language employed in sub-section (6), the Legislative intention is very clear and the same is to the effect that the meeting convened for the purpose of considering no confidence motion under this section shall not be adjourned for any reason expect as provided under subsections (3), (4) and (5). The situations contemplated under sub-sections (3), (4) or (5) are not obtaining in the present case and the meeting was adjourned for a different reason, which is not contemplated under the Act. In other words, the Act is silent as to the course of action to be adopted when the meeting convened and commenced could not meet its logical conclusion but got abruptly disrupted on account of violent interference by unruly elements. However, though the first respondent had no other option except to adjourn the meeting in view of the then prevailing tense and violent conditions, such adjournment of the meeting is, however, does not have the sanction of law. 14. However, though the first respondent had no other option except to adjourn the meeting in view of the then prevailing tense and violent conditions, such adjournment of the meeting is, however, does not have the sanction of law. 14. In view of clear and categorical bar contained in sub-section (6) against the adjournment of the meeting under any circumstances, except those covered by subsections (3), (4) and (5), adjournment of the meeting by the first respondent on 1-10-2009, even if, the same is justified on account of factual situation then obtaining, cannot be supported in law. At the same time, the lurking danger of sub-version of democratic processes and destruction of the democratic institutions by a handful of unruly elements indulging in acts of violence cannot be lost sight of. In order to protect and preserve the democratic institutions and their functioning, may be the relevant provisions under Section 34(A) need to be suitably amended to take care of such situations, as those obtaining in the present case as well and making it permissible to adjourn the meeting in the event of its disruption due to violent interference by unsocial elements. But as matters stand as of now and in the light of clear and categorical language employed in sub-section (6) of Section 34(A) and the three exceptional circumstances contemplated under sub-sections (3), (4) and (5), not being attracted to the present case, it must be held that adjournment of the meeting by first respondent, for the reasons stated, cannot be sustained in law. 15. Under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 34(A), the date for the meeting for consideration of non-confidence motion shall not be later than 30 days from which notice was delivered under sub-section (2). No fresh intimation was given by the members subsequent to 1-10-2009 the date on which the first meeting was aborted. The proposed meeting on 9-11-2009 was in pursuance of the original intimation dated 2-9-2009 itself. As the proposed meeting on 9-11-2009 is clearly beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 9-9-2009, the same is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 34(A) of the Act and hence, the same is legally unsustainable. 16. As the proposed meeting on 9-11-2009 is clearly beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 9-9-2009, the same is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 34(A) of the Act and hence, the same is legally unsustainable. 16. Though, the first meeting was convened on 1-10-2009 within 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 2-9-2009, the petitioner who filed W.P.No. 21093 of 2009 on the eve of the said meeting, ought to have participated in the meeting and facilitated smother conduct of the meeting in view of the interim orders passed by this Court that the resolution passed in the meeting shall not be given effect to for a period of three weeks and ought to have awaited further orders in the matter. On account of disruption of the meeting, the minutes could not be recorded and first respondent had to adjourn the same. When the first respondent issued fresh notice on 15-10-2009 again convening the meeting on 9-11-2009, the petitioner has chosen to question the same by filing second writ petition. The conduct of the petitioner, therefore, lacks bona fides. 17. However, the proceedings dated 15-10-2009 are held unsustainable in law, as the proposed meeting on 9-11-2009 is beyond the period of 30 days from the date of receipt of intimation on 2-9-2009. 18. In the circumstances, it is held that in view of the subsequent events, no further orders are required to be passed in W.P. No. 21093 of 2009, the same having become infractuous, as the meeting in fact was held on 1-10-2009, though ended abruptly, W.P.N o. 22613 of 2009 is disposed of, holding that the proposed meeting on 9-11-2009 in pursuance of the impugned proceedings dated 15-10-2009 is legally unsustainable. It is, however, open to the impleaded respondents 4 to 12 or other members of the society to submit a fresh requisition for no confidence motion to the first respondent and the first respondent is at liberty to take appropriate necessary action on such requisition in accordance with law. 19. In the result, both the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly with the above direction. No order as to costs.