Judgment :- (Per Ramesh Ranganathan, J.) 1. Allotment of Government land, at a nominal price, to recognized political parties for establishing their party offices is in vogue in several States and at the Centre. The Government of India is said to have formulated Policy guidelines dated 13.7.2006 for allotment of its land to recognized political parties for their party offices. In the State of Andhra Pradesh, the Government has been allotting its land to almost all recognized political parties, for locating their party offices, including the Telugu Desam Party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the Telangana Rashtra Samithi etc. 2. We do not intend examining the larger issue whether allotment/alienation of Government land at nominal value, by way of sale or otherwise, to recognized political parties would fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as none of the recognised political parties other than the 3rd respondent are arrayed as respondents in this writ petition and the pleadings are wholly insufficient for such an enquiry. We shall, however, examine among other issues the question whether or not land belonging to the A.P. Housing Board, (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), a statutory body created and established under the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”), could have been alienated, under G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 and on the directions of the State Government, by way of sale to the 3rd respondent for construction of their state party headquarters without adhering to the statutory conditions and the procedure prescribed under the Act. 3. G.O.Ms. No.76 Housing (HB.II) Department dated 25.11.2005 is under challenge in this writ petition as being arbitrary, illegal, without jurisdiction, ultra vires the provisions of the Act and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner seeks a consequential direction that Document No.2678 of 2007 dated 27.09.2007, registered at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Hyderabad, be declared illegal and invalid. 4. The petitioner, a registered society engaged in campaigning and organizing peoples’ struggle for housing, and working among the slum dwellers of Hyderabad and Rangareddy Districts for the last several years, has filed this Writ Petition in public interest contending that valuable public property, held in public trust by the State Government and the Board, were being disposed of at a nominal value of Rs.100/- per square yard in relaxation of the orders passed earlier in G.O.Ms. No.826, Revenue (Q) Department, dated 31.08.1987. 5. The State Government had earlier issued G.O.Ms. No.826, dated 31.08.1987 laying down guidelines for lease of Government lands to enable recognized political parties to locate their offices. The G.O. records that the Government had decided to allot land, not exceeding one acre, to such recognized political parties which did not already own any land or building in the State and District headquarters on a 30 year lease renewable for a further period as agreed upon at the option of the lessee. 6. The third respondent submitted a representation on 30.1.2004 seeking allotment of land in Hyderabad city for construction of their party’s state headquarters building. The first respondent instructed the District Collector, Hyderabad to identify land in Hyderabad City. The District Collector, Hyderabad identified land, belonging to the Board, admeasuring 5117.69 Sq. Yds in T.S.No.4/1, Block-M, Ward 47 of Nampally village. After consultation with the District Collector, Hyderabad, and the Vice-chairman and Housing Commissioner of the Board, the first respondent, on a careful examination of the proposal based on similar precedents, decided to allot Board’s land, admeasuring 5117.69 Sq. Yds in T.S.No.4/1, Block-M, Ward-47, Nampally Village, in favour of the third respondent for construction of their state headquarters office. The aforesaid extent of land was allotted at a nominal value of Rs.100/- per sq. yard in relaxation of the orders in G.O.Ms. No.826 dated 31.08.1987, subject to the conditions prescribed in G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005. 7. The conditions stipulated in G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 are that the third respondent should use the land only for the purpose of constructing their party office and not for any other commercial purpose; the depreciated value of the existing dilapidated buildings should be assessed and paid to the Board; part of the land under the occupation of M/s. Gemini Printers, though the lease granted earlier had expired, should be got vacated and handed over to the allottee; land under occupation of residents of Bheemrao Bada slum should be cleared of encroachment; the residents should be accommodated under VAMBAY Housing Scheme and, thereafter, the land should be handed over to the allottee. 8. The 2nd respondent, vide letter dated 28.11.2005, brought to the notice of the first respondent that the market value, as per the Sub-Registrar’s records, was Rs.25,000/-per sq. yard and that allotment of land, in favour of the 3rd respondent, at Rs.100/- per sq. 8. The 2nd respondent, vide letter dated 28.11.2005, brought to the notice of the first respondent that the market value, as per the Sub-Registrar’s records, was Rs.25,000/-per sq. yard and that allotment of land, in favour of the 3rd respondent, at Rs.100/- per sq. yard would result in a huge loss to the Board. The first respondent decided to compensate the 2nd respondent by meeting the differential cost of Rs.24,900/- per sq. yard and, accordingly, issued G.O.Ms. No.26 Housing (HB.II) Department dated 18.08.2007 sanctioning the said amount and directing that it be adjusted against the amounts payable by the 2nd respondent to the first respondent. From out of the total extent of 5117.68 sq. yards, an extent of 3000.32 Sq. Yards was conveyed by the 2nd respondent, in favour of the 3rd respondent, by registered sale deed dated 27.09.2007 and possession was also delivered. 9. With regards the remaining extent of 2,117.36, covered by the Bheem Rao Bada slum, all the residents are said to have been accommodated in residential houses at Afzal Sagar, Hyderabad after they were evicted on 27.12.2008. Possession of this extent of 2117.36 square yards was delivered to the 3rd respondent on 27.12.2008 itself which is now said to be in possession of the entire extent of land allotted under G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005. It is, however, not in dispute that there is no change in the nature of the land and that no construction has been made thereupon. Is alienation of land in favour of the third respondent, by G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005, ultravires the provisions of the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 ? 10. No.76 dated 25.11.2005. It is, however, not in dispute that there is no change in the nature of the land and that no construction has been made thereupon. Is alienation of land in favour of the third respondent, by G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005, ultravires the provisions of the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 ? 10. Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the 2nd respondent is a statutory body and a distinct legal entity; the Act does not empower either the first respondent or the Board to sell land to political parties including the 3rd respondent, that too valuable land at a nominal price of Rs.100/- per square yard; the Act requires the Board to frame and execute housing schemes keeping in view the housing needs of various sections of the urban population; Section 45 of the Act read with Rule 29 of the 1959 Rules authorises the Board only to sell or lease land vested in it and comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme; the Board has no power to sell or lease land not comprised in a housing scheme sanctioned under the Act; the Board does not have the power to alienate the subject land as it is not situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme; both the impugned G.O, and the sale deed dated 27.9.2007, fall foul of, and are ultravires, Section 45 of the Act, void and do not confer any right on the 3rd respondent. He would rely on Malakpet Citizens Forum Vs. The Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh (1984) 1 ANWR 244 and Peoples Cooperative House Building Society Limited Vs. State of A.P (1983 (1) ALT NRC 17). 11. Learned Advocate General would submit that, vide G.O.Ms. No.361, dated 21.2.1963, the State Government had allotted “free of cost” vacant sites and buildings on both sides abutting Mukarramjahi Road to the AP Housing Board for construction of buildings; this allotment was notified vide G.O.Ms. No.1940 dated 3.8.1965 and was referable to Section 40-C of the Act; and the Government had retained first preference in allotment. 12. It is useful, in this context, to refer to the contents of G.O.Ms. No.361 dated 21.02.1963 and G.O.Ms. No.1940 dated 3.8.1965 and was referable to Section 40-C of the Act; and the Government had retained first preference in allotment. 12. It is useful, in this context, to refer to the contents of G.O.Ms. No.361 dated 21.02.1963 and G.O.Ms. No.1940 dated 03.08.1965 in their entirety: GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT BUILDINGS AND SITES acquired by the Government of Mukarramjahi Road for the construction of Secretariat Buildings – Allotment to the Housing Board – Orders issued. PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.No.361 Dated: 21st February, 1963 Read the following:- i) From the Chairman, Housing Board, Lr.No.52/AS/61, dated 8.10.1961 ii) From the C.E.(P), Lr.No.RC/T2/Rents/37662/62-1, dated 7.11.1962 *** ORDER: The Government have decided to allot the vacant sites and buildings abutting Mukarramjahi Road on both sides as detailed below to the Housing Board for the construction of Multi Storeyed buildings subject to the condition that ample space for greenery and parking of cars will be provided in accordance with a carefully drawn plan. EASTERN SIDE OF THE MOAZAMJAHI ROAD The whole plot on the Eastern side from Moazamjahi Market up to the Ex. Customs’ Office (ie., excluding the building of the Ex. Customs’ Office). WESTERN SIDE OF THE MOAZAMJAHI ROAD The whole plot from Moazamjahi Market upto Gandhi Bhavan (ie., the whole land on this side between Moazamjahi Road and the nala). The existing approach road to the Exhibition Ground, shall be excluded. 2. In lieu of the free allotment of the above land, the Government should be given the option to rent the first floor of the buildings for Government offices and in addition, where a building on Mukarramjahi Road, now occupied by Government office, has to be vacated for the purpose of new construction, this office shall be given top priority in the allotment of accommodation by the Housing Board. 3. As no land will be left on the above sites for the construction of city courts and the Police Commissioner Office Buildings, alternative sites will have to be selected separately for these buildings. 4. This order issues with the concurrence of Financial Adviser, (Public Works Department) vide U.O.No.803/63-1, dt 20.2.1963. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) S.A.QUARDER, Secretary to Government. 4. This order issues with the concurrence of Financial Adviser, (Public Works Department) vide U.O.No.803/63-1, dt 20.2.1963. (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) S.A.QUARDER, Secretary to Government. To The Chairman, Housing Board, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad Deccan //FORWARDED BY ORDER// Sd/- Superintendent //TRUE COPY// GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT BUILDINGS and sites acquired by the Government in Mukarramjahi Road for the construction of Secretariat Buildings – Allotment to the Housing Board for the construction of Multi-storeyed building – ratified. PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT G.O.Ms.No.1940 Dated 3-8-1965 Ref:- G.O.Ms.No.361 P.W.D. dated 21.2.1963 ORDER: The following notification will be published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette: NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 40-C of the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Act, 1956 (Act XLVI of 1956), the Government of Andhra Pradesh hereby transfer to the Hyderabad Housing Board the vacant sites and buildings abutting the Mukarramjahi Road, Hyderabad, on both sides, as detailed in the schedule below, for the construction of multi-storeyed building subject to the conditions that: 1. Ample space for greenery and parking of cars shall be provided in accordance with a carefully drawn plan and 2. In lieu of the free allotment of the said land and buildings, the Government shall have first preference in the allotment of part of the first floor of the buildings for Government offices and in addition where a building on the Mukarramjahi Road, now occupied by the Government offices, has to be vacated for the purposes of the new construction, such offices shall be given top priority in the allotment of accommodation by the Housing Board. THE SCHEDULE a. EASTERN SIDE OF THE MAZAMJAHI ROAD The whole plot on the eastern side from Moazamjahi Market upto Ex-Custom’s Office (i.e., excluding the buildings of the Ex-Customs’ Office) b. WESTERN SIDE OF THE MOAZAMJAHI MARKET The whole plot from Moazamjahi Market upto Gandhi Bhavan (i.e., the whole land on this side between Mukarramjahi Road and the Nala). The existing approach land to the exhibition ground should be enclosed) (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) P. Gopal Rao Deputy Secretary to Government To The Chairman, Housing Board, Hyderabad FORARDED BY ORDER Sd/ SECTION OFFICER 13. All that G.O.Ms. The existing approach land to the exhibition ground should be enclosed) (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF ANDHRA PRADESH) P. Gopal Rao Deputy Secretary to Government To The Chairman, Housing Board, Hyderabad FORARDED BY ORDER Sd/ SECTION OFFICER 13. All that G.O.Ms. No.361 dated 21.02.1963 records is that, in view of free allotment of land, the Government should be given the option to rent the first floor of the building, constructed by the Board, for its offices. Similarly, under G.O.Ms. No.1940 dated 03.08.1965, the Government has the first preference in the allotment of a part of the first floor of the building for its offices and not a first preference in the allotment of land. 14. Section 40-C of the Act empowers the Government to transfer its land to the Board, either suo moto or at the latter’s request, for the purpose of providing housing accommodation. Every such order of the Government, transferring its land to the Board, is required to be published in the A.P. Gazette. Upon the government exercising its powers under Section 40-C, the land so transferred stands vested, under Section 3(2) of the Act, in the Board which is competent to hold immovable properties for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Section 3(2) stipulates that the Board shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession. The Board is a statutory body, not a department of the Government, and, as a creature of the statute, is required to adhere to the provisions of the Act and the Rules, to function within the four corners of the Act and not travel beyond. 15. In Malakpet Citizens Forum (1 Supra), the A.P. Housing Board initiated proceedings for acquisition of “Mahaboob Mansion” for implementation of a housing scheme with a commercial complex. The State Government initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and, on its possession being handed over to them, the property stood vested in the Board. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under the proviso to Rule 29 of the A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959, accorded sanction for transfer of Ac.40.25 guntas, of the “Mahaboob Mansion” land, on permanent lease of 99 years to the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad for the purpose of developing the land as a commercial complex. The State Government, in exercise of its powers under the proviso to Rule 29 of the A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959, accorded sanction for transfer of Ac.40.25 guntas, of the “Mahaboob Mansion” land, on permanent lease of 99 years to the Agricultural Market Committee, Hyderabad for the purpose of developing the land as a commercial complex. The validity of this lease was the subject matter of challenge before this Court and the Division bench, in Malakpet Citizens Forum (1 Supra), held that that the Board had no power to lease or sell the land vested in it if it was not comprised in a housing scheme sanctioned under the Act; the power conferred by Section 45 could only be used to further the object of the Act and not to defeat it. As the land allotted to the Agricultural market committee was not situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme the Government Order, according sanction for the land at “Mahaboob Mansion” to be leased for 99 years in favour of the Agricultural Market Committee, was quashed. 16. The submission of the Learned Advocate General that the judgment of the Division bench, in Malakpet Citizens Forum (1 Supra), has been overruled by the Supreme Court is not tenable. From the material on record it is evident that a memo of compromise was filed by the parties before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.3919 and 3920 of 1983 which, among other matters, provided for the judgment and order of the Division bench in W.A. No.476 of 1982 dated 25.02.1983 to be set aside. The judgment was set aside in view of the compromise between the parties and not as a result of the declaration of law by the Division bench being overruled by the Supreme Court. 17. The judgment was set aside in view of the compromise between the parties and not as a result of the declaration of law by the Division bench being overruled by the Supreme Court. 17. Be that as it may, we do not propose to rest our conclusions relying on the judgment of the Division bench in Malakpet Citizens Forum (1 Supra) as the questions which arise for consideration herein i.e., (1) whether Section 22(g) is an independent source of power enabling the Board to sell the land vested in it; and (2) whether the Legislature intended to confer power on the Board to sell land not forming part of an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme necessitating the word “and” used in Section 45 to be read as “or”; were not in issue in Malakpet Citizens Forum (1 Supra). 18. Learned Advocate General would submit that the word “housing” is not defined under the Act; the term ‘house’ is defined, in the allotment regulations, as a “dwelling unit”; the Board has the power under Section 22(g) to sell land comprised in a scheme; Section 22 (1) empowers the Board to include, in the housing scheme, the provision of “accommodation” for any class of inhabitants; the word “accommodation” means a building or a part of a building which is used for residential or non-residential purposes; the housing scheme, which can be prepared by the Board, is not limited to building houses alone and the present purpose, of locating a political party’s headquarters, is also covered under the provisions of the Act. He would contend that the Legislature, having already provided under Section 22(g) for the power to sell property comprised in a housing scheme, could not have intended to limit the power of the Board to dispose of property under Section 45 only to areas comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme; the “power to sell” vesting in the Board under Section 45 could, in a given case, be guided by the directions of the Government under Section 79 of the Act; the word “and” used in Section 45 ought to be read as “or” to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as disclosed from the context and that sale of land by way of the sale deed dated 27.9.2007 was also in accordance with Section 45 of the Act read with Rule 29 of the 1959 Rules. He would rely on Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia AIR 1980 SC 360 and M. Satyanarayana v. State of Karnataka (1986) 2 SCC 512 . 19. From its preamble, it is evident that the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 was made to take such measures, make such schemes and to carry out such works as are necessary for the purpose of dealing with and satisfying the needs of housing accommodation and that the Board was established with this object in view. Section 3 (2) of the Act stipulates that the Board shall be competent to acquire and hold both movable and immovable properties for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The Act mandates housing accommodation to be provided only by way of a sanctioned housing scheme. Under Section 21 the Board is empowered to incur expenditure and undertake works for framing and execution of housing schemes. Section 22 relates to matters to be provided for by housing schemes and, thereunder, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a housing scheme may provide for all or any of the following matters viz.., a. the acquisition by purchase, exchange or otherwise of any property necessary for or effected by the execution of the scheme; b. the laying or relaying out of any land comprised in the scheme; c. the distribution or redistribution of sites belonging to owners of property comprised in the scheme; d. the improvement and clearance of slums in the area included in the scheme. e. the closure or demolition of dwellings or portions of dwellings unfit for human habitation; f. the demolition of obstructive buildings or portions of buildings; g. the construction and reconstruction of buildings, their maintenance and preservation. h. The sale (including on hire purchase system), letting or exchange of any property comprised in the scheme; i. The construction and alteration of streets and back lanes; j. Provision of draining, water-supply and lighting of the area included in the scheme. h. The sale (including on hire purchase system), letting or exchange of any property comprised in the scheme; i. The construction and alteration of streets and back lanes; j. Provision of draining, water-supply and lighting of the area included in the scheme. k. The provision of parks, play-fields and open spaces for the benefit of any area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area and the enlargement of existing parks, play-fields, open spaces and approaches; l. The provision of sanitary arrangements required for the area comprised in the scheme, including the conservation and prevention of any injury or contamination to rivers or other sources and means of water-supply; m. The provision of accommodation for any class of inhabitants; n. The advance of money for the purpose of the scheme; o. The provision of facilities for communication and transport; The collection of such information and statistics as may be necessary for the purposes of this Act; b. Any other matter for which, in the opinion of the Government, it is expedient to make provision with a view to provide housing accommodation and to the improvement or development of any area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area or for the general efficiency of the scheme. 20. Under Section 22-A the Board may by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette declare its intention to make a housing scheme for any area setting forth the extent of land proposed to be included in the scheme and such other particulars as may be prescribed. Section 24 relates to preparation and submission of annual housing scheme programmes and, under sub-section (2)(a) thereof, the programme shall contain such particulars of housing schemes as may be prescribed and which the Board proposes to execute, whether in part or whole, during the next year. Under Section 25(1) the Board shall, before forwarding the programme to the Government under Section 24, publish a draft of the programme in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Section 25(2) provides that if, within three weeks from the date of such publication, any person communicates in writing to the Board any suggestion or objection relating to such programme the Board shall consider such suggestion or objection and may modify such programme as it thinks fit. Section 25(3) requires the Board to then forward the programme to the Government for sanction as required under Section 24. Section 25(3) requires the Board to then forward the programme to the Government for sanction as required under Section 24. Section 26 empowers the Government to sanction the programme forwarded to it with such modifications as it deems fit. Section 27 requires the Government to publish the programme, sanctioned by it under Section 26, in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. Section 31 relates to publication of the housing scheme in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette. 21. Chapter IV of the Act relates to acquisition and disposal of land. Section 40 relates to the power to purchase or lease by agreement. Under Section 40-A, for the purpose of acquiring land for the Board under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the said Act shall be subject to the modifications prescribed therein. Section 40-B relates to payment of compensation. Section 45 confers power on the Board, subject to any rules made by the Government under the Act, to retain, sell, exchange, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any land, building or other property vesting in it and situated in the area comprised in any housing scheme sanctioned under the Act. 22. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 70 of the Act, the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board Rules, 1959, (hereinafter called the 1959 Rules), were made and notified in G.O.Ms. No.1978 dated 10.08.1959. Rule 25 provides that the annual housing programme shall be as prescribed in Form-A specified in Schedule II. Form-A, in Schedule II, contains details of the name of the local authority where the scheme is to be executed, particulars of the scheme, estimated cost and how the scheme is to be financed. Rule 26 requires the draft of the programme to be exhibited at a conspicuous place in such office, and at such other places, as the Board may direct and to be published in two newspapers, having good circulation in the locality, one in Telugu and the other in English. Rule 29 reads as under: The Board may lease or sell any land or building vesting in it and situated in the area comprised in any housing scheme sanctioned under this Act, subject to the following conditions, namely:- (i). The transfer by sale or lease shall be by public auction. (ii). Rule 29 reads as under: The Board may lease or sell any land or building vesting in it and situated in the area comprised in any housing scheme sanctioned under this Act, subject to the following conditions, namely:- (i). The transfer by sale or lease shall be by public auction. (ii). A notice of the proposed sale or lease of the property shall be published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, and in not less than two prominent newspapers, one in English and the other in the Chief language of the locality. (iii). The sale shall be conducted subject to such terms and conditions as may be fixed by the Board from time to time. (iv). The property that may be sold or leased shall be transferred through a conveyance deed that may be drawn up by the Board in consultation with its legal adviser; Provided that the Board may dispense with the above procedure in regard to sale and lease of any land or building with the concurrence of Government. Provided further that the procedure laid down in conditions (i) and (ii) shall not be applicable in respect of temporary lease of any land for a period of not exceeding five years and revising a rent not exceeding Rs.2,500/-. 23. Rule 41 requires the Board to submit to the Government, within two months from the close of the year, an annual report in the narrative form describing the activities of the Board during the year. Rule 42 reads thus: Rule 42: The report shall contain particulars on the following matters, namely:- (i). programme schemes for the year; (ii). schemes under execution; (iii). particulars; of properties acquired; (iv). number of houses built under various categories; (v). receipts; (vi). expenditure; (vii).steps taken to secure adequate finance for formulating fresh schemes; (viii). research undertaken in the matter of securing materials at comparatively cheap cost; (ix) programme of schemes for the next year; (x). assets and liabilities; (xi). general remarks. 24. Rule 43 requires the Board to submit to the Government half yearly reports in Forms – A and B of Schedule – V. Form-A, in Schedule V, is the half-yearly progress report of works under execution and requires information, including those relating to the name of the scheme, to be furnished. assets and liabilities; (xi). general remarks. 24. Rule 43 requires the Board to submit to the Government half yearly reports in Forms – A and B of Schedule – V. Form-A, in Schedule V, is the half-yearly progress report of works under execution and requires information, including those relating to the name of the scheme, to be furnished. Similarly the half-yearly progress report of collection of rents and instalments in Form-B requires information relating to the name of the scheme to be furnished. 25. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 70 of the Act, the “A.P. Housing Board (Allotment of Plots) Rules, 1977”, (hereinafter called the 1977 Rules) were made. Rule 3(1) thereof empowers the Board to allot plots to persons who agree to purchase them in accordance with the Rules. Under sub-rule (2), disposal of plots shall be either on an outright sale basis or on hire purchase system in the manner provided under the Rules. Under Rule 5(1)(a), whenever the Board has formed an extension or layout in pursuance of any scheme, it shall offer any or all the plots in such extension or layout for allotment to persons eligible under the Rules. Rule 9(a) prescribes the principles which are required to be observed while making allotment of plots, by drawal of lots among the eligible applicants, under a particular scheme. 26. It is a draft housing scheme, containing all or some of the matters enumerated under clauses (a) to (p) of Section 22, which is formulated by the Board, sanctioned by the Government and, thereafter, executed by the Board. The housing scheme, with all such relevant matters as specified in Section 22, is made available for the information of the public on its publication in the A.P. Gazette under Sections 25(1) and 31(1), and on its being made available at the office of the Board for inspection under Section 31(4) of the Act. The Act makes the housing schemes, formulated and executed by the Board, subject to periodic public scrutiny. The general public is given a participatory role at two stages i.e., firstly when the draft housing programme is published in the A.P. Gazette, and secondly after the scheme is sanctioned by the Government and before its execution. The Act makes the housing schemes, formulated and executed by the Board, subject to periodic public scrutiny. The general public is given a participatory role at two stages i.e., firstly when the draft housing programme is published in the A.P. Gazette, and secondly after the scheme is sanctioned by the Government and before its execution. As the details relating to a housing scheme, which the general public need to be made aware of, are those enumerated under clauses (a) to (p), the Act in Section 22 enjoins the housing scheme to make provision for such matters. It is only if the information, relating to matters enumerated under clauses (a) to (p) of Section 22 regarding a proposed housing scheme is published as a draft programme in the A.P. Gazette under Section 25(1) can the general public have an effective opportunity of making suggestions or putting forth their objections which they are entitled to under Section 25(3) of the Act. 27. All that Section 22(g) requires is that the housing scheme should contain information of the manner in which any property, which is included in a housing scheme, will be allotted/alienated i.e., whether by sale, letting or exchange. Section 22(g) merely details one of the matters which a housing scheme should contain and this provision cannot be elevated to a source of power for the Board to sell or lease lands vested in it. 28. The word “or” is often used, in statutory provisions, to express alternatives of a defined term or an explanation of the same thing in different words. (Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 2 SCC 540 . The word “and” has, generally, a cumulative sense requiring the fulfillment of all the conditions that it joins together and it is the antithesis of “or” (Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edn., Vol.1 page 135; Tek Chand Bhatia (3 Supra). Where two limbs of a statutory provision are separated by the use of the conjunction “and” they have to be read conjointly. Where, however, they are separated by the use of the word “or”, the availability of one of the two alternatives would suffice. (Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v. Union of India (2000)1 SCC 426 ; Paras Ram v. State of Haryana (1992) 4 SCC 662 . The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive but at times they are read vice versa. (Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v. Union of India (2000)1 SCC 426 ; Paras Ram v. State of Haryana (1992) 4 SCC 662 . The word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive but at times they are read vice versa. The word “and” is, sometimes, by force of context read as “or” if reading it otherwise would defeat the rationale behind the provision and frustrate the intention and purpose of the legislation. (M. Satyanarayana (4 Supra). While dealing with the topic whether “or” should be read as “and”, and vice versa, Stroud says in Vol. 3 of his Judicial Dictionary: “You will find it said in some cases that ‘or’ means ‘and’; but ‘or’ never does mean ‘and’.” 29. Similarly, in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn., pp. 229-30, it has been accepted that “to carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions ‘or’ and ‘and’ one for the other”. As Scrutton, L.J. said in Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy State Co (1928) 1 KB 561 “You do sometimes read “or” as “and” in a statute . . . . But you do not do it unless you are obliged, because “or” does not generally mean “and” and “and” does not generally mean “or”. As Lord Halsbury L.C. observed in Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Henderson (1888) 13 AC 595 the reading of “or” as “and” is not to be resorted to “unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done”. (Tek Chand Bhatia (3 Supra). The word “or” cannot, ordinarily, be read as “and”. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, they are bound to be construed in their ordinary sense. (Nasiruddin v. STAT (1975) 2 SCC 671 . 30. The power conferred on the Board, under Section 45, to retain, sell, exchange, mortgage or otherwise dispose of is (1) of land, building or other property vested in it; and (2) situated in an area comprised in a housing scheme sanctioned under the Act. The Board can only sell land which is vested in it and which is situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme. The Board can only sell land which is vested in it and which is situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme. The power conferred on the Board, to transfer the land vested in it by sale or lease, is not unfettered but is circumscribed by the limits placed thereupon by the provisions of the Act including Section 45 itself. The only mode prescribed by the Act, to achieve its objects i.e., to deal with and satisfy the needs of housing accommodation, is by formulation and execution of a sanctioned housing scheme. As the power of the Board to acquire and hold immovable property is, circumscribed by Section 3(2), only to carry out the purposes of the Act the power to sell or lease land, conferred on the Board under Section 45, can only be exercised to carry out the purposes of the Act and not to frustrate it. As the Act requires housing accommodation to be provided only by way of a sanctioned housing scheme, it is evident that the power of the Board under Section 45 to sell its land can only be exercised if such land is situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme and not otherwise. The object of the Act, as reflected in its preamble and the various provisions referred to hereinabove, is not to sell land for a purpose other than for providing housing accommodation under a sanctioned housing scheme. The Act has not conferred any power on the Board to lease or sell land vested in it independent of, and not comprised in, a sanctioned housing scheme. There is no reason why a legislative command, to convert the conjunction “and” into the disjunction “or”, must be read into Section 45 nor is there anything in the words used therein which would require a presumption of such conversion by implication. On the other hand there are strong reasons to hold that such an interpretation is wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. (Puran Singh v. State of M.P. (1965) 2 SCR 853 ). 31. On the other hand there are strong reasons to hold that such an interpretation is wholly inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. (Puran Singh v. State of M.P. (1965) 2 SCR 853 ). 31. Sale of its land by the Board, in the absence of such land being situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme, is ultra vires its powers as it not only falls foul of the plain language of Section 45 but also defeats the object and purpose for which the Act was made i.e., to provide housing accommodation by way of a sanctioned housing scheme. Substituting the word “and” for “or” would enable the Board to sell the land vested in it for any purpose even if it be other than for providing housing accommodation. Such an interpretation is not only impermissible on the language used but would also not accord with a purposive construction of Section 45. 32. It is an elementary rule of construction to assume that the words and phrases of a legislation are used in their ordinary meaning and that phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. It is desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of a statute giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed. The rule of construction is “to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed”. The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature but such intention must be deduced from the language used: for “it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts cannot make the law”. Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. (MAXWELL ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES : 12th edition) 33. A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose. The purposive-and-literal interpretation is the most common construction, for usually a literal construction and a purposive construction lead to the same result. Legislation, having a certain purpose, naturally seeks to express this in the words used. A construction is purposive-and-literal where the literal meaning is clear and reflects the purpose. The purposive-and-literal interpretation is the most common construction, for usually a literal construction and a purposive construction lead to the same result. Legislation, having a certain purpose, naturally seeks to express this in the words used. A construction is purposive-and-literal where the literal meaning is clear and reflects the purpose. (F.A.R.Bennion: Statutory Interpretation (Second Edition). 34. In District Mining Officer Vs. Tata Iron & Steel Co. (2001) 7 SCC 358 , the Supreme Court held: “……A statute is an edict of the legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of them that make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation, the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature……… ..……. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention i.e. the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed…….” (emphasis supplied) 35. Even under Rule 29, of the 1959 Rules, the power of the Board to lease or sell land or building vested in it is only if it is situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme. The reports required to be furnished by the Board to the Government under Rules 41 to 43 include, among others, particulars of the housing scheme. Allotment of plots, under the 1977 Rules, can only be pursuant to a housing scheme made under the Act. Both under the A.P. Housing Board Rules, 1959 and the A.P. Housing (Allotment of Plots) Rules, 1977 sale of land/plots can only be pursuant to a sanctioned housing scheme. 36. Even if we were to proceed on the premise that allotment of land for locating a political party’s office can form part of a housing scheme under the Act, the land alienated by the 2nd respondent to the 3rd respondent pursuant to the impugned G.O issued by the 1st respondent is, admittedly, not situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme. It is evident that no housing scheme has been formulated by the Board, let alone sanctioned by the Government for the area in which land has been alienated to the 3rd respondent under the impugned G.O. G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005, whereby the 1st respondent directed the 2nd respondent to alienate its land by way of sale to the 3rd respondent, is ultra vires Section 45 of the Act. POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE DIRECTIONS TO THE BOARD: SCOPE OF SECTION 79(1) OF THE ACT: 37. Learned Advocate General would submit that the special powers conferred on the Government, under Section 79(1) to issue necessary directions to the Board for carrying out the purposes of the Act, was a common feature in many enactments; while dealing with cases under pari- materia provisions in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Section 78-A) the power of the State Government to issue policy directions to the Electricity Board has not only been upheld but the primacy of the Government has also been recognized. He would rely on AP State Electricity Board Vs. Venus Hotel AIR 1999 AP 333 and M/s. Real Food Products Ltd., Vs. Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board AIR 1995 SC 2234 in this regard. 38. The question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court, in M/s. Real Food Products Ltd. (14 Supra), was whether a direction, under Section 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, by the State Government was binding on the Electricity Board or whether such directions were merely of guidance and the Board, in formulating tariffs, was required to apply its mind independently to the criteria. The Supreme Court observed that Section 78-A used the expression “the Board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government”; the view expressed by the State Government on a question of policy was in the nature of a direction to be followed by the Board in the area of the policy to which it related; if, however, the view expressed by the State Government in its direction exceeded the area of policy, the Board may not be bound by it unless it took the same view on merits itself. 39. 39. In M/s. Venus Hotel (13 Supra), the A.P. State Electricity Board preferred an appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge wherein it was held that G.O.Ms.No.31 dated 30.04.1994 was a policy decision of the State Government which the Electricity Board was required to implement. In rejecting the appeal preferred by the Electricity Board, the Division Bench observed that the learned Single Judge had rightly come to the conclusion that G.O.Ms.No.31 dated 30.04.1994 was a policy decision issued by the State Government granting concession; it was the just expectation of the citizen that the policy-decision of the State would be carried out by all its instrumentalities and mere non-mentioning of a statutory provision in a policy-decision would not render the policy voidable ab-initio or unenforceable in law. 40. It is useful to read Section 78-A of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 in juxta-position with Section 79 of the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956. Section 78-A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 Section 79 of the A.P. Housing Board Act, 1956 1. In the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions in questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. 2. If any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final. 1. The Government may give the Board such directions as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of this Act, after giving an opportunity to the Board to state its objections, if any, to such directions and after considering the said objections. It shall be the duty of the Board to comply with such directions. 2. The Government may at any time for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, or as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Board or officer subordinate to the Government of the Board acting in exercise of any power or authority conferred by this Act or the rules, bye-laws and regulations made thereunder, call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by the Board or such officer and may pass such order with reference thereto as it thinks fit. 41. 41. Unlike Section 78-A(1) of the Electricity Supply Act which requires the Board, in the discharge of its functions, to be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government, the power of the State Government, under Section 79(1) of the Act, is to give such directions to the Board as are, in its opinion, necessary and expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Reliance placed by the Learned Advocate General, on the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Division bench of this Court under Section 78-A of Electricity Supply Act is, therefore, misplaced. 42. Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that Section 79 (1) merely enables the Government to issue directions of a general nature which, in its opinion, were necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act; G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 was not a direction under Section 79(1); the decision to allot land vested in the Board to the 3rd respondent could not be held to a direction to the Board to carry out the purposes of the Act; Section 79(1) could not be construed as conferring power on the Government to deal with the property of the Board; and illegal allotments, if any, made in the past could not validate the present allotment. 43. Learned Advocate General would submit that the “power to sell” vesting in the Board under Section 45 could, in a given case, be guided by the directions of the Government under Section 79(1) of the Act. While referring to the allotments made earlier to political parties, he would submit that Section 79(1) requires the Board to discharge its functions not only in consonance with the provisions of the Act but also under the supervisory authority of the Government; the Board is a statutory authority functioning under the supervisory authority of the State Government; and the State Government is fully competent to request the Board to permit its land to be utilized for a similar purpose. He would submit that, unlike Section 78-A(1) of the Electricity Supply Act, Section 79(1) of the Act did not limit the power of the Government only to issuance of policy directions but included, in its contours, the power to issue “such directions as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act”, also enabling thereby a participatory process with the Board. He would submit that the Government, exercising its power to issue directions under Section 79(1), had issued G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 for allotment of A.P. Housing Board land admeasuring 5117.68 sq. yards; the G.O expressly recorded the fact of participation of the Board in the decision making process; the subsequent G.O. Ms. No.26 dated 18.8.2007 addressed the concerns of the Board with regard to the market value of the land and the impugned action of the respondents was, therefore, unexceptionable. He would further submit that the normal procedure contemplated under Rule 29(i), i.e., sale or lease by public auction, was dispensed with on concurrence from the Government, (as provided for in the proviso), which was implied in the fact that the sale deed was executed on the directions of the Government under Section 79 (1) of the Act, and after consultation with the Board. 44. Sri L. Ravichander, Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, would submit that providing land, for construction of party offices of political parties, would also fall within the purposes for which the Act was made; the 1st respondent, which was empowered to give directions, had chosen an even better path of consultation as was stated in the impugned G.O and also in the pleadings; what constituted matters under the Act was provided for under Section 22; the impugned action is referable to the power of the Government under Section 79(1); once the power of the Government to issue directions/instructions to the 2nd respondent is conceded then the G.O. cannot be faulted merely on the form in which it has been effected; it would then be a case of seeking to set aside a sale deed which, in the normal course, this Court would not entertain in Writ proceedings. 45. 45. The directions which the Government can give to the Board, under Section 79(1) of the Act, are those which in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of the Act i.e., such purposes which are mentioned in the Act, since purposes not mentioned in the Act are not purposes of the Act. Section 79(1) does not empower the Government to give directions for carrying out purposes alien to the Act. Even if it is for the purposes of the Act it should be necessary or expedient for the Government to give such directions. Further, the directions which the Government can give under Section 79(1) must be preceded by an opportunity being given to the Board to state its objections, if any, to such directions and after such objections are considered. 46. The power to give directions under Section 79(1) is not unfettered but is circumscribed by the requirements that (a) the directions should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act; and (b) such directions are necessary for carrying out for the purposes of the Act. Exercise of the power under Section 79(1) can only be to direct the Board to act in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not contrary thereto for it is well settled that the discretionary power conferred under a statute must be exercised only in furtherance of the statute and not in derogation thereof. When anything is left to be done according to discretion, the law intends it must be done according to law. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. (Union of India Vs. Kuldeep Singh 2004(2) SCC 590 . 47. The power of the Government under S.79(1) is not unrestricted. The directions which the Government is entitled to give must be to carry out the objects and purposes of the Act and not run contrary to it. Only such directions, as are reasonably necessary or expedient for carrying out the object and purpose of the enactment, fall within the ambit of Section 79(1). An exercise of power which is ultra vires the provisions of the statute cannot be attempted to be resuscitated on general powers reserved in a statute for its proper and effective implementation. Only such directions, as are reasonably necessary or expedient for carrying out the object and purpose of the enactment, fall within the ambit of Section 79(1). An exercise of power which is ultra vires the provisions of the statute cannot be attempted to be resuscitated on general powers reserved in a statute for its proper and effective implementation. Section 79(1) authorises the Government to issue directions to ensure that the provisions of the Act are obeyed and not to empower it itself to proceed contrary to law. Section 79(1) authorises the Government to issue directions to carry out the purposes of the Act. That is the legislative mandate to be carried out. (Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa 1991(4) SCC 54 . The impugned G.O, whereby the 2nd respondent – Board was directed to alienate land by way of sale to the 3rd respondent, is extraneous to the purposes of the Act as the land, which has been alienated, is not situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme. The impugned G.O. is not a direction referable to and is, in fact, ultra vires Section 79(1) of the Act. 48. As G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 is ultravires Sections 45 and 79(1) of the Act, it is liable to be quashed. Cancellation of sale deed:- 49. Learned Advocate General would contend that a sale deed, registered under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and the Indian Registration Act, can neither be challenged nor declared invalid in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the petitioner has an effective alternative remedy, for cancellation of the sale deed, by invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 50. Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the challenge, in the present case, to the allotment of land and registration of the sale deed was in the public domain; the sale deed, executed contrary to statutory provisions, is a void document, confers no title and can be declared invalid at any stage; and this Court has the jurisdiction to declare the registered sale deed illegal and void. 51. 51. The sale deed, executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 3rd respondent on 27.9.2007, is merely a consequence of the impugned G.O. We are conscious that the High Court would not, ordinarily, exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 to set aside a registered sale deed as these are matters better left for adjudication by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. It cannot, however, be lost sight of that the 2nd respondent – Board is a creature of the Act and is bound to function in accordance with, and exercise its powers within the limits prescribed by, the Act. Execution of a sale deed, of land not situated in an area comprised in a sanctioned housing scheme, is ultravires the powers of the Board under Section 45 of the Act and, as such alienation is illegal and non-est, the impugned sale deed dated 27.9.2007 must, as of course, be set aside. EARLIER ALLOTMENT OF BOARD’S LAND BY WAY OF LEASE FOR ESTABLISHING A POLITICAL PARTY’S OFFICE: 52. Learned Advocate General would submit that, since land belonging to the Board in the very same area had earlier been leased in favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party, alienation of land in favour of the 3rd respondent cannot be faulted. We see no merit in this submission. Even if the alleged lease of land to the Bharatiya Janata Party is presumed to be illegal that would neither justify the 3rd respondent’s claim for parity nor entitle them to seek a direction from this Court that they should be given a similar benefit. In Chandigarh Administration Vs. Jagjit Singh AIR 1995 SC 705 the Supreme Court held:- “………Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed one illegal / unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again. The illegal / unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law - but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act / order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners case is similar to the other persons case. But then why examine another persons case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. But then why examine another persons case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into correctness of the order made or action taken in another persons case, which other person is not before the Court nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course - barring exceptional situations - would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles…….” (emphasis supplied). 53. We hasten to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the question, whether lease of land to the Bharatiya Janata Party is illegal or not, as it has neither been put in issue in the present writ petition nor has the Bharatiya Janata Party been arrayed as a respondent in these proceedings. Suffice it to hold that the order now passed by us will not preclude respondents 1 and 2 from taking action in accordance with law if allotment/alienation of land belonging to the Board to others, including recognized political parties, is ultravires the provisions of the A.P. Housing Board Act and the Rules made thereunder. EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 : ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES: 54. Sri L. Ravichander, Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent, would submit that this Court would not, in all cases, interfere in the exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction; While exercising its discretionary jurisdiction this court would be guided by factors including public good, whether the illegality went to the root of the matter or was cosmetic in nature, whether the action complained of was merely irregular or illegal and whether interference was in public interest. He would rely on K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC 592 ; Sangram Singh Vs. He would rely on K.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore AIR 1954 SC 592 ; Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal, Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425 ; State of Maharashtra Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481 Netai Bag v. State of West Bengal (2000) 8 SCC 262 ; Master Marine Services Pvt. Ltd v. Metcalfe and Hodgkinson Pvt Ltd (2005) 6 SCC 138 and Jayarajbhai Jayantibhai Patel v. Anilbhai Jayantibahi Patel (2006) 8 SCC 200 . 55. It is well to remember that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would not exercise its discretion to interfere except in larger public interest. A writ of mandamus is discretionary. One of the principles inherent is that the exercise of discretionary power should be for the sake of justice and if quashing the order results in greater harm to the society then the Court may refrain from exercising the power. (Prabhu (20 Supra). The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India need not be exercised in every case where there is an error of law. In the name of correcting errors of law, Courts ought not to bring forth a situation which would result in injustice and, if justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law, Courts are not expected to erase it in the name of correcting errors of law. (Roshan Deen Vs. Preetilal (2002) 1 SCC 100 . One of the limitations imposed by this Court, on itself, is that it would not exercise jurisdiction unless substantial injustice has ensued or is likely to ensue. It would not allow itself to be turned into a Court of appeal to set right mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice. (Sangram Singh (19 Supra). Even if a legal flaw might be electronically detected, this Court would not interfere save manifest injustice or a substantial question of public importance is involved. (Rashpal Malhotra Vs. Mrs. Satya Rajput AIR 1987 SC 2235; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Vs. K.G.S. Bhatt AIR 1989 SC 1972 . Quashing decisions may impose a heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. (Master Marine Service (P) Ltd. (22 Supra). (Rashpal Malhotra Vs. Mrs. Satya Rajput AIR 1987 SC 2235; Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Vs. K.G.S. Bhatt AIR 1989 SC 1972 . Quashing decisions may impose a heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. (Master Marine Service (P) Ltd. (22 Supra). Even when some defect is found in the decision making process, the Court must exercise its discretion with great caution, only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, should the Court intervene. (Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. (22 Supra); Air India Ltd v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000)2 SCC 617 . 56. It is not the practice of Courts to issue meaningless writs and it would refrain where a writ would be ineffective. (K.N. Guruswamy (18 Supra). The Court would not strike down a policy decision merely because it feels that another decision would have been fairer or wiser or more scientific or logical. (Netai Bag (21 Supra). Once the Court finds that the power exercised by the statutory authorities can be traced to a provision of a statute, unless and until violation of mandatory provisions thereof are found out, and/or it is held that a decision is taken for unauthorized or illegal purposes the Court will not, ordinarily, interfere either with the policy decision or any decision taken by the Executive pursuant to or in furtherance thereof. (Chairman and M.D., B.P.L. Ltd v. S.P. Gururaja & Ors 2003(8) Supreme 129 = (2003) 8 SCC 567 . A policy decision can be interfered with by the Court only if such decision is shown to be patently arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide. (State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal (1986) 4 SCC 566 : ( AIR 1987 SC 251 . 57. While the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be exercised for the mere asking or as a matter of course, the Court must intervene where the administrative action is found to be ultra vires the Statute, for it is the bounden duty of Courts to uphold the law and strike down administrative acts which are in flagrant violation of the law. Exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is a manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of power is manifestly arbitrary. (State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co AIR 1988 SC 1737 ; State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev (2005) 5 SCC 181 . Whenever a public body exceeds or abuses the powers vested in it, Courts intervene to correct the infraction as it is in larger public interest to do so. The ambit of the ultra vires doctrine is very wide. It includes the duties of administrative agencies and any discretionary powers that may be entrusted to them. The most direct application of the principle is when an authority or body acts without having the power to do so. (Administrative Law: Peter Leyland & Terry Woods, 4th Edition). The doctrine of ultra vires covers all situations where statutory power is exercised contrary to some legal principles. There is a condition implied in this as well as in other instruments which create powers, namely, that the powers shall be used bonafide for the purpose for which they are conferred. (Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1986) 1 SCC 133 . An act which is for any reason in excess of power is often described as being ultravires or ‘outside jurisdiction’. ‘Jurisdiction’, in this context, means simply ‘power’. Any administrative act or order which is ultra vires or outside jurisdiction is void in law i..e, devoid of legal effect. If it is not within the powers given by the Act, it has no legal leg to stand on. (Administrative Law. H.W.R.WADE& C.F. FORSYTH: Ninth Edition). 58. The doctrine of ultra vires permits Courts to strike down decisions made by bodies exercising public functions which they have no power to make. Acting ultra vires and acting without jurisdiction have essentially the same meaning, although in general the term “vires” has been employed when considering administrative decisions and subordinate legislative orders, and “jurisdiction” when considering judicial decisions, or those having a judicial flavour. (De Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Fifth Edition). 59. In the purported exercise of its discretion, the authority must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. (De Smith, Woolf & Jowell: Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Fifth Edition). 59. In the purported exercise of its discretion, the authority must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, have regard to all relevant considerations, not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, not seek to promote purposes alien to the legislation that gives it the power to act, and not act arbitrarily or capriciously. (Sanjeev (31 Supra). If a discretionary power has been exercised for an “unauthorised purpose”, that is enough to invite the Court’s review. (State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn., (1979) 3 SCC 229 . When a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. (Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel (23 Supra ). 60. What the rule of law demands is not that wide discretionary power should be eliminated, but that the law should be able to control its exercise. The requirement is the recognition that all power has legal limits. An act or order which is ultra vires is a nullity, utterly without existence or effect in law. That is the meaning of ‘void’, the term most commonly used. When an act has been pronounced by the Court to be unlawful, it ‘is then recognized as having had no legal effect at all’. This consequence flows from the ultra vires principle. As the impugned G.O, and the sale deed executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 3rd respondent, are ultravires Sections 45 and 79(1) of the Act, we must declare them to be null and void as it is in large public interest that the rule of law is upheld and exercise of power by the Government and the Board is confined within the limits prescribed by the Act. 61. As we are in agreement with the submission of Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned counsel for the petitioner, that the impugned G.O. issued by the 1st respondent, and the sale deed executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 3rd respondent, are both ultra vires the Sections 45 and 79(1) of the Act and must be set aside, it is wholly unnecessary for us to examine the other contentions raised by him. Suffice it to note that he had also contended that (1) Alienation of land to the 3rd respondent, under the impugned G.O, is contrary to the policy guidelines issued in G.O.Ms.No.826 dated 31.8.1987; (2) As the land forms part of a notified slum it could not have been allotted to the 3rd respondent depriving poor slum- dwellers of the land in their possession for which pattas were granted in their favour; (3) Stamp duty and Registration charges paid, on the sale of land to the 3rd respondent, is insufficient; (4) The impugned G.O, alienating land by way of sale to the 3rd respondent at an abysmally low price of Rs.100/- per square yard, is a gross abuse of power; (5) Allotment of land, under the impugned G.O, is contrary to the provisions of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act. 62. Before we conclude we must, however, examine the objections raised, on behalf of the respondents, to the maintainability of the Writ petition. Delay & latches:- 63. Learned Advocate General would submit that the challenge, to G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005, was belated and was made two years eight months after the G.O. had worked itself out. Sri L.Ravichander, Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent, would submit that this Court would not interfere where the impugned action suffered from latches. He would rely on Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1969) 1 SCC 185 ; Nandalal Jaiswal (29 Supra); and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 . 64. On the other hand Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that G.O.Ms. He would rely on Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports (1969) 1 SCC 185 ; Nandalal Jaiswal (29 Supra); and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh (2007) 9 SCC 278 . 64. On the other hand Sri G. Mohan Rao, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that G.O.Ms. No.76 dated 25.11.2005 was not to the petitioner’s knowledge till the matter, relating to the forcible eviction of residents of Bheem Rao Bada, was reported in the newspapers; even though the impugned G.O. was issued in November, 2005, it was acted for a part of the land of 3000.32 square yards only in September 2007; there was no change in the nature of the land and it is still vacant; the impugned G.O, which has been issued without authority of law and is contrary to the provisions of the Act, is void; the consequential sale deed is also void and conferred no right or title on the 3rd respondent and their validity could be challenged at any time; no period of limitation can be prescribed for challenging a void order; even otherwise, as there is no change in the nature of the land as on date, the question of delay and latches does not arise. 65. The evolution of the rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not, ordinarily, permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the Writ jurisdiction as it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene. When the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights is an important factor which always weigh with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise its jurisdiction. (Nandlal Jaiswal (29 Supra). 66. Discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the Court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (Pan Singh (35 Supra)). If it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 is in substance claiming a relief which, under the law of limitation, was barred at the time when the Writ petition was filed the High Court may refuse to grant relief in its Writ jurisdiction. 67. (Pan Singh (35 Supra)). If it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 is in substance claiming a relief which, under the law of limitation, was barred at the time when the Writ petition was filed the High Court may refuse to grant relief in its Writ jurisdiction. 67. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court. (Durga Prashad (34 Supra), Smt. Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of Bihar Civil Appeal No.10 of 1964 D/- 22.9.1966 (SC). There may be cases where, despite delay and creation of third party rights, the High Court may still, in the exercise of its discretion, interfere and grant relief. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. (Nandlal Jaiswal (29 Supra). 68. The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts. It will all depend on what the remedy claimed is and how the delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party, on the ground of laches or delay, is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others, by reason of the delay in filing the petition, should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the Writ court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to undue laches or negligence on his part. The test is not to the physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. (Dehri Rohtas Light Rly.Co. Vs. District Board, Bhopur 1992 (2) SCC 598 . 69. The test is not to the physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. (Dehri Rohtas Light Rly.Co. Vs. District Board, Bhopur 1992 (2) SCC 598 . 69. The question of delay in invoking the Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has to be considered along with the ultra vires acts of respondents 1 and 2. Can the respondents be heard to say that their having acted ultra vires the Act is of no consequence as the person, who has questioned such ultra vires acts, has not immediately invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the relief considered appropriate in the circumstances? Where the authorities are enjoined by a statute to exercise their powers within permissible limits, they are answerable to the Court why they have acted ultra vires the Statute and have caused public injury, even if the person who has invoked its jurisdiction has done so belatedly. (Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994)1 SCC 44 . 70. Having acted ultra vires Sections 45 and 79(1) of the A.P. Housing Board Act, it is not open to respondents 1 and 2 to turn around and contend that, despite their having violated the statutory provisions, the petitioner must be denied relief on the ground of delay and latches. As all ultra vires acts are a nullity, Courts are bound to declare such actions void. Not to do so would be against larger public interest and result in manifest injustice. In any event, as the land alienated to the third respondent is still vacant and no third party rights have arisen by reason of the delay in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, we see no reason not to entertain this Writ petition filed in public interest. XI. Locus standi: 71. Sri L. Ravichander, Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent, would contend that the petitioner does not have the locus standi to file this writ petition as they have a litigious attitude which is evident from the large number of cases filed by them, and as a part of the relief sought by them can only be granted by a competent Civil Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the respective parties. 72. 72. The law, on locus standi, has veered around from genuine grievance against orders affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest in the matter. Action of the executive, in disregard of the provisions of law, raise substantial issues of accountability of those entrusted with the responsibility of administration. It furnishes enough cause for an individual to approach by way of a Writ petition. The authorities can neither be permitted to seek shelter under the technicalities of locus standi nor can they plead restraint in the exercise of discretion as grave issues of public concern outweigh such considerations. (Bangalore Medical Trust(16 Supra). 73. The petitioner, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act with Registration No.5688/2001, is engaged in campaigning and organizing peoples’ struggle for housing. It is working among the slum dwellers of Hyderabad and Ranga Reddy Districts and has been espousing their rehabilitation and for providing them house sites. The petitioner claims to have taken up this issue with the National Human Rights Commission. It has filed W.P.No.17623 of 2008 challenging the allotment of public land to various private companies/organizations and W.P.No.7997 of 2008 challenging allotment of Government land to various housing cooperative societies at basic value. 74. There is no material on record even to create a suspicion, let alone establish, that the petitioner was acting for extraneous reasons and not in public interest. Even otherwise if any other member of the public, to whom the conduct alleged against the petitioner in the present case could not be attributed, can file such a writ petition for the same relief, this disability would not attach to him. The relief claimed by the petitioner in the Writ petition, being in the nature of a class action, without seeking any relief personal to them ought not to be dismissed merely on the ground of lack of standing since this is a matter of public concern and relates to the good governance of the State itself. (Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi v. The Speaker 1993(2) SCC 703 . We see no reason to non-suit the petitioner on this ground. 75. G.O.Ms.No.76 Housing (HB.II) Department dated 25.11.2005 and Document No.2678 of 2007 dated 27.9.2007 executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the 3rd respondent are ultra vires Sections 45 and 79(1) of the Act. They are declared void and are, consequently, quashed. The Writ petition is allowed. However, in the circumstances, without costs.