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2009 DIGILAW 930 (AP)

Union of India, represented by the General Manager, S. C. R. Secunderabad v. K. Niranjan Rao, S/o. K. Narasinga Rao

2009-12-22

B.N.RAO NALLA, V.V.S.RAO

body2009
JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice V.V.S.Rao) 1. The work of track-welding was entrusted to first respondent under a contract dated 07.4.1992 at an estimated cost of Rs.30,54,683/-. The disputes, which arose between appellants and first respondent, were referred to second respondent constituting the arbitral tribunal. An award dated 09.8.2007 was passed allowing the claims to an extent of Rs.43,11,916.60. Aggrieved by the same, appellants filed a petition under Section 34 (1) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act). The same being O.P. (SR) No.22783 of 2007 having been dismissed by the Court of I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, on 30.6.2009 only on the ground that there is unexplained delay of 45 days in filing the O.P., Union of India (UoI) represented by its General Manager, South Central Railway, and its Works Manager are before this Court under Section 37 of A&C Act. 2. Relying on Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of A&C Act, learned Senior Counsel for Railways submits that signed copy of the award is required to be served on the General Manager of South Central Railway and the same was never served on him and, therefore, there was no delay. He would rely on Union of India v Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors AIR 2005 SC 1832 . 3. Learned Counsel for first respondent submits that initially the appellants filed a petition before this Court with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of delay. The same was returned on the ground that Section 5 of Limitation Act has no application. One year thereafter O.P. (SR) No.22783 of 2007 is filed. Nextly he submits that in their O.P., appellants admitted that cause of action arose on 07.12.2007 when the signed award was received and, therefore, unless delay is explained petition cannot be entertained. 4. Section 31(5) of A&C Act in plain terms contemplates delivery of duly signed copy of the award to each party. Such party can have recourse to a Court under Section 34(1) of A&C Act for setting aside the award. Therefore the question who is “a party” to the award assumes importance. It has been well settled that Railways is a Department of UoI in the Ministry of Railways. Such party can have recourse to a Court under Section 34(1) of A&C Act for setting aside the award. Therefore the question who is “a party” to the award assumes importance. It has been well settled that Railways is a Department of UoI in the Ministry of Railways. Indeed when a suit is filed against the General manager of Railways, Supreme Court held that the suit is not properly instituted in accordance with Sections 79 and 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (see State of Kerala v GM, Southern Railway AIR 1976 SC 2538 ). 5. Therefore there cannot be any doubt that UoI in Railways is always represented by General Manager of Zonal Railways, and in this case, South Central Railway. Therefore, UoI represented by the General Manager is “the party” for the purpose of arbitration whenever there are disputes between the Railways and a contractor. It will be no gainsaying that when the powers are vested in the General Manager to take a decision with regard to enforcement of the awards or to challenge the awards, under Section 31(5) of A&C Act signed copy of the award necessarily has to be served on General Manager alone. In Tecco Trichy Engineers (supra), the position of General Manager in Railways (UoI), has been explained by the Supreme Court in the following manner. It is well-known that the Ministry of Railways has very large area of operation covering several Divisions, having different Divisional Heads and various departments within the Division, having their own Departmental Heads. The General manager of Railways is at the very apex of the Division with a responsibility of taking strategic decisions, laying down policies of the Organisation, giving administrative instructions and issuing guidelines in the organization. He is from elite managerial cadre which runs entire Organisation of his Division with different Departments, having different Departmental Heads. The day-to-day managerial cadre which runs entire Organisation of his Division with different departments rests with different departmental heads. Departmental Head is directly connected and concerned with the departmental functioning and is alone expected to know the progress of the matter pending before the Arbitral Tribunal concerning his department. He is the person who knows exactly where the shoe pinches, whether the arbitral award is adverse to Department’s interest. Departmental Head is directly connected and concerned with the departmental functioning and is alone expected to know the progress of the matter pending before the Arbitral Tribunal concerning his department. He is the person who knows exactly where the shoe pinches, whether the arbitral award is adverse to Department’s interest. Departmental Head would naturally be in a position to know whether the Arbitrator has committed a mistake in understanding Departmental’s line of submissions and the grounds available to challenge the award. He is aware of the factual aspect of the case and also the factual and legal aspects of the questions involved in the arbitration proceedings. 6. Insofar as the arbitral proceedings between the Railways and contractor are concerned, the Supreme Court observed as follows. The General Manager, with executive work load of entire Division cannot be expected to know all the niceties of the case pending before the arbitral tribunal or for that matter the arbitral award itself and to take a decision as to whether the arbitral award deserves challenge, without proper assistance of the Departmental Head. General Manager, being the Head of the Division, at best is only expected to take final decision whether the arbitral award is to be challenged or not on the basis of the advise and the material placed before him by the person concerned with arbitration proceedings. Taking a final decision would be possible only if the subject-matter of challenge namely, the arbitral award is known to the Departmental Head, who is directly concerned with the subject matter as well as arbitral proceedings. In the large organizations like Railways, “party” as referred to in Section 2(h) read with Section 34(3) of the Act has to be construed to be a person directly connected with and involved in the proceedings before the Arbitrator. 7. The above observations support the Senior Counsel’s plea that service of the signed copy of the award on the Counsel appearing for Railways or the Works Manager would not be sufficient compliance with the law. The question is, therefore, whether there is a proper delivery of award. 7. The above observations support the Senior Counsel’s plea that service of the signed copy of the award on the Counsel appearing for Railways or the Works Manager would not be sufficient compliance with the law. The question is, therefore, whether there is a proper delivery of award. Before the Court below when the objection was raised that there is a delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of A&C Act, the Counsel for Railways represented that the copy of the award was received by the General Manager on 07.12.2007 and, therefore, there was no delay in filing the petition. Though the plea was opposed, when the matter was heard by the Court below, there was no serious dispute to this factual aspect. It is now stated by the Counsel for Railways that the O.P., was presented on 20.12.2007, within three months and, therefore, there was no delay. To that effect an affidavit was also filed along with I.A. (SR) No.23577 of 2008 before the Court below. Therefore, we are convinced that rejection of O.P. on the ground that it is not presented within the time prescribed is erroneous. We also observe that whenever the Court, which is vested with the power to set aside arbitral award under Section 34 of A&C Act, receives O.P. beyond three months time as contemplated, such Courts should not ignore the proviso to Section 34(3) of A&C Award which empowers the condonation of delay of further period of thirty (30) days, when sufficient cause is shown. A plea that a party to the proceedings before the Court below was not delivered a copy of the signed award immediately is certainly a sufficient cause. 8. For the above reason, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. We observe that O.P. filed by appellants herein be registered and be disposed of in accordance with law preferably within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this award.