JUDGMENT 1. - This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order of his removal dated 26.2.1979. Petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Assistant Manager with the Matunda Gram Sewa Sahkari Samiti Ltd., Bundi. He was removed vide order dated 26.2.1979 on the ground that in a criminal case, he was found guilty of putting fire which led to damage and substantial loss to the society. Challan was filed against the petitioner in the criminal court for offence under Section 436 IPC. Court of Sessions Bundi vide its judgment dated 20.5.1980 acquitted the petitioner. Petitioner after his acquittal filed a civil suit in the court of Additional Civil Judge Bundi on 12.3.1981 with the prayer that the order of his removal passed on 26.2.1979 should be declared as null and void and he should be declared to have been throughout in service with direction to respondents to pay him salary for the intervening period with all consequential benefits. Civil Court framed as many as eight issues including the one; whether removal of the petitioner by the respondents from their services without serving upon him charge sheet and providing him opportunity of hearing illegally was not alleged. Civil Court although decided all the issues in favour of the petitioner but held that it has no jurisdiction in the matter in view of remedy available under Section 75(1) of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965. Suit, therefore, was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 3.5.1989. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner filed appeal before the court of learned District Judge, Bundi, which was dismissed vide order dated 26.9.1994. Instead of availing the remedy under Section 75(1) of the Rajasthan Cooperative Societies Act, 1965, petitioner filed this writ petition on 23.2.1995 which was admitted by this Court on 8.11.1995 and now it has come up for hearing. 2. Shri Amit Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that sole premise on which petitioner was dismissed from service was filing of challan against him by the police and with his acquittal by the court, very basis for his dismissal has ceased to exist. Respondents did not serve upon the petitioner any charge sheet nor was he otherwise afforded opportunity of hearing prior to passing of the order of removal. Respondents did not serve upon the petitioner any charge sheet nor was he otherwise afforded opportunity of hearing prior to passing of the order of removal. Learned Additional Civil Judge Bundi also gave a finding while dismissing the suit vide judgment dated 3.5.1989 on Issue No. 2 categorically holding that removal of the petitioner was made without serving upon him any charge sheet or without providing him any opportunity of hearing and in utter violation of the principles of natural justice. As per Rule 7E, respondents were required to serve upon the petitioner a charge sheet and then hold a departmental enquiry. Action of the respondents in removing the petitioner from service without adhering to the relevant rule, is liable to be declared illegal and unconstitutional. Removal of the petitioner was nothing but an arbitrary and colourable exercise of power. His removal order, therefore, is liable to be quashed and set aside and petitioner is liable to be reinstated in service. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though there was delay in his part in approaching this Court against the order of his removal dated 26.2.1979 but it occasioned because petitioner was advised to initially approach the civil court and, therefore, he filed civil suit. But then civil suit filed on 12.3.1981 was dismissed vide order dated 3.5.1989 and then appeal filed against that judgment of the civil court was also dismissed by the appellate court much thereafter vide order dated 26.9.1994. Petitioner thereupon approached this Court by filing this writ petition on 23.2.1995. Objection of delay raised by the respondents should be, therefore, over ruled in view of peculiar facts of the present case and keeping in view the spirit of provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Learned counsel submitted that although the civil court was of the view that in view of the remedy of arbitration proceedings available under Section 75 of the Act of 1965, it would have no jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that although the civil court was of the view that in view of the remedy of arbitration proceedings available under Section 75 of the Act of 1965, it would have no jurisdiction. But even then the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not circumscribed or otherwise restricted by Section 75 of the Act of 1965 and now that the present writ petition has remained pending for last 14 years and was admitted in the year 1995 itself despite observation made by the civil court, matters should be decided on merits rather than relegating the petitioner to the remedy of arbitration under Section 75 supra. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment of this Court in Brijendra Singh v. Administrator Sikar Kendriya Bank Ltd., Sikar : 1987(1) WLN 145. It is, therefore, prayed that writ petition be allowed. 4. Shri Zakir Hussain, learned Additional Government counsel opposed the writ petition and argued that when the civil suit filed by the petitioner was dismissed on the note that petitioner had remedy of arbitration under Section 75 of the Act of 1965, he ought not to have filed the writ petition. Writ petition in relation to service disputes of an employee of the cooperative society would not be maintainable. Learned counsel in support of his arguments relied on the judgment of this Court in Sawai Madhopur Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd., Sawai Madhopur v. Raj. State Cooperative Tribunal, Jaipur : 1989(2) RLW 321. It was argued that petitioner was responsible for safety of the stock of the society and that he was found guilty of causing fire, owing to which, huge financial loss was caused to the society. Even if petitioner has been acquitted on the charge for offence under Section 436 IPC, that acquittal was made for technical reasons because learned trial court extended him benefit of doubt. The order of removal passed by the respondents cannot, therefore, be said to be without jurisdiction. No interference is called for in the matter of this nature by this court. In any case, writ petition has been filed belatedly challenging the order of removal dated 26.2.1979 in 1995 and, therefore, writ petition is liable to be dismissed for delay and laches. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the documents forming part of the record. 6. In any case, writ petition has been filed belatedly challenging the order of removal dated 26.2.1979 in 1995 and, therefore, writ petition is liable to be dismissed for delay and laches. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the documents forming part of the record. 6. Analysis of the arguments that have been raised by the petitioner and respondents clearly show that respondents did not before termination of the petitioner from service hold any disciplinary proceedings and even no notice calling upon the petitioner to explain his alleged conduct was served upon him by the respondents. There was absolutely no adherence to the principles of natural justice. Order of removal was merely passed on the conclusions arrived at by the police in the criminal case. Petitioner has already been acquitted of the charge for offence under Section 436 IPC by the Court of Sessions in its judgment dated 20.5.1980. As far as criminal liability of the petitioner is concerned, he has been held to be not guilty of that offence. Civil Court also in its finding given on Issue No. 2 has clearly held that removal of the petitioner was violation of the principles of natural justice as neither any departmental enquiry was held nor any notice was served upon the petitioner before he was removed from service. The contention that since civil suit was dismissed on the premise that petitioner had remedy under Section 75(1) of the Act of 1965, therefore, writ petition should not be entertained, cannot be accepted because despite remedy under Section 75(1) of the Act of 1965, jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and decide dispute of this nature is not curtailed by mere reason of such remedy and this is all the more so because present writ petition was entertained by this court in the year 1995 and the writ petition was admitted and now at this distance of time, relegating petitioner to the remedy of arbitration under Section 75, would be very harsh upon him. This court in Brijendra Singh supra, while dealing with somewhat similar controversy where service of an employee of cooperative society was terminated on the ground of his conviction and when his conviction was set aside held that availability of remedy under Section 75 does not debar the petitioner from filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. 7. Judgment of Sawai Madhopur Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. supra on which reliance has been placed by the learned Additional Government counsel was a case in which validity of termination of an employee was questioned. This Court held that the dispute was not the one which was touching management of the society and, therefore, it would not be maintainable and on merits it was observed that order of termination is bad in law and decided the same against the society. Society preferred appeal before the Rajasthan Co-operative Tribunal. Tribunal upheld the objection that dispute between the employer and employee cannot be tried by the Registrar in the scope of Section 75 and, therefore, appeal was not maintainable before him. Learned Single Judge of this court held that since dispute was touching management of the Society, a reference was not maintainable under Section 75 of the Act and remanded the matter back to the Tribunal for decision afresh. It was in those facts that the Division Bench of this court upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Here, in the present case, facts are entirely different. Petitioner has approached this Court before any reference was actually made under Section 75 and his writ petition was not only entertained but admitted by this court. Now at this stage, relegating the petitioner to avail the remedy of Section 75, is likely to occasion discourage of justice. 8. Coming now to the merits, having held that removal of the petitioner was absolutely illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Rule 75(1) of the Act of 1965, what is to be considered is that what would be the effect of delay in filing writ petition. Order of removal was passed on 26.2.1979 and writ petition was filed on 23.2.1995. Since petitioner had approached the civil court on 12.3.1981 and the suit was decided by the civil court in the civil suit on 3.5.1989 and thereafter his appeal was dismissed by the appellate court on 26.9.1994, it would be seen that petitioner had been agitating his grievance before the court, one after another, which did not have the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Petitioner after dismissal of his appeal on 26.9.1994 soon after approached this court by filing writ petition on 23.2.1995, therefore, filing of writ petition as such cannot be said to suffer from delay and laches. Petitioner after dismissal of his appeal on 26.9.1994 soon after approached this court by filing writ petition on 23.2.1995, therefore, filing of writ petition as such cannot be said to suffer from delay and laches. But then question arises as to if respondents can be required to pay him back wages for all this time for the remedy wrongly prosecuted by the petitioner before the civil court. Starting from date of removal on 26.2.1979 and till filing of writ petition on 23.2.1995, petitioner is fully to blame himself for this delay. However, it is not disputed that petitioner rendered his services as Manager to respondent No. 2-Matunda Gram Sewa Sahakari Samiti Ltd. and upon his acquittal, he is liable to be paid at least half the back wages for the entire period except the period from 26.2.1979 to 23.2.1995 if eventually, he is required to be reinstated in service. 9. In the result, writ petition is allowed, order of removal dated 26.2.1979 (Annexure-1) is held to be illegal and unconstitutional. Same is quashed and set aside. Petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits excluding the period with effect from the date of removal dated 26.2.1979 to filing of writ petition on 23.2.1995 for which period he shall get only notional benefits. However, he shall be entitled to get 50% of back wages for the subsequent period.Compliance of the judgment shall be made within a period of three months from the date its copy is produced before the respondents.Writ Petition Allowed. *******