Judgment ( 1. ) BRIEFLY stated facts relevant for the purposes of this writ petition are that the suit property earlier belonged to one Ramnath. Ramnath had a son, namely, Rameshwar Dayal and a daughter Parwati Bai. Rameshwar Dayal had three sons and two daughters. Kriparam is one of his children. According to parwati Bai, after the death of Ramnath name of Rameshwar Dayal alone was entered in the revenue record in respect of the entire property left by Ramnath. After the death of Rameshwar Dayal, Kriparam sold l/3rd share vide registered sale deed dated 10-09-03 to Raju Singh Bhadoriya (respondent No. 2 ). ( 2. ) IN the back drop of the aforesaid events, Parwati Bai instituted a suit bearing No. 6-A/04 (new No. 63-A/08) with an allegation that she had half share in the property and Kriparam could not have sold 1/3rd. This apart, it was stated that there being no partition, Kriparam was not competent to execute registered sale deed in favour of Raju Singh Bhadoriya. Accordingly, a suit for declaration and perpetual injunction was instituted against various defendants including raju Singh Bhadoriya (respondent No. 2), who is the main contesting party. ( 3. ) SUBSEQUENTLY, another civil suit bearing No. 9-A/04 (new No. 62- A/08) was instituted by Kriparam with certain allegations. He also sought relief that registered sale deed dated 10-09-03 may be quashed/cancelled or declared illegal and ineffective. ( 4. ) PARWATI Bai submitted an application under Section 10 of CPC in Civil Suit no. 9-A/04 (instituted by Kriparam) that in view of her suit (Civil Suit No. 6-A/04)being earlier one, proceedings of the subsequent suit may be stayed. This application was rejected and the same was challenged in writ petition No. 2228/04. This court vide order dated 05-10-05 stayed the proceedings of Civil Suit No. 9-A/04 and gave opportunity to the parties to the litigation to move an appropriate application before the District Judge concerned for seeking consolidation of both the suits. ( 5. ) IT is important to note that pursuant to the aforesaid order of this Court, no application for consolidation was submitted by any of the parties till March, 2009. ( 6. ) IT is stated at bar that in Civil Suit No. 6-A/04 (new No. 63-A/08) evidence of Parwati Bai as well as of defendants No. 1 to 5 has been recorded. ( 6. ) IT is stated at bar that in Civil Suit No. 6-A/04 (new No. 63-A/08) evidence of Parwati Bai as well as of defendants No. 1 to 5 has been recorded. Statement of Raju Singh Bhadoriya (defendant No. 6) has also been recorded. However, four witnesses of Raju Singh Bhadoriya are yet to be examined. ( 7. ) AS regards Civil Suit No. 9-A/04, it is admitted that proper court fee has not been paid despite direction of the trial Court and written statement from defendants is still awaited. ( 8. ) AN application under Section 151 of CPC with a prayer for consolidation of both the suits was filed on 06-04-09 by respondents No. 2 and 3 here in which has been allowed by the impugned order dated 21-04-09 by the Court of learned sixth Additional District Judge, Bhind (Fast Track), which has been assailed on behalf of Parwati Bai in the present writ petition. ( 9. ) SHRI N. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that direction of this Court was issued on 05-10-05 to move an application for consolidation by any of the parties. Pursuant thereto no such application was filed with promptness within reasonable time. it is only after closure of plaintiffs evidence as well as of defendants No. 1 to 5, such an application is moved which cannot be allowed looking to the status of the earlier suit. ( 10. ) SHRI. SETH, learned counsel for the contesting respondents countered it with a say that the application has been allowed pursuant to this Courts direction and there being no jurisdictional error, the petition is liable to dismissal in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus V. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, AIR 1984 SC 38 . ( 11. ) CONSIDERED the submissions and perused the record. ( 12. ) CONSOLIDATION of suits is not specifically provided in Code of Civil Procedure as applicable to the State of Madhya Pradesh. It seems that it is only State of uttar Pradesh, which has made a specific provision for consolidation of cases by inserting Order 4-A in Code of Civil Procedure by way of amendment (U. P. Act of 57 of 1976) which runs as follows: 1. It seems that it is only State of uttar Pradesh, which has made a specific provision for consolidation of cases by inserting Order 4-A in Code of Civil Procedure by way of amendment (U. P. Act of 57 of 1976) which runs as follows: 1. Consolidation of suits and proceedings:- When two of more suits or proceedings are pending in the same court, and the court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice, it may by order direct their joint trial, whereupon all such suits and proceedings may be decided upon the evidence in all or any such suits or proceedings [u. P. Act 57 of 1976, Section 5 (01-01-1977)]. ( 13. ) CODE of Civil Procedure as it applies to the State of Madhya Pradesh contains no specific provision for consolidation of suits. It may be achieved by invoking Section 151 of CPC. Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive for the simple reason that legislature is not capable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing a procedure for them. Supreme Court of India in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra V. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, 1962 SC 527 has observed: the Code of Civil Procedure is undoubtedly no exhaustive: it does not lay down rules for guidance in respect of all situations nor does it seek to provide rules for decision of all conceivable cases which may arise. The civi Courts are authorized to pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of Court, but where an express provision is made to meet a particular situation the Code must be observed and departure therefrom is not permissible. ( 14. ) AS regards scope of Section 151 CPC, it has been observed in the aforesaid case section 151 C. P. C. itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the court, it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do Justice between the parties before it. ( 15. ) IN view of the aforesaid, by no stretch of imagination it can be doubted that consolidation of suits in appropriate cases may be ordered by invoking section 151 of CPC. Court has undoubtedly such a power where the circumstance so required to exercise inherent power to act ex-debito Justitios and to do real and substantial justice for the administration, for which alone, it exists. Thus, Section 151 CPC does not confer any power but only indicates that there is power inherent in the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for achieving the ends of justice as well as to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. ( 16. ) CONSOLIDATION of suits though not specifically provided in Code of Civil procedure, may be directed in order to avoid firstly; conflicting judgments and secondly; to save, valuable time, energy and money by clubbing the cases involving common question together. In Civil Suit N0. 63-A/08 instituted by Parwati Bai, it is alleged that she had half share in the property and accordingly Kriparam could not have sold 1/3rd share. If she succeeds the sale deed executed by Kriparam may not be valid to the extent of her share. Civil Suit No. 62-A/08 is instituted by kriparam, challenging the registered sale deed executed by himself. Thus, the grounds of attack contained in Civil Suit No. 63-A/q8 and Civil Suit No. 62-A/08 to common sale deed dated 10-09-03 are altogether different and it cannot be said that the judgments in both the suits shall have to be conflicting with each other. Judgment in both the suits decided in any manner, whatsoever, may co-exist without giving rise to any kind of conflict. This apart, it may be seen that in the Civil Suit instituted by Parwati Bai (Civil Suit No. 63-A/08) evidence of plaintiff as well as that of defendants No. 1 to 5 is closed. Statement of contesting defendant Raju singh Bhadoriya (respondent No. 2) is also recorded. Four witnesses of defendant no. This apart, it may be seen that in the Civil Suit instituted by Parwati Bai (Civil Suit No. 63-A/08) evidence of plaintiff as well as that of defendants No. 1 to 5 is closed. Statement of contesting defendant Raju singh Bhadoriya (respondent No. 2) is also recorded. Four witnesses of defendant no. 6 are yet to be examined as per learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3. Thus, Civil Suit No. 63-A/08 has undergone much progress and substantially near decision. On the other hand, in Civil Suit No. 62-A/08 instituted by Kriparam, proper court fee is yet to be paid and written statements of defendants are awaited. Thus, Civil Suit No. 62-A/08 is virtually at primary stage. This being so, the very purpose of consolidation cannot be achieved in view of divergent status of two suits. ( 17. ) IN the case of consolidation of suits, common evidence is recorded which serves the purpose in the cases consolidated. In Civil Suit No. 63-A/08 evidence has been already recorded substantially prior to order of consolidation which cannot be utilized in Civil Suit No. 62-A/08 except with the express consent of the parties concerned. It has been admitted by the learned counsel for the parties that no such consent was given by the plaintiff of both the suits. It is undisputed position of law as held by the Apex Court in the case of Mitthulal and another V. State of M. P. , 1975 JLJ 432 that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at a decision of another case. In view of the aforesaid legal position, the evidence recorded in Parwati Bais suit prior to order of consolidation cannot be legally looked into in the suit instituted by Kriparam and evidence shall have to be freshly recorded even in the case of Parwati Bai in view of the order of consolidation. Thus, impugned order shall have an effect of reopening of Parwati Bais case for no justifiable reason. On the other hand, parwati Bai, who has already produced her evidence would be dragged in the suit instituted by Kriparam, although no relief has been sought against her in that suit. An application for consolidation even in pursuance of this Courts order ought to have been submitted promptly within reasonable time. On the other hand, parwati Bai, who has already produced her evidence would be dragged in the suit instituted by Kriparam, although no relief has been sought against her in that suit. An application for consolidation even in pursuance of this Courts order ought to have been submitted promptly within reasonable time. Respondents No. 2 and 3 despite direction of this Court on 05-10-05 to move an application for consolidation observed silence for more than three years and five months and, therefore, they will be deemed to have acquiesced their right to have consolidation in the light of this Courts order dated 05-10-05. Moreover, this Court vide the said order did not direct for consolidation but had merely observed that it shall be open to any of the parties to file an appropriate application for seeking consolidation which shall be considered in accordance with law. Thus, the learned trial Judge while passing the order of consolidation has failed to exercise jurisdiction in judicious manner. He ought to have considered the stages of the suits and the purpose which could be achieved by ordering consolidation. Learned counsel for the respondents No 2 and 3, Shri Seth submitted that since proceedings of subsequent suit were stayed by this Court, respondent No. 2 was unable to move an application for consolidation within reasonable time. This submission is totally incorrect and highly misconceived because this Court in the order dated 05-10-05 itself has observed that stay of one of the suits passed by this Court shall not come in way for consideration of application for consolidation. Thus, silence of the respondent No. 2 in the matter of submission of application for consolidation did amount to acquiescence on his part and he could not have insisted for consolidation due to substantial progress of earlier suit which was well within his knowledge. ( 18. ) SHRI Seth, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 contended that there is no jurisdictional error in the impugned order and petition is liable to dismissal in view of the law laid down in the case of Mohd. Yunus V. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, AIR 1934 SC 38. It is observed in the case of Mohd. ) SHRI Seth, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 contended that there is no jurisdictional error in the impugned order and petition is liable to dismissal in view of the law laid down in the case of Mohd. Yunus V. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, AIR 1934 SC 38. It is observed in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra): the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record much less an error of law. ( 19. ) IN the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) it was found that there was no failure on the part of the subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. Contrary to this, it is found in the present case that due to the order of consolidation, evidence recorded already in the suit instituted by Parwati Bai (Civil Suit No. 63-A/08) will be washed out and there would be a denovo trial of the suit for no infirmity, legal or procedural. It is true that the order of consolidation could have been made by exercise of discretionary power by the trial Court. However, it is observed that discretion ought to have been exercised in judicious manner. Learned trial Judge has failed to exercise the discretion judiciously on account of ignoring nature of the suits and the relief prayed therein. It has equally erred in not taking into consideration unlikelihood of conflicting judgments. Apart from this, the stages of the suits were also ignored. This being so, learned trial Judge, failed to take into consideration that the purpose of consolidation could not have been achieved in view of more than 90% progress of the trial of Parwati Bais suit. ( 20. ) IN the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order is not sustainable in law and the same is hereby set aside, however without order as to costs. Petition allowed.