Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1. This case is not a happy reflection on the functioning of quasi-judicial authorities. The Financial Commissioner heard the arguments in this case on 21.8.2002 and reserved the order. The judgment was ultimately pronounced on 28.6.2007. Can such a judgment be sustained in the eyes of law is the question posed by the petitioners through the present writ petition. 2. Counsel for landlord-respondent No. 5 was rather emphatic in urging that Court should not interfere in this order as he is the sufferer of this delay and not the petitioners, who are tenants. The petitioners, as per the respondent-landlord, are neither paying rent nor are vacating the land, whereas they have an order staying dispossession in their favour since 16.8.2007. Counsel for respondent No. 5, thus, would urge, with some justification that respondent No. 5 suffered because of delay in delivery of the judgment and not the petitioners, who rather stand benefitted by delay in delivering the judgment. He would, thus, beseech this Court not to interfere in the impugned order whereby the order evicting the tenants has already been made. According to the counsel, interfering in the impugned order on the ground as urged would further prolong his right to get possession of his land and, thus, it would not be fair and just course having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. Factual position is not denied. The argument in this case was heard on 21.8.2002 and the judgment was pronounced almost after five years. Jeet Ram, father of the petitioners, was a tenant on payment of annual rent of Rs. 950/- and after his death, the petitioners are cultivating the land. It is alleged that respondent No. 5 did not accept the rent for the year 1981 and father of the petitioners, therefore, had to file an application before Assistant Collector IInd Grade under Section 14-A (iii) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act in order to pay/deposit of the rent. Assistant Collector, however, dismissed this application on 5.2.1982. Respondent No. 5 thereafter filed an application for eviction of the father of the petitioners from the land. This application, however, was dismissed on 17.2.1982. On an appeal filed against this order, the case was remanded to the Assistant Collector for fresh decision. Assistant Collector, however, again dismissed the application on 14.5.1993. Assistant Collector, however, dismissed this application on 5.2.1982. Respondent No. 5 thereafter filed an application for eviction of the father of the petitioners from the land. This application, however, was dismissed on 17.2.1982. On an appeal filed against this order, the case was remanded to the Assistant Collector for fresh decision. Assistant Collector, however, again dismissed the application on 14.5.1993. Appeal filed against this order was allowed by the Collector on 11.9.1996. This order was upheld by the Commissioner on 20.6.2000. This order was challenged by the petitioner before the Financial Commissioner. This revision has been dismissed on 28.6.2007 after having heard the arguments in this case on 21.8.2002. 4. This order may call for interference, though the consequence of the same apparently would be rather harsh for respondent No. 5. Counsel for respondent No. 5 appears justified in saying that in fact he would suffer in case the impugned order is setaside on this technical ground of delay in deciding the case after having heard the arguments so many years ago. It appears that sufferer would be respondent No. 5 as he has an order of eviction of the petitioners, which he could have executed to obtain possession of his land. Merely because the consequences are a bit harsh, would not a valid reason not to examine the validity of the order as per the law. 5. Delay in delivery of a judgment not only would need to be deprecated but give rise to an apprehension in the mind of a party that the arguments raised at the bar may not have received proper attention while disposing of the case after so much of delay. Counsel for the petitioners may be justified in saying that his arguments raised have not been properly appreciated and reflected because of this inordinate delay in delivering the judgment. Reliance is placed on Bhagwandas Fatechand Daswani and others v. H.P.A. International and others, 2000(2) RCR(Civil) 207 : AIR 2000 SC 775 in support of the submission that long delay in delivery of judgment by itself is held sufficient reason to set-aside the judgment under appeal. This was a case where judgment was delivered after 5 years from the date the hearing of the appeal was concluded. This was a case where judgment was delivered after 5 years from the date the hearing of the appeal was concluded. The reference can also be made to the case of Kanwar Singh v. Sri Thakurji Maharaj, 1995 Supp.(4) Supreme Court Cases 125, wherein it was observed that long delay in delivery of judgment give rise to unnecessary speculations in the mind of the parties to the case. It can also be said that the parties whose case is dismissed may have apprehension that the arguments raised at the bar have not been reflected or appreciated while dictating the judgment nearly after five years. On this short ground, thus, the order impugned and passed by the High Court was set-aside by the Honble Supreme Court in Bhagwandass case (supra). 6. The order impugned obviously suffers from infirmity as noticed by the Honble Supreme Court and adopting the same course, though with reluctance, I would set-aside the impugned order and remand the case back to the present Financial Commissioner to decide the same with some urgency. The Financial Commissioner is requested to attend this case expeditiously and may make an effort to decide the same within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The Financial Commissioner would appreciate that there should not be much delay in pronouncing and delivering the judgment after hearing the case this time. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms.