Judgment : 1. The petitioner is calling in question the order dated 28-6-2001 passed by the Land Tribunal. Sidlaghatta Taluk, sidlaghatta, in Case No. LRM/394/74-75. The said order is impugned at Annexure-Z to the petition. By the said order, the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the petitioner seeking occupancy right in respect of the lands bearing Sy. No. 20-F measuring 27 guntas and Sy. No. 20-G measuring 3 acres guntas of Sonnenahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, Sidlaghatta Taluk, Kolar District. 2. The application in Form 7 was filed by Sakammanavara Muniyappa, the father of the present petitioner claiming occupancy rights in respect of the property stated above. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 18-8-1976 had rejected the claim. The father of the petitioner was before this Court in W.P. No. 11663 of 1979. This Court quashed the said order and remitted the matter to the Land Tribunal. The claim was again rejected by order dated 27-11-1993. The petitioner herein had questioned the same in W.P. No. 15684 of 1994. The said order was once again quashed and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration. After such consideration, the present impugned order dated 28-6-2091 is passed. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the lands in question are said to be originally the inam land regarding which application were also filled by the father of the petitioner. Prior to this the property was old by Sri S. Venkatramaiah in favour of father of the fourth respondent under sale deed dated 6-7-1954. The father of the petitioner questioned the same by filing an application under the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 contending that the sale without notice to him though he is Kadim tenant is null and void. Though initially the said application was dismissed by the Tahsildar, the appeal against the same was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner and the sale was set aside by order dated 27-2-1959 holding that the father of petitioner was tenant under the third respondent. Meanwhile the property vested in view of the Inams Abolition. During the said proceedings, there was an order for appointment of receiver and subsequently this Court had observed that the father of the petitioner is in possession of the lands and directed the receiver to put him in possession. Meanwhile the property vested in view of the Inams Abolition. During the said proceedings, there was an order for appointment of receiver and subsequently this Court had observed that the father of the petitioner is in possession of the lands and directed the receiver to put him in possession. Hence, on 16-11-1961 as per the mahazar which was drawn, the father of the petitioner was put back in possession. As stated, the father of the petitioner had filed an application before the Special Deputy Commissioner, Sri S. Venkataramaiah had also filed an application. By order dated 15-11-1961, the application filed by the father of petitioner was rejected while the name of Sri S. Venkataramaiah was registered. Against the order dated 15-11-1961, the father of the petitioner had filed an appeal to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. During the pendency the third respondent herein made an application before the Tahsildar, sidlaghatta for recovery of rent. The Tahsildar by his order dated 19-10-1964 ordered the same to give horse gram and ragi. In the meanwhile the appeal before the Tribunal was allowed, the order dated 15-11-1961 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Special Deputy Commissioner for fresh disposal by order dated 23-5-1967. The Special Deputy Commissioner reconsidered the matter and by order dated 10-6-1968 held that the petitioner’s father is a permanent tenant in respect of the land. The said order was questioned by the third respondent before the Appellate Tribunal and the same was set aside and remanded by order dated 23-6-1972. 4. Since as stated earlier, the sale made by third respondent in favour of the father of the fourth respondent had been set aside, the fourth respondent instituted a suit for recovery of the sale consideration. The sit was decreed and towards recovery of the said amount, the execution proceedings in Ex. C. No. 60 of 1965 was instituted. The father of the fourth respondent purchased the same in the sale proceedings for recovery of the said amount. In the execution proceedings also the father of the fourth respondent is said to have admitted the possession of the lands by the father of the petitioner. In this regard, a verified statement of the decree-holder stated that the property is in the possession of the tenant S. Muniyappa, who is the father of the petitioner. 5. In the execution proceedings also the father of the fourth respondent is said to have admitted the possession of the lands by the father of the petitioner. In this regard, a verified statement of the decree-holder stated that the property is in the possession of the tenant S. Muniyappa, who is the father of the petitioner. 5. It is in the midst of all these, the father of the petitioner who claims to be the tenant of the lands in question filed Form 7 on coming into force of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974. Apart from the admission said to have been made by the original fourth respondent in the execution proceedings, the petitioner has also referred to an admission made in a suit in O.S. No. 276 of 1966 between the father of the petitioner and the fourth respondent. The petitioner with reference to all these matters contend that the Land Tribunal has not considered the matter in its correct perspective. Mala fides have been alleged against the members of the Land Tribunal and they have also been impleaded as respondents 6 to 9. 6. The contesting respondents have no doubt opposed the contention of the petitioner. However, the sequence of events of the earlier proceedings and different orders passed has not been disputed as they are all matters of record. The contention however is that the father of the petitioner was not a tenant of the land immediately prior to 1-3-1974 and a such cannot claim occupancy right. The fourth respondent also refers to the execution case proceedings to contend that he has succeeded in the Court auction and has therefore become the owner and been in possession thereafter. The fourth respondent contends that the revenue record stand in his name and he has also carried out improvement to the property after obtaining loans from Kolar Grameena Bank. The emphasis is on the sale dated 9-9-1965 in Ex. No. 60 of 1965 and it is contended that right from 1965, the fourth respondent is in possession and enjoyment. The said respondent has also referred to the suit in O.S. No. 84 of 1977 (New No. 81 of 1982) filed by the father of the petitioner wherein the application for temporary injunction was rejected on 29-11-1976 and rejection of M.A.No. 1 of 1979 on 16-02-1979 and also the dismissal of the suit on 16-6-1983. The said respondent has also referred to the suit in O.S. No. 84 of 1977 (New No. 81 of 1982) filed by the father of the petitioner wherein the application for temporary injunction was rejected on 29-11-1976 and rejection of M.A.No. 1 of 1979 on 16-02-1979 and also the dismissal of the suit on 16-6-1983. The allegations of mala fide against the members of the Land Tribunal is denied by the fourth respondent. The respondents 6 to 9 namely the members of the Land Tribunal also have filed their common statement and denied the allegations. The respondents 1 and 2 have also in their objection statement sought to justify the order of the Land Tribunal. 7. Heard he learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the writ papers including the records of the Land Tribunal made available by the learned Government Advocate. 8. At the outset, what is to be noticed in that the petitioner had also questioned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondents since the original contention is not pressed by the petitioner was inam land. However, the said contention is not pressed the petitioner since the learned Counsel for the petitioner himself has relied on the decision of this Court in the case of K.T. Venkatappa (since deceased) by his L.Rs and Others Vs. Land Tribunal, Bangalore and Another, ILR 2004 Kar, 1471, wherein the implication of that aspect has been considered and it has been held that the application under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 can be filed. In any event, the claim has not been rejected on that ground and the question is only as to whether the father of the petitioner was tenant in respect of the land as on 1.3.1974. 9. In this background, a perusal of the order dated 28-6-2001 passed by the Land Tribunal would indicate that the Tribunal no doubt has noticed the entire sequence of events which had taken place earlier and the manner in which the fourth respondent became the owner of the property in view of the auction conducted by the Court in the execution proceedings. The Tribunal after noticing the contentions has itemized the same by way of crystallization of the factual aspects. The Tribunal after noticing the contentions has itemized the same by way of crystallization of the factual aspects. The fact that the father of the petitioner was a tenant under the third respondent is noticed in Item No. 3 and after referring to the earlier proceedings, has at Item No. 12 concluded that the father of the petitioner was the sub-tenant under the third respondent. Having noticed the same, has in Item No. 14 posed the proposition as to whether the father of the petitioner can claim occupancy right since the fourth respondent has purchased the property in the public auction conducted by the Civil Court prior to 1-3-1974. In Item No. 16, the Tribunal has commented that it is not clear from the documents about the tenancy of the father of the petitioner and as to when he entered into the land. In Item No. 18, it is stated that the fourth respondent had not accepted him as a tenant and the witnesses have stated that the fourth respondent had purchased in the Court auction and he has been in possession thereafter and in Item No. 20, it is stated that the father of the petitioner has not questioned the decree and execution proceedings in any proceedings before the Court. The Tribunal has therefore concluded that even though the father of the petitioner was a sub-tenant prior to 1954 before it vested, has not shown that he was a tenant immediately prior to 1-3-1974 prior to filing the Form 7 and the application is rejected by the Tribunal. 10. The above analysis of the Tribunal would indicate that to that extent, the Tribunal has also noticed that the entire issue would boil down to the fact as to whether pursuant to the purchase in the public auction the fourth respondent has come in possession of the property and in that context, whether the father of the petitioner can still claim to have continued in possession as a tenant of the property upto a point as on 1-3-1974 or immediately prior to the same. The Tribunal no doubt has also referred to the revenue records but in my view, the entries therein would not raise a presumption as in a normal case since there are several interwinding proceedings and litigations and as such the cannot be considered as entries of undisputed point of time. 11. The Tribunal no doubt has also referred to the revenue records but in my view, the entries therein would not raise a presumption as in a normal case since there are several interwinding proceedings and litigations and as such the cannot be considered as entries of undisputed point of time. 11. In this background, upto the point that the father of the petitioner was cultivating the land under the third respondent cannot be in dispute and that position is also accepted by the Tribunal. Further, in that regard, it is clear that on suffering a decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1962 and the execution proceedings, the third respondent has lost right over the property except for the imams proceedings. The fourth respondent gained ownership in the execution proceedings in Ex. C. No. 60 of 1965. Since the fact that the father of the petitioner was a tenant under the judgment-debtor at least prior to 1965 is accepted by the Tribunal, the mood question would be whether such possession got interrupted by order in execution proceedings so as to conclusively prove that physical possession of the property was handed over the fourth respondent who was the decree-holder/auction purchaser. The procedure for the same is contemplated in Order 21, rules 94 to 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in the case of Paul Brothers (Tailoring Division) and Other Vs. Asim Kumar Mondal and Others, AIR 1991 SC 796 , to contend that even though such provision is there, granting vacant possession of tenanted land would not arise. The same need not be considered in detail at this stage since in any event, there is no material available at this point in the instant case to indicate the manner in which possession was delivered to the fourth respondent inasmuch as, whether constructive possession was handed over or the physical possession. In the absence of the same, the other materials would have to be noticed to come to the conclusion as to whether the observations at Item No. 18 onwards in the impugned order is justified and whether the claim of the fourth respondent that he has remained in physical possession from 1965 pursuant to execution proceedings can be accepted on face value. 12. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the document at Annexure-A and G. i.e., the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 27-12-1959 and the order of the Tahsildar dated 19-10-1964 wherein the possession and tenancy of the father of the petitioner is indicated. As evident, it is for the period prior to 1965 and would not be of assistance. The document at Annexure-R is the copy of the order sheet in Ex. No. 6 of 1962 The proceedings prior to sale would indicate that the decree-holder i.e., the fourth respondent’s verified statement was recorded. He has stated. “The property to be sold is at present in the possession of the tenant S. Muniyappa”. The order on 9-9-1965 would thereafter indicate that the fifth respondent herein has purchased it for Rs. 7,843,57 ps. As stated earlier, there is no conclusive material on record to indicate that the certificate and possession was granted as per the provision contained in the Code. No doubt, between the said date and the appointed day i.e., 1-3-1974, there is a gap of eight years and as such the manner of continuation of the possession is to be noticed. In this regard the document at Annexure-Q is the copy of the judgment passed in O.S. No. 276 of 1996. The said suit was filed by the petitioner’s father against the original fourth respondent and his brother seeking for declaration and injunction. The claim in that regard is that he is a interference with his possession. The Trial Court has referred to the written statement and noted thus: “It has admitted the plaintiffs possession at the suit land as tenant at any rate at the time of this suit”. It was also noticed that they have however denied interference and have contended that at a Court sale, the land was purchased by them and so they are the owners of the said property. They have also contended that the suit is not maintainable in view of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. In this background, while deciding issues No. 1 regarding the claim of the plaintiff’s (i.e., the father of the petitioner) exclusive possession of the suit property, the Court has come to the conclusion that the issue does not arise for consideration since the defendants have not disputed the fact that the plaintiff is not in possession. In this background, while deciding issues No. 1 regarding the claim of the plaintiff’s (i.e., the father of the petitioner) exclusive possession of the suit property, the Court has come to the conclusion that the issue does not arise for consideration since the defendants have not disputed the fact that the plaintiff is not in possession. The Court also referred to the evidence of the first defendant therein i.e., the original fourth respondent herein who has spoken about taking symbolic possession of the land through Court. It was also noted that it is not the case of the defendants that any one else or they themselves are in actual possession of the land and do all necessary things without injuring the tenancy right of the defendants also do not claim any actual possession of the suit land in themselves. Hence in answer to issue No. 1 it was held that the plaintiff is in exclusive possession of the suit land as a tenant. It is no doubt true that the suit was ultimately dismissed in view of the said admission of the defendants and therefore the interference not being established, but the finding with regard to possession as a tenant is clear and unequivocal. What is important is that even though the suit was filed on 21-11-1966, the judgment was pronounced on 31-3-1971, which is about three years earlier to the appointed day i.e., 1-3-1974. 13. If the above facts are kept in view, prima facie the observation of the Tribunal that the tenancy of the father of the petitioner is prior to 1954 and that too at a sub-tenant and that the witnesses have also stated that the fourth respondent has been in possession after the Court sale in 1965 does not appear to be correct and needs to be revisited in this background. No doubt the contesting respondents have relied on a subsequent suit in O.S. No. 84 of 1977 filed by petitioner’s father against the fourth respondent and the rejection of the application of temporary injection by order dated 29-11-1978, the dismissal of the miscellaneous appeal against the same and also the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution on 16-6-1983. No doubt the contesting respondents have relied on a subsequent suit in O.S. No. 84 of 1977 filed by petitioner’s father against the fourth respondent and the rejection of the application of temporary injection by order dated 29-11-1978, the dismissal of the miscellaneous appeal against the same and also the dismissal of the suit for non-prosecution on 16-6-1983. What is to be noted is that by such time, the proceedings before the Land Tribunal had commenced and by order dated 18-8-1976 the application was dismissed for the first tie and that was also noticed by the Court. The petitioner has also explained that he did not prosecute the same since the Civil Court would not have been able to decide the issue in view of the bar. 14. In any even, the subsequent suit was after the appointed date and as already observed by me, in the earlier suit, the judgment was pronounced on 31-3-1971 and in that view, the findings of the Land Tribunal cannot be held as correct. In fact, when it was shown that at a point earlier to the appointed day, the petitioner’s father was in possession as tenant and that too based on the admission of the defendants in the suit, if the fourth defendant contended that he had taken possession in the execution proceedings, there should be conclusive proof to that effect or in the alternative, the manner in which possession was taken subsequent to 31-3-1971, but before the appointed day would have to be established and this matter will require reconsideration by the Tribunal. 15. In the result, the following: ORDER (i) The writ petition is allowed in part and rule made absolute to that extent. (ii) Consequently the order dated 28-6-2001 passed by the Land Tribunal, Sidlaghatta in Case No. LRM 394/74-75 stands quashed. (iii) The matter is remitted to the Land Tribunal, Sidlaghatta to restore the Case No. LRM 394/74-75 on file and reconsider the same afresh. Contentions of the parties are left open. (iv) The Tribunal shall consider and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible but not later than six months from the date of receipt of the papers or its constitution (v) Parties to bear their own costs.