JUDGMENT By Court.--The common controversy, in this batch of the writ petitions, lies in different perception and interpretation of Clause 5 of the New Excise Policy issued by 'Excise Department, Government of Jharkhand, published in the official gazette dated 24th February, 2004 (Annexure1): All the writ petitions were tagged and heard together and are being disposed of by this judgment. 2. The brief fact giving rise to the batch of the cases is that the State of Jharkhand issued an amended excise policy by gazette notification dated 24th February, 2004 whereby a new excise policy for settlement of retail liquor shops was brought into effect from the financial year 2004-05. Prior to the said notification, excise "retail shops were used to be settled individually for one year. But in the amended policy, excise retail shops of country spirit and country spiced spirit are to be settled in Group-I, whereas retail Indian Foreign Made Liquor Shops are to be settled in Group-II for a block period of three years. Clause 5 of the said notification provides 10% increase in the licence fee in second and third year of the settlement. 3. In accordance with the said policy, sale notification was published inviting applications for settlement of retail liquor Shops. The shops were settled in the names of firms/persons, who are the private respondents in these writ petitions, on various dates. They deposited licence fees. 4. The controversy between the parties is regarding date of implementation of Clause 5 i.e. the date of 10% increase in the licence fee in second and third year of settlement, as provided in. Clause 5 of the said notification, which reads as follows: "5. BANDOVASTI TIN VARSH KI BLOK AWADHI KE LIYE KI JAYEGI. BANDOVASTI KE DUSRE EVAM TISRE VARSH ME PRATYEK BAR DAS PRATISHAT KI VRIDHI PRATIVARSH NILAMI RASHI ME KI JAYEGI." 5. According to the State, the increased licence fee is chargeable with effect from the commencement of the succeeding financial year after the settlement, irrespective of the date of settlement. The respondents-settles claimed that since the settlement was made after the commencement of the financial year in the midst of the year or at the fag end of the financial year, the increased licence fee is chargeable after expiry of 12 calendar months i.e. after a year from the date of settlement. 6. The respondents-settles claimed that since the settlement was made after the commencement of the financial year in the midst of the year or at the fag end of the financial year, the increased licence fee is chargeable after expiry of 12 calendar months i.e. after a year from the date of settlement. 6. As per the term of agreement, any dispute arising between the parties is to be referred to and decided by the Member, Board of Revenue. 7. Accordingly, the said dispute was referred to the Member, Board of Revenue, Jharkhand. He heard the parties and answered the reference by the impugned order dated 17th July, 2006, contained in Annexure-2, in favour of the respondents settles. He held that 'year' as used in the notification and Form 127 and the similar Forms specifying .10% enhancement in fees in the 2nd and 3rd year means year beginning after expiry of 12 and 24 British Calendar months from the date of initial settlement and the increased licence fee is chargeable after 12 and 24 months of the date of settlement. 8. Aggrieved by the said interpretation and the order of the Member, Board of Revenue, the State has filed these writ petitions. 9. It has been contended on behalf of the State-petitioner that the Member Board of Revenue has erroneously interpreted the word 'year' according to the British Calendar, though in Clause 8 of the said notification, it has been clearly provided that the amended provision would be made effective from the financial year 2004-05. 10. Mr. L.K. Lal, learned S.C. (L&C), appearing on behalf of the State-petitioner in all the cases, submitted that the interpretation of the word 'year' appearing in Clause 5 of the said gazette notification is not only inconsistent with Clause 8 thereof, rather the same is also contrary to Rule 44 of the Bihar Excise Rules. He submitted that Rule 44 provides that licences for the wholesale or retail vend of excisable articles may be granted for one year from the 1st April to the 31st March. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 44 makes it clear that if any licence be granted during the course of the financial year, it shall be granted only up to the 31st March, next following. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 44 makes it clear that if any licence be granted during the course of the financial year, it shall be granted only up to the 31st March, next following. According to him, the word 'year' appearing in the said notification has to be read in the light of the provisions of Rule 44 and the word 'year' appearing therein must be read as financial year. He further submitted that the interpretation made by the Member, Board of Revenue is erroneous 'and has caused a loss of Rs.12 crores to the State exchequer. 11. He further submitted that according to the definition in the General Clauses Act, Clause 8 of the said notification and Rule 44 of the Excise Rules are wholly erroneous and misconceived. In view of the clear provision for enhancing licence fee from the second and third year, the settles are liable to pay the enhanced fee after the commencement of the financial year, next following to the year of the settlement, irrespective of the date of settlement in their favour in the preceding financial year. 12. The respondents-settles, on the other hand, strongly supported the interpretation of the word 'year' and the order passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue. It has been urged that the word 'year' has not been defined in the Excise Act or Rules made therein and as such, learned Member Board of Revenue has rightly relied on the definition of 'year' as provided in the General Clauses Act. Clause 5 of the said notification mentions the word 'year'. The word 'financial year' is used only in Clause 8. Clause 8 provides that the notification shall come into force with effect from the financial year 2004-05. It has no relevance for interpreting the meaning of the word 'year' mentioned in Clause 5 of the said notification. It has been further submitted that if a word is not defined in the statute, recourse is to be taken to the definition provided in the General Clauses Act. The meaning of the word 'year', as provided in the General Clauses Act, is the British Calendar year of 12 months. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-settles emphasized that nothing can be read and implied other than the language used in taxing statute. Clause 5 mentions the word 'year'. It cannot be read as 'financial year'. The meaning of the word 'year', as provided in the General Clauses Act, is the British Calendar year of 12 months. 13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-settles emphasized that nothing can be read and implied other than the language used in taxing statute. Clause 5 mentions the word 'year'. It cannot be read as 'financial year'. Learned counsel submitted that wherever the use of word 'financial year' is intended, it has been clearly mentioned in the Rule and the notification. In the earlier notification, Clause 6 clearly provided that the settlement has to be made from the 1st April for a maximum period of one year and ending 31st March. In the said clause, there was provision of deposit of licence fee of one year, subject to enhancement of 10% and 5% licence fee. 14. From the plain reading of the said clause, it is clear that the enhancement in the licence fee was intended on the commencement of the financial year i.e. 1st April of the following year. The said provision has been amended, providing enhancement of licence fee by 10% in the second and third year of settlement. 15. The State Government now has come with a fresh sale notification for the settlement of liquor shops in the year 2008. In this notification, Clause 5 has been again amended and the words 1st April and financial year have been again specifically used in place of the word 'year' in Clause 4. That amendment conspicuously goes to show that the said notification is applicable prospectively. 16. It has been submitted that the learned Member Board of Revenue has taken pains to elaborately deal with the relevant provisions of law and has come to a right conclusion that the word 'year' used in Clause 5 clearly means the year according to the British Calendar. 17. Having heard learned counsel and on consideration of the relevant legal positions and the language used in the different notifications as also the interpretation and conclusion of the learned Member, Board• of Revenue, I find substance in the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents-settles. 18. It is well settled that a taxing statute is to be strictly construed. Having heard learned counsel and on consideration of the relevant legal positions and the language used in the different notifications as also the interpretation and conclusion of the learned Member, Board• of Revenue, I find substance in the submissions made by learned counsel for the respondents-settles. 18. It is well settled that a taxing statute is to be strictly construed. In 7th Edition of G.P. Singh's, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Chapter-10, Page-576, the well established rule interpreting taxing statute in the words of Lord Wensley-dale reaffirmed by Lord Halsbury and Lord Simonds has been quoted thus: "The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words." 19. Learned author has also quoted Lord Cairns saying......."lf there be admissible in any statute, what is called an equitable, construction, certainly, such a construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you can simply adhere to the words of the statute." At the same place, learned author refers Viscount Simon, who quoted with approval, a passage from Rowlatt, J. expressing the principle in the following words: "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used," He has also quoted the saying of Bhagwati, J. "In construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law. If the revenue satisfies the court that the case false strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the Legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter." [Quoted from A.V. Fernandez vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1957 SC 657 , p. 661] 20. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by• the authority of law. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by• the authority of law. Article 366 of the Constitution defines Taxation and Tax reads as follows: "Taxation includes the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and 'tax' shall be construed accordingly." 21. In view of the above, any compulsory exaction of money by Government amounts to imposition of tax which is not permissible except by or under the authority of a statutory provision. Reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CCE VS. Kisan ", Sahkari Chinni Mills [ AIR 2001 SC 3379 ]. 22. Though there is distinction between tax and fee, which are both imposition made by the State for raising revenue. A tax is imposed for public purpose for raising general revenue of the State. A fee in contrast is imposed for rendering services and bears a broad co-relationship with the services rendered, but a compulsory imposition of fee also comes within the fold of tax. 23. Again the position is different where a duty or fee is charged by the State for parting with its privilege of dealing in deleterious commodities such as liquor. 24. Though every fee must not satisfy the test of quid pro quo for a licence fee may be regulatory in nature where no quid pro need be established [State of Tripura vs. Sudhir Ranjan Nath, AIR 1997 SC 1168 , p.1173]. But such regulatory fee also cannot be excessive. Reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in A.P. Paper Mills Ltd. vs. Government of A.P., AIR 2000 SC 3290 ; and State of U.P. vs. Vam Organic Chemical Ltd., (2004)1 SCC 225 . 25. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. M/s Shrey Merchantile Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 2005 SC 1879, the Supreme Court has clearly held that so-called regulatory fee, which has no connection with the case of regulation, is really a tax in the garb of a fee. 26. 25. In Calcutta Municipal Corporation vs. M/s Shrey Merchantile Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 2005 SC 1879, the Supreme Court has clearly held that so-called regulatory fee, which has no connection with the case of regulation, is really a tax in the garb of a fee. 26. Learned Member Board of Revenue has broadly taken note of the fact that some of the licences which were granted in the month of December, 2004 and has occasion to deal with the liquor sale only for about four months and other licensees who enjoyed that privilege for 8-9 months in the first year of settlement, exacting the increased licence fee, in both cases with effect from 1st April 2005 is certainly discriminatory and arbitrary and against the principle of law. 27. In my view, a compulsory enhancement in the licence fee without taking into consideration the delay in granting licence to the respondents in the previous year is against the principle of imposition of regulatory fee even in the case of liquor and is arbitrary and unreasonable. The same violates the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 28. Learned Member Board of Revenue has also rightly held that the word 'year' as used in the notification and Form 127 and other similar forms specifying 10% enhancement in fees in the second and third year means a 'year' reckoned according to the British Calendar and 10% increase in licence fee in the second and third year should be made after expiry of 12 and 24 calendar months from the date of its settlement. The finding of the learned Member Board of Revenue fits with the established interpretative process of statutory provision. It is well established that when the language of the statutory provision is plain and clear, full effect must be given to them and there is no need of any interpretation to give a different meaning. Reference may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mangalore Chemicals & Fertilizers vs. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [ AIR 1992 SC 152 ], Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer [ (1990)3 SCC 682 ], Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Jaycee Drug & Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. [ (1991)2 SCC 637 (651)] and HH Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT [1991 Supp. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [ AIR 1992 SC 152 ], Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer [ (1990)3 SCC 682 ], Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Jaycee Drug & Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. [ (1991)2 SCC 637 (651)] and HH Sri Rama Verma vs. CIT [1991 Supp. (1) SCC 209], which have been also referred to and relied upon by learned Member Board of Revenue. 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no infirmity, illegality or arbitrariness in the impugned order of learned Member, Board of Revenue. The said order is upheld. 30. It is further held that the respondents are entitled to proportionate remission of licence fee paid in excess. The State petitioner is liable to comply with the term of the order passed by learned Member, Board of Revenue. 31. Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. 32. However, there is no order as to costs.