Judgment A. GOPAL REDDY, J :-In this batch of writ petitions, the legislative competence of the State Legislature in enacting Section 2(e) of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975 (for short "the Urban Area Development Act") including mining operations within the expression of "development" is challenged as ultra vires, unconstitutional and beyond the competence of the State Legislature. 2. The relevant facts, shorn of details, necessary for disposal of all these writ petitions are as under: M/s. Pokarna Ltd., Secunderabad - Petitioner in WP No. 12302/2006 was granted a quarry lease for a minor mineral, colour granite, over an extent of AcsA-90 cents in S.No.960 of Madikonda Village, Hanumakonda Mandal, Warangal District vide proceedings No.14812/K5/95 dated 26.8.1996 of the fourth respondent-Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad for a period of 15 years on petitioner executing a lease deed before the sixth respondent-Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal in Form-G. The Assistant Director issued work order proceedings No.2639/Q/96 dated 4.9.1996 limiting the lease period from 4.9.1996 to 20.4.2010 as the pattadar's consent was upto 20.4.2010. While so, the second respondent-Kakatiya Urban Development Authority, represented by its Vice-Chairman, Warangal (for short "KUDA") published an advertisement calling upon the lease-holders of minor-mineral to seek no objection certificate from KUDA on payment of usual charges. On issuing such advertisement, the petitioner and other companies by way of application dated 23.2.1998 requested the Government of Andhra Pradesh to exclude its quarry lease area along with other surrounding quarry lease areas from development area under Section 13(2)(a) of the Urban Area Development Act and to declare the same as "mining zone". On the said representation, the first respondent by its letter dated 10.9.2001 indicated certain guidelines. Thereafter, KUDA issued proceedings No.Cl/505/2003 dated 16.6.2003 permitting six quarry lease owners to continue mining operations declaring the said quarry lease as "temporary mining area" subject to certain conditions. KUDA by notice dated 10.11.2003 directed the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs.9,62,765/- towards application fee as per resolution passed by it and development charges for change of land use. The petitioner while registering its protest deposited Rs.3,08,365/- on 28-11-2003 with a request to issue permission without insisting any further charges. KUDA by its letter dated 30.1.2006 called upon the petitioner to pay the balance amount of Rs.6,54,400/-. The petitioner paid Rs.3,54,400/- on 11.5.2006 by way of pay order No.010701 dated 10.5.2006. The petitioner while registering its protest deposited Rs.3,08,365/- on 28-11-2003 with a request to issue permission without insisting any further charges. KUDA by its letter dated 30.1.2006 called upon the petitioner to pay the balance amount of Rs.6,54,400/-. The petitioner paid Rs.3,54,400/- on 11.5.2006 by way of pay order No.010701 dated 10.5.2006. For not paying the balance of development charges as demanded through notice dated 10.1.2003, KUDA by proceedings No.Cl/505/03 dated 27.5.2006 cancelled NOC/temporary permission issued by proceedings dated 16.6.2003. Questioning the demand notice dated 10.11.2003 for payment of application fee and development charges to a tune of Rs.9,62,765/- and cancellation of No objection Certificate by KUDA vide its proceedings No.Cl/505/03 dated 27.5.2006, the above writ petition came to be filed. 3. M/s. Imperial Granites Private Limited, Siddartha Nagar, Kajipet, Warangal-Petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 was granted quarry lease in respect of colour granite, a minor mineral, in S.Nos.907, 908, 909/AB, 1001 and 1002/1 of Madikonda Village, Hanumakonda Mandal, Warangal District by the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad. The Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal by proceedings dated 19.10.1993 accorded sanction to continue quarrying operations over an extent of Acs.9-00 cents in S.No.1002/1 of Madikonda Village for a period of 15 years with effect from 8.7.1992 to 7.7.2007. Further, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal, by proceedings dated 11.10.1994 accorded sanction to work over an extent of 6.350 hectares in S.No.907, 908, 100l/A and 1001/B of patta land and S.No.1002/1 of Government Land of Madikonda Village for a period of 15 years from 11.10.1994 to 10.10.2009. Further, the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal by proceedings dated 30.12.1993 accorded sanction to the petitioner to work over an extent of 1.980 hectares in S.No.909/B of Madikonda village for a period of 15 years from 7.4.1994 to 6.4.2009. KUDA issued a notice in RC No.Cl/5051 2003 dated 31.10.2003 calling upon the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.58,05,4801 - in favour of Vice-Chairman, KUDA, Warangal through DO drawn from any Nationalized Bank within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, failing which, necessary action will be initiated against the said quarry operations made in the site as per the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act. Questioning the said notice, the above writ petition came to be filed. 4. Questioning the said notice, the above writ petition came to be filed. 4. M/s. G.B.R. Minerals Private Ltd., Chennai-Petitioner in W.P.No.17056/2006 was granted a quarry lease on 17.2.2005 for colour granite, a minor mineral, in S.No.947 of Uppugallu Village, Zafargadh Mandal, Warangal District over an extent of 2.25 hectares vide proceedings No.5057/ R2-2/2004 dated 17.2.2005 of the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad. The petitioner was served with a notice in RC No.C-2/1265/97/998 dated 20.7.2006 of KUDA stating that the petitioner is continuing the mining operations without prior permission as required under Sections 13 and 14 of the Urban Area Development Act and the petitioner was called upon to submit an application along with a fee of Rs.2,67,000/- within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice. Questioning the same, the above writ petition came to be filed. 5. M/s. Imperial Granites Private Limited, Siddarthanagar, Kazipet-Petitioner in WP No.17057/2006 was granted quarry lease on 30.3.2001 for colour granite over an extent of 18.26 acres in S.No.111 of Kothapally Village, Hanumakonda Mandal, Warangal District by proceedings No.226341 R7-1/2001 dated 30.3.2001 issued by the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad. The petitioner was served with a notice in RC No.C-2/1265/97 dated 20.7.2006 stating that the petitioner is continuing the quarrying operations without permission as required as per the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act and the petitioner was called upon to submit an application along with a fee of Rs.6,93,0001-. Questioning the same, the above writ petition came to be filed. 6. M/s. Mettu Rama Swamy Labour Contact Co-operative Society Ltd., Madikonda Village, Hanumkonda Mandal, Warangal District-Petitioner in WP No:18160/2006 obtained licence for extracting colour granite over an extent of 1.23 hectares in S.Nos.905 and 1002/1 of Madikonda Village, Hanamkonda Manda/, Warangal District by proceedings No.2458/ 02 dated 18.2.2002 issued by the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Waranga1 or a period of two years from 18.2.2002 to 17.2.2004. As the petitioner could not carry on any activity, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal vide proceedings No.593/Q/04 dated 6.10.2005 granted mining lease for a period of 20 years valid till 5.10.2025 over an extent of 1.23 hectares in S.No.905 and 1002/1. As the petitioner could not carry on any activity, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Warangal vide proceedings No.593/Q/04 dated 6.10.2005 granted mining lease for a period of 20 years valid till 5.10.2025 over an extent of 1.23 hectares in S.No.905 and 1002/1. The petitioner was served with a notice by KUDA on 5.12.2005, wherein the petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rs.5,97,550/towards processing fee and development charges fur issuing no objection certificate for quarry lease, followed by final notice dated 30.1.2006. The petitioner made a representation to the second and third respondents, namely, Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Secretary, Mines and Geology, Hyderabad and KUDA stating that the petitioner is not in a position to pay the said amount. Whereupon, KUDA by proceedings No.C1/505/03 dated 27.5.2006 cancelled NOC/temporary permission. Questioning the same, the above writ petition came to be filed. 7. In all the writ petitions except WP No.12302/2006, this Court stayed the proceedings on condition of the petitioner depositing 50% of the demanded amount/balance of the demanded amount. 8. The plea taken by the petitioners in all the writ petitions is that Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India deal with the powers of Parliament and Legislature of the State to deal with respective matters contained in List I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Parliament by virtue of powers conferred under Entry 54 of List I enacted Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short "MMRD Act"). Under Section 15 of the MMRD Act, the State Governments are empowered to make rules in respect of a minor mineral. By virtue of Section 15 of the MMRD Act, the Government of Andhra Pradesh framed the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short "the Minor Mineral Concession Rules"). Pursuant to which, the petitioners were granted mining leases subject to payment of royalty, dead rent and other charges as laid down under the Minor Mineral Concessions Rules. There is no room left for the State Legislature to legislate under Entry 23 of List II levying development charges for mining operations within the urban area development. Pursuant to which, the petitioners were granted mining leases subject to payment of royalty, dead rent and other charges as laid down under the Minor Mineral Concessions Rules. There is no room left for the State Legislature to legislate under Entry 23 of List II levying development charges for mining operations within the urban area development. Therefore, Section 2(e) of the Urban Area Development Act authorizing the KUDA to levy development fee under Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act in respect of the areas where mining operations are carried on is arbitrary, illegal and beyond the competence of the State Legislature and ultra vires to the MMRD Act and the same is liable to be quashed. 9. Opposing the writ petitions, in WP No.11764/2004 the Joint Director (Town Planning) Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, Government of A.P., Hyderabad on behalf of the first respondent filed a counter-affidavit stating that KUDA issued no objection permitting M/s. Coromandal Agencies to utilize the land in S.No.1002/1 of Madikonda Village for quarrying the stone for the remaining lease period subject to certain conditions through proceedings No.C3/699/85/1336 dated 3.8.1986. Earlier M/s. Coromandal Agencies have operated the quarry under the permission of KUDA over an extent of 9 acres, but the petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 after acquiring additional land to an extent of 21 acres in S.Nos.907, 908, 1001/A and Band 1002 of Madikonda Village filed the writ petition by inventing false grounds. In fact, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology has to permit the lease holder to quarry after prior no objection certificate from the Competent Authority Le., KUDA, which is competent to issue no objection certificate according to land use and zoning regulations of Notified Master Plan sanctioned vide G.O. Ms. No.9 10, Municipal Administration, dated 25.11.1971 and G.OP. Ms. No.364, Municipal Administration, dated 4.6.1977 read with Sections 13 and 14 of the Urban Area Development Act, where the quarry is falling within the jurisdiction of "Development Area" as declared by the Government in G.O. Ms. No.1177, Municipal Administration, dated 6.11.1981. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has declared the Warangal city and its vicinity area covering 171 villages as "Development Area" for orderly development of Warangal city and its surrounding areas including Manikonda Village where the subject land is located. No.1177, Municipal Administration, dated 6.11.1981. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has declared the Warangal city and its vicinity area covering 171 villages as "Development Area" for orderly development of Warangal city and its surrounding areas including Manikonda Village where the subject land is located. In exercise of powers conferred under the Urban Area Development Act, KUDA issued a notice to the petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 to obtain No Objection Certificate duly paying the requisite charges as the activity being carried on by the petitioner shall be ultimately put the burden on City infrastructure facilities and arise demand for providing additional roads, transport, water supply, housing drainage etc., and impact on the environment. Since the second respondent being the statutory authority to look after the development according to the plan and secure control over the activity has to mobilize resources by collecting development charges on any development under Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act. On the request of the leaseholders-writ petitioners, KUDA declared Manikonda area covering an extent of 20.509 hectares as temporary mining area vide proceedings ROC No.C1/505/3 dated 16.6.2003 to conduct mining operations. The petitioners who got approval of declaration of mining zone from the second respondent under the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act cannot question the action of the KUDA in asking the petitioners to pay the development charges. 10. KUDA filed a separate counter contending that the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology is required to obtain NOC from KUDA as it is the competent authority to issue no objection certificate according to land use and zoning regulations as notified in the sanctioned master plan vide G.O.Ms.No.910, Municipal Administration dated 25.11.1971 and G.O. Ms. No.364, Municipal Administration dated 4.6.1977 and as per Sections 13 and 14 of the Urban Area Development Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh declared the Warangal city as "development area" and its vicinity area covering 171 villages for orderly development. The petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 filed WP No.3613/98, and it is pending. No.364, Municipal Administration dated 4.6.1977 and as per Sections 13 and 14 of the Urban Area Development Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh declared the Warangal city as "development area" and its vicinity area covering 171 villages for orderly development. The petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 filed WP No.3613/98, and it is pending. The petitioners were served with notices as per the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act as they are required to obtain NOC duly paying the requisite charges for development and extraction of rock in the large scale by deploying heavy machinery which activity will ultimately put the burden on the city infrastructure facilities and arise the demand for providing additional infrastructure, roads, transport, water supply housing drainage etc., and the activity of quarrying by the petitioners will have impact on the environment. KUDA being the statutory authority to look after the development as per the plan and secure control over the activities of the petitioners and as per the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act issued notice to the leaseholders and five other companies under the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act as the area was declared as "temporary mining area" to conduct quarry operations subject to conditions envisaged under Sections 13 and 14 of the Urban Area Development Act. Basing on the request made by M/s. Astral Granites; M/s. Imperial Granites; M/s. Pokarva Granites; M/s. Reliance Granites; M/s. Vaddera Stone Workers Union and M/s. Mettu Rama Swamy Workers Co-operative Society, the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology granted pem1ission to the above leaseholders to carry on quarry operations. They approached KUDA with a request to declare the quarry operations area as mining zone enabling them to carry on mining activity by declaring/converting the sanctioned master plan area from residential to quarrying zone. Considering the request made by the petitioners and others, KUDA declared the quarrying area into a mining zone subject to payment of conversion and development charges in the month of July, 2003. After declaring the quarry operation area as mining zone, some of the quarrying companies paid development charges and some have not paid. KUDA issued no objection certificate to M/s. Coromandal Agencies to the extent of lease period. The petitioner shall obtain NOC renewed as per the sanction accorded earlier by it through the proceedings No.C3/699/85/1336 dated 3.8.1986. After declaring the quarry operation area as mining zone, some of the quarrying companies paid development charges and some have not paid. KUDA issued no objection certificate to M/s. Coromandal Agencies to the extent of lease period. The petitioner shall obtain NOC renewed as per the sanction accorded earlier by it through the proceedings No.C3/699/85/1336 dated 3.8.1986. The development charges will be levied according to the land which is taken up for development are two purposes/use i.e., main and appurtenant land and ancillary activities such as parking of vehicles, dumping yards, free planting, storages etc., which is mandatory to the petitioner to provide all the facilities on the site. 11. The petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 filed a reply-affidavit stating that M/s. Coromandal Agencies has already paid development charges in respect of S.No.1002/1 in respect of Acs.9-00 cents of Madikonda Village, collecting once again the development charges on the same land does not arise on the basis that there is a change in the lease. The development charges, if any, could be levied on hectare basis and not square meter basis as per Section 28(2)(a) of the Urban Area Development Act. 12. Sri Pannala Srinivas, learned Counsel for the petitioner in WP No.12302/2006 contended that Section 2 of the MMRD Act has not left any area to State Legislature to deal with mining area and levy of any charges for such mining operations. Under Section 15 of the MMRD Act, power is conferred on the State Governments for framing rules, and once in exercise of the said power, the State Government framed Minor Mineral Concession rules, 1996 levying charges under Rules 9 and 12 and further levying development charges by KUDA is without authority and development authority should be prohibited from levying such charges. Pursuant to the demand notice dated 10.11.2003, the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs.3,08,365• on 6.12.2003 and further deposited a sum of Rs.3,54,400/- on 11.5.2006 without prejudice to their rights that they are not liable to pay the development charges as demanded. 13. Sri M V. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners in the remaining writ petitions contended that the impugned notice dated 31.1 0.2003 (in W.P.No.11764/ 2004) issued by KUDA demanding payment of development charges including process fee for issue of NOC is without any power or authority. 13. Sri M V. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the petitioners in the remaining writ petitions contended that the impugned notice dated 31.1 0.2003 (in W.P.No.11764/ 2004) issued by KUDA demanding payment of development charges including process fee for issue of NOC is without any power or authority. Assuming Section 2(e) of the Urban Area Act is valid, notice dated 31.10.2003 is not valid because without prior notice KUDA cannot demand the amount mentioned in the notice. Though the lease was granted in the year 1993, levying development charges by taking the value of the land in the year 2003 is arbitrary and illegal. Under Section 28 of the Urban Area Development Act, development charges shall be determined on the proposed use of land at the rate prescribed per hectare for that area, whereas demand made by KUDA shows that it was determined on square metre basis, which is per se illegal. Since the petitioner in WP No.11764/2004 obtained mining lease over an extent of 6.350 hectares in S.Nos.907, 908, 1001/A and 1001/B of patta land and S.No.1002/1 of Government Land in Madikonda Village, no development charges shall be levied on the land vested in or under the control or possession of the Central or the State Government or of any local locality as per sub-section (4) of Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act. Though notice dated 17.5.1984 development charges were already levied and M/s. Coromandal Agencies, Madras was called upon to pay the same and same has been paid by it, and the lease was transferred in the name of the petitioner, therefore, again subjecting the petitioner to pay the development charge, if any, is only for area covered by mining operations but not the entire land leased out. He further contended that calling upon the petitioners in WP Nos.17056/2006 and 17057/2006 to submit applications along with process fee for operating quarry operations does not arise as the Government has not agreed to notify it as mining zone. He further contended that calling upon the petitioners in WP Nos.17056/2006 and 17057/2006 to submit applications along with process fee for operating quarry operations does not arise as the Government has not agreed to notify it as mining zone. He further contended that in the impugned proceedings dated 27.5.2006 issued to the petitioner in W.P.No.181601 2006, a reference is made to the proceedings dated 16.6.2003 and the same has not been communicated to the petitioner at any time and in spite of the specific plea taken by the petitioners that it was not served on the petitioner, the same has not been denied by the respondents in their counter also, therefore, issuance of the proceedings dated 27.5.2006 is violation of principles of natural justice and the same is liable to be set-aside. In support of the contentions advanced by both the Counsel, strong reliance was placed on the following judgments: 1. State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch & Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284 2. Baijnath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 1436 Sri M V. Suresh Kumar further relied on the judgment of this Court in K.C.P. Ltd. v. Government of A.P., AIR 1990 AP 314 . 14', Per contra, Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned Additional Advocate-General contended that the Urban Area Development Act and MMRD Act operate in different fields. Sections 2(e), 5, 16, 27 and 29 of the Urban Area Development Act for levying development charges are nothing to do with exploiting mines. Section 2 of the MMRD Act deals with regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided under the Act. Section 3(c) of the MMRD Act defines "mining lease", to mean a lease granted for the purpose of undertaking mining operations, and includes a sub-lease granted for such purpose, whereas "mining operations" under Section 3(d) means any operation undertaken for the purpose of winning any mineral. Section 4 of the MMRD Act restricts on undertaking prospecting and mining operations except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence. Under Section 9 of MMRD Act, the holder of a mining lease under an obligation to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him particularly from the leased area. Section 4 of the MMRD Act restricts on undertaking prospecting and mining operations except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence. Under Section 9 of MMRD Act, the holder of a mining lease under an obligation to pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him particularly from the leased area. Quality of mineral is the basis for collecting royalty as held by the Supreme Court in National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd v. State of MP., (2004) 6 SCC 281 . There is no encroachment in the field occupied by the Central legislation by levying development charges for the land use. For the said proposition, he placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. Shri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v. Dar Dass Dey and Co, (1979) 3 SCC 106 2. State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd, (2004) 10 SCC 201 3. India Cements Ltd v. State of T.N., (1990) 1 SCC 12 He further placed reliance on the following judgments of this Court and the Apex Court. 1. Casken Tea Industries Limited v. Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, 1992 (1) ALT 64 2. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 104 3. Coleshill Investment v. Min. of Housing (H.L.(E.)), (1969) 1 WEEKLY LAW REPORTS 746 He further contended that "development" as defined under Section 2(e) of the Urban Area Development Act is derived from the European statutes, is uniform in all the State Governments under the Urban Area Development Act, and the provisions were upheld by the Supreme Court, therefore, challenge to the constitutional validity must fail. 15. In reply, it was contended by Sri Pannala Srinivas that there is no need to obtain NOC from the local authority i.e., KUDA for levying development charges as per Granite Conservation and Development Rules, 1999, framed in exercise of powers conferred under Section 18 of the MMRD Act and it was considered by this Court in Mahabaleswarappa and Sons, Bellary v. Commissioner of Land Revenue, Government of A.P. Hyderabad, 1996 (4) ALD 1163 = 1996 (4) ALT 334 (LB), which exclusively deals with levy of charges, therefore, KUDA cannot levy development charges. Whereas Sri M V. Suresh Kumar contended that KUDA has to justify imposition of development charges on the basis of quid pro, namely, rendering any service for mining operations. Whereas Sri M V. Suresh Kumar contended that KUDA has to justify imposition of development charges on the basis of quid pro, namely, rendering any service for mining operations. Once there is no necessity to comply with the provisions of the Urban Area Development Act, levying development charges is not at all warranted and if reasonable charges are demanded on hectare basis, the petitioners are agreeable to pay the same and levying development charges on square metre basis is highly arbitrary and illegal. Since no specific orders are required for change of land use in the case of quarry operations, levying development charges cannot be justified, therefore payment of process fee does not arise in the case of the petitioners in WP Nos.17056 and 17057 of 2006 as the Government has not agreed to change the land use. 16. In the wake of submissions, we shall now consider the submissions in the light of relevant statutory provisions under the Urban Area Development Act, which govern the issue involved in all these writ petitions. 16. In the wake of submissions, we shall now consider the submissions in the light of relevant statutory provisions under the Urban Area Development Act, which govern the issue involved in all these writ petitions. "2(e) 'development' with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of all or any of the works contemplated in a master plan or zonal development plan referred to in this Act, and the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes re-development: Provided that for the purposes of this Act, the following operations or uses of land shall not be deemed to involve development of the land that is to say- (i) the carrying out of any temporary works for the maintenance, improvement or other alteration of any building, being works which do not materially affect the external appearance of the building; (ii) the carrying out by a local authority of any temporary works required for the maintenance or improvement of a road, or, works carried out on land within the boundaries of the road; (iii) the carrying out by a local authority or statutory undertaking of any temporary works for the purpose of inspecting, repairing or renewing any sewers, mains, pipes, cables or other apparatus, including the breaking open of any street or other land for that purpose; (iv) the use of any building or other land within the curtilage purpose incidental to the enjoyment of the dwelling house as such; and (v) the use of any land for the purpose of agriculture, gardening or forestry (including afforestation) and the use for any purpose specified in this clause of any building occupied together with the land so used." "2(0) 'urban area' means- (i) the area comprised within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad or of any Municipality constituted under the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965 and also any such area in the vicinity as the Government may, having regard to the extent of, and the scope for, the urbanisation of that area or other relevant considerations, specify in this behalf, by notification; and (ii) such other area as the Government may, by notification, declare to be an urban area, which in the opinion of the Government, is likely to be urbanized. Section 5 of the Urban Area Development Act envisages object and powers of the Authority. It reads as under: 5. Object and powers of the Authority:-(1) The objects of the Authority shall be to promote and secure the development of all or any of the areas comprised in the development area concerned according to plan and for that purpose, the authority shall have the power to acquire, by way of purchase or otherwise, hold, manage, plan, develop and mortgage or otherwise dispose of land and other property, to carry out by or on its behalf building, engineering, mining and other operations, to execute works in connection with supply of water and electricity, disposal of sewerage and control of pollution, other services and amenities and generally to do any thing necessary or expedient for purposes incidental thereof. (2) The Authority may, for the purpose of efficient performance of its functions, constitute as many committees as it thinks fit, in such manner as may be prescribed, and provide by regulations made in this behalf for rules of procedure at the meeting of the Committees and allowances to members thereto. Section 13 confers power on the State Government to declare such urban area or group of urban areas to be a development area for the purposes of the Act. As per Section 14, every person or body including a Department of the Government desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 13 under an obligation to make an application in writing to the Authority in such form, which containing such parties in respect of the development to which the application relates as may be determined by regulations. Under sub-section (2) of Section 14 every applicable 'under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed. Section 16 excludes certain development works from the purview of the Act. Levy of the development charges is prescribed under Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act, which is a charging section, under which permission is required under the Act in the whole area or any part of the development area within the maximum rates specified in Section 28. Section 28 prescribes rates of development. It reads as under: 28. Levy of the development charges is prescribed under Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act, which is a charging section, under which permission is required under the Act in the whole area or any part of the development area within the maximum rates specified in Section 28. Section 28 prescribes rates of development. It reads as under: 28. Rates of development:-(1) x x x x x (2) The rates of development charges shall be determined on the proposed use of land or building:- (a) in the case of development of land, at a rate to be prescribed per hectare for that area; (b) in the case of development of building, at a rate to be prescribed per square metre of floor area for that area: Provided that the development charges may be levied at different rates for different institutions of use as may be prescribed from time to time to which the land, or as the case may be the building, is used; Provided further that where land appurtenant to a building is used for any purpose independent of the building, development charge may be levied separately for the building and the land. Section 29 deals with assessment and recovery of development charges. 17. We are, however, relieved of necessity to dwell deep into the question of operation of the law made by Parliament, namely, MMRD Act and scope and extent of field that is left to the State Legislatures or the extent of limitations in enacting the Urban Area Development Act in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited (supra), where the Supreme Court clarified the extent of field occupied by the MMRD Act vis-a-vis competence of the State Legislature in enacting the Urban Area Development Act in extenso. 18. The Supreme Court in the above case i.e., State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Limited (supra) was dealing with regard to the constitutional significance centring around Entries 52, 54 and 97 of List I and Entries 23, 49, 50 and 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as also the extent and purport of the residuary power of legislation vested in the Union of India. The constitutional validity of the amendments under the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 amending West Bengal Primary Education Act, 1973 and the West Bengal Rural Employment and Production Act, 1976 were successfully impugned before the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court of Calcutta after placing reliance upon, mainly, on two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, India Cement Ltd v. State of T.N (seven-Judge Bench decision) (supra) and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa, (1991) Supp. (1) 430, (three-Judge Bench decision) concluded that cess cannot be said to be on land so as to be covered by Entry 49 in List II and struck down certain levies by way of cess on coal as unconstitutional for want of legislative competence in the State Legislature. Against which, State of West Bengal preferred appeals before the Supreme Court. The High Court of Allahabad upheld the constitutional validity of cess levied under Section 35 of the U.P. Special Area Development Authorities Act, 1986 read with Rule 3 of the Shakti Nagar Special Areas Development Authority (Cess on Mineral Rights) Rules, 1997 (herein referred to briefly as "the SADA Act" and "the SADA Cess Rules") while rejecting the contention of the writ petitioners that MMRD Act,1957 having been enacted containing a declaration under Section 2 as contemplated by Entry 54 of List I and the Act being applicable to Sonbhadra falling within the State of D.P. as well, the State Legislature was denuded of its power to enact SADA Act and the SADA Cess Rules and the impugned cess would have the effect of adding to the royalty already being paid and thereby increasing the same, which was ultra vires the power of the State Government as that power was exercisable only by the Central Government and dismissed the writ petition filed in the High Court (reported as Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra, AIR 2001 All. 5 ). On dismissal, the writ petitioners before the Allahabad High Court carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court. 19. 5 ). On dismissal, the writ petitioners before the Allahabad High Court carried the matter in appeal before the Supreme Court. 19. Justice R.C. Lahoti (as he then was) speaking for the majority of the Bench after referring to its various earlier judgments on the subject including the judgments on which the Calcutta High Court as well as Allahabad High Court place reliance India Cement Ltd v. State of T.N., (supra) and Orissa Cement Ltd v. State of Orissa (supra), while summarizing the principles as under: "109. The primary purpose of taxation is to collect revenue. Power to tax may be exercised for the purpose of regulating an industry, commerce or any other activity; the purpose of levying such tax, an impost to be more correct, is the exercise of sovereign power for the purpose of effectuating regulation though incidentally the levy may contribute to the revenue. Cooley in his work on taxation (Vol. 1, 4th -Boo., 1924) deals with the subject in Paras 26 and 27: "There are some cases in which levies are made and collected under the general designation of taxes, or under some term employed in revenue laws to indicate a particular class of taxes, where the imposition of the burden may fairly be referred to some other authority than to that branch of the sovereign power of the State under which the public revenues are apportioned and collected. The reason is that the imposition has not for its object the raising of revenue but looks rather to the regulation of relative rights, privileges and duties as between individuals, to the conservation of order in the political society, to the encouragement of industry, and the discouragement of pernicious employments. Legislation for these purposes it would seem proper to look upon as being made in the exercise of that authority which is inherent in every sovereignty, to make all such rules and regulations as are needful to secure and preserve the public order, and to protect each individual in the enjoyment of his own rights and privileges by requiring the observance of rules of order, fairness and good neighborhood, by all around him. This manifestation of the sovereign authority is usually spoken of as the police power. This manifestation of the sovereign authority is usually spoken of as the police power. The power to tax must be distinguished from an exercise of the police power." (State v. Tucker (56 SC 516, 35 SE 215) The political power "is a very different one from the taxing power, in its essential principles, though the taxing power, when properly exercised, may indirectly tend to reach the end sought by the other in some cases". (p.94) "The distinction between a demand of money under the police power and one made under the power to tax is not so much one of form as of substance." (p.95). The distinction between a levy in exercise of police power to regulate and the one which would be in the nature of tax is illustrated by Cooley by reference to a licence. He says: "So-called license taxes are of two kinds. The one is a tax for the purpose of revenue. The other, which is, strictly speaking, not a tax at all but merely an exercise of the police power, is a fee imposed for the purpose of regulation." (p.97) "Suppose a charge is imposed partly for revenue and partly for regulation. Is it a tax or an exercise of the police power? Other considerations than those which regard the production of revenue are admissible in levying taxes, and regulation may be kept in view when revenue is the main and primary purpose. The right of any sovereignty to look beyond the immediate purpose to the general effect neither is nor can be disputed. The Government has general authority to raise a revenue and to choose the methods of doing so; it has also general authority over the regulation of relative rights, privileges and duties, and there is no rule of reason or policy in the Government which can require the Legislature, when making laws with the one object in view, to exclude carefully from its attention the other. Nevertheless, cases of this nature are to be regarded as cases of taxation. If revenue is the primary purpose, the imposition is a tax. Only those cases where regulation is the primary purpose can be specially referred to the police power. If the primary purpose of the legislative body in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the public." (Cooley, ibid., pp.98-99) 110. Only those cases where regulation is the primary purpose can be specially referred to the police power. If the primary purpose of the legislative body in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the public." (Cooley, ibid., pp.98-99) 110. This Court in a seven-Judge Bench decision in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1990) I SCC 109, agreed that regulation is a necessary concomitant of the police power of the State. However, it was an American doctrine and in the opinion of the Court it was not perhaps applicable as such in India. The Court endorsed recognizing the power to regulate as a part of the sovereign power of the State exercisable by the competent legislature. Brushing aside the need for discussion on the question, whether under the Constitution the States have police power or not, the Court accepted the position that the State has the power to regulate. However, in the garb of exercising the power to regulate, any fee or levy which has no connection with the cost or expenses of administering the regulation, cannot be imposed; only such levy can be justified as can be treated as part of regulatory measure. Thus, the State's power to regulate perhaps not as emanation of police power but as an expression of the sovereign power of the State has its limitations. In our opinion, these observations of the Court lend support to the view which we have formed that a power to regulate, develop or control would not include within its ken a power to levy tax or fee except when it is only regulatory. Power to tax or levy for augmenting revenue shall continue to be exercisable by the Legislature in whom it vests i.e. the State Legislature in spite of regulation or control having been assumed by another Legislature i.e. the Union. State legislation levying a tax in such manner or of such magnitude as can be demonstrated to be tampering or intermeddling with the Centre's regulation and control of an industry can perhaps be the exception to the rule just stated." held that the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1992 is intra vires the Constitution. 20. While considering the minor mineral matters arising in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held as under: "140. 20. While considering the minor mineral matters arising in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held as under: "140. The MMRD Act enables control over the regulation of mines and the development of minerals being exercised by the Central Government through legislation. The High Court has upheld the validity of the SADA Act by relating it to Entry 5 in List II which is "Local Government". Any Local Government exercising the power of governance over a local area shall have to administer, manage and develop the area lying within its territory which cannot be done without raising funds. It is usual for every piece of legislation giving birth to an institution of Local Government to feed it by incorporating provisions conferring power of generating funds for meeting the expenses of governance. The SADA Act intends to achieve a level of local governance which the usual models of Local Government such as boards and municipalities are not considered capable of achieving and that is why there is a special development area and a Special Area Development Authority. The fund established under the Act meets expenses of administration needed to be incurred by the authority. The funds cannot be utilised for any purpose other than the administration of the Act. There are pieces of land which though containing a mine yet fall within the territory of special development area. It was pointed out by the respondents before the High Court that in spite of the Act having been enacted in the year 1986, the successive State Governments, which had preceded it, did not take care of the legislation and it was only the then Government which became conscious of its obligations under the SADA Act and commenced identifying special areas requiring development such as Sonbhadra. The imposition of cess envisaged through the SADA Act and the Rules was a step towards developing the special area. It is a matter of common knowledge, and does not need any evidence to demonstrate, that mining activity carried on the land within the special area involves extraction, removal, loading-unloading and transportation of the minerals accompanied by its natural consequences entailed on the environment and the infrastructure such as roads, water and power supply etc., within the special area. It is a matter of common knowledge, and does not need any evidence to demonstrate, that mining activity carried on the land within the special area involves extraction, removal, loading-unloading and transportation of the minerals accompanied by its natural consequences entailed on the environment and the infrastructure such as roads, water and power supply etc., within the special area. The impugned cess can, therefore, be justified as a fee for rendering such services as would improve the infrastructure and general development of the area, the benefits whereof would be availed even by the stone crushers. Entry 66 in List II is available to provide protective constitutional coverage to the impugned levy as fee. 141. As held in Goodricke Group Ltd, (1995 Supp. (1) SCC 707), which we have held as correctly decided, this Court has noted the principle of law well established by several decisions that the measure of tax is not determinative of its essential character. The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects. Merely because the aspects overlap, such overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of the aspects. In our opinion, there is no question of conflict solely on account of two aspects of the same transaction being utilised by two Legislatures for two levies both of which may be taxes or fees or one of which may be a tax and the other a fee falling within two fields of legislation respectively available to the two. 143. As a tax the impugned levy of cess is clearly covered by Entry 5 of List II (as the High Court has held, and we add) read with Entries 49 and 50 of List II. There is no challenge to the declaration of the area as a special development area and the constitution of Special Area Development Authority for the administration thereof. In other words, the constitutional validity of the enactment as a whole and the rules framed thereunder is not put in issue. What is under challenge is only the levy of cess. There is nothing wrong in the State legislation levying cess by way of tax so as to generate its funds. Although it is termed as a "cess on mineral right", the impact thereof falls on the land delivering the minerals. Thus, the levy of cess also falls within the scope of Entry 49 of List II. There is nothing wrong in the State legislation levying cess by way of tax so as to generate its funds. Although it is termed as a "cess on mineral right", the impact thereof falls on the land delivering the minerals. Thus, the levy of cess also falls within the scope of Entry 49 of List II. Inasmuch as the levy on mineral rights does not contravene any of the limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development, it is also covered by Entry 50 of List II. The power to levy any tax or fee lying within the legislative competence of the State Legislature can be delegated to any institution of Local Government constituted by law within the meaning of Entry 5 in List II. Entries 5, 23, 49, 50 and 66 of List II provide adequate constitutional coverage to the impugned levy of cess. True it is that the method of quantifying the cess is by reference to the quantum of mineral produced. This would not alter the character of the levy. There are myriad methods of calculating the value of the land for the purpose of quantifying the tax, reference whereto has already been made by us in the other part of this judgment. Validity of cess upon the land quantified by reference to the quantity of its produce was held to be a levy on the land and hence constitutional in Ralla Ram (1948 FCR 207 = AIR 1949 FC 81), Moopil Nai ( AIR 1961 SC 552 ) and Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee ( AIR 1965 SC 1561 ) It does not become excise duty on manufacture and production of goods merely on account of having relation with the quantity of product yielded of the land. Rather it is a safe, sound and scientific method of determining the value of the land to which the product relates. The levy of cess considered as a tax is constitutionally valid. 146. As stated earlier also, the impugned cess can be justified as fee as well. The term cess is commonly employed to connote a tax with a purpose or a tax allocated to a particular thing. However, it also means an assessment or levy. Depending on the context and purpose of levy, cess may not be a tax; it may be a fee or fee as well. The term cess is commonly employed to connote a tax with a purpose or a tax allocated to a particular thing. However, it also means an assessment or levy. Depending on the context and purpose of levy, cess may not be a tax; it may be a fee or fee as well. It is not necessary that the services rendered from out of the fee collected should be directly in proportion with the amount of fee collected. It is equally not necessary that the services rendered by the fee collected should remain confined to the persons from whom the fee has been collected. Availability of indirect benefit and a general nexus between the persons bearing the burden of levy of fee and the services rendered out of the fee collected is enough to uphold the validity of the fee charged. The levy of the impugned cess can equally be upheld by reference to Entry 66 read with Entry 5 of List II. 147. Royalty is not a tax. The impugned cess by no stretch of imagination can be called a tax on tax. The impugned levy also does not have the effect of increasing the royalty. Simply because the royalty is levied by reference to the quantity of the minerals produced and the impugned cess too is quantified by taking into consideration the same quantity of the mineral produced, the latter does not become royalty. The former is the rent of the land on which the mine is situated or the price of the privilege of winning the minerals from the land parted with by the Government in favour of the mining lessee. The cess is a levy on mineral rights with impact on the land and quantified by reference to the quantum of minerals produced. The distinction, though fine, yet exists and is perceptible. 148. In our opinion, Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra, AIR 2001 All 5 = 2001 Al1.LJ 175, has been correctly decided. We uphold and affirm the same." 21. The distinction, though fine, yet exists and is perceptible. 148. In our opinion, Ram Dhani Singh v. Collector, Sonbhadra, AIR 2001 All 5 = 2001 Al1.LJ 175, has been correctly decided. We uphold and affirm the same." 21. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, as referred to above, we do not see any merit in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the definition under Section 2(e) of the Urban Area Development Act includes mining operations within the expression of "development" is ultra vires and beyond the competence of the State Legislature and the same is accordingly rejected. 22. Nextly, it was argued that as per Section 28(2)(a) of the Urban Area Development Act, development charges shall be determined on the proposed use of land on hectare basis but not on square metre basis. Rates of development charges levied on square metre basis is only where building activities are carried on but not mining operations. First proviso to subsection (2) of Section 28 prohibits levy of development charges exceeding Rs.300/- in the case of development of the land and Rs.125/- per square metre in the case of development of building. The impugned notice dated 10.11.2003 in WP No.12302/2006 discloses that the application fee for change of land use was levied at Rs.3-80 per sq.metre and development charges for change of land use at Rs.30/- per sq. metre. Rs.9,62,765/- towards development charges was levied, to be payable at one time. Since the lease period is for 15 years, for all these years, KUDA has to provide infrastructure facilities, roads, transport, water supply, housing drainage and to maintain environment by arresting pollution caused by the mining activity, by incurring necessary expenditure for the said purpose. Further on the request made by the 'petitioners, KUDA declared the quarry operations area as mining zone subject to payment of conversion and development charges after converting the sanctioned master plan area from residential to quarrying zone. Some of the quarrying companies have paid development charges, and some of them have not paid. 23. Further on the request made by the 'petitioners, KUDA declared the quarry operations area as mining zone subject to payment of conversion and development charges after converting the sanctioned master plan area from residential to quarrying zone. Some of the quarrying companies have paid development charges, and some of them have not paid. 23. In Kewal Kishan Puri v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416 , the Supreme Court while laying down principles for satisfying the test for a valid levy of market fees on the agricultural produce bought or sold by licensees in a notified market area held that the element of quid pro quo may not be possible, or even necessary, to be established with arithmetical exactitude but even broadly and reasonably it must be established by the authorities who charge the fees that the amount is being spent for rendering services to those on whom falls the burden of the fee and At least a good and substantial portion of the amount collected on account of fees, may be in the t1eighbourhood of two-thirds or three-fourths must be shown with reasonable certainty as being spent for rendering services of the kind mentioned above. 24. There is no complaint in writ petitions that the petitioners were not provided with necessary infrastructure facilities like roads, water supply, drainage facility to discharge the rain water within the vicinity of the area etc. In view of the same, it is un-necessary for us to go into the said aspect since the fee collected is being used for development of the area. Further, when the petitioners were applied for grant of no objection, KUDA has issued no objection certificate on petitioners complying with the conditions mentioned in its order in ROC No.C1/505/2003 dated 16.6.2003 by declaring the quarry area as "temporary mining area" and the petitioners are required to comply with the said conditions, failure to do so, KUDA can withdraw the no-objection for non-compliance of the conditions imposed. Therefore, wherever KUDA cancelled the lease without prior notice, the same can be treated as a show-cause and the petitioners are granted two weeks' time for submitting their explanation from the date of receipt of a copy of the order and on submission of such explanation, KUDA can consider the same and pass appropriate orders considering the question whether the petitioners have complied with the objections pointed out in the cancellation notice. 25. We do not see any merit in the contention that once M/s. Coromandal Agency paid development charges, no development charges can be levied on the petitioner in WP No.1 1764/2004 since lease granted in favour of M/s. Coromandal Agency was transferred in favour of the petitioner for the un-expired period of lease upto 7.7.1992. When the petitioner seeks for renewal of quarry lease for colour granite over an extent of 9 acres in S.No.1002/l of Government land of Madikonda Village, KUDA can levy development charges for the period renewal is sought for. 26. Similarly, the contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in WP Nos.17056 and 17057 of 2006 that they are not liable to pay process fee as the Government has not accorded to change the land use is also devoid of any merit. 27. Sub-section (4) of Section 27 of the Urban Area Development Act exempts levy of development charges on institution of use or of change of use or development of, any land or building vested in or under the control or possession of the Central or the State Government or any local authority. It is not the case of the petitioners that the institution is using or changing the use or development of any building vested in or under the control of the State Government. In view of the same, the petitioner in WP No. 1 8160/2006 can treat the impugned notice dated 27.5.2006 as show-cause notice and submit its explanation etc., as referred to above. 28. In the result, WP Nos. 12302/2006 and 18160/2006 are disposed of to the extent indicated above. The remaining writ petitions i.e., 11764/2004, 17056/2006 and 17057/2006 are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.