Judgment : Kakinada Municipality, represented by its Commissioner, filed the present civil miscellaneous appeal under Section 82 (2) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Act" for the purpose of convenience) challenging the order made in E.I.C.No.10 of 2002, dated 02.12.2005, made by the Employees' Insurance Court and Chairman, Industrial Tribunal-I, Hyderabad. 2. On 10.3.2006 this Court made the following order: Admit for the substantial question of law- "Whether a statutory body, like a Municipality, under the A.P. Municipalities Act, is covered by the provisions of the E.S.I. Act, particularly, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Committee, Abohar v. Regional Commissioner ( (1996) 7 SCC 488 )?" This Court in C.M.P.No.394 of 2006 granted interim stay on the aforesaid date, 10.3.2006. 3. Sri S. Nageswara Reddy, learned counsel representing appellant had taken this Court through the grounds of the civil miscellaneous appeal and would maintain that the Employees' Insurance Court and Chairman, Industrial Tribunal- I, Hyderabad (hereinafter in short referred to as "the Court" for the purpose of convenience) totally erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-Municipality also is liable to pay contribution. The learned counsel also would maintain that the Court below ought to have appreciated the fact that the same is not applicable to the employees working in Water Works Department in the appellant-Municipality. The learned counsel also had taken this Court to Exs.P-1 to P-3 and would maintain that the Court ought to have appreciated the fact that the Water Works Department employees may not be entitled to the said benefits in the light of the fact that the Municipality is not a factory. The learned counsel also would maintain that the court below failed to see that the Municipality is maintaining three hospitals and has been providing medical reimbursement to the employees. The counsel also would maintain that the employees of this Municipality are drawing salaries much higher than the prescribed salary specified under the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel also had taken this Court through the contents of the order under challenge and would maintain that the very approach adopted by the court below being wrong and erroneous, the order under challenge is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on certain provisions of the Act and also certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 4. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on certain provisions of the Act and also certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 4. Per contra, Sri P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel representing first respondent would maintain that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel representing appellant are distinguishable on facts and even otherwise acceptable evidence had been placed before the Court in those matters relating to the facilities and in the present matter no such evidence had been adduced. The counsel also would maintain that appellant-Municipality is covered by the provisions of the Act and the employees working in Water Works Department also would fall within the ambit of the Act and it is a factory within the definition of Section 2 (12) of the Act and the counsel also would maintain that contributions were paid by the appellant-Municipality up to 31.12.1996, but subsequent thereto stopped such payment and, hence, in a way the appellant is estopped from contending otherwise in this regard. The learned counsel also would maintain that appellant-Municipality had not applied for exemption under Sections 88 or 90 of the Act and no such exemption as such had been granted in favour of the appellant-Municipality. The counsel also had taken through the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1, Exs.P-1 to P-3, Exs.R-1 to R-13. The counsel also would maintain that the court below, on consideration of the facts of law, had arrived at the correct conclusion and inasmuch as no substantial question of law as such is involved in the present civil miscellaneous appeal, the same is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel also placed strong reliance on certain decisions to substantiate his submissions. 5. The substantial question of law on the strength of which the civil miscellaneous appeal had been admitted already had been referred to supra. 6. In the light of the submissions made, the following points for determination arise for consideration in this civil miscellaneous appeal. (1) Whether the order under challenge is liable to be set aside or to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? 7. Point No.1 For the purpose of convenience the parties hereinafter would be referred to as petitioner and first respondent as shown in E.I.C.No.10 of 2002 on the file of the Court below. 8. (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled? 7. Point No.1 For the purpose of convenience the parties hereinafter would be referred to as petitioner and first respondent as shown in E.I.C.No.10 of 2002 on the file of the Court below. 8. The present appellant-petitioner filed E.I.C. No.10 of 2002 under Section 75 (1)(g) of the Act to declare that the appellant-Municipality is a local body governed by the statute and has been providing better amenities to its employees and covered by the provisions of Section 1 (4) of the Act and further prayed for declaration that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the employees working in Water Works Department of the Municipality, as the Municipality is providing better and superior benefits and facilities than the first respondent Corporation and in the alternative direction had been prayed for that the respondent be directed to grant exemption under Section 90 of the Act by setting aside the order of attachment, dated 15.01.2002. 9. The averments made in E.I.C.No.10 of 2002 by the appellant-petitioner-Municipality are as hereunder. The petitioner-Municipality is constituted under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) District Municipalities Act, 1920, and functioning now under the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965. The Municipal Commissioner as administrative head and with the permission of the Council filed this application. The petitioner-Municipality is providing all the facilities to its employees, which are similar to that of the facilities offered by the first respondent Corporation. The Kakinada Municipal Udyogula Sangam, filed W.P.No.5396 of 1997 challenging the Notification No.G.S.R.582 (E), dated 23.12.1996 and also the coverage of the Act and its provisions to the employees working in Municipality, since the Municipalities Act is governed by special enactment and Rules and this Court disposed of the same directing the above Sangam to approach the Employees' Insurance Court, since the said Court got power under Section 75 of the Act to adjudicate the disputes. 10. The first respondent while implementing the provisions of the Act treated the Water Works Department as factory and collecting contributions from the employees of Water Works Department as well as from the petitioner-Municipality. 10. The first respondent while implementing the provisions of the Act treated the Water Works Department as factory and collecting contributions from the employees of Water Works Department as well as from the petitioner-Municipality. It is also averred that the Water Works Department is not a factory and the same is one wing of the petitioner-Municipality and the employees of Water Works Department are being paid scale of pay, allowances and benefits on par with the State Government employees and their services are governed by the A.P. Ministerial Municipal Subordinate Service Rules and C.C.A. Rules and, hence, the application of the Act is not proper. 11. The employees of petitioner-Municipality are enjoying and availing all the benefits to that of the benefits extended by the State Government to its employees viz., (1) Provident Fund, Gratuity and Pensionary benefits; (2) Group Insurance Scheme (GIS); (3) Funeral Expenses; (4) Maternity benefits to female employees; (5) Compassionate appointments to the dependants; (6) Accidental benefit up to Rs.1.00 lakh in employment injury; (7) Medical reimbursement in case of long diseases like Heart Attack; (8) Medical Leaves, Casual Leaves, Earned Leaves; (9) Treatment through Dispensaries maintained by the Municipality i.e., (a) K.N. Allopathic dispensary, near market, Jagannaickpur (b) four Ayurvedic Dispensaies situated at Kondayyapalem, Gandhinagar, Cinema Road and Jagannaickpur; (10) Maternity centres maintained 12. The petitioner-Municipality is providing better medical facilities and amenities to its employees than the first respondent ESI Corporation and also giving all the benefits on par with the State Government employees, therefore, the petitioner-Municipality is entitled for exemption from the application of the Act. The first respondent pressurizing the petitioner for payment of contribution by making the Act applicable to all the employees whose salary does not exceed Rs.6,500/- per month. 13. Since the petitioner is a local self Government functioning under A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965, whose employees are getting substantial benefits provided in the Act, the action of the first respondent in applying the provisions of the Act to the petitioner-Municipality is contrary to the very purpose of the Act. 14. The averments made in the written statement filed by the first respondent are as hereunder. The petitioner's factory under the name and style "M/s. Victoria Water Works" is covered under the Act and the petitioner paid contributions up to 31.12.1996 only, but stopped from 1.1.1997 onwards without any valid reasons. 14. The averments made in the written statement filed by the first respondent are as hereunder. The petitioner's factory under the name and style "M/s. Victoria Water Works" is covered under the Act and the petitioner paid contributions up to 31.12.1996 only, but stopped from 1.1.1997 onwards without any valid reasons. As per Sections 39 and 40 of the Act, the principal employer is required to pay contributions in respect of all the employees either directly engaged by him or through an immediate employer within the time limit prescribed under Rule 31 of ESI (G) Regulation, 1950. The Act did not envisage any distinction for coverage of a factory/establishment belonging to the Government, Local bodies or Public Sector. Hence, all the factories as defined under Section 2 (12) of the Act are coverable under the Act irrespective of their ownership/constitution or governance. The petitioner's Water Works Department, which is a factory covered under Section 2 (12) of the Act, is required to pay contributions in accordance with the provisions of Section 40 of the Act within time limit prescribed under Regulation 31 of ESI (General) Regulation, 1950. Hence, the action taken by the first respondent Corporation in enforcing the compliance under the provisions of the Act is valid and within the jurisdiction. 15. According to Section 2 (9) of the Act as provided under Rule 50 of the ESI (General) Rules, 1950, all the employed drawing wages up to Rs.6,500/-per month are coverable under the Act. The petitioner-Municipality, which is a local authority, is not providing similar or superior benefits to their employees, which compared to the benefits available under the Act. The petitioner-Municipality had not applied for any application/representation for exemption. Either the petitioner or the Karmika Sangam has no locus standi to challenge the notice issued by he Central Government, since the Supreme Court of India in the similar matters already settled the law on the issue. 16. The main activity of the Water Works Department is distribution of water after its purification with the aid of power. As defined under Section 2 (k) of the Factories Act, 1948, treating or adopting an article with a view to its reuse, sale or otherwise and purifying of water, transportation is a manufacturing process and the same definition has been adopted under the Act. As defined under Section 2 (k) of the Factories Act, 1948, treating or adopting an article with a view to its reuse, sale or otherwise and purifying of water, transportation is a manufacturing process and the same definition has been adopted under the Act. Hence, the petitioner's Water Works Department constitutes 'factory' as defined under Section 2 (12) of the Act and is coverable under the Act. 17. The petitioner is not entitled to exemption under Section 88 or 90 since the benefits provided by them are so inferior to those available under the Act. The application of the Act to the petitioner's factory is mandatory and in accordance with the provisions of Section 2 (12) of the Act which once the factory is covered under the Act, the other similar Acts i.e., Wage Ceiling Act, 1923, Maternity Act, Fatal Accidents Act etc., will have no application and the employer need not pay any contributions except to the Act and, hence, the question of double penalty does not arise as averred by the petitioner. 18. Exemption under the Act is not automatic and it has to be granted by the appropriate Government under Section 90 on an application made by the petitioner-employer and on examining the merits of the case. Section 1 (4) of the Act did not apply to the petitioner's factory, since it is neither a Government nor under the control of the Government. Since the petitioner failed to pay contributions as per the claims preferred by the respondent Corporation, the Recovery Officer called upon the petitioner to pay contributions due within 15 days by virtue of powers conferred upon him under Section 45 (c) to 45(1) of the Act and, hence, the petition is liable for dismissal. 19. R-2 and R-3 had not chosen to contest the matter. 20. On the strength of the respective stands taken by the parties, the Court below settled the following issues: (1) Whether the provisions of ESI Act are not applicable to the employees working in Water Works Department of the petitioner-Municipality as contended by the petitioner-Municipality? (2) Whether the petition is barred by limitation as contended by the ESI Corporation? (3) Whether the petitioner-Municipality is not liable to pay any amount as demanded in the order dated 15.1.2002? (4) To what relief? 21. The Time Keeper of the appellant-petitioner-Municipality was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked. (2) Whether the petition is barred by limitation as contended by the ESI Corporation? (3) Whether the petitioner-Municipality is not liable to pay any amount as demanded in the order dated 15.1.2002? (4) To what relief? 21. The Time Keeper of the appellant-petitioner-Municipality was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.P-1 to P-3 were marked. The Insurance Inspector was examined as R.W.1 and Exs.R-1 to R-13 were marked. 22. The court below, on appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, recorded findings at paras 7 to 11 and ultimately came to the conclusion that the petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed with costs and further held that the first respondent is entitled to withdraw Rs.3.00 lakhs deposited by the appellant-petitioner-Municipality under Section 75 (2B) of the Act after appeal time. Aggrieved by the same, the present civil miscellaneous appeal had been preferred. 23. The substantial question of law on the strength of which the civil miscellaneous appeal had been admitted already had been specified above. As already aforesaid, the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1 is available on record and the appellant-petitioner-Municipality relied on Ex.P-1 list of the employees, Ex.P-2 Form No.ESI-CP-4 (Xerox), Ex.P-3 prohibitory order. 24. Likewise, the contesting respondent relied on Exs.R-1 to R-13 viz., Ex.R-1 Form C- 18 notice on ad-hoc basis, Ex.R-2 letter, Ex.R-3 order under Section 45 A of the Act, Ex.R-4 application for recovery of contributions, Ex.R-5 form C-18 notice on actual basis, Ex.R-6 Form C-19 notice, Ex.R-7 Form C-18 notice on ad-hoc basis, Ex.R-8 order under Section 45A, Ex.R-9 Form C-19 notice, Ex.R-10 certified copy of judgment in EIC.No.13/2002, Ex.R-11 certified copy of petition in EIC. No.13/2002, Ex.R-12 certified copy of written statement in EIC.No.13/2002 and Ex.R-13 certified copy of counter in EIC.No.13/2002. 25. The appellant-petitioner-Municipality is maintaining three hospitals and providing medical reimbursement to the employees. The stand taken by the first respondent is that the appellant-petitioner-Municipality does not belong to the Government or under the control of the Government and, hence, Section 1 (4) proviso of the Act is not applicable to the appellant-petitioner-Municipality. It is the further stand of the first respondent that if the appellant-petitioner-Municipality wants exemption from the provisions of the Act, the Municipality has to obtain exemption from the Government as contemplated under Section 90 of the Act. Certain admissions made by P.W.1 also had been relied on. 26. It is the further stand of the first respondent that if the appellant-petitioner-Municipality wants exemption from the provisions of the Act, the Municipality has to obtain exemption from the Government as contemplated under Section 90 of the Act. Certain admissions made by P.W.1 also had been relied on. 26. The Act, Act 34 of 1948 is an Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto. 27. Section 1 (4) of the Act specifies that this Act shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government other than seasonal factories:) [Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to a factory or establishment belonging to or under the control of the Government whose employees are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially similar or superior to the benefits provided under this Act.] 28. Section 2 (12) of the Act defines 'factory' as unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof--- (a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, or (b) whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (Act No.35 of 1952) or a railway running shed; 29. Section 75 of the Act deals with matters to be decided by Employees' Insurance Court. Section 88 of the Act deals with Exemption of persons or class of persons and the said provision reads as hereunder: "The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose, exempt any person or class persons employed in any factory or establishment or class of factories or establishments to which this Act applies, from the operation of the Act." 30. Section 90 of the Act deals with Exemption of factories or establishments belonging to Government or any local authority and the said provision reads as hereunder: "The appropriate Government may, [after consultation with the Corporation], by notification in the Official Gazette and subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, exempt any factory or establishment belonging to [x x x] any local authority [from the operation of this Act], if the employees in any such factory or establishment are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially similar or superior to the benefits provided under this Act." 31. P.W.1, no doubt, admitted in his cross-examination that the Municipality paid contributions to R-1 from 1982 to 1986. Certain other further admissions also had been pointed out. The evidence of R.W.1 also had been relied upon and the orders made, Exs.R-3 and R-8 had been specifically pointed out and further reliance was placed on the other documentary evidence, Ex.R-1, Ex.R-2, Exs.R-4 to R-7, Exs.R-9 to R-13, as well. 32. The learned counsel for appellant-petitioner-Municipality strongly relied on the decision in Municipal Committee, Abohar v. Regional Commissioner, E.S.I. Corporation 1996 (1) LLN 810 : (1996) 7 SCC 488 wherein the Apex Court observed at paras 2 and 3 as hereunder: "This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the High court of Punjab and Haryana dated 5/10/1993 in FAO No. 589 of 1993 dismissing the appeal as usual in limine. The admitted facts are that the appellant-Municipal Committee has been running waterworks known as Patel Water Works. The employees working in the Waterworks Department are now sought to be covered under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (for short "the Act" ). When notice was issued to the appellant, they objected to the coverage of employees under the Act. Therefore, an order has been passed under Section 45- A of the Act. Challenging thereto, an appeal was filed under Section 75 of the Act. The Insurance court has confirmed that the employees are covered under the Act. Accordingly, when challenged, the High court in the first appeal dismissed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave. The question is whether the employees of the Municipal Corporation are also covered under the Act? Challenging thereto, an appeal was filed under Section 75 of the Act. The Insurance court has confirmed that the employees are covered under the Act. Accordingly, when challenged, the High court in the first appeal dismissed the same. Thus this appeal by special leave. The question is whether the employees of the Municipal Corporation are also covered under the Act? The employees of the Corporation are governed by the statutory rules made under the Act and in some cases in other States the benefits of the government scales of pay etc. have been extended. However, the fact remains that they are provided with the health scheme and are also eligible to medical facilities and reimbursement of the amounts spent by the employees concerned. Under these circumstances, the coverage of employees under the Act is per se illegal." 33. Likewise, in Assam State Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. v. E.S.I. Corporation 2001 (2) LLJ 234 it was observed at para 1 as hereunder: "The impugned judgment shall stand quashed in view of the decision of the Apex court in Municipal Committee, Abohar v. Regional Commissioner, E. S. I Corporation and another 1996 (7) SCC 488 : 1996-II-LLJ-98, wherein the Supreme Court pointed out that the employees of a statutory corporation are governed by the rules made under the Act and in some cases the benefits of health schemes have been extended and if they are provided with the health scheme and are also eligible to medical facilities and reimbursement of the amount spent by the employees, such employees cannot be covered by the Employees' State Insurance Scheme and the Supreme Court pointed out that coverage of employees under the Act is per se illegal as the benefits which they received from the Statutory corporation will be much more beneficial than the benefits which can be given by E. S. I. Corporation. In view of that matter, the impugned judgment stands quashed and the matter now shall go back to find out whether the contention of the Corporation that they have better benefits to the employees is correct or not. If it is found that the Corporation gave better benefits in terms of medical facilities and reimbursement, the question they being covered under the E. S. I. Act shall not arise." 34. If it is found that the Corporation gave better benefits in terms of medical facilities and reimbursement, the question they being covered under the E. S. I. Act shall not arise." 34. Sri P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel representing first respondent made an attempt to distinguish these decisions on the ground that on facts, the learned Judges arrived at such conclusions in those matters since acceptable evidence had been placed relating to the providing of the benefits and inasmuch as P.W.1 did not depose on this aspect at all for want of factual foundation and inasmuch as no substantial question of law as such is involved in this civil miscellaneous appeal and in the light of the language of Section 82 of the Act and further in the light of the fact that for some time contributions had been made by appellant-Municipality, the order under challenge to be confirmed. 35. Sri P. Rajasekhar placed strong reliance on the decision in Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Hyderabad v. Zuari Cement Ltd., Cuddapah District 2008 (1) LLJ 835 : 2008 (1) ALD 775 wherein it was observed at para 14 as hereunder: "The application which has been filed as contemplated under Section 75 falls under Chapter VI of the Act which contemplates adjudication of disputes and claims. Under Section 74 of the Act, the state Government by issuance of notification in the Official Gazette constitute the employees' Insurance Court for such local area and any aggrieved party can raise a dispute or any question by way of application under Section 75 of the Act. There is no dispute to the fact that the provisions of the act applies to the local area as contemplated 7. Substituted by Act No. 44 of 1966, Section 32, w. e. f. 28. 1. 1968. under Section 74 (1) and (4) of the Act. However, as provided for in subclauses (a)to (g) of Section 75, the powers of the state Employees' Insurance Court have been specifically detailed. Therefore, it is only such question which can fall within the ambit of any of these sub-clauses alone can form part of the subject-matter of the lis or dispute which can be gone into by the said Court and not beyond. Therefore, it is only such question which can fall within the ambit of any of these sub-clauses alone can form part of the subject-matter of the lis or dispute which can be gone into by the said Court and not beyond. There is no power specifically conferred thereunder to provide any sort of remedy like appeal, revision or review to fall well within the powers of jurisdiction under Section 75 of the Act to consider, go into or sit over any decision or order which has been taken under Section 87 of the Act. The power of exemption is provided for in a different chapter i. e. , Chapter-VIII. The said power is specifically conferred on the Government to decide on the question of exemption of an industry from the operation of the Act. The reasons could be many, especially, including the benefits which the employer provides are substantially similar or superior to the benefits which the Act provides. However, as against the said order, either way, granting or refusing to grant exemption, no remedy by way of appeal or revision has been provided for under the Act. Therefore, any order passed therein becomes final unless taken in appropriate proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of writ. Thus, a reading of these two provisions amply shows that the ESI court acting under the powers as conferred under Section 75 of the Act has no jurisdiction to take up or sit over the decision given under Section 87 of the Act. Even if it is found that the employer is providing far better benefits or similar benefits, it would not also constitute any basis or ground to interdict the decisions under Section 87 of the Act by the Court under Section 75 of the Act. Irrespective of the fact whether the order passed under Section 87 of the act is in anyway can be assailed by way of appropriate grounds, be it for want of reasons or lacunae or violation of principles of natural justice, it is not for the Employees' insurance Court acting under Section 75 of the Act to assail or set aside the same. The said order granting or rejecting exemption under Section 87 of the Act is very much binding and conclusive on the Employees' insurance Court as constituted under Section 74 of the Act. The said order granting or rejecting exemption under Section 87 of the Act is very much binding and conclusive on the Employees' insurance Court as constituted under Section 74 of the Act. Therefore, the entire approach of the Court below in proceeding to consider the correctness of the order of refusal to grant exemption in favour of respondent No. 1-employer is totally outside the scope of the powers and totally without any jurisdiction. The Court below could not have proceeded to have any look at those orders irrespective of the fact that better benefits are conferred by the employer or any principles of natural justice are violated. Though the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents herein sought to base their contentions on the directions given by this Court in the earlier batch of cases directing them to approach the authority constituted under Section 74 of the Act where all such questions can be gone into, however, the fact remains that it is only the applicability of the Act, on the facts and circumstances of each case of employer, which alone can form part of the adjudication, but not beyond it. Especially, where a Court or Tribunal or authority has no jurisdiction in any manner, whatsoever, as per the scheme of the Act, it would not confer on it any such power in terms oi the liberty which is given by the Court to approach the said authority. Any such direction would always be subject to the powers, authority and jurisdiction as conferred, available or provided for under the particular statute and it would not in anyway extend, wide open or confer anything which is not available on such authority, Court or Tribunal to take up all such questions which are beyond its purview." 36. Further strong reliance was placed on the decision in Workmen of Bharath Electronics, Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation 1997 (1) LLN 315 wherein the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court observed at para 8 as hereunder: "It is thus clear that unless it is shown that the factory or establishment attracts the proviso to Sub-sec.(4), the provisions of the Act are applicable to all factories, including the factories belonging to the Government. It is further clear that the Act statutorily becomes applicable to every factory or establishment from the date of commencement of the Act, or the date of the establishment of the factories or the establishments. In order to bring the factory or establishment within the purview of the proviso to Sub-sec. (4), the employer of the concerned factory or establishment, or the person claiming that the Act is not applicable, has to prove that the factory or establishment either belongs to the Government or is under the control of the Government. It has to be further proved that the employees of such factory or establishment have been receiving benefits which are either substantially similar or superior to the benefits provided under the Act." 37. Reliance also was placed on the decisions in Tata Employees' Union v. Union of India 1993 (1) LLN 387; Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore v. Nirmala Chemical Industries, Hubli 1993 (2) LLN 635 ; Employees of NTC (APKK & M), Ltd., Bangalore v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore 1992 L & I.C. 1825; Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare AIR 1989 SC 1247 ; Adwait Charan Sahu v. Divisional Forest Officer, Athmallik and others AIR 1993 Orissa 123 and Employees' State Insurance Corporation v. Hotel Kalpaka International 1993 (1) LLN 230. 38. The learned Standing Counsel representing appellant-Municipality however placed strong reliance on the decision in Employees State Insurance Corporation & others v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and others 2006 (7) SCALE 346 wherein it was observed at paras 64, 65 and 66 as hereunder. "This apart the maxim of equity which is founded upon justice and good sense was applied as well as other maxim; lex non cogit ad impossibilia (i.e., the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform) The applicability of the aforesaid maxim has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey and Others v. Tarapada Dey and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 398 and Gursharam Singh and Others vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 459 . The ESI Act has enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. Under the scheme of the Act, function of the ESI Corporation is to derive insurance fund from the contribution from employees and workmen. The ESI Act has enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury. Under the scheme of the Act, function of the ESI Corporation is to derive insurance fund from the contribution from employees and workmen. The employer is entitled to recover workmen's share from the wages of the workmen concerned. It was argued by the respondent that the employer is providing better medical facilities to the workmen and, therefore, the object and purpose of the Act has been fully satisfied. It is pertinent to notice that none of the employees of the Union have complained about medical services provided by the employer since the object is otherwise fulfilled. No further direction, in our opinion, is required to be passed. The act of Court can prejudice no party either the ESI or the respondent-companies. We, therefore, relieve the respondents from making any contributions for the period in question and direct them to make the contribution as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court. It is stated that some of the respondents have already filed exemption applications and that the appellant-Corporation has also granted them necessary relief. We also permit the other respondents who have not filed any exemption application may now file the same and if such application for exemption is filed, it is for the authorities to consider the same on merits and in accordance with law." 39. On a careful analysis of the facts of the present case and also the findings recorded by the court below the following essential aspects are not in serious controversy. (1) The appellant-petitioner-Municipality is a local body governed by the provisions of the A.P. Municipalities Act; (2) In the light of the relief prayed for it is clear that no application or representation had been made by the Municipality praying for exemption; (3) The details relating to the better facilities provided to the employees also had not been deposed elaborately; (4) The Municipality made certain payments relating to contribution for certain periods. 40. 40. The decision of the Apex Court in Assam State Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd. v. E.S.I. Corporation (2 supra) had specifically referred to the decision in Municipal Committee, Abohar v. Regional Commissioner, E.S.I. Corporation and another (1 supra) and it was clearly held that the employees of the Corporation are governed by the statutory rules made under the Act and in some cases the benefits of health schemes have been extended. However, the fact remains that they are also eligible to medical facilities and reimbursement of the amount spent by the employees concerned and under these circumstances the coverage of the employees under the Act is per se illegal. 41. The mere fact that P.W.1 had not deposed in elaboration on the aspect of extending of benefits to the employees may not seriously alter the situation, since several facts are not in controversy at all. 42. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra, this Court is of the considered opinion that the question of dealing with the decision in Employees State Insurance Corporation & others v. Jardine Henderson Staff Association and others (11 supra) may not be of much help and, hence, though for some time such payment of contribution had been made by the appellant-Municipality, this may not alter the situation in the light of the clear Law laid down by the Apex Court. It is needless to say that these being the binding precedents, this Court is bound to follow the said binding precedents. 43. Point No.2:- In the light of the same, the order impugned in the present civil miscellaneous appeal being unsustainable, the same is hereby set aside and the civil miscellaneous appeal is hereby allowed. No order as to costs.