Bishundeo Choudhary Son Of late Hardeo Choudhary v. State Of Bihar
2009-07-23
MIHIR KUMAR JHA
body2009
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGEMENT 1. Heard counsel for the petitioner, counsel for opposite party no. 2/informant as also the counsel for the State. 2. Prayer in this application is for quashing the order dated 11.10.2006 passed by Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Munger in G.R. Case No. 666 of 2003 rejecting the application dated 13.9.2005 filed by the petitioner for compounding of the offence. 3. Mr. Krishna Prasad Singh, learned Senior counsel in order to substantiate the aforementioned prayer would submit that initially a police case was filed by the opposite party no. 2 alleging that on 17.4.2003, this petitioner in capacity of the elder brother of one Mukesh Kumar, had conveyed his acceptance to the proposal for getting married to Jyoti Kumari, daughter of opposite party no. 2, the informant and had also accepted a sum of Rs. 65,000/- alongwith some utensils, clothes and gold ring but later on had resiled from such promise and thus marriage of the daughter of the informant could not be performed which led to not only humiliation and lowering of the prestige but also committing an offence of cheating and misappropriation, for which a sub-stantive case Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62 of 2003 was instituted under Sections 420, 406/34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act in which the police had submitted charge- sheet against the petitioner. 4. It has however been explained by the counsel for the petitioner and also stands supported from the connected records that both the parties had agreed to settle the dispute outside the Court and as such, a joint compromise petition for compounding the offence was filed on 26.4.2003. Pursuant to the aforementioned compromise, the matter was not only settled but the petitioner had also paid a sum of rupees one lac on 26.5.2003 and thereafter had got a compromise petition filed in the case filed by the wife of the petitioner against the opposite party no. 2 and his family members being Complaint Case No. 281C/2003 (Lakshmi Devi vs. Sitaram Raut & Ors.) as would be apparent from Annexures-B & C to the counter affidavit filed by the opposite party no. 2. 5. As would be evidenced from the aforementioned document, the settlement made before the panches, the opposite party no. 2 had also once.again accepted the compounding of offences relating to Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62 of 2003 and complaint case no. 561C/2003.
2. 5. As would be evidenced from the aforementioned document, the settlement made before the panches, the opposite party no. 2 had also once.again accepted the compounding of offences relating to Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62 of 2003 and complaint case no. 561C/2003. 6. Such settlement outside the court and filing of a compromise petition in fact was also duty recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. Munger in the order dated 25.6.2003 and 30.6.2003 in ABA No. 267 of 2003 and 392 of 2003 while granting anticipatory bail to two of the co-accuse, namely Laxmi Devi and Sheo Ram Choudhary for whom, as noted above, the compromise petition was filed on 4.6.2003. 7. During the pendency of the two compromise petition and after accepting a sum of rupees one lac, the opposite party no. 2 however on 3.7.2003 had filed a protest petition which led to separate complaint case no. 561C/2003 and led to a Panchayati held on 27.7.2003 with the following terms and conditions: 8. Any further doubt with regard to such compromise being not bona fide is itself ruled out in view of the order dated 8.9.2003 passed by the Sessions Judge, Munger in ABA No. 620 of 2003 while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner Bishundeo Choudhary, in complaint case no. 561C/2003 wherein the complainant Jyoti Kumari had herself appeared in person and had accepted such compromise as is recorded in the order itself to the following effect: ".....At the very outset, it has been pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioned that all the disputes of the parties have already settled amicably. Now the complainant does not want to proceed with this case and she is present in court today to support the factum of compromise. The victim girl appeared before me and accepted the contention of learned counsel tor petitioners in toto......." 9. It was only after recording the aforementioned statement that the petitioner of this case with three others were granted anticipatory bail in the complaint case no. 561C/2003.
The victim girl appeared before me and accepted the contention of learned counsel tor petitioners in toto......." 9. It was only after recording the aforementioned statement that the petitioner of this case with three others were granted anticipatory bail in the complaint case no. 561C/2003. As a matter of fact, the petitioner, who was taken into custody in connection with other case being Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62 of 2003, was granted regular bail by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-VIII, Munger again by taking into account the said compromise wherein the court had again recorded that the matter had ended into compromise and the compromise petition had been filed alongwith the bail application and that two co-accused were granted anticipatory bail on the basis of some compromise. 10. Thus, filing of the compromise and its being acted upon before the court is a concluded fact. It was only in that background that an application was filed before the court below on 13.9.2005 by the petitioner for passing a final order on the pending compromise petition which, however, came to be rejected by the impugned order dated 11.10.2006 wherein the court below in view of the objection raised by the opposite party no. 2 resiling from such compromise had made a prayer for taking cognizance and proceeding with the trial. The trial court having recorded the objection of the informant and holding that the prayer of the petitioner was not bona fide had gone to reject the prayer of the petitioner with a direction to the parties to appear for framing of charge. 11. Mr. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would accordingly submit that after the parties including the victim girl in person had unequivocally accepted and supported the factum of compromise before the concerned court, it was no longer open to the informant to raise an objection to the compounding of offences and that this Court in exercise of the inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should quash the impugned order and direct for acceptance of the compromise. Mr. Singh also in this context had placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ruchi Agrawal vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal & Ors. reported in 2004(8) Supreme Today 525. 12. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 did not dispute the aforementioned facts including signature of opposite party no.
Mr. Singh also in this context had placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ruchi Agrawal vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal & Ors. reported in 2004(8) Supreme Today 525. 12. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2 did not dispute the aforementioned facts including signature of opposite party no. 2 or the girl on the compromise petitions dated 26.4.2003 and 4.6.2003 or on panchnama prepared in course of the Panchayati heid on 27.7.2003 in presence of as many as 31 villagers as also payment of Rs. 1,05,000/- in two instalment but then he had submitted that all these compromise petitions were filed under compulsion and Coercion and that the opposite party no. 2 had never intended to compound the offence. In this context it was further explained by him that as the wife of the petitioner had filed another criminal case being complaint case no. 281C/2003, alleging abduction of the bridegroom i.e. the younger brother of petitioner leading to false allegation and humiliation of opposite party no. 2 and his daughter, there was no question of entering into compromise specially when the offence under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was itself not compoundable. 13. This Court after giving very serious consideration to the aforementioned submissions is of the view that the opposite party no. 2 cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold in the same breath. The opposite party no. 2 admittedly had filed two compromise petitions on 25.4.2003 (Annexure-2) and 4.6.2003 (Annexure-2/1) as also had acknowledged payment of rupees one lac on 26.5.2003 by the petitioner and Rs. 5,000/- on 27.7.2003 before the panches and 31 independent persons as would be apparent from the document of Panchayati containing signature of the opposite party no. 2 in the date of 27.7.2003 and 31.7.2003 accepting the aforementioned verdict of the panch. In such a situation, when the petitioner and other accused persons were granted bail by recording of compromise and acceptance of this fact by Jyoti Kumari, the daughter of the informant in the court, it would be difficult for the counsel for the opposite party no. 2 to resile from the factum of compromise and it must be held that the compromise petition filed by the parties including opposite party no.
2 to resile from the factum of compromise and it must be held that the compromise petition filed by the parties including opposite party no. 2 was bona fide and fit to be acted upon specially when the terms of such compromise was also acted upon by the petitioner and his wife in course of filing a separate compromise petition in complaint case no. 281C/2003 relating to abduction of brother of the petitioner. The pendency of complaint case no. 281C/2003 could also not furnish the opposite party no. 2 a valid ground from resiling from compromise entered by the parties, inasmuch as it was the part of compromise that all the cases filed by the parties shall be compounded. 14. That being so, this Court must hold that the changed stance of the opposite party no. 2 opposing compounding of offences in the cases petitioner and his family member was itself mala fide. The Apex Court in a similar situation in the case of Ruchi Agrawal (supra) had held that the subsequent change of mind of the complainant after giving effect to the terms of compromise by way of acceptance of money was only to harass the accused persons and such conduct of the complainant would amount to abuse of the process of Court. 15. This Court, therefore, following the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ruchi Agrawal (supra) as also noticing the facts mentioned above in the background of the fact that the petitioners case filed by the petitioner, the opposite party no. 2 and his family members have already been concluded on account of the petitioner and his wife leading no evidence, must hold that the compromise petition dated 26.4.2003 and 4.6.2003, for in the two cases against the petitioner and compounding the offences in two cases against the petitioner and his family members, being Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62/2003 and complaint case no. 561C/2003 were fit to be acted upon and allowed. 16. The only plea that the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not compoundable, in fact, will not be also available to the opposite party no.
561C/2003 were fit to be acted upon and allowed. 16. The only plea that the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is not compoundable, in fact, will not be also available to the opposite party no. 2, inasmuch as, from a bare reading of the First Information Report, it would appear that the marriage was not solemnized on account of certain differences between the parties and therefore, even on the basis of reading of the First Information Report itself, no case under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is made out. 17. That being so, the compromise petition filed by the parties must be given effect to and consequently the impugned order is hereby set aside and the entire criminal prosecution of the petitioner and his family members, co-accused arising from Jamalpur P.S. Case No. 62 of 2003 and Complaint Case No. 561C/2003 is hereby quashed. At the same time the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 281C of 2003 filed by the wife of petitioner against the opposite party no. 2 and his two sons and three others pending for trial in Sessions Case No. 89 of 2006, if surviving is also hereby quashed. 18. In the result, this application, in the light of the aforesaid observations and directions, is allowed.