Judgment ( 1. ) IN the present intra-court appeal filed by the appellants under Section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyay Peeth Ko Appeal)Adhiniyam, 2005, the order dated 02. 12. 2008 passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 4565/2007 (S), whereby the learned single Judge has set aside the order of termination of the services of the respondent No. 1 and has further directed for his reinstatement with 50% back wages, has been called in question. Before the learned single Judge, the respondent No. 1 challenged the order of termination of his services dated 8. 7. 2001. The appellants i. e. the respondents No. 3 and 4 before the learned single Judge submitted that the original petitioner-respondent No. 1 was unauthorisedly absent from his services and since the conduct of remaining unauthorisedly absent is misconduct, therefore, the services of the original petitioner were terminated in exercise of powers vested with the appellants under Rule 18 (15) of the M. P. State Handloom Service Rule (for short "the Rules" ). These Rules were also filed by the appellants along with their return before the learned single Judge as annexure R/4-1. ( 2. ) THE learned single Judge found that the order of termination was founded upon the misconduct of the respondent No. 1 of being unauthorisedly absent from the services and since no inquiry was conducted by the appellants, therefore, the order as such has been held to be bad and the respondent-employee was entitled to be reinstated in services. A submission was put forth on behalf of the respondent-employee before the learned single Judge that rule 24 (2) of the Rules, wherein the provision was made to terminate the services of a permanent employee by giving him three months notice, has been declared as ultra-vires. The learned single Judge found that since the action is not taken under Rule 24 (2) but is taken under Rule 18 (15) for the misconduct, therefore, the Rule 24 (2) was not applied by the learned single Judge and for this reason the submission of the original petitioner that the action taken to terminate his services is bad, was not accepted. While arguing the case much stress is made on behalf of the appellants that the learned single Judge was not justified in directing for 50% back wages. While arguing the case much stress is made on behalf of the appellants that the learned single Judge was not justified in directing for 50% back wages. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the order of termination was passed on 8. 7. 2001 and the petition before this Court was filed by the original petitioner in the year 2007, therefore, the petition itself suffers from delay and laches and accordingly no back wages could have been allowed. It is further contended that grant of back wages after setting aside of the order of termination is not automatic. It is urged on behalf of the respondent-employee that after termination of his services an appeal was preferred on 22. 8. 2001, which is Annexure P-5 on the record of the writ petition and thereafter a reminder was given on 2. 4. 2003 (Annexure P-6 ). Therefore, it is not a case where the relief of back wages can be denied on the ground of delay and laches. On this basis, it is contended that the learned single judge was justified in granting back wages. ( 3. ) THE record is perused and the rival submissions put forth on behalf of the parties are considered. It is not in dispute before us that the appellants who were respondents before the learned single Judge are a cooperative Society registered and governed under the provisions of the M. P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (fort brevity "the 1960 Act" ). It is seen that though a remedy was available to the original petitioner to file a dispute under section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act and a limitation of 30 days from the date the order is passed, is also provided therein but the original petitioner did not invoke the jurisdiction of the adjudicating authority as per Section 55 (2) of the 1960 act but hastened to file a petition before this Court. The petition before this Court was filed in the year 2007 and the limitation of 30 days for challenging the order as provided under Section 55 (2) has already expired. ( 4. ) IT is also to be seen that the original petitioner submitted before the learned single Judge that immediately an appeal was preferred on 22. 8. 2001 (Annexure P-5) to the in-charge Chairman of the appellant-society and thereafter a reminder was also given on 2. 4. ( 4. ) IT is also to be seen that the original petitioner submitted before the learned single Judge that immediately an appeal was preferred on 22. 8. 2001 (Annexure P-5) to the in-charge Chairman of the appellant-society and thereafter a reminder was also given on 2. 4. 2003 (Annexure P-6) and the same was pending for consideration, therefore, the petitioner did not approach the Court. It is utterly surprising to note that after the reminder was given on 2. 4. 2003 there was no justification on the part of the petitioner to wait for nearly about four years for filing the case. In this reference, the appellants filed their return before the learned single Judge and the fact of filing of any appeal by the petitioner was specifically denied that neither any appeal was submitted nor any representation was given by the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a rejoinder and in the rejoinder he has not challenged the averment of the appellants in the return that neither any appeal was submitted nor any representation was given. There was no specific averment in the rejoinder as to who received the said appeal but it is only stated that the appeal was maintainable to the Chairman against the order impugned. For the purposes of scrutinizing the justification for grant of back wages, two circumstances have already been narrated by us in the earlier paragraph; firstly, that no case was filed by the petitioner before the adjudicating authority appointed under Section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act and secondly that there had been no material placed in the rejoinder as to whom the said appeal was submitted by the original petitioner. ( 5. ) THAT apart, we may also take into account the fact that before effecting the order of termination dated 8. 7. 2001 a show cause was issued to the original petitioner on 22. 6. 2001 wherein the appellants directed the original petitioner to attend his duties. The original petitioner neither submitted any application for leave nor presented himself for the duties. Under the circumstances, the employer terminated the employment without holding a departmental enquiry. These are the circumstances in relation to the conduct of the respondent-employee to be taken note of while awarding the back wages. The original petitioner neither submitted any application for leave nor presented himself for the duties. Under the circumstances, the employer terminated the employment without holding a departmental enquiry. These are the circumstances in relation to the conduct of the respondent-employee to be taken note of while awarding the back wages. If the original petitioner was to remain absent, he should not have remained absent without moving an application for leave but he should have submitted some application for leave but he did not chose to do so and remained unauthorisedly absent. In our opinion, for all the conducts of the petitioner as such the appellants should not be saddled with the liability to pay the back wages. In this connection, we may refer with profit to the judgments rendered by the Apex Court in state of Maharashtra and others Vs. Reshma Ramesh meher and another, (2008) 8 SCC 664 . The relevant paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 from the said judgment are reproduced herein below:- "it is true that once the order of termination of service of an employee is set aside, ordinarily the relief of reinstatement is available to him. However, the entitlement of an employee to get reinstated does not necessarily result in payment of full or partial back wages, which is independent of reinstatement. While dealing with the prayer of back wages, factual scenario, equity and good conscience, a number of other factors, like the manner of selection, nature of appointment, the period for which the employee has worked with the employer etc. , have to be kept in view. All these factors and circumstances are illustrative and no precise or abstract formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances full or partial back wages should be awarded. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh a three-Judge bench of this Court has observed that there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages and an order of back wages should not be passed in a mechanical manner. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh a three-Judge bench of this Court has observed that there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages and an order of back wages should not be passed in a mechanical manner. It has been held that a host of factors, like the manner and method of selection and appointment; the nature of appointment, namely, whether ad hoc, short term, daily wages, temporary or permanent in character; and the length of service, which the workman had rendered with the employer are required to be taken into consideration before passing any order for award of back wages. (See also Haryana State electronics Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Mamni; U. P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey and U. P. SRTC v. Mitthu Singh ). Having considered the matter on the touchstone of the aforenoted broad principles, we are of the opinion that the facts in hand do not warrant payment of back wages to the respondents. In the instant case, though there is no allegation against the respondents that originally the caste certificates were obtained by them fraudulently and, in fact, none of the authorities have recorded any findings to that effect, yet we feel that non-disclosure of the caste Scrutiny Committees Report dated 23-3-1996/ 27-3-1996 by the respondents before the Tribunal is tantamount to suppression of material and vital information from the Court, bordering fraud. " ( 6. ) THEIR Lordships of the Apex Court in their judgment rendered in C. Jacob Vs. Director of Geology and mining and Another, (2008) 10 SCC 115 while dealing with the issue of unauthorized absence and grant of back wages in a case where the Court directed the department to consider the stale claim have held that the award of back wages based on misplaced sympathy encourages indiscipline and leads to unjust enrichment of employee and drain on public exchequer and therefore, the award of back wages should not be awarded as a routine but there must be application of mind. ( 7. ) APART from the aforesaid, it was not stated in the petition or in the rejoinder by the original petitioner that after his termination he was not gainfully employed. ( 7. ) APART from the aforesaid, it was not stated in the petition or in the rejoinder by the original petitioner that after his termination he was not gainfully employed. In this reference, we may also see that if the dispute would have been preferred under Section 55 (2) of the 1960 Act before the adjudicating authority then the authority had the jurisdiction to record evidence. The appellants being the employer would have an opportunity to cross-examine the original petitioner on the ground that he had been gainfully employed but since the case was filed before this Court by way of writ petition and the High Court exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution has no power to record the evidence. Thus, in the fitness of circumstances there should have been some justification on the part of the learned single Judge to justify the award of back wages. ( 8. ) IN view of the aforesaid conduct of the respondent-employee and taking note of the ratio of the judgments passed by the Apex Court, we are of the opinion that it will not be justified to award even 50% back wages. However, we are not inclined to interfere in the order of reinstatement as in the present case, the order itself was passed without holding departmental enquiry on the ground of misconduct. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned single Judge deserves to be modified and accordingly we set aside the part of the order of the learned single Judge by which 50% back wages have been awarded. The original petitioner, however, shall only be entitled for reinstatement without any back wages. ( 9. ) IN the result, the writ appeal stands partly allowed. There shall be no order as to cost.