ORDER Dipak Misra, J. 1. In this intra-court appeal preferred under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 the sustainability of the order dated 23-7-2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 6925/2009 is called in question. 2. The present appellant invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of a writ of mandamus to the respondent No. 3/School to admit him in Class XIth in the Maths and Science stream. It was putforth before the learned Single Judge that the appellant has obtained 69.8 % marks and, therefore, he prayed that principle of rounding off would be made applicable and the same should be treated as 70% and on that basis he should be given admission in the school. 3. The aforesaid stand of the appellant was resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3/School that the merit of the students of Class Xth Examination, 2009 was displayed in the Notice Board wherein the name of the appellant featured at Sr. No. 136 and the student who has obtained 70.2% is shown above him at Sr. No. 135. The cut off percentage of the marks for determining the eligibility criteria was fixed at 72%. It was stipulated that the general aggregate of 360 out of 500 (72%) must be obtained for eligibility to the Maths and Science stream. Subsequently, as less number of students had applied, minimum percentage was reduced to 70%. The writ petitioner applied in the prescribed form and after excluding the name of those students who withdrew their candidatures, the final revised list was notified in which the name of the appellant was featured at Sr. No. 100. The student whose name finds place just above the appellant is at Sr. No. 99 has obtained 70.2% marks. Be it noted before the learned Single Judge it was contended that as per the instructions of CBSE dated 6/13-7-2009 the school was required to admit 40 students in per section but the respondent-school exceeded by admitting 99 students in two sections. On behalf of the writ petitioner certain citations, namely, State of Orissa and another vs. Damodar Nayak and another, (1997) 4 SCC 560 and Dharmendra Kumar Shrivastava vs. Jiwaji University, Gwalior 2002(2) MPLJ 619 were pressed into service. 4. On behalf of the writ petitioner certain citations, namely, State of Orissa and another vs. Damodar Nayak and another, (1997) 4 SCC 560 and Dharmendra Kumar Shrivastava vs. Jiwaji University, Gwalior 2002(2) MPLJ 619 were pressed into service. 4. The learned Single Judge addressed to the concept of rounding off and came to hold as follows: In the instant case, the criteria laid down by the respondent/school is that the applicant must obtain a minimum aggregate of 70% marks. Apparently, the criteria does not permit admission of a student who has obtained less than 70% marks and in such circumstances, where the criteria prescribes obtaining not less than a particular percentage of marks, the system of rounding of marks to make a candidate eligible who has obtained less than the percentage prescribed and is actually not qualified, is not permissible and cannot be adopted. If the rounding is made permissible a candidate who has obtained less than the minimum percentage of qualifying marks prescribed, would become eligible which is not permissible in law. Another reason why the principle of rounding off cannot be applied is that in todays age of intense academic competition where several students obtain marks in decimal and fractions and the seats available/or admission are limited the selection is made or denied by a fraction of a mark and therefore in cases like the present one even a fraction of mark assumes great importance and cannot be ignored except in cases where seats are available in abundance or are unlimited. The situation in the present case is that several students have obtained marks infractions and decimals as is evident from the merit list filed by the respondent/School in its return. As many as 8 students have got marks between 69% and 70% and therefore, where a specific minimum cut off marks is prescribed and where the seats are limited, rounding off marks as sought by the petitioner, cannot be permitted specifically in the facts and circumstances of the present case as that would result in upsetting and exceeding the maximum number of students fixed per section by the C.B.S.E. which has already been exceeded by four students. 5. Questioning the correctness of the order it is submitted by Ms. 5. Questioning the correctness of the order it is submitted by Ms. Gurleen Kaur Chhabra, learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned single Judge has given inappropriate reasons for not applying the principle of rounding off as the same is not dependent on the facts and circumstances of the case. It is urged by her that when the writ petitioner had secured 69.8% of marks the same has to be rounded off and thereafter her case be considered on merits. Learned counsel further submitted that the school has admitted 99 students and, therefore, the school be directed to adjust the writ petitioner so that his career is not marred. 6. Mr. Anshuman Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3/School, submitted that the writ petitioner could not have adjusted in the school in view of the fact that the last student who has been admitted has secured 70.2% marks. It is his further submission that the learned Single Judge has adverted to the fact that as many as eight students secured between 69-70% and, therefore, that would unsettle the admission. It is also urged by him that on a perusal of Annexures-R-3/5 filed by the respondent-school the appellant has obtained permission for leaving the school and accordingly, applied for transfer certificate from the respondent school. 7. Three issues emerge for consideration in this writ appeal: (i) whether rounding off marks is permissible; (ii) whether the appellant can take the stand as the school has admitted 99 students contrary to the directions issued by the CBSE on 6/13-7-2009 it can also admit another student; and (iii) when the last student who has been admitted has secured 70.2% marks and there are other students who have got 70% marks, can this Court issue a writ of mandamus to the school to admit the students. 8. As far as rounding off of marks is concerned we refer with profit to the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Dr. Vinod Gupta vs. State of M.P. and others, W.P. No. 6569/2008 decided on 27-8-2008 wherein it has been held as under : 7. In Asha Mehta (supra) the Apex Court has expressed the view as under: The question "whether 32.5% could be rounded off to 33% is purely an arithmetical calculation, a procedure which the Public Service Commission in fairness has been adopting in all other cases. In Asha Mehta (supra) the Apex Court has expressed the view as under: The question "whether 32.5% could be rounded off to 33% is purely an arithmetical calculation, a procedure which the Public Service Commission in fairness has been adopting in all other cases. The High Court had noticed this aspect of the matter and also relied upon earlier precedents in support thereof. In that view of the matter, we do not think that it is a fit case for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. 8. In Damodar Nayak (supra) the Apex Court treated 53.9% equivalent to 54% for the purpose of relax of Grant-in-Aid Scheme. 9. In Pawan Kumar Tiwari (supra) Their Lordships have held as under: 7. We do not find fault with any of the two reasonings adopted by the High Court. The rule of rounding off based on logic and common sense is: if part is one-half-or more, its value shall be increased to one and if part is less than half then its value shall be ignored. 46.50 should have been rounded off to 47 and not to 46 as has been done. If 47 candidates would have been considered for selection in general category, the respondent was sure to find a place in the list of selected meritorious candidates and hence entitled to appointment. 8. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that if this principle of rounding off is to be applied then the percentage of reservation in scheduled tribe category -would come to 2 by rounding off 1.86, to the nearest higher value, and in that case a candidate from scheduled tribe category and not the respondent -would be entitled to appointment. We cannot agree. No candidate in scheduled tribe category has chosen to lay challenge to the selection. We are also not aware if there is any scheduled tribe category candidate available and qualified for appointment consequent upon his having participated in the process of selection. This plea of the appellants is without any foundation and hence does not deserve to be taken note of. 9. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court has to be maintained. The total number of vacancies was 93. This plea of the appellants is without any foundation and hence does not deserve to be taken note of. 9. There is yet another reason why the judgment of the High Court has to be maintained. The total number of vacancies was 93. Consequent upon the allocation of reservation and calculation done by the appellants, the number of reserved seats would be 47, leaving only 46 available for general category candidates. Meaning thereby, the reservation would exceed 50% which would be unconstitutional. The total number of reserved seats could not have been more than 46 out of 93. 10. A Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Narayan Verma vs. Rani Durgavati Vishwavidyalaya Jabalpur, W.P. No. 7013/07 decided on 27-3-2008 has held as follows: Learned counsel has also commended us to the decision rendered in Ku. Bhavna Mishra vs. Barkatullah University and others, W. P. No. 207/05 decided on 13-4-2006 wherein reference has been made to decisions rendered in Ku. Neelam vs. Devi Ahilya Vishwa Vidyalaya, Misc. Petition No. 935/1988 decided on 5-5-1989 and the decision in State of Punjab and another vs. Asha Mehta, (1977) 11 SCC 410 wherein a view has been expressed the opinion that mark could be rounded off. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn further inspiration from the decision rendered in State of U.P. and another vs. Pawan Kumar Tiwari and others, AIR 2005 SC 658 wherein the Apex Court was dealing with a situation -wherein the High Court has rounded off 46.5% marks to 47%. Dealing with the said aspect Their Lordships have expressed the opinion as under: 7. We do not find fault with any of the two reasoning adopted by the High Court. The rule of rounding off based on logic and common sense; if part is one-half or more, its value shall be increased to one and if part is less than half then its value shall be ignored. 46.50% should have been rounded off to 47% candidates would have been considered for selection in general category, the respondent was sure to find a place in the list of selected meritorious candidates and hence entitled to appointment. In view of the aforesaid citations and the clarification issued by the Bar Council of India we are of the considered opinion that the marks secured by the petitioner deserves to be rounded off to 40%. In view of the aforesaid citations and the clarification issued by the Bar Council of India we are of the considered opinion that the marks secured by the petitioner deserves to be rounded off to 40%. In view of the aforesaid, we are inclined to direct the University to publish the result of the petitioner pertaining to entrance examination. After publication of the result, in the event of success a seat shall be allotted a seat in any of the college affiliated to the University in respect of academic session 2008-09. 11. Mr. Deepak Awasthi, learned Govt. Advocate submitted that if the principle of rounding off is adopted merit will be sacrificed. In Dr. Preeti Shrivastava and another (supra) the Constitution Bench has held thus: (5) It is equally permissible for the State authorities while undertaking the aforesaid exercise of short-listing to fix 50% minimum qualifying marks at the entrance test for general category of candidates and to dilute and prescribe lesser percentage of passing marks for reserved category of candidates as exigencies of situation may require in a given year but in no case the minimum qualifying marks as reduced for reserved category of candidates can go below 25% of passing marks for such reserved category of candidates. In other words, a play is available to the State authorities to prescribe different minimum passing marks for SC/ST and OBC eligible candidates between 50% and 25% as the prevailing situation at a given point of time may require. In such categories for SC, ST and OBC candidates different diluted passing marks can be prescribed, but this exercise has to be within the permissible limits of less than 50% and up to minimum 25% passing marks for each of such reserved categories. 12. The learned Govt. Advocate has also commended us to the decision rendered in Miss Nisha Kukreja and anr. vs. The State of Punjab and others, (1991) 5 SLR 655. In the said case the Division Bench did not accept the contention that the" fraction more than half cannot be permitted to be rounded off in respect of M.B.B.S. Course as the prospectus does not provide so and further the same is a competitive examination. Learned Govt. Advocate has also commended us to the decision rendered in Sanjeev Kumar vs. Punjab University and others, (1996) 7 SLR 563. Learned Govt. Advocate has also commended us to the decision rendered in Sanjeev Kumar vs. Punjab University and others, (1996) 7 SLR 563. In the said case the petitioner had secured 59.95% marks instead of 60% which was the requirement. The petitioner therein was not given the benefit of rounding off. The Division Bench had expressed the view that the benefit of rounding off was not permissible. Regard being had to the date of delivery of the judgment, the view expressed and in the absence of any prohibition in the Rule, we are of the considered opinion, the decisions are distinguishable. 13. Learned counsel for the State has referred to the M.C.I. Regulations and the Rules framed by the State which prescribe for securing minimum percentage of marks. It is proponed by him that obtainment of minimum percentage of marks is compulsory and there cannot be any deviation even if the seats remain vacant. Learned counsel has specially invited our attention to Rule 19 which deals with merit list. He has laid emphasis on the aspect that the successful candidate is under an obligation to secure not less than 50% marks in unreserved category and if principle of rounding off is accepted that will defeat the purpose of the Rule. 14. Submission of Mr. Raghuvanshi, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the State has no legs to stand upon inasmuch as there are situations where candidates secure equal marks. If the doctrine of rounding off is adopted the petitioner would be entitled to get 100 marks and in that case he only would be placed in the equal zone of consideration. Thus, he can be automatically selected. Once he comes in the equality zone the selection criteria provided in the Rules would apply. In Rule 1.10(e) it has been prescribed as follows: 1.10 Examination and Merit list - (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx (e) In case two or more candidates obtaining equal marks, the inter se merit will be decided as per procedure described in sub-rule (2) of Rule 19. In Rule 1.10(e) it has been prescribed as follows: 1.10 Examination and Merit list - (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx (e) In case two or more candidates obtaining equal marks, the inter se merit will be decided as per procedure described in sub-rule (2) of Rule 19. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 1.19 of the Rules reads as under: (2) Inter se merit - In case two or more candidates obtaining equal marks in the entrance examination, the merit will be decided as per procedure indicated below- (a) A candidate, who scores more marks in Part "B " of the question paper will be kept higher in the merit list. (b) For candidate scoring equal marks even in Part "B" of the question paper, the candidate older in age will be placed higher in the inter se merit of such candidates. 15. If the aforesaid rules are appreciated in proper perspective there can be no trace of doubt that there is inbuilt provision to deal with the cases of inter se merit. Thus, the submission of Mr. Awasthi, learned counsel for the State that if there would be rounding off the merit would be sacrificed leaves us unimpressed. 16. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we are of the considered opinion, the principle enunciated in Damodar Nayak (supra), Pawan Kumar Tiwari (supra), Ku. Bhavna Mishra (supra) and Asha Mehta (supra) would be applicable to the case of medical' admission as it really does not have any impact and effect on merit. 9. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has fallen into error by not permitting rounding off marks. Be it placed on record, in those cases while conferring the rounding off benefit this Court has left the matter to be considered on merits by the authorities concerned and hence, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is unsustainable. 10. As far as the fault of the school is concerned, the school has violated the directions issued by the CBSE and the same should not be treated as an issue before this Court. 10. As far as the fault of the school is concerned, the school has violated the directions issued by the CBSE and the same should not be treated as an issue before this Court. Even a mistake is done by the school, as we perceive the factual scenario, the appellant cannot get the benefit inasmuch as the last student who has been admitted has secured 70.2% marks and whereas the appellant would get only 70% marks after adopting the principle of rounding off. Even if the fault of the school is noted, the appellant cannot get the benefit straightaway. 11. That takes us to the next submission. As is demonstrable from the order of the learned Single Judge there are eight students who have secured between 69 to 70% marks. On a perusal of merit list, Annexure-R-3/3, it is perceptible that two other students have secured 69.6% marks each. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that they have not approached the Court. The aforesaid submission on first flush looks quite attractive but on a deeper probe melts into insignificance. Assuming that they would have got 70% marks on application of principle of rounding off, the last candidate who has been admitted has secured 70.2% and, therefore, they would not have been in a position to get the admission. The present appellant, as we are disposed to think, stands on a similar situation. The students who have not approached this Court, even if they would have approached, they would not have got more than 70% marks. Requiring the school to admit the present appellant by way of command would give rise to further disturbance in the stream of admission as the other students who had secured 69.6% would required to be considered. That apart, as is evincible from the return the appellant has filed an application on 14-7-2009 as he had not granted admission in mathematics and science stream and, therefore, he should be granted transfer certificate just to pursue his further studies in some other school. In view of these cumulative facts we are inclined to think that the writ of mandamus should not be issued as that may ultimately create some confusion and may also be rendered futile as rights of others cannot be straightaway curtailed when they are similarly situated. In view of these cumulative facts we are inclined to think that the writ of mandamus should not be issued as that may ultimately create some confusion and may also be rendered futile as rights of others cannot be straightaway curtailed when they are similarly situated. We are further disposed to think, to avoid this confusion, the school has fixed the cut off marks at 70.2% and rightly so. Thus, the despite applying the principle of rounding off the position of the appellant does not improve. 12. Consequently, though we unsettle the finding of the learned Single Judge as far as rounding off marks is concerned in the ultimate analysis the result remains the same and, therefore, the present appeal has to pave the path of dismissal and we so direct. There shall be no order as to costs.