Judgment :- 1. This appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, by the State Government against the judgment and award passed by the reference court in LAC. No.15/03 should have been dismissed without batting an eyelid, following the two earlier like decisions one rendered by the Division Bench of this court in M.F.A.No.4278/06 and the other by a single Bench of this court in M.F.A. No.4279/06 involving the very common judgment, though the awards are in respect of different land owners, has not taken the same course, but is deviating for the reason that on the proper application of law to the facts of the case as revealed from the records, the very reference in which the civil court passed the award enhancing the compensation from Rs.10,000/-per acre awarded by the L.A.O. to Rs.54,000/-per acre, is the one obtained by practicing fraud, trickery, misrepresentation, manipulation of records not only at one stage and at one place, but at several places including the office of the S.L.A.O. and sought to be shown as though there was some earlier correspondence in respect of a matter which was received by the civil court for the first time on 20.1.2003 by which time, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Laxuman reported in AIR 2006 SC 24 , interpreting the very provision of law namely, Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended by the State of Karnataka, the reference was not only barred by time, but also inevitably to be rejected on the ground of limitation. 2. On the judicial side, it is rather unfortunate that this law of the land as declared by the Supreme Court in terms of the judgment in the case of Laxuman (supra) was overlooked by this court in the other appeals by the State government against the very common judgment of the reference court, and it is not known as to whether it was accidental or incidental. This aspect of the matter appears to have not been brought to the notice of the court by Sri S.S.Kumman, learned AGA appearing for the State in the other two appeals. 3. This aspect of the matter appears to have not been brought to the notice of the court by Sri S.S.Kumman, learned AGA appearing for the State in the other two appeals. 3. If that were to be the only reason, perhaps, for maintaining consistency, uniformity, judicial norm and propriety, we would have dismissed this appeal also, but for the fact that the ground of appeal is that the reference itself was barred by limitation and an objection to this effect had in fact been raised on behalf of the S.L.A.O. before the reference court to the claim of the land owner for enhancement. 4. The other disturbing factor which has weighed with us to inevitably allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and award of the reference court is, that the reference court as well as this court suffered under a mistake at the time of passing the judgments, that the reference was made pursuant to the application filed by the land owner on 7.11.1997 and further that the reference was made by the S.L.A.O. in May 1998. If this were to be the fact borne out on record, there would not have been any difficulty, and then only result of this appeal would have been the dismissal. But unfortunately for the land owner, we have noticed from the records which we called for not only from the reference court but also from the office of the S.L.A.O. then at Lingasugur and not at Devadurga, that the fact of filing the application u/sec. 18(1) of the Act seeking reference to the Civil Court, on 7.11.1997 is highly doubtful, and the reference was not made in May 1998 as claimed. 5. Though the present S.L.A.O. who claims that he is holding additional charge of this post at Devadurga, was specifically directed to produce all original records for the relevant period, he has not been able to secure the most important and relevant register namely inward register at that office during November 1997, which would have shown as to whether or not the application u/Sec.18(1) of the Act seeking reference to Civil Court had been received at the office of the S.L.A.O. in November 1997 and the outward register for the month of May and June 1998 which would have shown that the reference was sent to Civil Court. 6. 6. In the light of the above, what is important for the present purpose is, when exactly the reference was received by the civil court in terms of the endorsement made by the judicial officer presiding over the court at that time for having received the reference application with other supporting documents. 7. From the endorsement found on the papers sent by the S.L.A.O., Lingasugur, it is clear that the reference was received by the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Raichur, only on 20.1.2003 and not at any point of time earlier. The entry at Sl.No.109, in the inward register maintained in the office of Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Raichur for the period from 1/1/2003 to 2/7/2003 would also indicate that the reference pertaining to this case was received by the Civil Court only on 20/1/2003. Unfortunately for the owner, a reference received on this date in respect of the award dated 8.7.1997, notice of which was received by him on 8.8.1997, is invariably and inevitably barred by limitation in terms of Section 18(3) of the Land Acquisition Act read with residuary Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, and as per the legal position in terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court. 8. It is for finding out as to whether there is any possibility of saving the award in favour of the land owner, a poor hapless farmer who had lost his land for some project of the State Government, that we embarked on the journey of looking into all available records/registers which were placed before us, not only by the S.L.A.O., but also secured from the court of Civil Judge (Senior Divn.), Raichur. Even after perusal of all the registers placed before us, we are left with no choice but to allow this appeal of the State Government, as we could not come across any supporting material to sustain the stand of the land owner that the reference had in fact been sought in the year 1997 and it had in fact been forwarded by the S.L.A.O. to the civil court in May 1998. 9. 9. We have found from the register showing disposal of applications made for reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act from March 1995 onwards that the entry at serial no.272 at page no.26 of this register shows 30.12.1998 as the date on which references were made to the court. But the claim of the land owner is that the reference was made in May 1998, and unfortunately for him, even this entry of 30th December 1998 is not supported by any corresponding entry in the outward register, for the relevant period nor a corresponding entry in the inward register of the court. Above all, the actual receipt of reference application as noted and recorded by the court of Civil Judge (Senior Divn.), Raichur, was only on 20.1.2003. In fact, before the reference Court, it was not the case of claimants that the reference was received in the Civil Court during May 1998. In the Judgment under appeal, the learned Judge of the reference Court has noticed that the reference was received by the Civil Court only on 20.01.2003. Nevertheless, by following a decision of this Court, the reference Court held that the reference is in time. However in the light of authoritative pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court in Laxuman’s case referred to supra, the reference received on 20.01.2003 was clearly barred by time. 10. All these developments are reflected in terms of our order dated 7.12.2009. Sri Ibrahim Maigur, incharge S.L.A.O. of Devadurga who is present before us today also, has only pleaded his helplessness in placing the inward register for November 1997 and outward register for the month of May and June 1998. However the outward register for the period from 30.06.1998 to 08.02.1999 and the outward register for the period from 03.04.2002 to 13.07.2004, does not indicate reference/ correspondence having gone out of the office of the S.L.A.O. to the civil court or to any other place with reference to such request of the land owner. 11. Sri Ibrahim Maigur, S.L.A.O. has stated that the official incharge of the records at the office of S.L.A.O., Devadurga, one V.B.Muttige, has given written information to him to the effect that whatever records available are handed over and the rest are not found in the record room. The contents of this letter are as under: 12. 11. Sri Ibrahim Maigur, S.L.A.O. has stated that the official incharge of the records at the office of S.L.A.O., Devadurga, one V.B.Muttige, has given written information to him to the effect that whatever records available are handed over and the rest are not found in the record room. The contents of this letter are as under: 12. We have already indicated that there is obviously some manipulation of Government records/registers and possibly even reference applications, etc. In this state of affairs, while we had directed the officer to take necessary steps to identify the erring officials at his office and to ensure further action, we are not very satisfied/convinced that necessary follow up action will be taken by him to unearth a good amount of irregularities and illegalities that might have occurred during the period, particularly as we have noticed from the register indicating that one S.L.A.O. who had taken charge, had made an endorsement to the effect that entries starting from serial no.151 to 280 made in respect of 18(1) reference applications are made on the basis of charge list and it is not known what exactly this means, but obviously other later insertions are made, as and when applications are received from the land owners, but wholesale entries made on one day. 13. These are matters which definitely require a detailed investigation by inquiry and commensurate action and therefore, we direct the Additional Registrar General of this Bench to retain all the records that have been placed before this court and forward the same to the Lokayukta and recommend commensurate action within the jurisdiction of the Lokayukta for not only bringing to book erring officials, but also to ensure that such malpractices are prevented henceforth. 14. We also notice that it is rather strange that Sri Ibrahim Maigur, S.L.A.O. whose first posing is in Jamkhandi, hails from Terdhal village, Jamkhandi Taluk of Bagalkot District. It is not desirable that an officer who is on probation is put to such tests by posting him to his native taluk and cause an embarrassing situation, leading to consequences not very pleasant and palatable to the officer. Therefore, it is desirable to post this officer far away from his home taluk. For this purpose we direct that a copy of this Judgment be sent to Secretary DPAR, Government of Karnataka for necessary action. 15. Therefore, it is desirable to post this officer far away from his home taluk. For this purpose we direct that a copy of this Judgment be sent to Secretary DPAR, Government of Karnataka for necessary action. 15. Sri Santhosh Biradar, learned counsel for the respondent/land owner has made a passionate plea to sustain the award and dismiss the appeal, by following the other two appeals and submitted that this land owner should not be subjected to hostile discrimination and singled out, while the other land owners who made like references/claims on the same day, i.e. on 20.1.2003 have all been able to sustain enhancement by the reference court and therefore, there is no justification for denial of this benefit only in respect of this particular land owner, which amounts to OTHER LANGUAGE discrimination. We are unable to accept this contention for the reason that the concept of discrimination does not operate in areas of committing illegalities and more so, of fraud, misrepresentation, etc. 16. Perhaps we could have accepted this submission if we were to function only as courts of equity and are not to be guided by statutory provisions. The High Court, while disposing an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, acts as an appellate body and is governed by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, so also the civil court while dealing with a reference application made under Section 18 of the Act. If the judgment of the reference court is vitiated by any illegality, it is the duty of this court to correct that judgment while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, more so when the illegality that has occurred in the passing of the judgment by the reference court is brought to our notice and our attention is drawn to the irregularities which have taken place not only on procedure but also by placing incorrect and non-existing facts before the reference court and obtaining judgment, which otherwise is barred by the law of limitation. 17. It is not for this court to act on sympathetic considerations when the law is clear and leaves us with no choice but to implement the rule of law. 17. It is not for this court to act on sympathetic considerations when the law is clear and leaves us with no choice but to implement the rule of law. However, we may observe that it is open to the State Government if payment has already been made in favour of land owners, to take a decision as to whether they should go for recovery of the amount from land owners as a result of enhancement granted by the civil court in terms of the impugned award which has been set aside in this appeal. A decision to this effect shall be taken only at the Secretary level, and not at the lower level. 18. To quote Prof. H.W.R.Wade, ‘A common case where an order, however void, becomes valid is where a statutory time limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned’ as in Smith v. East Elloe R.D.C.(1956) A.C. 736, and ‘The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result’ as in Administrative Law (5th Ed.) p.314, we find the present situation is the converse of such proposition as we are bound to reverse the judgment and award of the reference court because the law of limitation operates, and what strikes us is, that this court is a statutory appellate functionary under Section 54 of the Act and more so when the Supreme Court has, on the interpretation of this provision of law namely, Section 18 (3) of the Land Acquisition Act, has held that such references are barred by limitation, while legal position being the law declared by the Supreme Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, binds all courts in the country. 19. This legal position does not leave any scope for this court to indulge in any other exercise on the platform of equity and in the legal system governed by stature and the Constitution, ‘justice’ is only judgment in terms of law and there cannot be any concept of justice independent of law, as adhering and enforcing law in itself is rendering justice for the individual and the society alike. 20. Indian courts are not free to venture upon delivering or rendering judgments independent of the legal provision or at variance with the legal provision/statute in the name of either ‘justice’ or ‘equity’. 20. Indian courts are not free to venture upon delivering or rendering judgments independent of the legal provision or at variance with the legal provision/statute in the name of either ‘justice’ or ‘equity’. It is for this legal position, we are unable to accept the statement of Sri Santosh Biradar, learned counsel for the appellant. 21. Sri K.S. Bilagi, learned Additional, Registrar General, has orally reported to us the outcome of the efforts to secure the records which we have already noticed. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The common Judgment and the award in so far as it related to Lac No.15/2003 is hereby set aside. The reference is rejected as barred by time.