Judgment ( 1. ) THE present writ appeal has been preferred under section 2 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 against the order dated 21. 08. 2008 passed in W. P. No. 14955/2006 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petition filed by the writ petitioner. ( 2. ) THE facts leading to the present case are that the present appellant filed an election petition against the election of the respondent no. 1 on the post of Sarpanch. According to the allegations made in the election petition it was the ground that since the respondent no. 1 gave birth to 9th child on 27. 8. 01, therefore, she was not qualified to be elected as a Sarpanch in view of the provisions as contained under Section 36 (1) (m) of M. P. Panchayat Evam Gram swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 which provides that no person shall be eligible to be an officer bearer of the Panchayat who has more than two living children, one of whom is born on or after 26. 01. 01. ( 3. ) THE said election petition was dismissed by the competent authority. The order passed by the competent authority is placed on record as Annexure P/1 dated 15. 9. 06 passed by the Prescribed Authority. The prescribed authority, on the basis of the evidence which was adduced before it came to the conclusion that the 9th child to the respondent no. 1 was born on 05. 12. 2000. The Prescribed authority also came to the conclusion that the appellant has failed to prove that the last child to the respondent no. 1 was born on 27. 8. 01. The Prescribed authority has taken into account the relevant documents filed by the parties before him and after appreciation of evidence, the said authority came to the conclusion that on the basis of the certified filed by the respondent no. 1, she gave birth to the last child on 05. 12. 2000 and not on 27. 8. 01. ( 4. ) THE present appellant filed a petition before this Court challenging the order Annexure P/1 and submitted that the prescribed authority was not justified to record a finding that the respondent no. 1 gave birth to a child on 05. 12. 2000 and not on 27. 8. 01. 12. 2000 and not on 27. 8. 01. ( 4. ) THE present appellant filed a petition before this Court challenging the order Annexure P/1 and submitted that the prescribed authority was not justified to record a finding that the respondent no. 1 gave birth to a child on 05. 12. 2000 and not on 27. 8. 01. Since a finding of fact has been arrived at on the basis of appreciation of documentary and oral evidence which was adduced before the Election Officer, the petition was dismissed. The learned Single Judge also came to the conclusion that the ground as such cannot be raised to set aside the election merely because a false declaration was given by the respondent no. 1 ( 5. ) IN this reference it is to be seen that the Division bench of this Court in W. P. No. 5069/02 (Ojhilal Gond Vs. State of M. P. and Others) and other connected matters which were decided on 06. 11. 2003 came to the conclusion in paragraph 21 of the judgment as under:- "the centripodal issued that falls for consideration is that though the aforesaid provision meets all other requirements, it creates a situation which borders on the principle of impossibility. One may call it a situation beyond ones control. It is a matter of accepted jurisprudence that law does not require any person to do an impossible act. In that event doctrine of attaining the impossibility comes into play. Because of this situation whether the said provision should be regarded as arbitrary creating a different and unworkable situation? We have no hesitation in saying that the drafting of provision is faulty and the status is the master but when the provision as it stands, becomes totally unworkable paving the path of meaningless the court has a duty to perform. It is worth noting here that the purpose of legislation is clear that it wanted to spell out a disqualification in respect of a person who has begotten more than two children after the cut off date. The purpose is to provide a cut off date. A cut off date as is understood can not be picked up from the hat. It must have some rationale. In the present provision there is a gap of eight months exposing a legal flaw and lacunae. The purpose is to provide a cut off date. A cut off date as is understood can not be picked up from the hat. It must have some rationale. In the present provision there is a gap of eight months exposing a legal flaw and lacunae. It cannot be said that man would anticipate a legislation and would abandon the concept of procreation. The gap, if allowed to stand, would become utterly illogical and absurd. Simultaneously, the statute has to be allowed to be workable keeping in view the intendment of the Legislature. In the case at hand we are disposed to think that the provision should be allowed to stand to create a logical, proper and workable situation. We are conscious that the Courts do not entrench upon the field of Legislature but if a lacunae can be eradicated by extending the date to make the provision workable and valid, the same would not border on the area of legislation. Taking into consideration the totality of circumstances we are inclined to think the provision should be regarded as constitutional treating the cut off date as 30 April, 2001. We feel this is the only way by which this provision can be saved. Accordingly, we so do. At this juncture, we may hasten to add that if the date as mentioned in the provision is allowed to be given effect to it would usher in an absurd situation and to avoid the same we have taken the gestation period into consideration and also added some grace period to it. On that foundation, the date has been fixed. " ( 6. ) ACCORDING to the judgment, the cut off date was extended till April 2001 and on this basis a finding was recorded that since the respondent no. 1 gave birth to a child prior to the cut off date, i. e. April 2001, therefore, she was disqualified. ( 7. ) A finding of fact on appreciation of evidence has been arrived at by the Prescribed authority wherein he has held that the respondent no. 1 gave birth to her last child on 05. 12. 2000 which was the date prior to the cut off date i. e. April 2001 and the documents submitted by the present appellant in the election petition were not relied upon. 1 gave birth to her last child on 05. 12. 2000 which was the date prior to the cut off date i. e. April 2001 and the documents submitted by the present appellant in the election petition were not relied upon. The documents on which the reliance was placed by the present appellant were not proved but only an affidavit was filed. The prescribed authority has given reasons not to accept the documents and the plea which was raised by the present appellant. ( 8. ) UNDER the circumstances, this Court exercising the intra-appellate jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate the evidence against the original order passed by the prescribed authority. It is also not argued as to how the findings arrived at by the Prescribed authority are perverse in any way. ( 9. ) IN view of the aforesaid, we do not find any substance in the present appeal and the appeal sands dismissed without any order as to costs.