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2009 DIGILAW 98 (ORI)

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX v. MISS LOPAMUDRA MISRA

2009-02-03

B.S.CHAUHAN, I.MAHANTY

body2009
JUDGMENT : B.S. Chauhan, C.J. - In W.P. (C) No. 3226 of 2008 the Commissioner of Income Tax has sought to challenge the order dated 20.7.2007 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cuttack (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal") in Misc. Application No. 49-CTK/2004 by which the learned Tribunal was pleased to recall its earlier order dated 5.8.2004 and further directed re-hearing of the matter afresh. 2. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Standing Counsel for the Income Tax Department submitted that the Tribunal finally disposed of ITA No. 341/CTK/2003 by an order dated 5.8.2004 and the Assessee (opposite party herein) purportedly filed an application for rectification u/s 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") alleging that certain errors had crept in the original order passed by the Tribunal. This application came to be allowed by the Tribunal by the impugned order dated 20.7.2007 in Misc. Application No. 49-CTK/2004. Mr. Mohapatra, learned Standing Counsel for the Revenue strenuously submitted that the impugned order under Annexure - 2 dated 20.7.2007 was passed without any authority of law in as much as the impugned order would indicate that the Tribunal has effectively sought to review its earlier order dated 5.8.2004 while such power of review is not vested in the Tribunal. The learned Counsel submitted that if any party was aggrieved by the final judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 5.8.2004 Annex - 1, it was open to the said party to file a statutory appeal. The learned Counsel further submitted that the opposite party, in fact, has filed such a statutory appeal before this Court which is registered as ITA No. 219/2004. 3. The opposite party has appeared (being represented by her father Mr. Basant Kumar Misra) and submitted that the Tribunal had originally failed to take into account the fact that Section 115-BB of the Income Tax Act only came into force with effect from 1.4.2002 and while passing the original order in appeal dated 5.8.2004 this fact was omitted from its consideration. Therefore, he submitted that after this fact was brought to the notice of the Tribunal, the Tribunal in exercise of power u/s 254(2) of the Act corrected its own error and recalled its earlier judgment dated 5.8.2004 and directed re-hearing of the matter; and the Income Tax Department should have no objection to the said order. 4. Therefore, he submitted that after this fact was brought to the notice of the Tribunal, the Tribunal in exercise of power u/s 254(2) of the Act corrected its own error and recalled its earlier judgment dated 5.8.2004 and directed re-hearing of the matter; and the Income Tax Department should have no objection to the said order. 4. We have considered the rival contentions of the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 5. In Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai etc. Vs. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Another the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that in absence of any power of review, the Tribunal could not have subsequently reconsidered its previous decision and the subsequent order re-opening the matter was illegal, ultra-vires and without jurisdiction. 6. In Harbhajan Singh Vs. Karam Singh and Others the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in absence of any provision in the Act granting express power of review, it is manifest that review could not be made and the order in review was ultra-vires, illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court has rightly quashed it by the grant of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. While deciding the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on a large number of judgments, particularly in Drew v. Mills 1891 (1)QB 450; Hession v. Johns 1914 (2) KB 421 in Re: St. Nazaire Company (1879) 12 Ch. D. 88; and Baijnath Ram Goyanka v. Nand Kumar Singh 14 Ind App 54 (PC), wherein it had categorically been held that the power of setting-aside an order, which has been made after hearing the arguments, does not lie unless it is given by the Statute. The Court, under the Statute, cannot review an order deliberately made after argument and entertain a fresh argument upon it with a view to ultimately confirming or reversing it. The Courts may have limited power only to make a necessary correction if the order, as drawn up, did not express the intention of the Court. A party is entitled to assail the judgment only by the mode as indicated in the Statute and in absence of express provision of review, it cannot be entertained for the reason that review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. 8. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. A party is entitled to assail the judgment only by the mode as indicated in the Statute and in absence of express provision of review, it cannot be entertained for the reason that review is practically the hearing of an appeal by the same Officer who decided the case. 8. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication and in absence of any provision in the Act, review of an earlier order is impermissible. 9. In Major Chandra Bhan Singh Vs. Latafat Ullah Khan and Others the Apex Court followed the earlier referred two judgments in Chunnibhai and Harbhan Singh (supra) and observed that it is well settled that review is a creature of Statute and cannot be entertained in absence of a provision therefor. 10. In Dr (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and Others the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: It is now established that a quasi-judicial authority cannot review its own order, unless the power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute under which it derives its jurisdiction In the circumstances, it must be held that Vice Chancellor acted wholly without jurisdiction The said order of the Vice-Chancellor dated March 7,1987 was a nullity. 11. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa and Others Vs. Commissioner of Land Records and Statement, Cuttack and Others, . 12. In Krishna Ashram Educational Trust and anothers Vs. District Judge, Allahabad and others after placing reliance upon a large number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court held that in absence of a provision for review, the Authority becomes functus officio after deciding the case and it has no competence to entertain review application and change the order passed by it earlier. Nor the order/ Award be reviewed under the garb of clarification/rectification/correction. 13. Therefore in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition it can be summarised that in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible. 14. Nor the order/ Award be reviewed under the garb of clarification/rectification/correction. 13. Therefore in view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition it can be summarised that in absence of any statutory provision providing for review, entertaining an application for review or under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not permissible. 14. In so far as the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the order impugned Annex - 2 are concerned, the impugned order arose by an application of the provisions of Section 254(2). Section 254 (1) and (2) are set out below: 254. (1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. (2) The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within four years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under Sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to the notice of the Assessee or the Assessing Officer: Provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the Assessee, shall not be made under this Sub-section unless the Appellate Tribunal has given notice to the Assessee of its intention to do so and has allowed the Assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard " (Emphasis added) 15. In fact the provision enables/empowers the appellate Tribunal to rectify a mistake and make an amendment accordingly. This rectification of mistake means a clerical or arithmetical mistake and certainly not and substituting the same by making amendment in the original order. But such a power are not tantamount to power of review of judgment. These powers are analogous to the provision of Section 151 of the CPC and not analogous to the powers under Order 47, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. 16. In exercise of that power correction is permissible only when it is necessary to give effect to the judgment, degree or order so that the manifest rights of the parties intended to be effectuated by the earlier decision of the Court may not be defeated. When degree is not clear as to what was decided and what the Court intended, the Court may amend it so as to carry out its meaning. When degree is not clear as to what was decided and what the Court intended, the Court may amend it so as to carry out its meaning. (vide AIR 1931 104 (Privy Council) and Seth Manakchand v. Chaube Manoharlal and Anr. AIR 1994 PC 46). This provision cannot be resorted to in order to annul the degree or where there is no clerical or arithmetical mistake or error arising from accidental slip or omission or the power can be used to re-determination the rights of parties already adjudicated upon. In Dwaraka Das Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that powers cannot be used to grant something which had not been granted earlier as it would not amount to accidental omission or mistake. In L. Janakirama Iyer and Others Vs. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and Others, the Apex Court held that as in the degree the mesne profit had been typed as a net profit and it was merely a typographical error in exercise of power u/s 152 CPC the word "net" must be substituted by "mesne". The powers of the Court are limited only to correct this kind of typographical mistakes. In K. Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N. Swamy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if while deciding a case interest pendente lite had not been granted it cannot be granted while allowing the application u/s 152 CPC In M/s Plasto Pack Mumbai v. Ratnakar Bank Limited 2001 AIR SCW 3426 a similar view has been reiterated observing that power to amend a degree cannot be exercised so as to add to or subtract therefrom any relief granted earlier. 17. In Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph Coelho, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in State of Bihar and Another Vs. Nilmani Sahu and Another, and Bai Shakriben (dead) by Natwar Melsingh and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, and held that the inherent powers as exemplified in S. 152 CPC generally be available to all Courts and authorities irrespective of the fact whether the provisions contained u/s 152 CPC may or may not strictly apply to any particular proceeding. 18. But the power to rectification of clerical and arithmetical errors or accidental slips does not empower the Court to have a second thought over the matter and to find a better order or degree could or should be passed. 18. But the power to rectification of clerical and arithmetical errors or accidental slips does not empower the Court to have a second thought over the matter and to find a better order or degree could or should be passed. There cannot be reconsideration of merits of the matter to come to a conclusion that it would have been better and in the fitness of things to have passed an order as sought to be passed on rectification. On a second thought the Court may find that it may have committed a mistake in passing an order in certain terms but every such mistake cannot be rectified in exercise of the Court's inherent powers as contained u/s 152 CPC It is to be confined to something initially intended to left out or added against such intendment. 19. Similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan Vs. Hari Prasad Bhuyan and Others, and it has been held that such powers can be used limited to the extent that a clerical or arithmetical mistake occurred in the judgment, degree or order or error arising therein from any accidental slip or omission can be corrected subsequently by the Court either on its own motion or on the application of any of the parties. While deciding the said case, the Court placed reliance upon the judgment In re Swire; Mellor v. Swire (1885) 30 Ch. D 239 wherein it had been held that the said provisions enabled the Court to vary its judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and intention, when the order was passed. 20. Similar view has been reiterated in Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union Vs. Management of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Another, 21. In The Income Tax Officer, Alwaye Vs. The Asok Textiles Ltd., Alwaye, ; the Apex Court considered the issue involved herein and held that the provisions of rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record cannot be equated with the power of a Civil Court to review its own order as provided under Order 47, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. After analysing the provisions, Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the two provisions do not mean the same thing. The said judgment has been approved in Commnr. Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Bharat Bone Mill, . 22. After analysing the provisions, Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the two provisions do not mean the same thing. The said judgment has been approved in Commnr. Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Bharat Bone Mill, . 22. Section 152, CPC deals with correction of typographical and arithmetical mistakes in a judgment and decree. But under the garb of this exercise of power court cannot change the order itself. (Vide AIR 1931 104 (Privy Council); AIR 1944 46 (Privy Council); L. Janakirama Iyer and Others Vs. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer and Others, ; Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, ; Satnam Verma Vs. Union of India (UOI), ; State of Bihar and Another Vs. Nilmani Sahu and Another, ; Bai Shakriben (dead) by Natwar Melsingh and Others Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, ; Dwaraka Das Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, ; K. Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N. Swamy, ; Jayalakshmi Coelho Vs. Oswald Joseph Coelho, ; M/s Plasto Pack Mumbai v. Ratnakar Bank Limited (2001) 6 SCC 689; Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan Vs. Hari Prasad Bhuyan and Others, ; and State of Punjab Vs. Darshan Singh, ). 23. On consideration of the facts indicated above and the case laws as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which have been indicated hereinabove, we are also of the considered view that the Tribunal erred in exercising its jurisdiction u/s 254(2) of the Act and further allowing the application for recalling its earlier order. Therefore, we have no hesitation for quashing the order of the Tribunal dated 20.7.2007 under Annexure - 2 and hold that the power to rectify an error vested in the Tribunal u/s 254(2) cannot be a garb to review its own order, in the absence of specific statutory authority to do so. 24. The Assessee has filed the connected writ petition, i.e., W. P. (C) No. 8194 of 2008. In the said petition prayer has been made to direct the Tribunal to take up the matter afresh pursuant to the order dated 20.7.2007. In W. P. (C) No. 3226 of 2008 filed by the Department of Revenue the said order has been quashed. Consequently the writ petition filed by the Assessee requires no further consideration and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, W. P. (C) No. 3226 of 2008 is allowed and W. P. (C) No. 8194 of 2008 is dismissed. 25. In W. P. (C) No. 3226 of 2008 filed by the Department of Revenue the said order has been quashed. Consequently the writ petition filed by the Assessee requires no further consideration and the same deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, W. P. (C) No. 3226 of 2008 is allowed and W. P. (C) No. 8194 of 2008 is dismissed. 25. Before parting, it becomes necessary to direct that I.T.A. No. 219 of 2004 filed by the Assessee may be listed on 10.2.2009 before this Bench. I. Mahanty, J. 26. I agree.