JUDGMENT : 1. The appellant stands convicted under sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years and 2 years respectively with a direction that both the sentences shall run concurrently. The corresponding judgment delivered on 7-10-1994 by Fifth Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in S.T. No. 359/91 is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal. 2. The prosecution case, in short, may be narrated thus - (i) Tarabai (since deceased) was the daughter of Puranlal (PW2), niece of Maddo Bai (PW3) and sister of Yogendra Kumar (PW1). Her marriage was solemnized with the appellant, employed as a casual labour in the P&T department, nearly 5 years prior to the incident in question. (ii) Only after one-and-half year of the marriage, the appellant started subjecting Tarabai to cruelty due to non-satisfaction of demand for a cash amount of Rs.10,000/- and a plot of land in dowry and, ultimately, she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home. (iii) On 23-4-1991 i.e. only a day before untimely death of Tarabai, her minor sisters-in-law viz. Sangeeta and Manisha (since prosecuted in the Juvenile Court) came to her father's house, situated in Badi Ukhdi (Laxmipur), Jabalpur where she had been residing for a considerable period of 6 months. It was in the wake of the statement made by Sangeeta and Manisha that their mother namely co-accused Tulsabai (since discharged for the reasons assigned in the order-dated 6-12-1991) had called her, Tarabai was sent back to the matrimonial home located in a house bearing No. 119, Ramnagar, Garha Phatak, Jabalpur. (iv) On the following morning, Tulsabai informed the police that at about 5:30, she had found Tarabai dead in a severely burnt condition in a place situated adjacent to kitchen of her house. Accordingly, a marg was registered at P.S. Lordganj. (v) After inquest proceedings, dead body of Tarabai was sent to Medical College Hospital at Jabalpur. The Autopsy Surgeon Dr. D. K. Sakalle (PW8) opined that the cause of Tarabai's death was shock due to ante-mortem burns. (vi) City S.P. namely Satpal Singh (PW10) inspected the spot and seized a torn petticoat, a burnt matchbox containing 3 or 4 burnt matchsticks, a plastic can wherefrom smell of kerosene was coming out, residues of burnt hair; clothes and electric wire and appliances. Photographs of the circumstances attending the occurrence were also taken. (vi) City S.P. namely Satpal Singh (PW10) inspected the spot and seized a torn petticoat, a burnt matchbox containing 3 or 4 burnt matchsticks, a plastic can wherefrom smell of kerosene was coming out, residues of burnt hair; clothes and electric wire and appliances. Photographs of the circumstances attending the occurrence were also taken. (vii) In the light of the findings of marg inquiry, SHO G.P. Shrivastava (PW11) registered a case under sections 498A and 304B of the IPC by scribing the report (Ex.P-18). During investigation, a letter (Ex.P-12) containing allegation against the appellant as to dowry harassment and said to have been written by Tarabai to the President of the Caste Panchayat was also seized from the possession of her father Puranlal. 3. On being charged with the offences punishable under sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant abjured the guilt and pleaded false implication at the instance of his in-laws who, according to him, were annoyed with him due to sudden death of Tarabai. 4. The prosecution sought to prove the charges by examining as many as 11 witnesses including Puranlal, his son Yogendra Kumar and sister Maddo Bai. The defence also produced Gangaram (DW1), Saraswati Patel (DW2) and Moorat Bai (DW3), respectively the then Headman of the Caste, Mausi (aunt) of the appellant and an inhabitant of the locality wherein the place of occurrence was situated. 5. Upon a critical appraisal of the entire evidence, learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that guilt of the appellant for the offences charged with was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. He, accordingly, convicted the appellant and sentenced him as indicated hereinabove. 6. Legality and propriety of the convictions in question have been assailed on the following grounds - (i) The letter (Ex.P-12), said to have been written by Tarabai nearly 2 years prior to her death, was not admissible under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Moreover, its custody did not have a genuine origin. (ii) There was no evidence on record to suggest that soon before her death, Tarabai was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand for dowry. Further, even assuming that the appellant had made demand for Rs.10,000/- and a plot of land, the same would not come within the meaning of dowry. (ii) There was no evidence on record to suggest that soon before her death, Tarabai was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with demand for dowry. Further, even assuming that the appellant had made demand for Rs.10,000/- and a plot of land, the same would not come within the meaning of dowry. (iii) Contents of the letter also do not indicate cruelty within the meaning of section 498 A of the Indian Penal Code. In response, learned Panel Lawyer, while making reference to the incriminating pieces of evidence, has submitted that the convictions were fully justified. 7. In order to appreciate the merits of the rival contentions in the right perspective, it is necessary to first advert to medical and other evidence as to the probable cause as well as nature of Tarabai's death. 8. Autopsy Surgeon Dr. D.K. Sakalle (PW8) described the burn injuries found on the body of Tarabai in the following manner - "III degree flame burns found on face, all over neck, frontal region, ears, all over trunk except left iliac fossa where grade IV burns are present, all over thighs and legs and dorsum of left foot, over genitals and perineum, all over right upper limb, on left upper limb burns up to grade IV present except fossa and back of forearm where burns up to grade V present; on right iliac crest region, blisters containing fluid and infected burns present, line of reddish in the brunt area over legs." Correctness of his opinion that cause of Tarabai's death was shock due to these ante mortem burns was also not questioned by the defence. This apart, no dispute was raised as to the genuineness of the photographs (Ex.P-3 to P-10) reflecting that dead body of Tarabai was found in a pugilistic attitude and in a fencing posture. This deformity was in consonance with the observation made by the Autopsy Surgeon that he had noticed fourth degree burns on both the upper limbs and fifth degree burns on the back of forearm. 9. Coming to the other evidence, it may be seen that Tarabai's father Puranlal (PW2) had given vivid description as to how she was subjected to dowry torture and harassment at the hands of the appellant due to non-fulfilment of a demand for Rs. 10,000/- and a plot of land. 9. Coming to the other evidence, it may be seen that Tarabai's father Puranlal (PW2) had given vivid description as to how she was subjected to dowry torture and harassment at the hands of the appellant due to non-fulfilment of a demand for Rs. 10,000/- and a plot of land. According to him, - only 6 months after the marriage, the appellant had demanded an amount of Rs.500/- informing that he had been implicated in a case of acid throwing and one-and-half year thereafter, again demanded an amount of Rs. 500/- for getting his transfer to Calcutta stayed. He categorically deposed that Tarabai could lead a happy married life for a very short duration of about 18 months as the appellant had started ill-treating her for compelling her to get the dowry demand fulfilled only thereafter. Yogendra Kumar (PW1) and Maddo Bai (PW3), respectively the son and sister of Puranlal, duly corroborated his evidence as to the dowry harassment meted out to Tarabai in her matrimonial home and, as rightly pointed by learned trial Judge, the defence was not able to elicit any material contradiction in their cross-examination. 10. It is also relevant to note that in the cross-examination of Yogendra Kumar (PW1), it was suggested that on being compelled to return to her matrimonial home, Tarabai had committed suicide by self-immolation but this defence was not reiterated by the appellant in his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Although, Gangaram (DW1), examined as the Headman of the Caste, came forward to support the plea that Tarabai was in a habit of leaving matrimonial home by stating that upon a complaint made to the appellant in this regard, he had an occasion to advise Tarabai yet, he was not able to give the relevant details. He candidly acknowledged his interestedness in the matter saying that he was related to the appellant as grandfather. 11. The evidence of Murat Bai (DW3), a neighbour of the appellant, to the effect that marital relationship between him and Tarabai were cordial did not assume any significance as it was not expected that the harassment should be made within the hue or hearing of inhabitants of the neighbourhood. 12. 11. The evidence of Murat Bai (DW3), a neighbour of the appellant, to the effect that marital relationship between him and Tarabai were cordial did not assume any significance as it was not expected that the harassment should be made within the hue or hearing of inhabitants of the neighbourhood. 12. The fact of the matter is that, admittedly, after residing for a considerable period of 6 months, Tarabai had returned to her matrimonial home only a few hours before her death under suspicious circumstances within 7 years of marriage. Thus, irrespective of whether it was a case of homicide or suicide, the penal provision of section 304B of the Indian Penal Code was attracted. 13. Both Puranlal (PW2) and his son Yogendra Kumar (PW1) were emphatic in deposing that about 3 years after the marriage, Tarabai had handed over a letter (Ex.P-12) addressed to President of the Caste Panchayat reflecting instances of cruelty attributable to the appellant due to non-satisfaction of demand for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and a plot of land. Yogendra Kumar further asserted that the letter was written by Tarabai only whereas Saraswati (DW2), Mausi of the appellant, was called in defence to establish that Tarabai was not the author of the letter. However, no standard handwriting of Tarabai was brought on record. 14. Learned Senior Counsel, while placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 , has strenuously contended that even if it is assumed that the letter (Ex.P-12) was written by Tarabai nearly 2 years prior to her death, the same would not be admissible under section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. For this, extensive reference has been made to the following concurrent yet explanatory observations made by Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) - Though the test of proximity cannot and should not be too literally construed and be reduced practically to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application, it must be emphasised that whenever it is extended beyond the immediate, it should be the exception and must be done with very great caution and care. As a general proposition, it cannot be laid down for all purposes that for instance where a death takes place within a short time of marriage and the distance of time is not spread over three or four months, the statement would be admissible under section 32 of the Evidence Act. This is always not so and cannot be so. In very exceptional circumstances such statements may be admissible and that too not for proving fact but as an indication of a negative fact, namely raising some doubt about the guilt of the accused. 15. However, as explained by a three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 , distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant in a case where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story. Further, as pointed out already, the circumstances of the transaction leading to an unnatural death of Tarabai were duly established from a cogent, consistent and creditworthy oral testimony of Puranlal, Yogendra Kumar and Maddo Bai. Thus, even if, for arguments' sake, the letter (Ex.P-12) is excluded from consideration, the other evidence on record would be sufficient to bring home, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accusation that Tarabai was subjected to cruelty and harassment due to non-satisfaction of the demand made by the appellant. 16. The ratio in Biswajit Halder vs. State of W.B., (2008) 1 SCC 202 is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case as, in that case, there was practically no evidence to show cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the dowry death. 17. Learned Senior Counsel still contended that even assuming that the appellant had demanded a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as well as a plot of land, the same would not come within the meaning of 'dowry'. To buttress the contention, reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Appasaheb vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 763 . But, in that case, it was demand for money on account of financial stringency or for meeting urgent domestic expenses for purchasing manure that was not considered as a demand for dowry. To buttress the contention, reference has been made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Appasaheb vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 763 . But, in that case, it was demand for money on account of financial stringency or for meeting urgent domestic expenses for purchasing manure that was not considered as a demand for dowry. Further, the presumption under section 113-B, which is relatable to dowry death places heavier onus on the defence than the one placed under section 113-A of the Evidence Act but the accused/appellant did not lead any evidence to prove that the demand was made to meet any urgent domestic expenses. In this view of the matter, the verdict in Appasaheb's case is of no avail to him. 18. The next contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the legal fiction contemplated in section 113B of the Evidence Act was not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case in absence of the evidence that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant for or in connection with any demand of dowry soon before her death. To substantiate the contention, the following decisions have been cited at the bar - (i) Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2006 SC 680 . (ii) Mungeshwar Prasad Chaurasia vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 10 SCC 163. (iii) Sunil Bajaj vs. State of M.P., (2001) 9 SCC 417 . (iv) Sham Lal vs. State of Haryana, (1997) 9 SCC 759 . 19. However, it is well settled that the expression 'soon before her death' used in the substantive section 304B, Indian Penal Code and section 113B of the Evidence Act is to be understood in relative and flexible sense. These words cannot be construed as laying down rigid period of time to be mechanically applied in each case. In this regard, the following illuminating observations made by the Supreme Court in Hira Lal vs. State (Govt. of NCT), Delhi. (2003) 8 SCC 80 and reiterated in Kaliyaperumal vs. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828 may usefully be quoted - No presumption under section 113-B of the Evidence Act would be drawn against the accused if it is shown that after the alleged demand, cruelty or harassment the dispute stood resolved and there was no evidence of cruelty or harassment thereafter. Mere lapse of some time by itself would not provide to an accused a defence, if the course of conduct relating to cruelty or harassment in connection with the dowry demand is shown to have existed earlier in time not too late and not too stale before the date of death of the victim. This is so because the expression used in the relevant provision is "soon before". The expression is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit. The expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. It cannot be said that the term "soon before" is synonymous with the term "immediately before". This is because of what is stated in section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link. 20. As concluded already, there was a persistent demand for dowry by the appellant who had subjected his wife Tarabai to cruelty and harassment to such an extent that she had to reside with her parents for a continuous period of 6 months ending on the day before her death. Besides this, the harassment for non-fulfilment of demand for money and plot squarely fell into the definition of cruelty, as explained by the Apex Court in Giridhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 5 SCC 177 - "in the statutory provision under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word "cruelty", where Explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz. (1) to drive a woman to commit suicide or (2) to cause grave injury or (3) to cause danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical; in Explanation (b) there is an absence of physical injury that includes coercive harassment which obviously is equally heinous to match the physical injury, where one is patent, the other one is latent, but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrace the attributes of cruelty in terms of section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code". 21. Accordingly, dowry harassment and the consequent desertion fell well within the Explanation (b) to the penal provision. In the light of these facts and circumstances of the case and the well-established position of law on the point, none of the contentions as raised against legality of the convictions deserve acceptance. 22. Although, a considerable period of 17 years has already elapsed after the incident in question yet, taking into consideration the social impact of the crime and the relevant circumstances of the case including that delay in trial as well as disposal of appeal is contributorily attributable to frequent violations of conditions of bail by the appellant, no interference is called for with the sentence under section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. However, imposition of a separate sentence for the offence under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code would be unnecessary (See. Shanti vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 ). 23. Thus, for academic purpose, the appeal is allowed in part. In the result - (i) The conviction of the appellant under section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and the consequent sentence are hereby affirmed. (ii) His conviction under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is also maintained but the corresponding custodial sentence is hereby set aside. 24. Appellant is on bail. He is directed to surrender to his bail bonds before the trial Court on or before 15-10-2009 for being committed to the custody for undergoing remaining part of the sentence.